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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines 'the genealogy of Muslim intelligentsia (and power) in twentieth 
century Indonesia'. The main concern of the thesis is with the genealogy of the 
collective entity of Muslim 'intelligentsia'. Even so, attention will also be given to the 
role of individual 'intellectuals' as fom!Ulators and articulators of the Muslim 
intelligentsia's collective identities and ideologies. 
Although the Indonesian intelligentsia has been the ruling stratum of Indonesian 
society, there has been no single systematic study under the rubric of Indonesian 
(Muslim) 'intelligentsia'. The very few available studies related to this issue have used 
the tenn Indonesian (Muslim) 'intellectuals' but have examined the ideas of individual 
intellectuals rather than provide an analysis of the structural position and collective 
representation of the Indonesian people of ideas. 
Til a·· .::rtain degree, Indonesian intelligentsia has been studied under the rubric 
of the Indonesian 'elite'. The mainstream analysts of the Indonesian elite tended to 
restrict the notion of power struggle to the purely political and bureaucratic fielcls, while 
power struggle in the realm of knowledge and meaning was not taken into serious 
consideration. Based on the assumption that Indonesian Muslims had frequently fniled 
to win elections and control parliament, many analysts came to the conclusion that 
Muslim politics had been defeated. Moreover, most of these studies focused too much 
attention on individual time, without considering the time of the 'longue clurec ·. In 
considering intellectual perfonnance and politics as an end product rather than as a 
process, as a synchmnic state rather than as a diachronic development, these studies 
underestimated the regenerative capacity of Muslim intelligentsia. Such a conclusion is 
problematic in the context of the current preponderance of Muslim intelligentsia in the 
political and bureaucratic elite. 
This thesis is a dynamic, interactive and intertextual approach to the study of 
Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia and its relations to power. The dynamic approach of 
this thesis attempts to situate synchronic states within a diachronic context. This 
approach reveals that throughout the 201h century there have been diachronic Muslim 
intellectual networks across generations that made possible the continuity of Muslim 
intellectual political traditions. At the same time, there have been continuous synchronic 
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changes in the formulation of Muslim intelligentsia's identities and ideologies across 
generations. 
The interactive approach of this study allcmpts to sec the development of 
Muslim intelligentsia and power as the result of a dynamic interplay between past and 
present, between and within various intellectual-political traditions, and between 
various arenas of power relations. This approach reveals that ideological formulation 
and power strategies of a particular generation of Muslim intelligentsia cannot be 
isolated from the influence of the previous generation, the presence of significant others 
and the interplay ofva!ious arenas of power relations. 
The intcrtcxtual approach of this study allcmpts to mobilise interdisciplinary 
studies and to sec the interconnectedness of texts and discourse. This approach reveals 
the interdependence of inter-gencraticnal texts of Muslim intelligentsia and the 
relationality of diverse texts as well as of discursive and non-discursive formations. 
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Islamic teacher (oflhc traditionalist type). 
Ko111psi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (Corruption, 
Collusion, and Nepotism) 
Koninklijk Netherlands Indisch Leger (Royal 
Netherlands Indies Anny) 
Komitc Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central 
Indonesian National Commillcc) 
Teachers' Training School 
Lcmbaga Dakwah Kampus (The Campus Mosque 
Dakwah Body); sec dakwah 
Lembaga Kebajika11 Islam Sama11l111di (The 
Samanhudi Institute for I~lamic Benevolent 
SerVice) 
Lemlmga DaJ.wah Mahasiswa Islam (The DaJ.~mh 
Institute of Islamic Students); the HMI's dakwah 
body; sec daJ.wah 
Latihmr Mujahid DaJ.wah (Training of the 
Dakwah Cadre); sec daJ.~vah 
Lm11lraga Pe11elitimr, Pcm/idika11 dan Penera11gan 
Eko11omi dan Sosial ('the Social and Economic 
Research, Education, and lnfornmtion Institute) 
Lembaga Swaclaya Masyarakat (Self-Reliant 
Community Institution); the Indonesian version of 
NGO.SccNGO 
Lcmbaga Swrli Pembrmgrmmr (Institute of 
Development Studies) 
Mahkamah Agu11g (the Supreme Court) 
Lit. School. Modernised Islamic school offering 
both religious and general subjects 
Ma11ijcsto Po/itik. Political Manifesto, the 
ideology for Guided Democracy, introduced by 
Sukarno on I 7 August 1959; it called for the 
revival of the spirit oflhe \945 Revolution 
Macljelis Sjuro Muslimi11 I11clo/lcsia (Consultative 
Council oflndoncsian Muslims) 
Madjlisul lslam A 'laa brclo11csia (Supreme Islam 
Council oflndoncsia 
Majelis Mahasiswa brdmresia (Indonesian 
University Student Assembly) 
Mar/jelis Pcrsrrmsjawara/all Rakjat (People's 
Consultative Assembly) 
Majelis Pemmsyawarata11 bulo11csia Seme11tara 
(The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) 
Majelis Ulama ltrclollcsia (Council of Indonesian 
Islamic Scholars) 
MULO 
Muhammadiyah 
Nasakom 
NIAS 
NEI 
NGO 
NKK 
NICA 
NU 
Orde Baru (Or1·7' 
Orde Lania (0' ;, • 
OS VIA 
Pagujuban l'asundan 
PAN 
Paneasila 
Parkindo 
·Parnmsi 
Part indo 
PBB 
PDI 
PDI-P 
Peranakan 
Pembangunan 
Penghulu 
xiv 
Meer Uitge!Jreid Lager 
Extended Elementary 
Secondary School 
Rcfonnist-modemist 
educational association 
Ondenvijs (lit. More 
Education). Lower 
Islamic social and 
Nasimzalisme, Agama, Komrmis (Nationalism, 
Religion, and Communism); A united front of 
proponents of Guided Democracy 
Nederlaruisclr-Indisclrc Artsensclrool (Netherlands 
Indian Doctors' School) 
Netherlands East Indies 
Non-Government Organization 
Norma/isasi Kclridupmr Kampus (Nonnalisation of 
Campus Life) 
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
Nalrcliatui Ulama (Lit. Renaissance of the 
Religious Scholars). A traditionali~t Islamic 
association 
Lit. New Order. The period of Suharto's 
government ( 1966-98) 
Lit. Old Order. The period of Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy 
Opleidingssclrool mor Inlandsclre Ambtenaren 
(Training School for Native Administration) 
Sundancse Association 
Parlai Ammwt Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
Lit. Five Pillars. The national philosophy of the 
Republic of Indonesia, consisting of five 
principles: belief in the One God; a just and 
civilised humanity; a united Indonesia; popular 
rule through policies fonned after representative 
consensus; and social justice for the whole 
Indonesian population 
Partai Kristen Jrulonesia (Indonesian 
Christian/Protestant Party) 
Partai Mus/imilr Indonesia (Indonesian r.tuslim 
Party) 
Partai Indonesia {Indonesian Party). A nationalist 
political party, founded in 1931 and re•established 
in 1959 
Partai Bulan Bintmrg (Crescent and Star Party) 
Partai DemoATasi Indonesia (Indonesian 
Democratic Party) 
Partai Vemokrasi Imlonesia-Perjuangmr 
(Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) 
A locally born person of foreign extraction; 
lndonesia.;-born foreigner 
Development 
In Minangkabau the head of family or adat chief. 
In Java a person in charge of a major mosque. 
Perhimi 
Persami 
Perti 
Pesantrcn 
Pesantren Luhur 
Pet a 
PI 
I'll 
I>K 
I>KB 
PKI 
PMII 
PMKRI 
PNI 
PPKI 
PPM I 
ppp 
PPPKJ 
P3M 
Prijaji!Priyayi 
XV 
During the Dutch colonial period, it was a title of a 
religious official supJ'orted by stipend irom the 
Dutch government. 
Pcrhimpunun Mahusiswa Indonesia (The 
Indonesian University Student Association) 
Pcrsatua11 Sardjana Muslim Indo11csia 
(Association of Indonesian Muslim Sardjana. Sec 
sa rclj a 11 alsmj mw 
Pcrsarum1 Tarbijah Islamijah (Islamic Educational 
Association); the West Sumatra-based 
traditionalist association 
Traditional (boarding) Islamic school; place for 
religious instruction in Java. Sec surau 
Advanced Pcsantrcn 
Pcmbcla Tanah Air. Fatherland Defence Force (set 
up during the Japanese occupation) 
Pcrhimpunm1 I11doncsia (Indonesian Association) 
Pclmljar Islam I1!do11csia (Union of Indonesian 
Islamic High School Students) 
Partui Kcadilan (Justice Party) 
Partai Kebangkita11 Bungsa (National Awakening 
I' arty) 
Partui Komllllis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist 
Part)'} 
Pcrgcrakall Malwsiswa Islam Indonesia (The 
Indonesian Islamic University Student 
Movement); A union of NU university students. 
Pcrhimpwum Mahasiswa Kato/ik lndol!esia 
(Union of Indonesian Catholic University 
Students) 
Partcli Nasio11al I11do11csia {Indonesian National 
Party). 
Pcmitia Pcrsiapan Kemcrdckam1 Indonesia 
(Committee for the Prcpamtion of Indonesian 
Independence) 
Pcrscrikatan Pcrhimp1111a11 Mallasiswa Imloncsiu 
(The Federation of Indonesian University Student 
Organizations) 
Partai Pcrsatlccm Pemba11gmw11 (United 
Development Party) 
Pcmlufakatan Pcrhi111p1man-Pcrhi111pu11a11 Politik 
Kcbangsaa/1 Indonesia (Federation of Political 
Organizations oflndonesian People) 
Pcrkumpulan Pcngcmbangan Pcsa11tren dan 
Masyarakat (Association for Pcsalllrc11 and 
Community Development) 
Javanese nobility; member of the Javanese official 
(~dministrativc) class. 
PSI 
PSII 
Refonnasi 
Repelita 
RHS 
RUSI 
Sautri: 
Sardjanalsatiana 
Sarckat Dagang Islam 
Sarpkat Islam 
SDI 
Sckolah 
SI 
SIS 
Sorogan 
STI 
STOVIA 
Surau 
THS 
TNI 
Twecdc Klassc School 
UGM 
UI 
Ull 
Ulama 
Ummat/Ummah 
xvi 
Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist 
Party 
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Union Party. Sec SI 
Lit. 'rcfonn'; generally meaning political 
libcralisation and economic transparency. Also 
used to refer to the period following Suharto's fall 
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Y car 
Development Plan) 
Rechtslwogesrlwol (College of Law) 
The Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
Student, pupil (of the pesantren or religious school 
in Java); also member of the devout Islamic 
community 
Degree holders or scholars 
Sec SDJ 
Sec SI 
Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial 
Association) 
Lit. School. The (modem) schools following the 
Western educational system 
Sarektll Islam (Islamic Union); A proto· 
nationalist association with Islamic colour, 
established in 1912 
Stutlemcn Islam Stutlieclub (Muslim Students' 
Study Club) 
A method of teaching in pesantrcn based on 
individual-centred learning in which a student 
(santri) sits in front of a religious scholar (kjai) to 
read a religious text 
Sekolah Tinggi Islam (Advanced Islamic School) 
School tot Oplcitling van Inlamlsche Artsen 
(Training School for Native Doctors) 
Traditional Islamic school or place for religious 
instruction in Central Sumatra: equivalent of 
Javanese pesantren. 
Teclmische Hoogesc/wol (College of Engineering) 
Tetttara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Military) 
Second Class Native (elementary) School 
Unii'Crsitas Gacljah Mat/a (Gadjah Mada State 
University) 
Universitas ltrcloncsia (the University of 
Indonesia) 
Universitas Islam Indonesia (Islamic University of 
Indonesia) 
Islamic scholars; in Indonesia, it specifically refers 
to scholars of religious knowledge 
Islamic Community 
UHDEK 
YLBHI 
Wcton(an) 
xvii 
Undang-Umlang Dusar 1945 (the 1945 
Constitution), Sosialisme Jndonesia (Indonesian 
socialism), Demokrasi terpimpi11 (guided 
demo~racy), Ekonomi tcrpimpin (guided 
economy), and Kcpribadian Indonesia 
(Indonesian identity). Sukarno's ideology of the 
1960s. 
Yayasan Lcmbaga Bantuan Hukrmr Indonesia 
(Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutions) 
A method of teaching in pesantren in which 
students sit in a circle in front of the scholar 
working t" \ various texts. The kjai calls on various 
students to rccitt' and clarify what they arc reading 
Chapter I- /ntrodllclion 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The intellectuals hm•e created the political life of the underdcvclcped countries; 
they !tare been its instigators, its It ~s. and its c.xccuta11ts. 
Edward Shils (1972)1 
The imclligclltsia stratum develops ... whc11 ctlucatcd members of the establi.shment 
arc unable to face ami solve the nation's growing problems. 
In response, the intelligentsia appears as a new c/emcm of lite social stroctrtrc, as a stratum placed 
betwec11 the 'power establishment' on the one lta:ul, and all other classes on tlte other. 
Aleksander Gella (1976)2 
lndonesimr/slam is a reality that scholars can 110 longer ignore. 
The ware of /slatitic resurgence that has swept the coUiJtry in the past two dccmlcs makes it increasingly 
difficult to portray Islam as a marginal force on the edges oflmlonesitm civilization. 
Mark R. Woodward ( 1996)1 
Out oflhe galactic crisis of the Indonesian polity at the twilight of the previous century, 
a new crescent has begun shining in the sky of Jakarta: the emergence of the Muslim 
intelligentsia as the rising political and bureaucratic elite. 
In the late Suharto eta, following the demoralisation of Muslim politics irom the 
1960s, various figures of the Muslim intelligentsia surprisingly took centre-stage ;;, 
Indonesian ·socio-political discourse.' About the same time, many other members of the 
Muslim intelligentsia were appointed to the upper echelons of the government 
bureaucracy.5 Issues surrounding this Muslim intelligentsia produced extensive media 
coverage and provoked public debate; following the establishment, in December I 990, 
of the lkata11 Cem/ekimvtm Muslim Se-lndonesia {lCMI, the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intelligentsia). 
By the time of the emergence of the refom1 (reformasi) movement in 1997/8, 
some ligures of the Muslim intelligentsia played crucial roles in the process of 
Suharto's resignation. this political significance of the Muslim intelligentsia was 
accentuated during the period of Habibie's interregnum when the cabinet and senior 
1 Shils (1972: 387). 
2 Golla (1976: 25). 
1 Woodward (1996: 34). 
' Among public figures of the Muslim intelligentsia in the late Suharto era were Nurcholish Madjid, 
Abdurralunan Wahicl, Amien Rais, Dawam ltnhardjo, Adi Sasono, lmaduddin Abdulrahim, Djalaluddin 
Rakhmat, Sri llintang Pamungl:as and Emha Ainun Nadjib. 
' Examples of lhesc figures were Mar'ie Muhammad, Bcddu Amang, Muslimin Nasution, Sutiipto 
Wirosardjono, Sctyanto P. Santoso, Sajuti lbsibuan, Matzuki U~man, Dipo A lam and many others. 
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administration was composed largely (lf lCMI members .• v the same time, tlte 
leadership of the Golkar party f11> the heir to the New Order's political machine) came 
to be dominated by fonncr activists of the Islamic Univer~ity Students' Association 
(HMI). This culminated in the selection of Abdurrahman Wahid (fonncr chainnan of 
Nahdlatul Ulama) as President succeeding Habibie. along with the appointment of 
Muslim figures as senior &tate officials. 
Althou~:h the Muslim intelligentsia in the late 20°' century was able to achieve 
greater intellectual credibility as well as better political and bureaucratic positions, 
Muslim politics as a whole suffered from a relative decline of its mass political base. In 
the 1998 election, the vote for all Muslim's parties, including parties which adhered to 
Paucasi/a principles, was only 36.38%, thus providing only 37.46% of the total scats in 
the DPR (Parliament-173 out of a total of 462 scats).6 Furthcnnorc, as the Muslim 
intelligentsia's political and bureaucratic position improved, most senior Islamic leaders 
became less-obsessed '.<iih Islamic claims. Their obsession with the agenda of 
reinstalling the so-called 'Jakarta Cl;art•r'7 in the state constitution !cssenrJ. 
This picture of the Muslim intclli~;cntsia in the late 20'h century stands in 
contrast to that in the early 201h century. During the early decades of the century, only a 
few of the best educated segments of Indonesian intelligentsia joined Islamic 
associations such as Sarckat Islam (Sl, Islamic Union), for most of them preferred to 
join organization; with priyayi links such as Budi Utomo (Glorious Endeavor). In 
championing the voice of the oppressed people, however, the Sl emerged as the first 
Indies association with an Indies-wide constituency, attracting the largest membership 
among the existing associations. By late 201h century, a vast number of the best cdu,a!cd 
• 
segment of Indonesian society had joined associations of Muslim students and 
intelligentsia (such as HMI, ICMI, and KAMMI) as well as Muslim parties. However, 
the attraction of Muslim politics at the grass-roots level tended to wane. 
Despite the political preponderance of the Muslim intelligentsia and the 
strengthening of Muslims' political inclusivism, Islamic parties and communal identities 
were sustained. The survival of this Muslim identity politics can he seen from the 
6 For a more elaborate description of tho result of Muslim panics in the 1998 election, sec chapter 6. 
7 Drafted in tltc lead up to the Indonesian procl:nt:1tion of independence of the 1945, L~is Charter contains 
among other things a special provision that tl1e phrase of the Belief in One God as the f:rst of 
Indonesian's live principles (Pancasila) should be expanded by the insertion of tl1e clause 'with tl1e 
obligation for the adherents oflsl:un to practice Islamic law'. This clnusc came to he known as 'the seven 
words'. 
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efforts of particular :;cgmcnls of the Muslim intelligen:G,;: Jccially those of the 
younger generation, to struggle for the implementation of Islarr.ic Law (shari 'a). Allhe 
same time, Islamic labels were still widely used as names of intellectual and political 
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orgamzaltons. 
Alongside the emergence of liberal and illiberal Muslim parties, the contestation 
of political ideologies and identities both between and within intellectual traditions 
continued with difl'crenl agendas and with varying intensity and e.<pression. Muslim 
politics experienced an unprecedented internal fragmcnlalio;; evident in the emergence 
of a plethora of Muslim political parties. During the reform era, even the Muslim 
inlelligerttsia who had united under ICMI ~plil into various party orientations. 
All these features reflect the continuity and changes in the development of 
Muslim intelligentsia. This diachronic and synchronic presentation of the Muslim 
int~lligcnl.';ia deserves serious academic allenliOt'. The Jndcncsian intelligentsia has 
been, to liSC Shils's words, the 'insligatJr', 'lead~r', and 'executaul' of national politics 
(Shils I 912: 387). For one reason or another, the high degree of the Indonesian 
intelligentsia's political involvement and preoccupotion with authority continued to be a 
basic feature of Indonesian politics. Thus, endeavouring to underst:md the continuity 
and changes in the development of the Muslim intelligentsia is crucial to understanding 
the continuity and changes in the formation of the Indonesian elite and its politics. 
Moreover, the transformation of the Muslim intelligentsia from the margins to 
the centre of the Indonesian polity and bureaucracy appears perplexing in the context of 
existing studies on the modem Indonesian elite and politics. Clifford Gccrtz in his 
seminal work, The Re/igio11 of Jam (1960, 1976), depicted the aristocratic and 
bureaucratic clements (priyayi) of Javanese society as representing a pre-Islamic 
worldview. He even tended to portray the priyayi and the sa11tri (pious Muslim element) 
as mutually exclusive catcgorics.9 .Robert van Nicl (1970) portrayed the modem 
1 More than 80 years after the word 'Islam' was first explicitly used as the name of an association by the 
Sarckat (Dagang) Islam, the same word or its derivative such as 'Muslim' was still widely used ns names 
of poJitical parties and action groups. More than 70 yeats after the word 'Islam' (lslmtlictcn in Dutch) 
was first used as the name of n student organization, Jong /slamictcn Bond (JIB), the snme term continued 
to be use,j by many student·intellectu:il collectivities such ns Jkatan Cendckitm•ar~ 'Muslim' Sl.!-!ndoncsia 
llCMI) and Kesatua11 Aksi Mahasiswa 'Muslim' Imlor.esia (KAMMl). 
Thus, after depicting the 'pcngiJUiu • as n kind of 'safllri aristocracy', he soon questioned his analysis for 
it might contain 'a contradiction in terms' (1976: 133). Although he had seeu among followers oflslamie 
parties (NU and M,.,,umi) tl1at 'the young, the educated, the urban, and the weakly religious' tended to 
'be more modem' (1976: 163), he had never !mag111Cd that this young cducntcd Muslim generation would 
in tum flood tltc modem burcaucrocy. neing santri for him was the antithesis to being a bureaucrat: 'Tile 
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Indonesian elite as 'imitators of Western ways' which gradually pulicd 'ns mot~.::-..; ·)f 
Indonesian society' (1970: 23-7). R. William Liudle (1973) highlighted the dominance 
of 'secular modernising intellectuals' during the rise of the New Order. Donald K. 
Emmerson (1976) ilOiiccd that 'in the late 1960's and early 1970's, Indonesia's military, 
technocratic, and bureaucratic regime could be called Muslim ncitl,cr in name nor in 
practice' (1976: 23). 10 Ruth McVey (1989) described 'faith' (Islam) as the outsider in 
the Indonesian polity. 
The growing influence of the Muslim inteJ!;gentsia, intellectually, politically and 
bureaucratically, after the long period of the margtr! 11isation of political Islam, offers 
new insight:; into the importance of considering multiple dcten11inations of politics and 
multiple arenas of power relations. On the other hand, the weaken<'lg of Muslim parties' 
attraction to grass-roots voters and the chonging politic<! attilt•C·' •mong senior 
members ofihe Muslim intelligentsia in the late 201h century indicates tnc importance of 
considering synchronic states within a diachronic dcvelopn';:; of the Mu5lim 
intelligentsia. 
ihis thesis is an attempt to examine the genealogy of Muslim intelligentsia (and 
power) in ', weutieth century Indonesia. In this effort, the longua clurca approach will be 
combined with an interactive, interdisciplinary and intertextual method to better 
understand the various underlying impulses and interactions ~ontributing to continuity 
and change in the long term developmeilt of the Muslim intelligentsia and its relation to 
power. 
1.1 Foundations of Analysis 
In this study of the 'genealogy of the Muslim intelligentsia (and power) in 
twentieth century Indonesia', there: arc at least five ~roncepttlal terms that require further 
clarification: 'genealogy', 'Muslim', 'intclligcnwia', 'power', and '!ndoncsia'. 
I. 1.1 Genealogy 
The ten11 'genealogy' here is defined in terms both of its conventional and 
Foucauldian senses. In following traditional historical and anthropological studies, 
problem is particularly acute ari1ong the satJtris, whose values are so ar,ii-burcnucratic, "independent", 
and "equalitarian" in nature; for they realize that as their leaders become civil servants due to santri 
political power, Utcy become also tcso santrl in outlook' (1976: 373). 
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'gcn~alogy' can be defined as the study of the evolution and network nf a particular 
group of people over several generations. This notion of gcnc;bgy is meaningful lo 
cnqsider the ·liachronic devclopmeni and inter-generational h·• ''· :!ual chain of the 
M .; ... ,intelligentsia. 
In a Foucauldian sense, 'genealogy' is history writtel! in the light of current 
concerns. In Foucault's view, history is always wrillcn from the perspective of the 
present; history fulfils a nc~d of the present. The fact that the present is always in a 
process of tran5fonnation means that the past must be continually re-evaluated. In his 
sense, 'genealogy docs not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken 
continuity'. On the contrary, 'it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations'. It 
focuses on ruptures, synchronic stales and the union of erudite knowledge and local 
memories (Foucault 1994, \996; Lcchtc 1995: 110-5). 'Genealogy' in this sense is 
meaningful to consider the dynamics, transformation and discontinuity in the historical 
development of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
Thns, the gcnealogic••l reading of this study will situate synchronic states in 
diachronic time. '1 he cc!0hration oflhe Saussurean and Foucau\dian emphasis upc.m the 
impo1\ance of studying synchronic moments will be balanced by the al\ention to a long-
span diachronic process. As Penelope J. Corfield rhetorically questions (1991: 6): 'How 
succe:bi'ully can synchronic structures be studied without reference to the inexorable 
tk•w of Space•time?' If the study of synchronic momPn•s expresses the histmical 
disjuncture of social formation, th~ f,tudy of diachronir. .:me may explain th~ persisting 
ar.twork of \races and memories of a longer contested hislory. 11 'E· • .-;ry (·.islorical stale 
of affairs presented dialectically', said Walter Benjamin, 'polarizes and becomes a force 
field (Kraftfeld) in which the conflict between fore- and after-history plays itself out' 
(1980: 60). 
The study of diachronic conlinuity in combination with synchronic ch .. ngc is 
important to look at the 'stntcturalion' of intellectual traditions in Giddens' sense 
(1984). The intellectual ideas, role and self-perception depend to a gr:1t extent upon th~ 
historically structured constm,.,;.; of particular cultural and intellectual traditions on the 
10 In £nt.'11~rson's view, political Islam by this lime ha1l br:en defeated constitutionally, physically, 
ektoralty, hutcaucratically, and symbolically (1989). 
t• ·,'1.Js is especially important for the study of posl·colonial sodclics. II is said that the postcoloniality is n 
historical condition marked by the vi~i~~1e apparatus of fre:dom and !he concealed persistence of 
unfreedom, and the longevity of tensions between arrival ond departure, independence and dependence. 
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pos5ibility of action and the desires of human • agencies. lntelligenisia and/or 
intellectuals arc part of an historical process in which human actors reinvent cultural 
and intellectual traditions in different contexts (Eis~nstadt 1973). 
The concern of the thesis with the diachronic process of the development of 
Muslim intelligentsia and power is meaningful as mainstream analysts Qf Indonesian 
politics ha••c given too much attention to synchronic states in politi'cal Islam. The 
concentration of ,:ulitical analysis on day-to-day political events ri~ks focusing too 
much attention on, to borrow Fernand Brandel's view (1980}, individual time, the time 
of the 'conjunctnre' for its own sake, without considering tl:.~ time of the 'lo11gue 
drm!e '. 
In disregarding the time of the 'longue drm!e', Gccrtz's trichotomy of 'smrtri-
abmrgan-priyayi '11 failed to sec the backward and forward cqnstruction of the priyayi 
worldvicw. He might wonder that long before he conducted his fieldwork in the I 950s, 
some figures of the newly born Indies intelligentsia of ihc early 201h century such as 
Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Tirto Adhi Surjo, Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto, the 
Djajadiningrat brothers and Sutomo were actually .· ··1s of priyayi families with strong 
sautri religious backgrounds (sec chapter 3). He might also wonder that some decades 
after his research, the image of the stmtri as the trading clement of Indo\!~,:ian society 
came to be ovcrshado\\ "d by the image of the santri as nco-bureaucrat. 
On the other hand, ihe concern in the thesis with synchronic change is important 
to save intellectual history from the assumption of essentialism. Mochtar Pabottingi 
(lry82}, for instance, in his study on Indonesian i!':.ctlcctuals before the Revolution of 
JC,.!) came to the conclusion that the Indonesian intdlectual had always been :'ntachcd 
to, und never bc~n alienated from, the masses. In f.1ct, there had been a moment for 
intcllcctua~s of the first generation of Indonesian intelligentsia, when their public sphere 
v !5 initially confined to a nucleus of educated priyayi, while the public, in the wider 
sense of the masses, was an anonymous, faceless and indifferent, third party. 
TilUs, 'the postcolonial dream of discontinuity Hi ultimately vulnerable to the :1fectious residue of its own 
unconsidered and unresolved past' (Gandhi 1~98: 6-7). 
"In Clifford Geenz's Tile Religion of Jam (1960),lavancse society consists oftlueo systems of meaning 
grouped into a/iran (vertical stmctures of identity and organization): priyayi, abang.:.'l and santri. The 
priyayi tradition is said to be an ideolog}' of the court and literati oricnteU to Hind.t-lluddhist and 
Javanese myc;tical world-views. 111e ahangatz tradition is a more popular syncretic ideology of the 
pezsantry hc:~.vily influenced r·' Javanese aninUc;rn_ while the santri tradition is a pious Islamic world· 
view shared by elements ir. boll~ Javanese and 0 .·,t.r Island society. 
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Attention to S)11Chronic changes will also reveal that the Muslim intelligentsia's 
political identities arc not a fixed and stable construction, unfolding from beginning to 
end through ull the vicissitudes of history without change. To borrow Stuart Hall words 
(1997: 4): 'Identities arc about questions of using the resources of history, language and 
cu!•urc in the process of bccoming ... They arc subject to a radical historicization, and 
constantly in the process of change and transformation.' Individuals are also made up of 
many identities, and this multiplicity is constructed in diff~rcnt contexts (Mouffc 2000). 
In this process of transformation and construction, discursive practices play a decisive 
role. As Hall noted (1997: 4): 'Identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, 
we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites 
within specific discursive fonnation and practices.' 
1.1.2 Muslim 
The term 'Muslim' in this thesis is not a signifier for everyone who embraces the 
!slamic religion and is not a reference to religious piety. Those who belong to the 
Muslim intelligentsia arc not necessarily pious Muslims, and those who do not belong to 
the ·.·uslim intelligentsia arc not necessarily impious Muslims. 'Muslim' her" is a 
signiticr for the Islamic"oricntcd, intcllcctual"political traditions constructed by 
discursive practice> in a particular historical moment of hr iottesian history. 'Islamic 
orientation', refers to the association (of these intcllcctual·political traditions) with 
Islamic ideologies and/or collectivities. These Islamic ideologies ate diverse and 
divergent because of the presence of contestation and various opposing positions, while 
Islamic collectivities include Islamic 'epistcmic communities' (schools, religious 
outreach and orrlcts, etc.), Islamic associations (foundation, societies and political 
parties) and Islamic action groups. The notion of 'Isbmic' as the adjective of these 
collectivities is again constructed in specific historical and institmi·;nal sites within 
spcdlic discursive formation and practices. As such it is subject to contestation, challgc 
and transformation. 
The term 'Muslim' develops out of competing discourses and clashes with other 
identities, and because of this there is a political dimension. The term has been 
politicised for several reasons. First, this could be a reflecti 'n of a fragmented 
nationalism .. This fragmentation emanated from the plurality o: • ~ nation and the 
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diversity nf collective memories and identities as well as the multifarious nature of 
subject posit!ons, intellectual traditions and networks of indonesian society. 
From thll vantage point of these perspectives, the preoccupation with Islamic 
identity politics and symbols signifies a double-bind situation. On the one hand, it can 
be interpreted as what Alain Touraine might call a 'historical action' of a particular 
collective identity in the 'struggle for historicity' (Touraine 1981). On the other hand, it 
indicates a recurring tendency of the postcolonial pathology signified by continuous 
contradictions arising from its indisputable historical belatedness. According to Albert 
Mcmmi (the Tunisian anti"colonial revolutionary and intellectual), this pathology of 
postcolonial limbo between 'the visible apparatus of freedom and the concealed 
persistence of unfrccdom', 'arrival and departure', 'independence and dependence', has 
its roots in 'the residual traces and memories of subordination' (Gandhi 1998: 6-7). 
Second, this politicisation of Islamic symbolisn: seems to be the infectious 
residue of what W. F. Wertheim (1980) once called the 'majority with minority 
mentality' syndrome, emanating fron1 the ironical stance of islam in this nation: 
A great majority of Indonesians profess the Islamic religion. From a quantitative 
point of view Indonesia could even count as the largest 'Islamic country' in the 
world. Y ct, the attitudes of the Moslem community (the umuwt Islam) in that 
country arc typically those of a minority group. This is largely due to the fact 
that, i~ the political field, throughout the history of the past centuries, the 
representatives of the Moslem community ha1·c rather consistently been 
assigned an outsider's role (Wertheim 1980: 1). 
Third, the tcffil 'Muslim' has been frequently politiciscd because of internal 
conflicts within the Muslim community in the contestation for the 'true' representation 
of Islam. The heterogeneity of Indonesian Muslim backgrounds, in teffils of cthnicity, 
culture, geography and religious schools, in combination with the lc~scr pressure of 
non-Musl.ims (at l~ast in tenns of number) in most Indonesian regions, has provided a 
greater opportunity for intcmal variations within the Islamic community. As a result, 
Indonesian Muslim politics have been characterized by diversity, by contestation; and 
by various opposing positions, which often stimulated an intense politicisation ofislam. 
Last but not least, for many Muslims of the younger generation, especially those 
who grew up during the late Nc1v Order modernisation, the obsession with Islamic 
symbolism might also be encouraged by the intrusion of the post-modem condition and 
the global penetration of mass culture. Living in a post-modem world, as Baudrillard 
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(1992) has reminded us. is living in an interpenetration of cultural experiences and 
pluralisation of life-worlds with the indefinite reproduction of ideals and proliferation of 
consumer lifestyles leading to the differentiation and fragmentation of worldvicw. 
These developments have had a severe impact on Indonesian MUslims, as on any other 
religious communities in the worid, representing for Muslim activists a new threat of 
indirect colonial penetration in the fonn of the secularisation of culture. Thus, a return 
to 'Muslim identity', to bartow Turner's view, is 'an attempt to create a new 
gcmciuschaft, a new version of the traditional household which would close off the 
threat ofpostmodemity by re-establishing a communal ideology' (Turner 1994: 93). 
In other words, the preoccupation with Islamic identities and symbols is an 
indication of what Geertz called the relentless Muslims' 'struggle for the real' (1972: 
324), 13 as a reflection of huge discrepancies and long-tenn struggles between Islamic 
ideals and realities. An allusion to this point of view has been made by Abu·Rabi': 
'lslamism, thus, is a reflection of a pathological crisis that is deeply rooted in Muslim 
society' (Abu-Rabi' 1996: 59). 
I. 1.3 Intelligentsia and Intellectual 
The main concern of this thesis is with the genealogy of the collective entity of 
Muslim 'intelligentsia'-as a substratum of the Indonesia's (modem-educated) 
intelligentsia-rather than tllat of individual Muslim 'intellectuals'. In describing the 
development of a particular group ofthe intelligentsia, however, attention to the role of 
individunt intellectuals as fornmlators and articulators of collec!ivc identities and 
ideologies is unavoidable. 
To define an 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectual' is notoriously problematic. Both 
tenns have been widely used ambiguously in the discourse on Indonesian history and 
politics. !here has bech Jack of understanding that each has its own genealogy and 
specific social formation; and refers to a distinct social concept and phenomenon. 
Mohammad Hatta, in his historic speech before the civitas acadcmica of the University 
of Indonesia on 11· June 195/, 'Tauggrmg Djawab Moril Kawu brtcligcusia' (The 
Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia), interpreted 'intelligentsia' as synonymous 
with 'intellectual' and used Benda's conception of intellectual in La Trahisou des 
13 The stugg1e for the real is 'the attempt to impose upon the world a particular conception of how things 
ot bottom ore ond how men ore Utcrcforc obliged to oct' (Goertz 1972: 324). 
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Clercs (The Betrayal of lnlcllecluals) as his conceptual framework (Halla 1957). Selo 
Socmardjan wrote 'The Changing Role of lnlellccluals in Indonesian National 
Development' (1981) to indicate the role of 'intelligentsia'. He argued: ' ... the concept 
of 'intellectual' in the sense of those who arc regarded or regard themselves as 
intellectuals should be taken as identical with the word 'intelligentsia" (Soemardjan 
1981: 139-140). Allhe same lime, AriefBudiman wrote 'Students as Intelligentsia: The 
Indonesian Experience' (1981) using the framework of Western European literatures on 
'intellectual', in which the term 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia' had been used 
interchangeably. Al one point, he slated that Indonesian students belong to 'the 
intellectual group' (p. 224). At another point, he depicted the students ~s the 
intelligentsia (p. 225). Just few months before I completed writing this thesis, Daniel 
Dhakidae published his book on Indonesian intellectuals during lhc New Order, 
Cendekiall'an dan Kekuasaan cia/am Negara Orde Ban1 (200~). Y cl, he made no ck:tr 
distinction between the concept of 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia'. While associating 
the term 'cendekiall'an' with 'intellectual', he used the Russian 'intelligentsia' as an 
example of the presentation of intellectuals (p. 8-9). 
Such ambiguity is not only evident in the study of Indonesia but also commonly 
occurs in Western (scientific) discourse. According to Aleksander Gclla (1976), 
Westcm sociologists for a considerable lime 'did not even notice the di'fcrcnce between 
intellectuals in the West and that unique social fonnalion which, under the name 
intelligentsia, began lo develop in Russia and Poland during the middle of the 
nineteenth century'. He pointed out that 1:1J tcm1 'intelligentsia' did not receive a 
separate entry either in the Encyclopaedia of tluJ Social Sciences or in the /11/ernationa/ 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Moreover, he noticed that in the work of Robert 
Michels (1932) and Edward Shils (1968) both terms were not regarded as different 
concepts. While Michels used these terms interchangeably, Shils 'was more consistent 
and wrote exclusively about intellectuals, omitting nearly all reference to their East-
European counterparts' (Gella 1916: 19). 
Gclla's description is an indication of the existence of contrasting approaches in 
tackling the tenn 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia, between the "''11lalislic and historical 
approach. The first approach is quite typical of sociologists of Western Europe and 
America, who arc generally inclined to identify the intelligentsia with intellectuals. In 
this approach both intellectual and intellig~ntsia denote ;,,; ;.,Jividual or group of 
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individuals dealing with ideas, and fulfilling a social role as men and women of ideas. 
The second approach is maintained mainly by sociologists and historians of Eastern 
Europe who tend to sec the intelligentsia as a unique and particular phenomenon. In this 
approach, both tcrn1s arc perceived as belonging to specific social formations and as 
such cannot be used interchangeably, for they have their own historical trajectories and 
social consequences (Gclla I976, 11-12). 
A. Intelligentsia 
In contrast to groups of intellectuals, the intelligentsia appeared from its 
beginning as a social stratum. 14 This stratum emerged in Poland and Russia during the 
reign of Peter the Great (but it did not have much shape until the 1860s), composed of 
the better educated segment of society but distinct from other educated people of the 
upper classes. The main constitutive clement of this rising stratum was an educa~ion in 
and orientation towards European culture, e .ially in the realm of technical 
knowledge and science, which exceeded tile already established adoption of European 
manners and mannerism by the nobility (Gena 1976; Eycrmml 1994). 
It is said that until the IS'h century, Russian intellectual life \vas religious in 
character. In the following centuries, however, the Russian Muscovites (intel/igenty) 
came increasingly under secular influence of Western Europe as a consequence of the 
expansion of Russia by military conquests and annexation, the 'new window' opening 
on to the West, and the establishment of more enduring contacts with the countries 
'beyond the seas'. This process ofWcstcrnisation·cunHccularisation were considerably 
enlarged during the reign of Peter the Great, through his policy of extensive cultural 
borrowings which left the Muscovy fully exposed to Western influ~nccs in the fields of 
technical lnowlcdge and science (Nahirny 1983: 19-20). The initial bearer of this 
mission sac.-.. of cultural borrowings was the gentry-the stratum whose members were 
charged with ·. · .. ~ ·ing the state. Y ct the reliance on the gentry as the principal bearers of 
14 TI1e early use of the term 'intelligentsia' is a matter of controversy. Some historians assume that it was 
coined ::y Peter Doborykin, ~ Russian author, in 1860. TI1is, however, hJs been opposed by Wac1aw 
Lednicki, who found that the term was used in Russian literature especially in the work ofV. G. Belinsky 
in 1846. Moreover, he also noticed that the teim was used approximately at the same time in Poland and 
concluded tlmt Russia and Poland were the binhplace of this stratun~ and their languages created tl1e term 
'intellige,Jtsia'. Richard Pipes questioned that the term was coined by Doborykin based on his finding 
that 'the GertlUn word 'intelligenz' was used as early as 1849 to point to the same phenomenon as 
intelligentsia in Poland and Russia. Finally, Aleksander Gella lms shown that the tern> was first used in 
Polish literature by Karol Libelt in 1844 (Gella 1976: 12). 
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the mission was doomed to fail, as it was the stratum of society which was least 
disposed to assume this role. By the second half of the 19'11 century, people from more 
diverse classes and social strata subsequently engaged in the proccss, 15 which led to the 
con>titution of the distinct strata of intelligentsia (Nahimy 1983: 22-4). 
Vladimir C. Nahimy (1983) and Aleksandcr Gclla (1976) share a common 
understanding of the main characteristic of this stratum. According to Nahimy, the 
intelligentsia, as a distinct group of people, admittedly stood above, and outside of, the 
established social order-either etas• or estate system. He then described it further: 
By virtue of this position, the members of the intelligentsia were neither bound 
together by class or occupational interests nor fomtcd a status group of 
individuals enjoying definite rights and immunities derived from custom and/or 
law. To that cxtct\t the intelligentsia differed from conventional social 
formations-personal cliques, occupational status groups, associations of 
professional people, or corporate bodies. Although it is true that matrix of the 
intelligentsia was the educated stratum of society, individual members of this 
stratum belonged to the ranks of the int~:tigcntsia neither by virtue of their 
education and professional competence, not their intellectual accomplishment 
alone (Nahimy, I%:.: 7·8). 
In parallel to Nahimy, Gella argues that to be a social stratum, the intelligentsia 
is much more than just '· group of people united by certain intellectual interests, 
educational levels or occupational relations. 'The old intelligentsia was united neither 
by economic standard of life and income not by occupational vested interests, but 
mainly by sharing certain attitudes, and accepting a cultural heritage larger than the 
national one' (Gelb 1976: 13). In addition: 'Members of the intelligentsia, without 
respect to their occupations and economic status, were united by one common calling: 
'serve your nation" (p. 14). This calling in the Russian experience was galvanised by 
the impetus to abolish Tsarism, to destroy the old stale by peaceful or revolutionary 
means. In Poland, the motivation was a double one: to abolish the empires of the 
oppressors as well as to rebuild the independent Polish state (p. 15). 
Unlike Russia and Poland, in the free-market societies of Western Europe, 
educated people did not Conn a separate stratum. In most Western free-market societies, 
educated people (intellectuals) appear as an organic part of classes. They can be 
attached to the middle and upper or even proletariat classes (Konn\d & Szclcnyi 1979; 
15 It is said that whereas the gentry tended to be interested in literary and mi1itary pursuits, individuals of 
clerical origin were expected to enter scholarly and professional occupations, while the best opportunity 
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Gella 1976: 20). Thus, to be an intellectual in the Western Europeai• -c:cieties is by no 
means to change one's class attachment or class-consciousness. In Poland and Russia, 
however, the intelligentsia fanned a stratum in their own right by assuming a CQllective 
identity emanating from common psychological characteristics, manners, life style, 
social status, value system and historical callih,; (Gella 1976: 13). 
The leadership of this stratum was articulated by a relatively small group of 
moral and intellectual leaders. In Gella's words: 'The beliefs, the moral attitudes, and 
the political behavior of these le3ders were not fully duplicated by all members of the 
intelligentsia' (Gella 1976: 13.). By and large, however, an average member of 
intelligentsia maintained the intelligentsia's collective identity by imitating the manners 
and, at least verbally, the basic motes and value-goals of the intellectual leaders of this 
stratum. In short, this stratum of ihe intelligentsia had its own intellectuals who 
performed the role of fommlatots and articulators of a collective identity. 
B. Intellectual 
The last sentence links the discourse of intelligentsia with the discourse of 
intellectuals in Westem societies. The tcnn '/es intellectuels' which was coined by 
Clemenceau acquired widespread usage in France in 1898 as a repercussion of the 
'numifeste des intellectuels' awakened by the Dreyfus Case (Feuer 1976: 48; Gella 
1976: 19). In 1896, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French am1y was convicted 
of espionage and stripped of his rank by a military tribunal and sentenced to jail for the 
rest of his life. In protesting against the arbitrariness of the decision, Emile Zola, a 
well•known popular novelist, published an open letter on the front page of a small 
P.-.;;.-;. · newspaper, accusing members of the French army of fabricating evidence, 
,;,., •. : ·.: .• :ing and coV;:ting up the facts of the case. This letter, which carne to be known 
' ' .~ 'manifeste des inte//ectue/s' (the Manifesto of the intellectuals) caused a split 
among the French literati who fanned two groups: Dreyfusards (the defenders of 
Dreyfus) and anti-Dreyfusards. Out of this polarisation the tenn 'intellectual' emerged, 
initially as an abusive tenn with a negative connotation. To the anti-Dreyfusards, who 
spoke from the point of view of the established institutions of the state, the tcm1 
'intellectual' was used to indicate market-oriented writers and celebrities linked with the 
for conunoncrs was in the fields of art (painters, sculptors, musicians) and theatre (nctors, singers) 
(Nohimy t983: 27). 
---------------------------------- ----
------ - -- ----------------------------------------- ----
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Drcyfusards. The effect of this labelling, however, was to galvanize the Dreyfusards, 
giving them a name and consciousness of their own new social identity. Since that time, 
the word 'intellectual' not only became a popular term but also a model for a new form 
of intervention into public life as well as a role to be played (Eyerman 1994: 23-53). 
Thus, the intellectual in its incipience refers to an identifiable group with a self-
proclaimed IT'', ,:on to defend a collective conscience on basic political questions. In 
later devclopmcnts, however, definitions of the intellectual multiplied and became more 
diverse. 'Every definition they propose', Zygmunt Bauman argued, 'is an allcmpt to 
draw a boundary of their own identity. Each boundary splits the territory into two sides: 
here and there, in and out, us and them' (Bauman 1989: 8). 
In following Eycmmn (1994: 1), those various definitions can be put into two 
categories. First, the definition which interprets the intellectual in terms of personal 
characteristics, such as 'a person for whom thinking fulfils at once the function of work 
and play' (Lasch 1965) or those 'who never seem satisfied with things as they arc' 
(Coscr 1965: viii). Mich~cl Wnlzcr (1989) and Paul Jo!\nson (1988) followed and 
developed this kind of definition. Second, the dcflnilion which links the term to a 
particular social structure and function. this has been shared, for instance, by Seymour 
Martin Lipsct who defined intellectuals as those 'Who create, distribute, and apply 
culture' (1960: 311), Alvin Gouldncr (1979), George Konr:\d and h•an Szclcnyi (1979), 
Pierre Bourdicu ( 1984, 1988), and A ~to,io Gramsci ( 1971 ). 
In addition to Eycnnan, theories about the social function of intellectuals can be 
divided by and large into two contending perspectives. On the one hand, political 
theorists influenced by Marx and Lenin saw the positions of intellectuals as dctem1ined 
mainly by their relationship to power or economic structure. On the other hand, 
sociologists influenced by Weber's ideas saw the positions of intellectuals in terms of 
their relationship to knowledge (Miller 1999). 
The most influential exponent of the flrst perspective WtlS Gramsci. For him, it 
was highly problematic to identify intellectuals as people with certain allegedly innate 
special qualitics. 16 In his view, everyone 'carries on some form of intellectual activity', 
16 ln his view, it is impossible to define with any precision attributes such as 'an unusual sensitivity to the 
sacred [or] nn uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe'. It is atso hard to see why they 
should not be present in n person who had received little or not formal education. According to him, 
'there is no human activity from which every form of irttetlec:tuat participation can be excluded: /romo 
faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens •. All people, in his view, usc their intellects to some extent: 
the difference is one of degree, not of kind (Grnmsci 1971: 8-9; Miller 1999: 25). 
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'but not all men have in sc:>ciety the function of intellectuals' (Gramsci 1971: 8-9). 
Thus, the determining far•-r whether someone is to be categorised as an intellectual or 
manual worker lies in 'social function'. In contrast to the liberal view of intellectuals as 
somehow 'above' or 'outside' society,Gramsci views the intellectual as an integral part 
of the concrete materiality of those processes that constitute societies. On the basis of 
the social function and social affinity of intellectuals, Gramsci distinguished two 
categories of intellectuals: 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. Under the category 
of 'traditional' intellectuals he included not only philosophers, literati, scientists and 
other academics, but also lawyers, doctors, teachers, clerics and military leaders 
(Gramsci 1971: 7, 9). In his judgement, traditional intellectuals unavoidably acted as 
accomplices of the ruling group. Even when they were critical of the status quo, they 
ultimately allowed the dominant value system to shape the terms of their debates 
(Gram sci 1971: 7·S, '2). For him, 'organic intellectuals' referred to intellectuals who 
function as the formulators and articulators of class ideologies and interests with a 
specific emphasis on those of the rising class (the working class). He argued that all 
social groups that played a historically significant economic role created their own 
intellectuals to justify that role: 'Every social group, coming into existence on the 
original terrain of an essential function, creates together with itself, organically, one or 
more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and awareness of its own 
function not only in the economic bat also in the social and political fields' (Gramsci 
1971: 5). 
Gramsci's notion of organic intellectual drew on the Marxist interpretation of 
sor.ial formation in the European context which subsumes questions of status to class 
interests. He thus incorporates organic intellectual into the class structure. In countries 
where class formation was far less clearcut or consolidated than in Europe, however, 
Weber's ar, ··ent that status cannot satisfactorily be reduced to class found its 
justification. ..i Indonesia, for instance, where class formation had never be(;c;,nc the 
17 Weber distinguishes two other basic aspects of the distribution of power within a community besides 
class. One he calls stat11s and the other party. Status refers to a different degree of social prestige between 
social groups within a community. In Weber's own words, status ('status situation') is described as 'every 
t)'l'ical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social 
estimation of honor' (Weber t967: 24). Whereas class refers to the unequal distribution of economic 
rewards, status refers to tlw unequal distribution of 'social honour'. \Vhile class is objectively given, 
status depends upon people's subjective evaluations of social di!Terences (Giddens 1990: 212). TI1e 
conception of Party refers to power over the nction.r; oi' collective decisions of any organized groups, 
oriented toward tlte acquisition of social 'power', that is to say, toward influencing a communal action no 
matter what its content may be (Weber t967: 27). While Marx iended to explain both status di!Tcrenees 
-------- -------- -- -- ------------ - ----------
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main basis of social incorporation, many intellectuals attached themselves to cultural 
solidarity groupings rather than to class. Another problem comes from Gramsci's notion 
that the intellectual activities of organic intellectuals arc directed entirely toward 
furthering the interests of their own class. Thus, the 'organic intellectuals' of the 
proletariat would be people of working class origins. This is problematic, especially in 
the cont"xt of non-European countries such as in Latin America and in Indonesia, for 
the overwhelming majority of intellectuals, even most intellectuals of the workiug-class 
(the communist party), have been people of aristocrat Jnd (petty) bourgeois origin. 
The limitalion; of the Gramscian notion of the int,pllcctual leaves room for the 
Wcbcrian conception. In Wcb~r;s view, the sphere of ideas is relatively autonomous 
from that of economics; so that intellectuals as the sounding board of the sphere of ideas 
do not necessarily advocate ideas that arc conducive to their material interests. In 
Sadri's Max Weber's Sociology of flltellectuals (1992), it is said that the intellectuals' 
attitude towards ideas is less determined by practical considerations. 'This is not meant 
to imply that intellectuals arr ·c apt to disregard their own interests for the sake of 
ideas. Rather, it means that their "ideal interests" (in tracing the immanent process of 
rationalization) counterbalance, occasionally precede, and may even contradict their 
material interests (Sadri 1992: 70). According to the Weberian perspective, intellectuals 
were, by the nature of their commitment ',~ the pursuit of truth and their shared 
discourse of critical reason, distanced if not altogether divorced from society and 
maintained a critical perspective on power (Miller 1999: 13). Weber tolerated 
participation of intellectuals in 'politics' if they were individuals and individualists with 
• 
the commitment to save the world from becoming the prison of individuality and the 
graveyard of freedom (Sadri 1992: 84 & 91). Julien Benda's classical book La Trahiso11 
des C/ercs (The Beirayal of the Intellcctuals)18 is a representative par excellence of the 
conception of intellectual in this perspective. Intellectuals, for him, should be 
'essentially those whose activity is 1101 the p<·rsuit of practical aims' (Benda 1959: 30). 
The critique of this perspective has been argued hy Gramsci. In addition, this 
pcrspc~tivc is also problematic in the context of p':'st-colonial and Third World 
and party organization in tenns of class, Weber argues that neither, in fact, can be reduced to class 
divisions. Althcugh the inOuencc of class situation on both 'status' and 'party' is obvious, tlte reverse is 
also true. 11tat is, 'status' and 'party' can influence tl1e economic circumstances of individuals and 
groups, tlius in tum affecting class as well. Furthemtore, Weber argued that in any given society class, 
status and party relationships could be found cross-culling each otl1cr (Web.'< 1967: 24-27). 
11 TI1is book was first published in Paris in 1927 and was first translated into English in 1928. 
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countries where intellectuals have become not only organic parts of social and political 
forces but also as instigators and leaders of national politics. Fredric Jamison cvei. 
tends to exaggerate the situation by saying that 'in the third-world situation the 
intellectual is always a political intellectual' (Robbins 1990: ix). 
As a response to the shortcomings of both perspectives, n middle way 
conception has emerged since the 1970s whieh recognises the inter-relationship between 
power and knowledge. This synthesis emerged from scholars of the Marxist tradition 
(Raymond Williams' development of cultural history [1958]), of the sociological 
tradition (l'ierre Bourdieu's work on cultural and political 'fields' [1984]) and French 
post-structuralism (most notably Michel Foucault (!980]).19 Eyerman's description of 
'intellectual' (1994) represents not only a synthesis but also highlights the importance of 
considering intellectual traditions in particular socio•spatial contexts. For him, it is true 
that the production/market relation.: al"l the capacity of individual human capital have a 
significant impact on the constitution of the intellectual, but the main formative clement 
of the intellectual is the commitment to nomts and traditions; that is the commitment to 
articulate the fundamental notions of a collective identity and conscience, by embodying 
and practising the unity of truth, moral values and aesthetic judgment. It is in the 
process of giving voice to the collective conscience and <radition that an individual 
intellectual rcsronsc may lead to collective action (Eyemtan 1994: 6). 
Beyond these perspectives, there has been a recent attempt to conccptualise 
'intellectuals' as a distinct collective entity in the fom1 of class in its own right. This 
notion based on an assumption that the processes ofmodor: 1sation and industtialisation 
have been followed by the expansion of non•manual occupations, overstepping the 
footprint of what Gramsci calls 'traditional' intellectuals, such as teachers, clergies, 
literary and scientifi~ professions. The upper I eve;!, -~f these non-manual occupations, 
composed of activities based on 'mental skills' or sometimes called 'human' or 
'cultural' capital, arc the ground for what can be called 'intellectual labour'. It is from 
the gto\ :igtii!icance of this 'intellectual labour' that the definition of the intcllcctua: 
as a disiinc:. social cbss takes its basis. As the bargaining position of this intellectual 
labour in tl:~ production and/or market relations is more and more powerful, some have 
assumed the emergence of a 'new class' (Gouldner 1979) or 'kno'>Vlcdgc class' (Bell 
1973). 
"For a commcnlaty on the lhree aulhors' conccplion ofinlcllecluals, sec Miller (1999: 13). 
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This notio11 ,,; intellectual as a new class, however, is problematic. Not only 
docs the concept remain academically debatable-· because of the sul>stantial internal 
differentiation within its ranks,20 but it docs not fit with conditions of many developing 
countries such as Indonesia. According to Alvin Gouldncr, the possessor of cultural 
capital could emerge as a class in its own right for it has 'considerable de facto control 
over the mode of production and hence considerable leverage with which to p1•rsue its 
interest' (Gouldncr 1979: 12). In fact, the Indonesian intelligentsia from its emergence 
in the early 20111 century up to the end of the century did not possess such a powerful 
control over the mode of production. They were predominantly government employees 
and humanistic intellectuals lvho had no strong connection to the productive sector of 
the economy. 
At this point we may draw some conclusions about the main differences between 
'i..'e.lligcntsia' and intellectual. From the very beginning, the tcnn 'intelligentsia' 
t"icrrcd to a social stratum and indicated the 'collective response' of a particular 
collective identity, as a reflection of common edJcational criteria, psycho-socio· 
graphics, value system, ltabi!,/S and collective memory. On the other hand, the term 
'intellectual' originally referred to the 'individuality' of people of ideas and indicated 
the individual response of people of ideas to a specific historical 'call' or social 
function. The collectivity of intellectuals is made possible by a common rcspcr;;e to a 
particular historical 'call', such as the collectivity of French intellectuals (".'OK<'•.'. by a 
common response to the 'Dreyfus' affair, or a collective action in articuh11i1·~ '.•:.dition 
and interests of a particular established class or other social groupings. Wit!; th•! coming 
of the so-called post•industrial society, there has been an attempt to conccptualise 
'intellectual labour' within a collective entity, namely, the 'new class' or 'knowledge 
class'. This term, however, r"mains debatable academically and has little relevance to 
the Indonesian reality. 
C. lntelligentsb and lntcllectUJi in the Indonesian Context 
How should we grot•nd the term 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectual' in an 
lnrloncsian social formation and historical context? There is no doubt that the 
intellectual role or specific social function ofpeop!c of ideas in the archipelago has long 
been performed by the cmutly-oricntcd 'pandita' (priest), 'resi' (ascetic guru), '/..yia' or 
>:For Ute crilicism c:. c~'• , cnecpi, sec Konr.id & Szelenyi (197~). Etzioni-l!olevi (1985), Ross (1990). 
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•11[ama' (religious scholars). Nevertheles~. the understanding of the term 'intellectual' 
or 'i~telligentsia' and its cognates in the modem Indonesian context refers to a specific 
social fomtation and historical trajectory, resulting from the introduction of a 'Ncstcm 
education system in this country-initially by Christian missionaries and the Dutch 
colonial administration and then by other social agencies. 
Tho genesis of the modem Indonesian educated-elite is more or less similar to 
the genesis of intelligentsia in the Polish and Russian historical context. Although the 
socio-historical conditiuns for the development of the Indonesian intclligenty have been 
··~ry different from those in 191h cct.tl!ry Eastern Europe, there is one basic formal 
similarity. This similarity, to bc.~<.•w Gella's view, is the appearance of a generation 
erl~cated and influenced by an imported Wcslcm body of ideas and knowledge (Gella 
1976: 17). Moreover, in common with the Russian experi~rice, the prototypes of East 
Indies (now Indonesian) Wcslem-educatcd people that emerged in late 191h century also 
came largely from the nucleus of noble families. With the expattsion of colonial 
government and private-capitalist bureaucracy, however, people of diverse status groups 
were gradually exposed to modem education. By the early 201h century, these hwzinc!s 
novi with Western education emerged as a stratum in their own right,21 \vito shared a 
common occupational orientation, h;~bitus, language, co&nitive structure and sense of 
social responsibility. 
While the old intelligentsia of Eastern Europe came i!!;o being as a relatively 
homogenous stratum with common traditioits, the Indonesian intelligentsia from its 
early formation has been ht:terogcnous both in tem1• of social position and traditions. 
This heterogeneity reflects not only the diversity of its social-class origin but also the 
plurality of its religi<'-cultural, ethnic and territorial backgrounds. As a result of this 
intcm.1l fragmentation, the Indonesian intr.lligcntsia has never formed a unified social 
stratum. In addition, while the Czarist slate as promoter of the intelligentsia in the 
Russiar. t ontext was an integral part of the Russian society, the colonial state as a 
promoter of the East indies intelligentsia was an 'alien' state with various discriminative 
and segregative policies. In discriminative ani ,:cgregative situations, the attemp1' ;':• 
create a modem educated-elite with Wcstcm secular values and principles was subjec, 
" As Harry J. Benda observed (1962: 240): 'II is tlte exception rather than the rule that tlte young 
aristocrat, the landowner's son or for t.hat matter even the scion of a newly-established bourgeois class, 
once he has acqu~,._ J a we:-:-:m education of any kind, becomes the defende1 and spo\:csman of the c1ass 
of his social origin.' 
-------- ---------------------------------
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tv a,tithctical tendencies once members of the intelligentsia found a way back to their 
own moorings. Some of those who came from strong Muslim family backgrounds, for 
instance, because of their disenchantment with the colonial situation and/or their 
encounter or rc-cncountcr with Islamic figures and their cpistcmic community and 
associations, reattached themselves to the Islamic intellectual community. In this 
reattaclunent they began to enrich their religious knowledge resulting in the emergence 
of the so-called imelek-ulama (intelligentsia who were literate in religious knowledge). 
Moreover, the colonial-state promotion of w~~tcm education constructed the 
colonial hierarchies ofkrtowlcdgc and values that reinforced what Edward Said calls the 
'dreadful secondarincss' of some segments of society and cultures (Said 1989: 207). 
This provided the impetus for the insurrection of subjugated knowlcdgcs by using, 
among other things, the strategy of mimicry and appropriation. The Islamic cpistcmic 
community, for instance, made • cvciy effort to adopt modem educational apparal.us, 
methods and curriculum as the vehicle to revitalise Islamic teachings and endurance. 
There emerged the so•callc.! 1mulrasah educational system in which modern apparatuses 
and methods were introduced and religious subjects were taught side by side with 
secular ones. This led to the emergence of a 'clcrical-intclligcntsia' that came to be 
known as ulama•intelek (Islamic 'clerics' who were literate in modem knowledge). 
As members of the Indonesian intelligentsia began :;, ·?rrnulatc an irtcological 
response to the repressive colonial state, the plurality of their socio-cultural 
backgrounds gave rise to ideological differences. Consequently, members of the 
intelligentsia were divided into several intellectual politkal traditions. Thus, tMrc 
emerged a group of Muslim intclli~cntsia, communist intcliigcntsia, nationalist 
intelligen·.·~ia, socialist intelligentsia, Christian intelligentsia and so on. lrt conflicts 
among these intellectual traditions 'each group attempted to expand its followers by 
attaching itself to .established status groups (cultural ~olidarity groups). In these 
~ircu~stanccs, .the Indonesian intelligentsia hccamc . a fractured social stratum that 
caused difficulties for its ·identification. as 'a distinct social stratum. Even so, they 
continued _to shari) common sucial privilege, language, habitus, educational features and 
occupational orientation. In other words, the . Indonesian intclligcrttsia reflects a 
collective expression in terms nf 'identity in difference' and 'difference in identity'. 
However huge the differences among them, the Indonesian intelligentsia 
' -
belonged to a minority grouv .>f the modem Indonesian elite who were able to hold 
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leadership positions in Indonesian scdcty, polity and bureaucracy. The term 'elite' here 
means 'minorities of people who arc especially influential in shaping society's various 
institutional structures or spheres of activity. In modem society such structures and 
spheres include politics, administration, the economy, the military and the sphere of 
culture' (Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 15). Since the Indonesian intelligentsia as a social 
stratum became blurred, the term 'elite' could also be used to describe the 
intelligentsia's social fommtion after the 1920s. The Indonesian intelligentsia was part 
of Indonesian historical dynamics, and therefore its social formation was subject to 
historicization and transfom1ation. 
The first Indonesian (Malay) tcnninology to indicate the genesis of the Indies 
intc11ig~ntsia was 'bangsmvan pikiran' (the nobility by intellect) that began to emerge 
in the public sphere in the first decade of the 20'" century. 'fhis term was a code for the 
new generation of modem-educated Indies people associated with the movement 
towards kemacljoean (progress), in contrast to the term 'bangsal\'an ocsoe/' (the nobility 
by birth), which was associated with the old aristocracy. 'fhc tcm1 'bangsawmz pikiran ' 
was used either as a reference to individual intelle<:luals or to the collective entity of 
new Indies intc11igentsia. To emphasise the presence of the imagined community of the 
intelligentsia, the collectivity of 'bmzgsawmz pikiran ' was ~all·~d 'kaoem mace/a' (the 
new progressive community), while that of 'bangsml'lm ocsoc/' \V:"' called 'kaoem toea' 
or 'kaocm kol!llo' (the old community). In the 1910s, the opposition of members of the 
intelligentsia to the old aristocracy led to an effort to dissociate the word 'pikirtm ' 
(intellect) from the word 'bangsmvmr' (the nobility), since the tern! 'bangsawmz' 
implied a glorification of the old aristocratic privilege. There socn emerged the term 
'kaoe1.r tcrpelacljar' (educated community) , 'pcmoccla-pclacljar' (educated-youth) or 
jong (in Dutch). 'fhese terms were used as references to a collective entity of modem 
educated people. 
While the social formation of the modem Indonesian educated-elite resembled 
the constitution of the intelligentsia in the Eastern EuM(.~an context, the intellectual and 
conceptual framework of the Indonesian io1tclligcntsia was heavily influenced by 
theoretical literatures of Western Europe. The word 'Dreyfusiana'-rcfcrring to 
Western Europe's intellectu~l's hero, Alfred Drcyfus-was used by an Indies 
vernacular paper, Pembrita Bctawi (1901·03), as the nan1c of onr. of its columns. The 
Dutch term 'izrtcllec/lleel(en)' for 'intellcctua1(s)' was adopted in the writings of 
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members of the Indies intelligentsia by the 191 Os and began to gain its popularity in the 
public sphere by the 1920s. This was signalled by the establishment in 1923 of the first 
East Indies association to usc the word 'intel/ecllleelcn', namely the 'Bond van 
Inte/lectueclcn' (The Intellectual Union). On the other hand, the term 'imc/igcnsia' 
(intelligentsia) only began to be adopted in Indies ·'~ri;ings in the 1930s and to be 
frequently used in intellectual discourse from the late 1940s, but it never gained the 
same popularity as the tern> "intc/lec/lleel(en) '.22 The Indonesian tendency to usc the 
tcrn1 'intcl/ectucc/cn' interchangeably with the tcrn1 'inteligcnsia' followed a similar 
tendency in Western Europe. Thus, it was quite common in Indonesian intellectual 
discourse to usc the tern> 'inte/lectucel(en)' (with various spellings) to refer to the 
collective entity of a particular group of the intelligentsia, or to usc the tcnn 
'intc/igcnsia' as a reference to an individual intellectual. 
the Indonesian difficulty in distinguishing between 'intelligentsia' and 
'intellectual' becomes even more sCiious in the face of the popularity of the term 
'cendckiawan '.This term is in fact an lndoncsiar- neologism, synonymous with both the 
term 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectual' (kridalaksana 1994).1t is a neologism because the 
early meaning of the tcnn wns very different from its later and current associations. As a 
neologism it was subject to competing signillcation and discursive fom1ation. 
According to R. J. Wilkinson's dictionary of prc-20'h century Malay (1903; 
1985), the tcrn1 ctymoiogically derives from the Hindustani 'clrhmuli-f..ya' or 
'chandakiya '-which when adopted into classical Malay (pre 20°' century), meant 
'penipu' (deceiver) or 'pcndaya ' (s/mulerer). This word for instance was used in the 
traditional Malay text /Jikayat Gul /Jakuwali, in exprcssicns such as 'cllandakiya 
mana', which means 'what deceiver', 'what slander'. Sir Richard Winstcdt in his 
dictionary (1960) has also described that the word clri!lldi!kia in Malay as n further form 
of the word chandakia meaning pcnipu (deceiver) or pemlaya (slanderer), but in the 
Ncgcri Scmbilan rcgion,23 mcans 'clrerdek' (smart) or 'pin tar' (clever). 
In Indonesia, the word 'tjclu/ekia' appeared in W.J.S. Poerwadarminta's 
dictionary, Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia (1951), where it is reported to mean 
berakal. pandai, tjerdik (intelligent, clever, smart) and litjik (slander), and in Sutan 
21 The entrance of the term 'intelligentsia' into the Indonesian public sphere was most likely through a 
detour via Western European intellectual influence, instead of being imported directly from Russia or 
Poland. 
"The area oftl1e Malay Peninsula which is heavily settled by Malays from West Sumatra. 
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Mohammad Zain's dictionary, Kamus Mot/em /Jalrasa Imlonesia (1960), where it 
means tjerdik (smart). Furthermore, Zain indicates that the word is associated with 
Tjanakja, the fomter Prime Mini~ter of a Kingdom in pre-modem India, who was quite 
well known for cleverness in rhetoric. Finally, J Gonda in Sanskrit in Indonesia (1952) 
argued that the word 'cendekia ' or 'cmu/akiya' (in classical Malay) derives from the 
word 'canaJ..ya '. This word might refer to the name of a minister in the government of 
Candra Gupta in India (in the 4';. century), who was well known because he was both 
smart and clever in rhetoric. Alternatively, he added, the word 'canaJ..ya' can also be 
derived from the Hindi word 'cham/i ', which means tricky and deceitful. Thus, in the 
Minangkabau world the word has been used to describe an extraordinarily smart or 
tricky person. 
In the 1960s, the term 'cemlekiawon' (or 'tjemlekiawan' in old spelling) began 
to have political connotations synonymous with the concept of 'intellectual' or 
'intelligentsia'. This was signalled by the emergence of a lefiist intellectual association, 
Organisasi 1)endekiawwz Indonesia (OTI, Indonesian Intellectual Organization), in 
early 1965. Not long afierwards, the resistance journal of the Bandung chapter of the 
United Front of Indonesian Scholars (KASI), 7]emlekiawmz /Jerdjual!g (Intellectual in 
Struggle), appeared in 1966. By the 1970s the temt was regularly used in Indonesian 
public discourse through the New Order's policy of replacing Wr.stem words and 
tenninologies with indigenous ones. On 29 March-29 April 1976 there was a national 
seminar in Menado on 'Pem11mz dan Tauggzmg Jawab Ce11dekiawau dalam 
Pem/Jangzman' (The Role and Responsibility of 'Cendekiawan' in Development). A 
few months later (November 1976) Prisma (the most famous Indonesian socio· 
economic journal throughout 1910s/1980s) published a special edition (No.I I) entitled 
'Cemlekiawan'. In both cases, the term 'cel!dekiawall' was use.d to refer both to 
individual 'intellectuals' (ranging from u/ama and local geniuses to ·the modem• 
educated intellectual) and to the collective representation or 'intelligentsia' ?4 
During the 1980s/J990s, the term 'cemlekimvan Muslim' (Islamic·orientcd 
Cem/ekimvan) was widely used in publir. discourse. The attachment of cendekiawan to 
24 1lie notion of ccuclekiawau as intellectual can be found, for instance, in the work of Harsja W. 
Bacliliar, 'Kaum CcttcfckiawatJ di Indonesia: Suat11 Skctsa Sosiologi' ('Ccndekiawan in Indonesia: A 
Sociological Sketch'). The notion of ce11dekiawal! as intelligentsia can be found in the work of 
Oorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'CcmlekiawaiJ Dmria Kcliga: Orang 'Barat' di Dunia 'Timur" (11,e l11ird 
\Vord 'Ccndckiawan': TI1c \Vcstcm People in 11u: Enstcm World'), and agnin in Sclo Socrr.ardj;m's 
Cllaptcr I • lmrodllclio" 24 
the adjective 'Muslim' in this period reflects the growing influence of the Muslim 
intelligentsia, as a result of the increasing numbers of Muslim sarjana {degree holders), 
the invention of the Muslim intelligentsia's communicative sphere centred in mosques 
of secular universities, the growing influence of Muslim intellectuals with Western 
university backgrounds, and the deepening accommodation of the Muslim intelligentsia 
by the New Order bureaucracy and polity. In this context, the term 'ccndckiawan' was 
mainly attaclied to particular collective identities emanating from a common social 
habitus, value system, cognitive structure and collective memories, rather then from 
some specific historical 'call' or social function {as the ground of an intellectual 
collectivity). 
The adjective 'Muslim' as an icon of a particular collective identity/tradition 
was frequently activated in the power struggle both in the axis of state•society relations 
and in clashes of groups within society. The establishment of various associations of 
Muslim educated people such as JIB {1925), SIS {est. 1934), GPII {est. 1945), HMI {est. 
1941), I'll {est. 194/), II'NU {est. 1954), PMII {est. 1960), IMM {est. 1964), Pcrsami 
{est. 1964),1CMI {est. 1990), and KAMMI {est. 1998) can be seen as monuments to th~ 
reproduction of the Muslim intelligentsia's collective traditions and identities in the 
struggle for historicity. 
In this regard, it is clear thatthe_collectivity of Muslim educated•people in these 
various associations as well as in many other cultural and polilicRI organizations is best 
understood as the collectivity of 'intelligentsia' rathc' ,~;._,. the collectivity of 
'intellectuals', Even so, it is important to note that there is no collectivity without 
intellectuals. To quote Gramsci's view {1959: 67): 
There is no organization without intellectuals, that is, without organisers and 
leaders, without the theoretical aspect of the theory·practicc nexus distinguishing 
itself concretely in a stratum of people who 'specialise' in its conceptual and 
philosophical elaboration. 
To describe the individual intellectuals who serve as the re-fornmlators and 
articulators of collective ideologies and traditions, this thesis will adopt Gramsci 's tCrril 
'organic intellectual.' Differing slightly from Gramsci's conception {which grounded 
the term on timdamcntal social class), 'organic intellectual' in this study will be 
attached especially to cultural solidarity groupings. While Gramsci theorised that 
\Votk, 'PeranaiJ Cendekiawa11tialam l'embangwmn' (the Role of 'Cendekiawan' in the Oevelopmcnt). 
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organic intellectuals of a particular class (or group in the context of this thesis) have to 
emerge from their own class (group), which was not the case in the Indonesian context. 
Many leaders of the communist party, for instance, came from (lesser) priyayi and 
(petty) bourgeois families. At the same time, organic intellectuals of the stmtri group 
might come from non-santri origins. In the face of social encounters and inter-
relationships, identities arc subject to change and transformation. Thus, 'organic' in this 
sense is simply to indicate that this kind of intellectual is an integral part of social forces 
and to challenge the Wcbcrian notion of the intellectual as divorced from society. 
On the other hand, the fact that leaders of the Indonesian communist party 
mostly carne from a non-working-class origins indicates the importance of considering 
the Wcbcrian emphasis on the cultural sources of an intellectual's legitimation. ihc 
acquisition of kncwlcdgc through sccula; and religious educational institutions is 
invariably one component of being an intellectual, even if the type of knowledge and 
educational institution that acquires social prestige may vary widely at different times 
and in different socio-cultural contexts (Miller 1999: 26). ihus, organic intellectuals of 
the modern Muslim collectivities emerged from members of the intelligentsia and 
'clcrical·intelligcntsia' wl!o acquired educational qualifications as sources of 
(intellectual) legitimation. 
1.1.4 Power 
l'ollowing Foucault, the tcnn 'power' here refers to 'the total structure of 
actions' bearing on the actions of individuals who arc free; power is exercised over 
those who arc in a position to choose, and it aims to influence "'hat their choices will 
be. Thus, it involves 'strategic games between liberties' (Foucault 1980: 220; Hindcss 
!996: 99-100). 
Foucault criticized the traditional political theory of power for at least three 
reasons. 25 FirS<, orthodox domination theory or the 'sovcreigttty theory' of power views 
po\ver as fundamentally occasional. Power is a possession of the powerful, and it is at 
their discretion whether it is used or not. This notion of power, according to Foucault, 
risks masking its increasing interventions in social life (Foucault 1980: 92-114: 
Pasewark 1993: 7-9). 
All of these articles can be found in a book edited by A. Mahasin and I. Nalsir(1983). 
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Second, the traditional conception, as in Marxist theories, views power as 
fundamentally tied to the State and as the possession of a few. This monolithic view of 
power has been criticised by Foucault for concealing the practice of power by a diverse 
range of social actors and forces as well as impending efforts to analyse strategies of 
resistance to power (Foucault 1980: 156; Pascwark 1993: 9). To shift from this view, 
Foucault developed a different model of power which docs not locate power as a 
possession within the hands of a monolithic State. Foucault states: 'I don't want to say 
that the State isn't important; what I want to say is that relations ofpowcr ... ncccssarily 
extended beyond the limits of the State' (1979: 38). Thus, Foucault seems not to 
minimise the importance of the power of the State; he would rather suggest that power 
operates around and through the networks which arc generated around the institutions of 
the State; in some senses power has always been more thoroughly dispersed throughout 
society than has been realised. Power is regarded as a ubiquitous feature of human 
interaction. It is everywhere and is available to anyone (Mills 1999: 39; Hindcss 
1996: 100). 
Third, s,·vcrcignty theory places power and knowledge in an external 
relationship to each other. Knowledge is associated not with power but only with 
reason. This division, in Foucault's view, hides the involvement of power with 
knowledge. Knowledge is conceived as a sphere or its own, as if it is uninterested in 
power. Fot· Foucault, knowledge is inseparable from power, as modem power invades 
all aspects of social life. Knowledge is recognized as rut instrument as well as an effect 
ofpower(Foucault 1979a: 27, 257-308; Pascwark 1993: 8·9). 
Foucault then makes a distinction between the relationship of power as strategic 
games between liberties and two other types of power relationships, namely, 
'domination' and 'government' (Foucault 198g: 19). The reference to power as strategic 
games between liberties is at the core of his understanding of power in general. In this 
conception, power 'designates relationship between partners' in an ensemble of actions 
(Foucault 2000: 17). It depends on freedom and is exercised over free subjects who are 
in the position to choose and to influence. Thus, 'where there is no possibility of 
resistance there can be no relation of power'. 'For this reason, relationships of power 
will often be unstable, ambiguous and reversible' (Hindc.<s 1996: I OJ) 
2
' An excellent summary of the vnriety of conccptiorts of power Foucault criticizes is given in Pascwnrk 
1993: 7-t3). 
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Where power has been consolidated into 'domination', resistance remains 
possible, but it becomes much more difficult. Domination refers to those asymmetrical 
relationships of power in which subordinated persons have lillie room for manoeuvre 
because their 'margin of liberty is extremely limited' by the effect of power (Foucault 
1988: 12; 1-Iindess 1996: 103). 
Power exercised in 'government' lies between 'domination' and strategic games 
between liberties. 'Government' is particularly associated with notions of 'conducting' 
(in the sense of leading and or controlling a series of actions). It refers to a certain less 
sporttancous exercise of power over others (in more calculated and considered ways) 
mid, particularly, to the usc and invention of technologies for the regulation of conduct. 
In Foucault's view, 'there has been an expansion of government itself relative to 
straightforward domination on the one hand and to unstable and reversible relations of 
power on the other' (1-Iindcss 1996: 107). Authoritarian governments extensively 
exercise domination, while democratic governments give more room for reversible 
power relations. 
Based on Foucault's distinction of the three types of power relationship, it will 
be highlighted in this study that the problem of power relations in Indonesia is that the 
'statc-govcmmcnt power' for most of Indonesian history has extensively exercised 
'domination' rather than reversible powc1 ;~lations. Since the practice of domination 
i;as always been accompanied by the practice of discrimination and favouritism, this in 
turn affected power relations between individuals and groups within society. Thus, 
'domination' has been exercised not only in state-society interactions but also in power 
relations within society. 
Foucault's conception of power is important for this study. With the notion of 
moving away from a fixation on the State and the few, it is possible to view the power 
struggle of the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia not only along the axis of state and 
society relations, but also through clashes of individuals and groups within society. The 
development and performance of the Muslim intelligentsia can be seen to be influenced 
by the presentation of significant 'Others'. The type of power relations exercised by the 
state-government and other social forces affected the power strategies of Muslim 
in\d!igcntsia. 
The notion of knowledge as inseparable from power provides this study with the 
insight that the cultural struggle of Muslim intelligentsia might not be merely oriented 
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for the sake of'lruth' or religious ends but also for the sake of power interests. Thus, in 
the recurring emergence of the Indonesian Muslims' slogan of the return to 'gerakan 
kebudayan' (cultural movement), there could be submerged political motives and 
strategies. 
The notion of power as contestable and reversible enables this study to view the 
possibility of subordinated groups resisting the hegemonic stale and governmental 
power as well as of the prevailing power interplay and inlerpcnelralion among various 
groups of intelligentsia within Indonesian society. No hegemony is so powerful thai it 
exhausts all resources for resistance. 'Every power relationship', said Foucault, 
'implies, al least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forces arc not 
superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused. Each 
constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of possible reversal' 
(t~oucaull 2000: 25). Even a minority group does not necessarily become the loser in all 
dimensions of power relations, as politics and societies is comprised of an oficn 
complex balance of forces and cannot be reduced to the usc of legitimate force alone. 
Dale F. Eickclman and James Piscatori put this as follows (1996: 8): 
Societies, whether Buropcan industrial democracies, Third World developing 
countries, or bedouin tribal communities, arc comprised of an often complex 
balance of forccs ... Whilc it is true thai the highest decision-making hody-a 
parliament, oligarchic elite, ruling junta, or tribal council-often imposes its will 
and enforces decisions on subordinates, the usc of force may sometimes be 
counterproductive, risking greater instability than is already present. For the sake 
of collective order, authorities must oficn mediate differences among various 
groups in society. They may even find themselves in the position of needing to 
negotiate social, economic, or political policy with ostensibly subordinate 
groups. 
Thus, despite the preponderance of Muslim intelligentsia in the formal political 
and bureaucratic structures in the late 20111 century, the allraclion of Muslim politics at 
the grass·rools level tended to wane. AI the same time, most senior Muslim leaders 
tended to be less-obsessed with Islamic claims. this indicates the triumph of secular 
intelligentsia in other arenas of power relations. The winning of a power struggle in a 
particular sector can lead lo the limiting of power in another sector. 
The notion of power as a ubiquitous feature of human interaction practised by a 
diverse range of social actors and forces broadens the horizon oflhc political sphere and 
anticipates multiple determinations of politics. Politics as a power practice can be seen 
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as a potentiality in every aspect of social life. Politic~ as an arena of power relations, 
actions, and contestations resides not only in the mastery of socio·political capital 
(party, election, parliament, etc.) or in the ownership of economic capital (money and 
other economic resources), but als~ in the control of cultural-symbolic capital 
(education, discursive formation, and other systems of signification). 
For a long period of time, mainstream analysts of Indonesian politics who 
a!!cmptcd to make sense of Indonesian political history and development failed to see 
beyond surfa~e political phenomena. As David Levine noted ( 1969: 5), most Indonesian 
political observers limited their concerns to the purely political level and a month-by-
month cataloguing of political events. Because the concern of political analysts was 
limited by and large to the purely political level, power relations and contestations in the 
realm of knowledge and meaning tended to be ignored. As a result, political analysis 
drew a superficial picture of political developments and ignored the complexity and 
multiple arenas of power struggle. 
Based on the assumption that Indonesian Muslims had frequently failed to 
establish strong political parties, win elections, and control the parliament, many 
analysts ~arne to the conclusion that Muslim politics had been defeated. There was a 
little sc:ious a!!ention given to the Muslim struggles in the educational and symbolic 
field, which might have considerably increased the Muslim intelligentsia's bargaining 
power. Most political analysts underestimated the regenerative capacity of Muslim 
intellectuals and politics because they ~ ,·. ·.ntellcctual performance and politics as an 
end product rather then as a proccrs. To aiJ!lroach politics and intellectual performance 
as a process, it is important to develop an 'interactive' model of analysis which 
emphasis the ubiquity of power relations as well as the 'intertcxtuality' and multiple-
determinations of politics. 
1.1.5 Indonesia 
The term 'Indonesia' as a code of for an 'imagined-community' began to be 
invented by the lhdoncsian intelligentsia in the 1920s. Before this period, the terms 
'Netherlands East Indies' (NEI), 'Dutch East Indies' (DEI) and 'East Indies (EI) were 
used in reference to the territory and people under the Dutch colonial administration. In 
giving a!!ention to synchronic states of a language, this study will use NEI, DEI, or EI 
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for the historical period up to the 1920s and wit! apply the tenn 'Indonesia/Indonesian' 
afier the 1920s. 
Under the Dutch colonial administration of the twentieth century, East Indies 
society-based on the Law of December 31, 1906-was classified into tjtree groups: 
Europeans (including Eurasians), Natives (Boemipoetera}, and Chinese and other 
foreign Orientals (Maier 1993: 39). For these groups the colonial administration applied 
segregation policies which influenced peoples' pcrcepticn of communal boundaries. 
Before the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, the temt 'East 
Indies/Indonesian intelligentsia' in this study will specifically refer to the 'Native' 
intelligentsia in the sense of this Law. Afier Independence, however, the tcnn will be 
applied to intelligentsia of all Indonesian citizens, including the Chinese and Arab 
intelligentsia. This is again consistent with the attention to synchronic states. 
In pr~ctice, the island of Java was the focal point of the East. Indies (Indonesian) 
society. In Java were centred the political, administrative, educational and economic 
activities of the NEI (Indonesia). It was also in Java that the majority of the Indonesian 
population lived. Titus, the term 'Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia' in this study 
basically refers to a Java-centred (Muslim) intelligentsia composed of various ethr.ie 
backgrounds, although prominent Sun\atraitS arc also included. 
1.2 Previous Studies of the lltdoncsiail (1\tnslint) Intelligentsia and Intellectuals 
Surprisingly, there has been no single systematic study under the rubric of 
'Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia' (or illte/igellsia in Indonesian). Works under this 
rubric have appeared only as the text of a speech, an anthology, sections of books and 
articles in newspapers and journals.26 In all these cases, the term 'intclligeutsia' was 
interchangeable with 'intellectuals'. 
The absence of a systematic study of the Indonesian (M1slim) lntelligentsia 
reflects a Weberian bias in approaching Indonesian people of ideas. this approach has 
26 The only example of the published text of a speech is Ilana's 'Tanggung Djawab Moril Kaum 
lnteligensia' (11te Moral Responsibility or tlte Intelligentsia) delivered at the University or Indonesia on 
II June 1957. Dawam Rahardjo's book 'ltrtclcktua/, ltrtc/igcnsia, dan Pcrilab Politik Bangsa: Risalalr 
CendekiawarJ M11slim • (Intellectuals, Intelligentsia, and Political Behaviour of lhe Nalion: Essays on the 
Muslim intellectuaVintelligentsia [1993)) is tlte only example or an nntho1or,y. Works by Arier Budim:m 
(1981) and Selo Soemardjan (1981) are examples or articles on ln~onesian intelligentsia ns sections oro 
book. Wiratmo Sukito's work. 'Poslsi Kaum /llleligensitz ltuloncsia O~Jwasa lni' {11te Contemporary 
Po<ition or the lndonesion Intelligentsia) in Slasat Rant (No. 655, J(J December 1959) is on example or 
articles on Indonesian intelligentsia in journals. 
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been insensitive to the socio-historical context and social formation of people of ideas. 
As a result, attention has been given to ideas of individual intcllectulls rather than to the 
structural position and collective representation of various groups of Indonesian 
intellit;entsia. Julien Benda's conception of intellectu~l has been frequently used in 
Indonesian intellectual discourse and in the analysis of Indonesian intellectuals, whereas 
in fact people of ideas in most cases and in most of Indone~ian history have been an 
integral part of their own community and political collectivities. 
There have been only few systematic studies under the rubric of 'Indonesian 
(Muslim) intellectuals (or intclcktual and cctulckiawan in Indonesian). Among the few 
arc the works of J.D. Legge (1988), Daniel T. Sparringa (1997), and Daniel Dhakidae 
(2003) on Indonesian intellectuals in general;27 and the works of Mohammed Kamal 
Hassan (1980), Howard M. Federspiel's book (1992), and M. Syafi'i Anwar (1995) on 
Indonesian Muslim intelltctuals.2" The remaining works on Indonesian (Muslim) 
intellectuals arc only minot works, anthologies and thousands of articles in journals and 
newspapers.1.9 
With the exception of Legge's work that deals with the period of the Japanese 
occupation. all these bollks on Indonesian (Muslim) intellectuals focused their temporal 
attetltion on the New Older historical period. Thus, in terms of temporal orientation, 
none of these books is concerned with the time of longue dtm!e. Some books did look 
briefly at the historical antecedents of particular synchronic developments. This is, 
however, just background to their main temporal focus. In giving attention to the 
historical roots of modem Indonesian intellectu~ls, a common misconception prevailed 
27 Legge's book is entitled lntellccllla/s ancl Nationalism iiJ lmloncsia: A Study of the Following Recruited 
by Sutan Sjalrrir in Occupation Jakarta. Sparringa's dissertation is entitled Discourse, Democracy ancl 
Intellectuals in tire Nrw Order Indonesia, a Qualitati,•e Sociological Study. Dha~Jdae's book is entitled 
Cendekiawa11 da11 Kekuasaan tlalan: Ncgu:--a Orde /Jaru (Intellectuals and Power in the New Order State). 
" Hassan's book is entitled Muslim Intellectual RcspoiiSc to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia. 
Federspiel's book is entitled Muslim Intellectuals ami National De-.•elopmcnt !11lncloncsia. Anwar's book 
is entitled Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam lntlone.sia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cemlckiawan Af1ulim 
Orde Hant (Ideas and Actions of Indonesian Islam: A Political Study on the New Order's Muslim 
Jntcllcctuals/intclli&er.tsia). 
29 I!xamplcs of minor works are Ridwan Saidi's book (1990), CcndekiawatJ Islam zaman Bc/anda 
(Islamic intcllectual"intclligentsia in Dutch colonial era), and Fuadi Mardatillah's masters thesis (1997). 
lntd/cctua/ RcspoiiScs to the Establishment of/katcm Cemlckiawmr Muslim Indonesia (ICM/), 1990-/99S 
Ex~mplcs of anthologies arc works of Dick Hartoko, Golonga11 Cemlekiawan, Afereka ya11g Dcnmrah di 
Angin (Intellectual Group, 1llose Who Live in the Wind (1981]); of Aswab Mahasin (ed.), Cendekiawan 
dan Politik (Intcllcctuals/Jntclligcntsia nnd Politics [1933)); of Dawam Rahnrdjo, 'lntclekJua/, 
InteligeiiSia, dan l'erilaku Politik Dangsa : Risalah Cendekiawan Muslim (lntcllcctuals, Intelligentsia, 
and Political Ochtviour of the Nation: Essays on tlrc Muslim intellectuaVintclligcntsia [1993]); and of 
A.F.. Priyono (cd.) Kebcbcuan Cenclckiawan: Rcjlclcri Karmr Muda (Intellectual Freedom: Youths' 
Reflections [1996]). Examples of articles can be found in Appendix A & D. 
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in presenting the Dutch Ethical Policy of the early 20'11 century as the origin of the 
installation of a Wcstcm educational system in this country/Q whereas in fact it 
originated in the Dutch Liberal Policy of the later part of the 19111 century. The 
misconception refl,·· ,: the in~dcquacy of a common genealogical reading. In giving 
attention to the in:~ : ·,· Jal response and developments in a particular historical period, 
most of these books do not pay enough attention to the transmission and transfonnation 
of intellectual collective memories and traditions across generations. Because of this 
they failed to reveal how the past continues implicitly to penetrate or inspire the 
construction of intellectual ideas and identities of the present. 
Apart from their emphasis on a particular historical period, most of these 
books also limit their attention to a partial aspect of intellectuals' and intellectual 
development. With the exception of Legge's and Anwar's works, these books do not 
take into serious consideration the educational field as the cultural basis of intellectual 
development. bhakidae did pay attcntkn to the influence of the Dutch Ethical Policy on 
the genesis of modem Indonesian intellectuals. Nevertheless, in focusing his study on 
the New Order period, he almost omits to take into consideration the New Order's 
educational features and development as the cultural basis of intellectual presentation in 
this period. With the exception of Dhakidae's and Hassan's works, these books also 
give little attention to the 'structure of discursive practices as a constructive factor in 
intellectual development .1:1d contestation. Attention has been given to the political 
setting of particular historical periods and how intellectuals reacted to it, but there has 
been little awareness of how the structural position of intellectuals, the public sphere 
and political opportunity structure have affected intellectual expressions and strategies. 
The lack of this latter consideration has given rise to the essentialist notion of 
intellectual imperatives n Ia Weber. 
Beyond the tenn 'inteWgentsia' and 'intellectual', the Indonesian (Muslim) 
intelligentsia have been studied under the general rubric of the 'Indonesian elite'. 
Exan1ples of these studies were Robert van Niel's work (1960) on the origins and 
fommtion of the nationalist elite in the first quarter of the 20111 century; Herbert Feith's 
work (1962) on the solidarity makers and administrators of the Indonesian elite during 
the period of parliamentary democracy (1950-1951); Donald K. Emmerson's work 
(J 976) on the political culture oflndonesian elite in early years of the New Order, and 
30 Titis kind of misconception can be found in Dhakidae (2003), Anwar (1996), Azra (2000). 
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Ann Gregory's work (1976) on the recruitment and the factional pattern of 
Indonesian political elite dming Guided Democracy and the early New Order prriod. 
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The term 'elite' is supposed to be a broader category than intelligentsia. In the 
East Indies (lndoncsiml) context it has also to include the old aristocracy and adat (local 
customs) chiefs, traditional scholastic u/ama and other former (non-Islamic) clerisies as 
well as the old (moneyed) bourgeoisie. In fact, all t.he•.c books arc concerned more with 
the modem Indonesian elite, which is more or less idcr.tical with the intelligentsia. 
Under the tub ric of 'elite', focus of attention is mustly given to the political dimensions 
of this educated stratum (such as political gains, v:~lucs, behaviour, and recruitment), 
rather than to krtOwledgc and cognitive dimensions of this stratum (such as schools, 
ideas, and discourses). 
All works on the Indonesian elite share certain commonalities. They arc not 
intended lo deal with the time of longue durce, although they do give attention to the 
historical background of their field of study. All highlight the importmtcc of Western 
education in the constitution of the modem Indonesian elite. Nevertheless, \vith their 
concern on power relations being limited to the purely political and administrative 
fields, there lias been no serious attempt to look at the educational field as an arena for 
power struggles among various groups of the elite and to figure out the impact of 
contestation and achievement in this field for the future constitution of the Indonesian 
elite. In emphasising the influence of political and bureaucratic positions on dec!sion 
making processes, these works also gave little attention to power struggles ;n the 
discursive formation and symbolic field which would have significant political impacts. 
In addition to these commonalities; they have some individual shortcomings. 
Van Nicl tended to ignore how the status-oriented school; and different educational 
systems became a source of conflict and contestations amr ng the early modem elite. In 
depicting the modern educated elite as followers of West :m ways, he did not attempt to 
envision the possible followers of Islamic ways from the trajectory of the Western 
education system. In emphasizing the importance of West•!m education, he gave little 
attention to the formation and development of modem-Islamic schools that would also 
contribute to the constitution ofthe modern Indonesian elite. 
Feith paid attention to discursive practkcs especially in relations to issues of 
democracy and constitutional debates in•the Constituent Assembly. In focusing on a 
particular historical period, however, he did not pay enough attention to the 
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interpolation· of diachronic inter-generational intellectual memories and ideas in these 
.synchronic debates. He realized that education had become a constituting clement of 
. l 
administrators. His attention to this fie:: r. ... wcvcr, did not extend beyond the programs 
of the cabinets. 
In focusing on the political culture of the Indonesian elite in the early New 
Order period, Em•ncrson's work did take into consideration the long-term development 
of the Indonesian elite. In finding that the composition of the Indonesian legislators and 
administrators had been dominated by the abcmgcm elite, however. Emmerson quickly 
came to conclusion that political Islam was weak. At the same time, he found that the 
origins of the students in his samples, in comparison to those from the elite, wt. c Jess 
Javanese and more urban and smllri, as well as less intense in feelings of cthnicity and 
more intense in religious feeling. Even so, he made no an attempt to extrapolate this 
finding as a basis for envisioning the possible elevation of these scmtri students into the 
future legislative and admi:.istrativc elite of this nation. 
Ann Gregory's work came to th~ same conclusion as EmmerSon's that the 
political elite had been dominated by the educated {1baaga11 of the upper status of 
Central Java. In coming to this conclusion, ho\Vcvcr, she did not take into COilsideration 
Muslim progress in the educational field which would influence the elite recruitment 
pattern in the future. 
Other kinds of works rclevm\1 to the study of the Indonesian (Muslim) 
intelligentsia and intellectuals arc works mi: (i) intcllcctualmovcmcnts, (ii) a~sociations 
of Indonesian (Muslim) students and intelligentsia; (iii) schools and politics, and (iv) 
ideas or ideo-political formulation and responses of individual intellectuals or group of 
intclLctuals in a particular historical conjuncture. two examples of the firSt one arc the 
works of McVey (1965) on the rise of Indonesian communism and of Ocliar Nocr 
(1973) on the Modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia, 1900·1942; two examples of 
the second one arc works of Akita Nagazurni (I 972) on the formation of Budi Utomo 
and of Agussalim Sitompul (1997) on the historical development ol liMI; two 
examples of the third one arc the works of Lee Kam Hing (I 99S) on education and 
politics in Indonesia, t94S-1965 and of Taufik ,\bdullah (1972) on the Kaum Mud•l 
schools and politics in w"~t Sumatra; three cxumplcs of the fourth one are works of 
Mochtar !>abottingi (1991) on ideas of nationalism and egalitarianism in Indonesia, 
1908-1980, of Michael Francis Laffan (2003) on the formation of Islamic nationalism, 
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and of Bahtiar Efcndy ( 1994) on the transfonnation of Indonesian Islamic political ideas 
and practices. 
Most of these books arc historical narratives of particular case studies, which do 
not offer thorough theoretical frameworks. Works on intellectual movements, student 
associations, and schools and politics, for instance, surprisingly did not include the 
theoretical literatures and perspectives on social movements. Moreover, in giving 
attention to the institutional and ideational dimensions of Indonesian (Muslim) educated 
people, most of these studies did not pay attention to the structural position of 
Indonesian educated-people. In giving attention to the educational field, most of these 
studies tended to be biased to one or another educational system, thus ignoring the 
diversity of educational trajectories of the ·.;• .'clemlndonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia. In 
cases when some of these studies paid attention to the time of longue dtm!c, they failed 
to consider generational &nd synchronic dimensions of particular ideas. With the 
exception ·Jf the works of Pabollingi and Laffan, and to some extent of Noer, these 
works also did not examine discursive practices and their constructive efii.:cts as a 
critical field of analysis. 
MeV e) recognised that early Indo,Jesian nationalist movements did net begin as 
structured political parties but rather as loosely organized social movements. Without 
the insight of theories of social movements, however, she did not go further to 
extrapolate the future shape of Indonesian nationalist movements from the growth of 
structurccl political parties from the 1920s. 
In giving attention to reformist schools as a focal point of the modernist Muslim 
movement, Noer gave little allcntion to the \Vestcm education system. As a result, he 
did not make any extrapolation of the emergence of rnodcmist Muslim intellectuals 
from the trajectory of Western education system, nor did Laft 1'S work. 0.1 the oUter 
hand, with his focus of attention on Budi Utomo, Nagazumi .;aid nc- attention to the 
growth of modem Islamic schools. Abdullah's and Lee Kam Hing's concerns with 
education and politics were limited respectively to the involvement of particular school 
communities in a particular political movement and to the transfommtion of education 
in line with the transformation in the national politics. Neither saw the educational field 
as a site of political and power contestations itself. 
Sitompul's work tended to overestimate the individual influence of Lafran P,!•lc 
(the founding father of the HMI) in the construction of the HMI's ideology of 
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inclusi·1ism, ignoring the generational dimension of this con.;truction. On the other 
hand, Effendy tended to overestimate the role of the new generation of Islamic 
intellectual of the 1970s/1980s' as the first Muslim intellectual generation which offered 
a 'substantialistic' approach to Islamic political ideas. In fact, had diachronic inter-
generational influences been considered, it could be seen that the progressive ideas of 
this new generation developed out of the foundations that had been paved by 
intellectuals of the previous generation, namely, the third generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia. Furthcnnorc, while the poly-interpretability of Islam was the core of his 
argument, he depicted this new generation as a monolithic intellectual representation of 
the 'rcnewal'-libcral line, ignoring the presence of contestations and conflicting 
positions within this generation. 
Pabottingi offered a useful approach and analysis by tackling the economic, 
cultural and discursive detcm1inations of Indonesian nationalism and egalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, llc tended to ignore the educational deterrnination of intellectual 
development and ideas. l-Ie did not offer cnougll discussion on education as a force field 
of power relations and struggles. 
All in all, previous studies in this field have not given sufficient attention to the 
social formation and structural positi()J\ of the Indonesian intelligentsia. Most of the 
studies have ignored the importance of the /ougue durcc. In relation to this temporal 
dimension, there has been little attempt to combine attention to synchronic states in 
relation to diachronic continuities and the generational dimension of intellectual ideas 
and movements. In these studies, power relations have been restricted to the purely 
political and bureaucratic fields. As such, power relations in the educational, Sylilbolic 
and discursive field have not been taken into serious consideration. Studies on particular 
groups of the ln:.Joncsian intelligentsia have tended to isolate the development, 
ideologies and identities of these groups from interaction and interpenetration with other 
groups. Most of the studies ill this field have been historical narratives which have not 
involved an intertextual and interdisciplinary approach. All these characteristics make 
most of these studies particularistic in tem!s of their temporal and spatial relevance. 
Only a few of til em make a significant contribution to the enrichment of methodologies 
and theoretical literatures. 
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1.3 Alternative Approach, Aim and Methodology 
This thesis is a dynamic, interactive and intertextual approach to the study of 
Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia in its relations to power. Its approach can be 
understood ihrough the following features. 
1.3.1 Dynamic 
The dynamic approach of this study lies in its attempt to situate synchronic 
states within a diachronic context. The aim of this approach is to sec continuity and 
change in the development of Muslim intelligentsia and power, especially in the 
performance of its education, associations, discursive practices, identities, ideologies 
and political achievement, within the time concept of the longue durce; that is from the 
inception of the Western education system in the East Indies in the second half of the 
19th century until the end of the 2oth century. Discussion focuses on the development of 
Muslin! intelligentsia in the 20th century. 
Based on the argument that each synchronic state exists in diachronic time, this 
thesis will examine the historically structured intellectual traditions and identities and 
the possibilities of action and the desires of individual or collective agencies to 
reproduce and reformulate these traditions and identities, within specific conditions of 
the public sphere. Individual agency as reproducer and re·fom!Ulator of these collective 
traditions and identities is represented by organic intellectuals; while collective agency 
is represented by generation. The term generation here is not simply detcmlined by a 
commonality in age, but also by historical experience. As Eyern1an noted (1994: 70): 
The sociological notion of generation implies more than being born at 
approximately the same time: it suggests a co :~monality of experience which 
creates a ground for shared outlook, a sense of collective destiny, that unites 
actors, even those who have never met, ... especial!y if one sl:nres other 
characteristics, such as social background and values, as well. 
In Karl Mannheim's view, a generation is a forn1 of collective identity growing out of a 
common set of experiences, which give rise to 'an identity of responses, a certain 
affinity in the way in which all move with and arc forn1cd by their common 
experiences' (Mannhcim 1952: 306).31 
For each generation this study will try to find its dominant discourse and special 
codes of ideational and identity formation which served as signposts for the construction 
------------------------- ---- -- ---------- - --- ------ -- - --- ---
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of community and otherness, of tmdition and innovation, and of what to expect and 
what to do. These codes would in tum reflect what Eycnnan and Jamison called 'the 
knowledge interest' of a particular intellectual generation (Eycnnan and Jamison 
1991).32 
1.3.2 Interactive 
The interactive approach of this study lies in its attempt to describe the 
development of Muslim intelligentsia and power as being a result of dynamic interplay 
between past and present, between and within various intellectual-political traditions, 
and between various arenas of power relations. The aim of this approach is threefold: 
first, to raise an awareness about the debt of current intellectual thought to the past and 
to avoid an overestimation concerning the production of new ideas or the view that they 
can be just taken for granted; second, to raise an awareness that the self-perception, 
identities and idealism of the Muslim intelligentsia cannot be isolated from the presence 
of signif1cant 'Others'; third to raise an awareness about the multiple dctcmtinations of 
politico•intcllr.ctu~l bargaining power, politico·intcllcctual strategies, and politico• 
intellectual ideologies. Concerning the J\rst aim, attention will be given to the vertical 
network of memories and intcllcctual·political tradition~ across generations. Concerning 
Ute second aim, attention will be given to the imerpcnetration and conflicting 
relationships between and within diverse intellectual-political traditions. Concerning the 
third aim, attcntimt will be given to international environment, political opportunity 
structure, economic factors, education, discursive practices, public sphere and 'power 
games' (actual political contestations). 
With Ute time-frame and technical lintits of this study, discussions of the 
domestic and international environment, political opportunity structure and economic 
factors will be presented as a background to the core analysis. Th~ core analysis will be 
focused on the interplay of power struggles in the educational field, discursive practices, 
and the public sphere which culminate in 'power games' (actual political contestations). 
Thus, the emphasis is given to cultural and political dimensions of the Muslim 
intelligentsia's development (sec Figure 1). 
31 Quoted in Eyerman (1994: 70). 
32 The 'knowledge interest' can be defined as the kind of knowledge that is fotrtted in the context of a 
particular generation of intellectuals (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 45·65). In comparison, Weber's view 
~ ~-~ ~~ ~-~ ---- -------------------------- ----- -
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A. Education 
Education is considered important not only as a source of the intelligentsia's 
cultural legitimatiort, but also as an arena of power struggle. Education provides not 
only a schemata of class distinction but also a fundamental principle of the established 
order. As Pierre Bourdicu argued, the dominant class docs not dominate overtly: it docs 
not force the dominated to confonn to its will. Rather, the influence of the dominant 
class is embodied in economic and cultural capital, which is imbricated throughout 
society's irtstitutions artd practices and rcpror1uced especially by educational institutiorts 
and practices (Bourdicu 1988: 87). In this context, education plays an importartt role in 
the construction of habiws; that is the collective schemata of experience and perception 
that delimits the availability of 'subjective' ideas, personality, personality traits, and 
irtstances of consciousness (Bourdicu 1996: I 0 I). 011 the other hand, Antonio Gramsci 
argued that the battle for counter hegemony necessitates an alternative educational 
system which enables the dominated class to obtain access to fonnal education 
(Gramsci 19/1: 29-43). In addition to Bourdicu and Grmitsci, it has to say that even 
within a particular system of education there is a possibility for competitive power 
struggles. This is especially true in the context of the public educational system, 
particularly that of the irtdepcrtdcnt state, which is theoretically open for people from 
diverse socio·graphic backgrounds. 
With education as an arena of power struggle, knowledge is seen ns irtseparable 
from power. The rise of human sciences, as F\·.ucault eloquently pointed out in 
Discipline and Pu11islt: The l1irtlt of the Prisons ( 19/9a), has been both all instrument 
and an effect of ever-increasing power interventions in social life. In the Indonesian 
context, the early ititroduction of a modem education system and the imported body of 
Wcstem knowledge can be seen ns part of a colonial domination, which created a new 
social hierarchy based on the colonial hierarchy of knowledge. This forced the 
subordinated groups to fonn an alternative school system in their efforts to revitalize 
subaltern knowlcdgcs. As there was more than one educational system introduced in the 
NEI (Irtdoncsia), education can be regarded as both part of what joined people in groups 
and what divided groups. With the passing of colonialism, the power struggle in the 
was that ideas ai'c socially 'situated' ana :;haped by world-views or 'styles of thought'. TI1cse styles of 
thought were associated with, among other things, periods and with generations (Ourke 2000: 5). 
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educational sphere was far from over. In assuming that economic capital continued to be 
dominated by foreign and non-indigenous capitalists, the mastery of 'cultural capital' 
through the improvement of educational qualifications became the main vehicle of 
various groups of Indonesian intelligentsia for the elevation of their bargaining power. 
B. Discursive Practices 
Discursive practices as processes of text production, distribution and 
.:onsumption arc considered important as the mediums and instrument of power 
struggles, social change and social construction. Power struggles occur both in and over 
discourse. 'Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undcrn1ines it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it' (Foucault 1976: 101). 
Thus, changing discursive pmctices arc an important clement in social change. 
Discourse has at least three constructive effects. It contributes to the construction of 
social 'identities', of social 'relational' (relationships between people) and of social 
'ideational' or systems of knowledge and bclicf(Fairclough 1999: 55·6, 64·5, 78-9). 
This study will try to consider the contestations of various groups of the 
intelligentsia within and through discursive practices and the influence of a dominant 
discourse at a particular historical conjuncture on the construction of the social 
identities, social relation and social ideologies of a particular gcr1cration of the 
Indonesian (Muslim) intclligcrllsia. The discourse analysis in this study will also 
identify the influence of particular books, periodicals. newspapers and other 
publications for the reproduction and rcfonnulation of the Muslim intellectual-political 
identities, ideologies and traditions. 
C. Public Spllcrc 
The public sphere is considered important as the site where discourses arc 
expressed and where intellectual and political exercises find space for actualization. The 
tcnn public sphere here refers to the domain of social life in which public opinion is 
fonned. 
As JOrgcn Habcnnas observed ( 1989), the establishment of a modern intellectual 
tradition in the Western European context was part of the emergence of what he called 
the 'bourgeois public sphere' around the 171h and I 81h century. This public sphere was 
centred around a critical discourse on literary works of the audience-oriented bourgeois 
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family in !he newly fom1cd social inslilutions of the public realm: clubs, journals, 
periodicals, coffee houses, salons andcenacles. This kind of public space was a meeting 
place for the intellccltml circles of urbanising European (mercantile) society in which 
private individuals assembled 'for the free, equal interchange of reasonable discourse, 
thus welding themselves into a relatively cohesive body whose deliberations might 
assume the fom1 of a powerful political force' (Eagleton 1997: 9). 
The new sociability, together with the rational-critical discourse that grew in 
social institutions of the public realm, depended on the rise of national and territorial 
power stales on the basis of an early mercantile capitalist economy. This process led to 
an idea of society separate from the ruler (or the slate) and of a private realm separate 
from the public (Habem1as 1989: 23·6; Calhoun, 1992: 7). 
The early bourgeois public sphere was composed of narrow segments of the 
European population, comprised mainly of educated and propertied men, in which 
aristocrats played leading roles. They conducted a discourse in an exclusive way with 
prejudice to the interests of those excluded. Habermas names this public sphere as the 
'bourgeois public sphere' not simply because of the class composition of its members. 
He rather suggests that the rise of a new bourgeois society around the 171h century 
Europe produced a certain form of public sphere. tn further developments, this 
bourgeois public sphere experienced a continual expansion to include more and more 
participants (as well as the development of large scale organizations as mediators of 
individual participation). This situation brought degeneration to the quality of discourse 
(Haber111as 1989: 22-3; Calhoun 1992: 3, 7). 
The ideal of the public sphere, in Habem1as' view, is that equality and rational 
critical argument prevail. Participants in public discourse arc unconstrained by 
inequalities of power or money; citizens could exercise influence on the slate without 
being subjeetlo coercion. This influence is, for the most part, infor111al; it only becomes 
formal periodically, during general elections. In contemporary society, however, his 
view is that the public sphere no longer functions as the domain of rational debate. The 
liberal public sphere, although it presumed the participation of all, was actually limited 
to men with property. In the nineteenth century it expanded beyond these limits to 
include working-class men. With the growth of the welfare stale, in particular, these 
changes meant that the public sphere was no longer the site of discussion between 
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private individuals. It had now become the area for conflicts of interests between groups 
and organizations (Habcnnas 2000: 2:;9-294; Nash 2000: 283-4).33 
The genesis of the modem 'Indonesian' (Ea~t Indies) 'public sphere' in the early 
twentieth century shows some similarities and some differences with that of the Europe. 
Similar to the early European puhlic sphere, the early 'Indonesian' public sphere was 
composed of a narrow segment of the East Indies population, mainly educated people 
(of aristocratic and petty bourgeois families) and aristocrats, with the powerful influence 
of old aristocracy. These early modem educated East Indies people also conducted a 
discourse in an exclusive way with prejudice to the interests, ideas, and values of 
conservative groups. However, while the emergence of the modem public sphrr2 in the 
European context was an organic part of the rise of the (moneyed) bourgeois class, in 
the Indies context, it was part of the rise of the new stratum of intelligentsia. Thus, it is 
more appropriate to depict the early (modem) 'Indonesian' public sphere as the 
'intelligentsia public sphere' rather than the 'bourgeois public sphere'. 
Furthermore, while the early public sphere in the European context was centred 
around a critical discourse on literary works, the early public sphere in the 'Indonesian' 
context centred around a discourse on the issue of kcmadjocan (progress); that is how to 
catch up with the progress of other civilizations, especially Wcstem societies. Last but 
not least, the degree of freedom of the early 'Indonesian' public sphere was a far cry 
from that of the Europe, for it was operated under colonial domination. 
The usc of Habcnnas' notion of public sphere in the Indonesian context needs a 
certain adjustment. First, in agreement with the critique of contemporary theorists of the 
public sphere, the very emphasis of Habcrrnas' notion of the public sphere on rational-
critical debate implies an incapacity to deal fairly with 'identity politics' and conccms 
for difference (Calhoun 1992: 3). In the Indonesian context, the public sphere has been 
used not only for expressing rational-critical arguments but also, in most cases, for 
expressing the rationalization of identity politics and ideologies of competing social 
forces.34 Second, while the transformation of the public sphere in Haberrnas' view only 
" For these reasons, Hobennas's book was er.litled 'Stmktumamlcl dcr 6jfcnt/iclleit' {111e Structuml 
Trnnsfomution of the Public Sphere), first published in Gennony in 1962.111e English trnnslotion of this 
book wos first published in 1989. 
" It has been orgued by Kious Eder (1993: 20-7) thot the key to cxploining the path of development 
leading to modernity in the Western experience lies in the learning process nnd symbolic practices in the 
sphere of culture. As a society moves from traditional to moderit life, the arena for n collective learning 
shins from closc:d..communal to opcn·associational bonds, from estates and castes to class society. Tite 
changing arena of social learning will in tum change the symbo1ic universe. In association the symbolic 
---- --- --------------- --- ------------ --------------- ---- --- ------------ ---- ---- ---
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means the transfonnation in the scope of its participants, this transformation in the 
Indonesian context involved not only its scope but also its degree of frc~ctom: from 
restriction to openness and vice versa. Third, Habcm~as's notion of t'•~ public sphere 
remained biased toward the traditional conception of power relations, such as Marxist 
theories, which view power as fundamentally tied to the state. Thus in his view, critical 
discourse in the public sphere is primarily intended to influence the statu: Habennas 
tends to undervalue its function in influencing power relations among t.it:!Jicting groups 
within society. For a plural society like Indonesia, where clements of the social orders 
seldom mingle as ortc political unit (Fumival 1980}, discursive practices in the public 
sphere, especially in the absence of a common enemy, arc directed first and foremost to 
influence power relations within society. 
D. Power Games 
Power games, as actual political contestations, arc the climax of an ensemble of 
power struggles in various arenas of power relations at a particular historical 
conjuncture. Power games reflect and affect consolidation as well as severe corttestation 
irt a series of power struggles both in state-society relations and in clashes among 
various groups (ofintclligerttsia) within society. 
'these power games produce specific historic (political) 'monuments' of eacli 
gcnemtion of the intelligentsia. 'these monuments in tum became touchstones for the 
reproduction and rcfommlation of intellectual traditions by the following generation of 
intelligentsia. 
universe is produced by discursive communication which involves a high degree of 1ationality and equal 
rights to free thinking and speech. On the other bond, Indonesian society in Ute 20~ crntury was still a 
communal not an associntional society. Its cultural solidarity still rcm.aincd locked in primordinl systems 
(ascribed group affiliation). instead of achieved group affiliation. Associations as a neccsso.ry condition 
for establishing civil society did not yet exist to any grc~t extent. TI1e process of collective social learning 
ho.d mostly been facilibtcd by communal groups, instead of associations. As a ~esult. the production of a 
symbolic universe, as n mediation for whole social actions, was fostered more by the spirit of 
communalism rather tlmn by rational measures of association. 
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The genealogy of the Inrlone~ian Muslim intelligentsia can be incorporated 
academically into the tield of the 'social history oi intellectuals'. According to an 
American specialist in this field, Martin Jay, the social history of intellectuals 'can be 
fruitfully unders1~11d as a force field of different impulses' which functions at 'the 
shifting intersection of different, ol\en conflicting discourses'. Intellectual historians, ia 
his view, tend tc value a productive exchange betweeil these impulses and discourses 
rather thar: an either/or choice (Jay 1993: 2·3). 
In using the concept of the lollgue tl:m!e, this study will also follow a Braudelian 
emphasis on the importance of :\j• interdisciplinary apjltoach. lu Draudel's view, no 
particular disciplinr. has a mon<';;vly t.n the truth about human or natural existence. He 
argued that all social scicn~es shou.d be mobilized because it is essential that a histor; 
based on the loll~lie durce be truly multi-faceted (Braudel1980; Lechte 1994: R9-90). 
-- -- -- ---- -- --- - -- - ------- ---- -- -------------------- --------- ---- ---- ------- ----- --- -------------------- --- __ _I 
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In following the Braudelian emphasis on the longue dtm!e and on an 
interdisciplinary approach, this study is not intended to f.·,::.:w all of Braudel's 
approaches to historical writing. The timeframe expected by Braudel's longue duree is 
probably much longer than that covered in this study. Braudclian historical writing is 
concerned with the details of particular events and realities, while the concern of this 
study is not on the detail but rather on finding a general pattern of hi:<<orical events and 
realities. Furthermore, while the interdisciplinary approach of Braudclian historical 
writing mobilizes broad academic disciplines such as economics, geo~;raphy, 
anthropology, sociology, the interdisciplinary study of this thesis will involve more 
limited academic disciplines. Geography, for instance, will not be included in the 
analysis, while economics will be used in a very liwited sense. 
The interdisciplinary approach of this study will be based by and large on 
sociology (especially sociology of knowledge and political sociology-including the 
sociology of social movements), cultural studies, post-colonial studies, socio-linguistics, 
and discourse analysis. A new sociology of knowlcdge35 for its great concern with 
microsociology, with the everyday intellectual life of small groups, circles, networks 
and cpistcmic communities is important to understand the fundamental units which 
construct and disseminate krtowledg~ and ideologies (Burke 20fl0: 8). A new political 
sociology36 with its emphasis on the contestation of soeiai relationships in culture: in 
everyday life, media representations, and institutional practices-in addition to the 
traditional concerti of political sociology on the relations between society and the 
state-helps to uuderstand politics at a potentiality in every aspect of social life. Politics 
in this sense can be seen as cultural. 'Where social life is based on signification, the 
manipulation and contestation of meanings is itself political' {Nash 2000: x-xii). The 
sociology of social movements because of its concem with a network of informal 
interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations (Diani 2000: 
161) is useful to understand the creation and reproduction of a shared set of beliefs amt 
a sense of belongingness, as Wcli as of collective solidarity and identities of particular 
traditions of the intelligentsia. Cultural studies with its concern for the construction, 
interpenetration, and transformation of cultures and identities provides an insight into 
the creation and changes of Muslim individual and collective identities. Postcolonial 
"For tlte difference between the old and new sociology of knowledge, see i'eter Durke (2000). 
,. For the difference betWeen the otd and new political sociology, see Kate Nash (2000: x-xiv). 
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studies provide an insight into the longcr-tcnn implications of the colonial hierarchy of 
knowledge and residual traces and memories of subordination for the dc\·clopmcnt of 
the Muslim intelligentsia. Socio-linguistics is helpful to understand the social 
specificity and transfonnation of language: that language in its social dimension is 
constantly reflecting and transforming class, institutional, and group interests (Bakhtin 
and Volisinov 1986: 66). Finally, discourse analysis is important to identify power 
struggles over and within discourse and their constructive effects on social identities, 
social relationships and ideologies of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
In line with this interdisciplinary approach, ideas and theoretical frameworks of 
particular great thinkers and theoreticians such as Antonio Gramsci, Max Weber, 
Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and JUrgcn Hallctmas wili be adopted partially-as 
far as their relevance is apr , 'riatc to the understanding of the subject matter and 
particular issues of this study-rather than as a total package. When parts of their ideas 
arc adopted, they arc also subject to modification. This is for the simple reason that all 
social phenomena are socially and historicall} :..:oundcd (Turner 1994: 146). As such no 
single grand narrative and theory in its totality and its original construction can be 
applied to the whole of particular social phenomena and historical realities. 
Furthermore, Indonesia as a plural society with diverse social memories and identities, 
modes of production, systclns~Ofsignification and subject positions is too complex to be 
approached and explained by n single theory and narrative. 
'fhis study will also mobilize an 'intcrtcxtual' approach. This last tcnn refers to 
notions of the rclationality, interconnectedness and interdependence of texts and 
discourses. In the view of modem literary theorists such as M. M. Bakhtin, Julia 
kristeva; and Roland Barthes, texts, whether they be literary or non-literary, can be 
l'iewcd as lacking in independent meaning. A particular text or work of literature, after 
all, is built froa! systems, codes and traditions established by previous texts and works 
of literature and is influenced by different systems, codes and traditions of other 
contemporary texts and works of literatur<:. To quote from Graham Allen (following 
Bakhtin): 'All utterances arc dialogic, their meaning and logic dependent upon what has 
previously been said and on how they will be received by others' (Allen 2000: 19).37 
Based on this theoretical perspective, to interpret texts and utterances of Muslim 
intellectuals and to. discover their meaning, or meanings, is to trace those relations. In 
37 For a good sununary of theories of'intcrtcxtuality', sec Graham Allen (2000). 
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this regard, attention will be given to the interplay of inter-generational t~;;ls of Muslim 
intellectual traditions, to the rclationality of diverse and often conflicting texts and 
discourses, and to the interdependence of discursive and non-discursi"c fo,mations. 
The aim of this interdisciplinary and intcrtcxtual ~pprnach is to ~~c the 
development of Muslim intelligentsia from many different po5itinns and perspectives as 
well as to sec the diversity of impulses and interactions ill influencing the development 
of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
1.3.4 Methodology 
The methodology of this study has been indicated • · tile discussion or' the 
aloremenl;oned approaches. In practical terms, the analysis and writing of this study 
will usc the following methoc.ls. 
In attempting to situate syrtchronic states within a diachronic context, the 
organization of this writing will bP. based on chronology. In prcscntinc an interactive 
approach, however, this chrotiOiogical method will be combined with a thematic 
organization of writing. Thus, it is a chronology expressed through sub-topics of each 
chapter. Each sub•topi,., might rctum the chronology to its early stage. The sub·tor,ics of 
every chapter will include 2 description of the poliiical and econoiuic setting ts 
background; education; discursive practices; thr public sphere; power games; and the 
intcr·generationallinkagc ofMuslin1 intellectual traditions. 
In relation to the data gathering, primary data will )lc explored whcr. data oil 
particular matters arc unavailable in the secondary sources. this study docs not put its 
priority on piescnting primary sources, but rather on the reconstruction and 
. 
reinterpretation of the scattered secondary data fouhd in various secondary sources 
within the framework of this study. 
As far as the primary data arc a concern, some material was collected through 
ihc usc of a documentary and database survey, interviews, a questionnaire, and direct 
observation. The documentary survey was intended especially to lind out specific codes, 
publications, main issues and polemics of particular generations and their specific 
meaHing at a particular historical conJuncture. This investigation was carried out mainly 
through the reading of hard cooy and microfilm of Indonesian newspapers and 
periodicals, especially collections in the Menzies Library of The Australian National 
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University, the National Library of Australia, the National Library of Indonesia and the 
Library of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
The database survey was intended to obtain unpublished statistics and data on 
membership or participants of particular con•; ... mities, associations and training 
programs. The unpublished statistics especially on educational attainment by religion 
were obtained from the database of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The 
unpublished data on former recruits of the Salman mosque and its dakwah trainings 
(LMD) were obtained from the database of the Salman executive board. The 
unpublished data on ICMI membership were obtained from the ICMI database. The 
unpublished d:1ta on JAIN lecturers who pursued postgraduate study in Western 
universities was obtained from the database of the Mini~t!1' nfReligious Affairs. 
Interviews were designed to gain first hand infommtion and views about 
individual intellectual biographies, particular events, associations, and movements of 
the Muslim intelligentsia at a particular historical conjuncture. These interviews were 
mostly conducted duriug my first fieldwork in Indonesia-for achieving a masters 
degree (July·Dcccmbcr 1998) and dt::ing my second fieldwork-for achieving a PhD 
degree (October 200I·April 2002). In addition, interviews were also cr.;1ductcd on 
several occasions such as during my short trips to Indonesia (October -December 1999 
and October-December 2000) and during the visits of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals 
to Australia or via email correspondence. As a result, more t11,m 70 Muslim intellectuals 
and activists were interviewed; though onlylhc opinions of some of ther.1 arc explicitly 
tccorded in this study. 
The questionnaire was specifically intended to understand the socio-religious 
background and religio-political perc~ptions of ICMI .r.~.nbers. For this purpose, some 
500 questionnair'" were distributed via post to members of ICMI throughout Indonesia 
from September unul D~cember 1998, by using the cluster-random sampling method. 
This numb~r of questionnaires is equal to 2.7% of total registered ICM! members up to 
June 1998; that is 18.377 (ICMI Database 1998). In fact, only 210 out of the 500 
questionnaires were returned by respondents. 
!Jircct obscrva!ion was intended to locate myself as a participant observer in 
crder to understand remembrances, motives, ideas, concerns and the political behaviour 
of the Muslii; intellig~ntsia. I attended mec:ings of ICMI's boards and also engaged in 
its seminars and the artivities of itr. autonomous bodies. 1 also attended discussion 
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forums of Muslim intellectuals such as Majlis Rcbocm, Paramadiua, and Masika. I 
actively took part in meetings of Islamic student activists and established a close 
r:·:ationship with leaders or fonner leaders of Islamic student organizations such as 
HMI, KAMMI, IMM and PM II. 
All these primary and secondary data were analysed using descriptive-analytic 
methods in combination with discourse analysis and a modified version of Foucault's 
'interdiscursive' ami 'cxtradiscursive' analysis (Foucault 1991: SS). The first is an 
interdiscursive analysis of diff-~rcnce, ofien connicting academic discourses: such as the 
interdependency between perspectives of history, sociology, politics, cultural studies, 
and socio-linguistic. The second is extradiscursive dependency between discursive 
transfommtions and the transformations outside of discourse, as for instance, the 
.~<>rrelations between religious discourse and a whole play of economic, political and 
social change. 
1.3.5 thesis Organization 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. With the exception of Chapter I 
(Introduction) and Chapter 7 (Conclusion), each chapter will include some of the 
following sub-sections: political and economic settings, education (secular and Islamic 
schools), discursive practices, the public sphere, power games (consolidation and 
contestation), the specific development (or response) ofpolit:~allslam and the Muslim 
intelligentsia, and the transmission of Islamic intellectual-political traditions. 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 focus~s on the formation of the 
first generation of Indies intelJigentsia. Although emphasis is given to the formation of 
the Indies intelligentsia in the first two decades of the 20'h century, this chapter will 
consider the roots of its gestation in the installation of the Western educational system 
and the Westem·influenccd pu!Jiic sphere in the late I9'h century Liberal era. While 
tracing the Western educational roots of the Indies intelligentsia, this chapter will pay 
attention to the moderttization of Islamic schools as a basis for the constitution of the 
Muslim intelJigentsia. Discussions will theo\ deal with the genesis of an intelligentsia as 
a new stratum of Indies society along with its ideas, collective identities and its public 
sphere. This will be followed by discussions of the impact of differences in economic 
relations and cultural-ideological orientations on the early fragment.ttion of the Indies 
intelJigentsia. Finally the chapter discusses the rise of proto-nationalism, 
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Chapter 3 focuses on the fonnation of Indonesia as an imagined community and 
as an 'historical bloc' as well as the fommtion of various competing intellectual-
political traditions. This chapter covers the timcframc from 1920 to 1945; a period when 
the notion of Indonesian nationalism and the state were discussed among competing 
groups of the intelligentsia and when the intelligentsia of higher learning began to 
assume a major role in the leadership of the nation. Discussions will show. that it was 
during this period that the notion of 'Musli:,\ intelligentsia' wn< consolidated within the 
construction of Muslim intellectual-political traditions. The boundary between 'Muslim' 
and 'non•Muslim' was constructed through the discursive practices, the formulation of 
Islamic political ideologies, and the emergence of Islamic parties and associations of 
Muslim students. This chapter will also reveal that tlus period heralded an acute internal 
fragmentation within the Islamic community. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the failure of political lslani in the newly (sclf-proclaime:l) independent 
Indonesia. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of the intelligentsia as a political elite in the fully 
sovcreigi1 lnuonesiaii Republic, stretching from early months of Indonesian 
independence in 1945 until the fall of the Sukamo regime in 1965. During this period, 
contestations of various intellectual traditions were translated into contestations of 
various political parties in the struggle for control r;f state leadership. The chapter will 
discuss the failure of the civilian intelligentsia to exercise parliamentary democracy in 
the 1950s as well as predicaments of dcniocratic experiments in this period. At the same 
•:ime, this chapter will also pay attention to the acceleration of educational development 
that gave rise to the quantitative explosion of the Muslim int~••igcntsia. Special 
attention will be given to the rise and fall of the Muslim intelligentsia as political 
leaders ,,f the nation. Discussions of the rising tide of a new generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia will form the climax of this chapter. 
Chapter S focuses on the rise of the New Order as a re1.ressive-dcvclopmcntalist 
rtgime and its impact on the development of Muslim intelligentsia. Discussions will 
then deal with various conflicting Muslim intellectual responses to the New Order's 
modernization and the marginalisation of political Islam. Attention will be given to the 
variety of responses based on generational criteria as well as on internal fragmentation 
within a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia. This will be followed by 
di~cussions of the implication of these differences on Muslim intellectual movements 
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and the polarisation within the community of Muslim intelligentsia. Finally, this 
chapter will examine the impact of the New Order's p10motion of education and 
advanced training in Western countries as well as the changes in the international 
environment on the performance of various Islamic intellectual movements. 
Chapter 6 focuses on a specific case: the rise and decline of ICMI. This chapter 
will cover the historical period from the rise of ICMI in 1990 until the end of the 201h 
centu:y. Attention will be given to the changing political opportunity stmcture that 
made possible ICMI's establishment and its decline and to the Muslim intelligentsia's 
creation of cultural capital. Discussions will deal with controversies surrounding its 
emergence and its political manoeuvres, followed by an assessment of ICMI's political 
and cultural achievements. This chapter ends with a discussion of the role of Muslim 
intellectuals in the reform (reformasi) movement and the impact of Suharto 's 
resignation on the political position and attitude ofMuslirt1 intelligentsia. 
Chapter 1 offers the conclusions of this study. An attempt is made to highlight 
important issues and their possible implications for the future development of the 
Muslim intelligentsia and Indonesian politics. 
1.4 A Note oli the Spelling 
Indonesian studies often face problems of transliteration. Basically, both the old 
Dutch·oriented spelling system and the new Indonesian official spelling system 
inaugurated in 1972 arc employed ill this study, since they both occur in the printed 
sources extending from the 1900s to the present. Even so, there arc some exceptions. In 
general, the spelling oe (in old/Dutch spelling) will be replaced by 11, except when it is 
used in direct quotations, in names ol publications and authors, and also in specific 
'codes' of particular historical moments-such as the term 'kemadjoea11' as a code of 
tile first generation of intelligentsia. 
The spelling of personal names will follow the spelling employed by the 
individuals themselves wherever possible, but in general the letters oe will be rei aced by 
11. Thus, Soekamo will be spelled S11kamo. Some exceptions are (Mohamad) Roem, 
Pramocdya (Ananta) Toer, (Ddiaa) Noer, and (Wiratmo) Soekito, because they 
consistently used that spelling for their names until the late 20'h century. Indonesian 
names adopted from Arabic words will be spelled in the (old and new) lndonesiml 
spelling system (but again oe will be replaced by 11) as employed by individuals 
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themselves. Thus, Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of Multammadiyalt) will be spelled 
Achmad Dachlan. On the other hand, the names of (non-Indies) Arab peoples will be 
spelled according to the romanizcd Arabic spelling system. 
Names of organizations and institutions will be spelled according to the 
historical contexts of their existence (but the Jetter oe will be replaced by u). For 
consistency, however, names of organizations ru; well as the s:ate institutions and 
principles that continued to exist until the end of the 201h century will be spelled 
according to the new Indonesian spelling system. Thus, Moelwmmadijalt will be spelled 
Multammadiyall; Madje/is Pcrmusjawaratan Rakjat will be spelled Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat; Panlja Sila will be spelled Pancasila. 
Finally, the spelling of names of cities and other places will usc the new 
Indonesian spelling systell1, so that Djakarta, Socrabaja, and 1]irc/;on, for instance, will 
be spelled Jakarta, Surabaya and Circbon. 
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Chapter 2 
THE FORMATION OF TilE INTELLIGENTSIA 
The olll artier is destroyed, ttnew worltl U crcatctl am/ all arou11d us U change. 
Munshi Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (1843)1 
A group exists whe11 It is 11amecl. 
Jerome Lindon ( 1988)2 
there is lillie trcetllo prolo11g our cliscJLSl'imr 011 the '11o/Jility by birtlr' 
because its rise h'US predcsti11ecl. 
Abdul Rh·ai (1902)' 
As they entered the 191h century, the 'clerisy~ of the 'land below the winds' stood at a 
crossroads. The knowledge road to Mecca inherited from previous centuries through the 
international networks of ulama remained.5 At the same lime, the deepening penetration 
of Dutch colonialism and capitalism inescapably brought its ow11 regime or knowledge 
that paved the new ilttellectual toad to the 'West'. 
It was the Libctal•capitalist penetration of the second half of the 191h century 
Dutch colonial era that was responsible for the government's intro .. \uction 'lfa Western-
style education system to the East Indies. The introduction of the Netherlands right-
wing 'Ethical' colonial policy in the early decades of tile 201h century brought this 
educational transformation to a further stage. 
Electrified by \he pulsing wave of liberal movements and democratic revolution 
in Europe around the 1840s (Stromberg 1968: 12·8), the Liberal wing in the 
Netherlands led by Jan RudolfThorbecke quickly responded to the political momentum 
by oucccssfully shifting the course o( Fundamental law (',; ·omlwctslrcrticning) from 
conserva:: .• rn towards liberalism. With this Fundamental law o( 1848, the Netherlands 
became a constitutional monarchy, and the Queen had to be responsible to the 
parliament. Consequently, the Dutch moved from the rule of absolute authority to the 
rule of law. Ui>der the provisions of this law, the Liberal wing wa.• able to intervene in 
colonial matters through parliament. In the educational realn,, the Fundamental Law of 
1 Quoted from Hikayat Abdul/n!J, as tmttstatcd by A.ll.llill (1970: 63, 162). 
2 Quoted inN. Kauppi (1996: 99). 
3 Bintang Hindia No. l/1902,tts quoted by Adam(1995: 102-3). 
4 TI1e tenn 'clerisy' is used here to refer to a social group whose members variously thought of 
theinSelvcs ns 'me;, of !earning' (docti, emditi, samnts, gc/ehrten, illanra) or 'inen of letters' (literati, 
llommcs d" /etli:rs, pujangga). For a further explanation of the term, sec Gellner (1988: 70-1) and Durkc 
(2000: 19-20). 
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1848 guaranteed free education to everyone in the Netherlands and had a trickle down 
effect, which gradually led to a new attitude towards public education in the 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI] (Simbolon 1995: 126-27). 
Supported by private entrepreneurs and a politically conscious Liberal middle 
class, this Liberal force became increasingly dissatisfied with financial administration, 
first in the homeland and then in the colony. The Liberals aimed originally to wield 
power at home and, later, to have access to, or control over, colonial profits (Fumivall 
1944: 148). In the context of Liberal aspirations abou\ 'free cultivation', 'free labour', 
and 'individual possession', to assume control over colonial profits meant to urge the 
colonial govcmmcnllo secure private capital to obtain land, labour and opportunities to 
run new businesses or plantations.• the shi fi towards a Liberal economy in fact 
necessitated not only institutional rcfom1s but also infrastructure support, 7 especially the 
improvement of bureaucratic services, which in tum demanded tlu; improvement of the 
educational sector of t11e NEI. 
the Liberal colonial era did not last long. Successive social-economic and 
political events, both in the Netherlands and the NEI, in the late 191h century brought 
13ew overtones to the colonial treatment of the East Indies. In the Netherlands, these 
events were specifically the emergence afier 1870 of a benevolent new breed of 
administrators imbued with socialism and a sentimental idealism a Ia Mullatuli8 in 
conjunction with the reorientation ol political parties along religious lines. This 
occurred in 1888 when the position of old Conservatives was replaced by an alliance of 
the Anti-Revolutionaries and Calvinists with the 'Romanists',9 who deserted their old 
5 So did tlte knowledge toad to India oftl1e llindu/Buddhist monks. 
6 This push issued in the passing of the Agrarian Law and Sugar Law of t870, which guaranteed property 
rights and the opcrntioii of private enterprise. Tiiis achie\'emeilt was accelerated by the iinprovcmertts in 
cortlinunications: telegraphy, opened to the public in 1856; a modem postal service, inaugurated in 1862; 
railway installation and high seas steamers in 1867; tlte completion of tlte Suez Canal in t869; and the 
operation ofthe Royal-Dutch shipping company, Koninklijke Pakctmart Maatsclmppij (Kl>M) aficr 1888, 
both for intclll:ltional and domestic voyages (l'umivall 1944: 174-15; Lombard 1996a: 12; A Campo 
1994). 
7 Private enterpriscs/plailters deill:lnded irrigation for their field!;, railwnys for their produce and transport, 
medical fncilities for their fnmilies and their coolies, scl:ools and vocational training for their children, 
subordinates and stalT, and so forth (Fumivall 1944: 175). 
1 Multatuli is the pseudonym of the famous colonial iconoclast Eduard Douwcs Dekker (1820-1887). 
Artiving in Batavia in 1839 his highest achie\'errtcnt in the colonial administmtivc seJVicc was Assistant 
Resident.of Lcbak (West Java) around tltc mid-1850s. In Match 1856 he was dismissed from tlle post 
nftct accusing local Javanese Regents of coiroption. Under the pseudonym 'Multntuli' ('I have suffered 
much') he then published in Hollnnd a famous autobiographical novel called Max Havclaar (1860). Titis 
novel contained a vitriolic nttnck on the injustices of the colonial administration as well ns the cruelty nnd 
corruption of the co-opted Javanese ruling class th:ll created n sensation and helped to stimulate n 
movement for reform in the Indies (Anderson 1979: 229). 
9 TI1e 'Romanists' refer to members or adherents of the Church of Rome. 
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Liberal ~tlics to fonn a new Clerical Party on the Right against the secularist Lc!l. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, it was the party of the Right that first declared a new colonial 
policy proposing that exploitation, whether by the State or by private enterprise, must 
give way to a policy of moral responsibility (Furnivall 1944: 228-9). 
The impetus for the Clerical Party's creed was the ongoing deterioration of 
social life in the NEI, resulting from economic stagnation, crop failure, cattle disease, 
famine and poor health conditions. These various kinds of social calamity were 
unintended consequences of the Liberal economy and had given rise to a new climate of 
opinion in the Netherlands. All parties came to favour State activity in the direction of 
expansion, efficiency and welfare, placing the welfare of East Indies in the foreground 
of colonial policy. Thus, after the elections of 1901 that resulted in the victory of the 
Right wing, liberalism was an outworn creed overshadowed by the Christian spirit of 
compassion (Furnivall 1944: 225-33). 
The Clerical Party came int.: power as the champion of a moral responsibility. 
Reflecting thi 'pirit, Queen Wilhelmina in her annual message from the throne on the 
assembly of Parliament in 1901 spoke about 'the debt of honour' to and the ethical 
responsibility of the Netherlands to the people of the East Indies (Van Nicl 1970: 32).tt 
This new direction of colonial treatment of the East Indian came to be known as the 
'Ethical Policy'. 
Under the Ethical Policy, cducatic (education), irrigatic (irrigation) and 
ifmigmtic (transmigt.:tion)t 2 became the priority of the welfare (ethical) program. Of the 
three programs, education was in fact regarded as the most essential. In the eyes of the 
father of the Ethical movement, Th. Van Dcvcntcr, improvement of native welfare 
could hardly be achieved without adequately trained indigenous personnel to carry the 
burden. He envisioned a rebirth of the East Indies through improved education, while 
another Etlzici, Abcndanon, considered education as the tic of friendship and trust which 
10 The phrnse of' A Debt of Honour' (Een Eerc.rchuld) was first introduced by Dt. 11t. Van Deventcr, in 
the journal De Gids, in August 1899. Initially he was a Liberol of the school of Mullatuli with socialist 
tendencies. When Socialism had not yet become respectable and the solid majority remained Liberal he 
joined the Liberal Party with a special concern for the moral and material welfare of the Natives. After 
spending some time as a Ia•.- cr in Scmarang (Java), upon his return to llolland in 1897 he joined the 
Radical Democrat Party ahli ,,.ned campaigning not only in support of the needy colony but also for the 
separotion between inctropoJilt,n and colonial finances. 11tis gained hiin the ~::tc of 'the father of the 
Ethical movement' (Fumivall 1944: 230·31; Van Niell960: 31-4). 
11 She proclaimed that 'as a Christian power, the Net1terli'nds is obliged in the Enst Indian archipelago, to 
better regulate the legal pD! ition of native Christians, to lend support, on a finn basis, to Christian 
missions, nnd to imbue Ute W.tvlc conduct of government with Ute consciousness that the Netherlands has 
a moml duty to fulfill towards ~be people ofUtcse regions' (Adam, 1995: 91). 
" This trilogy oftcrms was coh1cd by Van Deventcr to describe Ute Ethical Policy. 
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could link all people along the path of progress. Behind such idealistic views lay the 
goal of education as a means of improving the Natives' welfare within the scope of a 
Western inspired civilization (Van Niel 1970: 34, 66-7). 
The coming of the Ethical Era brought also a new course in the colonial 
treatment of Islam, particularly under the influence of an outstandim•. Dutch Arabist and 
lslamologist, Christiaan Snouck Hurgrm: ,~, vi flO arrived in the NEI in 1889. In the 
same year he was appointed as an adviser to the Office for Arabian and Native Affairs 
(Kantoor voot Inlmulschc zakcn), which he himself proposed and founded, 1 ~ and began 
to introduce a new approach to dealing with Isla:nic mailers. 
Snouck countered Dutch fears concerning Islam, at both international and local 
levels, by crilicising fomtcr Dutch misconceptions about Islam. 14 He c'11phasiscd the 
pcacefulnatu•e of the Islamic religion in the archipelago, but also admitted the potential 
dangers of a small minority of fanaticalulama imbued with the notions of pJn-Islam. In 
this regard, he catilc out with recommendations for an Islamic policy in the framework 
of tllc so-called 'sp/itsiugsthcoric ', This theory envisaged a division of Islam into tWo 
parts, one religious, the other political. While the government should respect the first 
dimension of Muslims' life-world, it must nat tolerate the latter one. 111 Snouck's view, 
'any sign of incitement must, therefore, be resolutely met by force, and t~ll interference 
in matters Islamic from abroad must be nipped in the bud' (Benda 1958:24). 
The shill in the colonial policy on Islam was in fact only the first step in 
Snouck's prophetic vision for the ideal future of the East Indies. He believed that the 
future leadership of Indies society could not rely on devout Muslims and chiefs of adat 
(local customs). According to him, devout Muslims could not be expected to develop a 
lasting bond between the East Indies and the Netherlands, while chiefs of at/at, who had 
long become the most powerful barrier against Islam, were tao conservative to be 
expected to serve as bearers of the long-term purposes of colonial administration. Since 
a modem East Indies could not be ruled either by Muslirr.s or by ada/ chiefs, Snouck 
recognized the importance of creating Westemised East lndie.; elites (Benda 1959: 25· 
7). These Westemised elites would be expected to foster a modem East Indies society in 
line with the so-called 'association' policy. By 'association' he meant the effort to 
u This office, which would metamorphose into the Slnimubu (the Religious Affairs Office) durinr, the 
Japanese occupation, may rightly be viewed as the predecessor and pioneer of the Indonesian Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (Steenbrink 1993: 88). 
1 ~ Exumplcs of these misconceptions, according to Snouck, were the perceived existence of a clerical 
establishment in Islam, and the threat ofthe so-called Islamic 'priests' and 'popes' in Ute NEI. 
C!Japtcr 2 ·Tile Farmatlon oftiJc lr~tcl/igcntsia 57 
create 'a Dutch state, consisting of two geographically distant, but spiritually connected 
parts, one of which would be in north-western Europe and the other in Southeast Asia' 
(Steenbrink 1993: 88). 
In so doing, Snouck recommended that the colonial government promote the 
large-scale organization of education on a universal and religiously neutral basis that 
would be able to 'emancipate' the new elite from its religious attachment. 'To 
emancipate' in this context meant to detach the new elite from Islamic tutelage. Thus 
the birth of an East Indies national consciousness would be guided through conperation 
with, and direction of, the Dutch and not be directed by the politically dangerous Pan-
Islamic J!lovetr.c•·,: (Lee 1977: I 57). To usc Snouck's rhetoric: 
Upbringing and education arc the means for achieving that end. Even in 
countries of a much older Muslim culture than our archipelago we see them 
working effectively to relieve the Mohammedans of some of the medieval 
rubbish which Islam has been dragging along in its wake for too long (Quoted in 
Stecltbrink, 1993: 89). 
The introduction of Liberal and Ethical Policies certainly brought their own 
political opportunity structure, which could either hamper or enable particular 
developments in the educational, intellectual, political and religious licld of the East 
Indies. This chapter explores the implications of tloe Libcwl and Ethical policies for the 
formation of the Indies intelligentsia and will focus on the lirst two decades of the 20th 
century. However, to understand the forntatiofl of the intelligentsia in this period, some 
attention will be given to events in the latter part of the 19'h century, cSpL·.:ially in 
relation tu tl1e early installation of a Western-style education and Western-influenced 
public sphere. Included in this chapter is a description of Islamic education and the 
early modernisation of some Islamic schools as a basis for the constitution of a Muslim 
intelligentsia. 
Discussions will then deal with early competing discourses, the invention of the 
modem Indies public sphere, and its expansion by the Islamic Kaoem Maeda. This will 
be followed by an overview of differences in economic relations and cultural· 
ideological orientations which contributed to the early fragmentation of the Indies 
intelligentsia. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of political contestations and 
the rise of proto-nationalism. 
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2.1 The Western Educational Roots of the Modern (Muslim) Intelligentsia 
The presence and absence of particular fonns of education withir• a society 
provides not only a schemata for class distinctions and the fundamental principles of the 
establi~hed order, but also a catalyst for ccmpetitive power struggles. This nmion of 
educnt;on as a force field of conflicting power relations is wcll·rcpresentcd by 
edur.ational situation under Dutch colonial rule. Under the Dutch, education reinforcer! 
status differences; it became part of what joined people in groups or what divided 
groups. 
I lntilthe early nineteenth century, the knowledge and educational institutions of 
the East Indies had resembled those in most traditional religio-political systems all over 
the world. Knowledge and educatioh irt the pre-modem world tended to be subordinate 
to the sacred. Religion provided the rationale, objectives, and content of traditional 
education, as wel.l as the teachers and the spatial setting for learning. ihe ruler 
patronized learning as part of his overall patronage of the faith (Smith 1970). This was 
also the situation of education iu the East Indies before the introduction of a Dutch-
sponsored secular education zystelll. In areas where Islam was heavily entrenched, 
children of the gentry, Muslin! traders, and other religious families were sent to 
traditiortal Islamic schools (pcscmtrcn, surau, mewwsah, dayah), or perhaps to centres 
of Islamic learning irt the Middle East. 
ihe authority of United [Dutch] East India Company (VOC)ts that assumed 
control over parts of the NEI for almost 200 years ( 1602·1800) had no interest in 
interfering with native religious matters and education, except for some haphazard 
support for missionary schools. With the collapse of the VOC in 1799,16 hegemony over 
the region was handed over from the colonial-private enterprise to the colonia.-state 
empire. Under the new regime, most parts of the islands were gradually and 
distinctively integrated into the colonial empire, transfonning dispersed power centres 
into a unitary colonial state. 17 Yet until tlie mid-191h century the Dutch colonial state 
15 VOC is an abbreviation of Vereem'gclc Oost Ind;sche Compag11ie. 
16 On December 31, 1799, the VOC, because of mismanagement nnd 'bankruptcy', was officially 
trnnsfcrred, together with all ilS possessions, debts (140 million guilders), and property, to the Datavia 
Republic under thejul'isdictinn of the home government in the Netherl:mds (Adam 1985:4: Nieuwenhuys 
1999: 1·5). 
17 Most of today's Indonesia was only conquered by the Dutch in the second half of the 19"' century. 
Some kingdoms were not even conquered until the first decade of the 20th century. Control of Aceh was 
bitterly contested for 30 years (1873-1904), while other Kingdo01s such as in South Dali and Done (South 
Sulawesi) were not conquered until 1906. It is also worth noting that some of the conquered islands were 
administered directly while other parts were indirectly ruled (Nicuwcnhuys 1999: 1·5; Anderson 1991: 
I I; Dick 2002: 2). 
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continued to neglect native education and avoided an excessive interference with native 
religious affairs. 
Economic interest and the desire to maintain status distinctions were among 
reasons behind a long period of colonial lack of interest in native education. In the 
initial stage the colonial concentration was on capital accumulation. There had been 
such a feeling of Western superiority among the Dutch that there was no call t.o impose 
a Westen! civilized life"world upon the native cultures but rather a wish to maintain the 
'authentic' exotic garden of the East (Mooi Imliif). 18 Alongside such sentiments, the 
Dutch created a boundary between the civilized and uncivilized world by limiting the 
introduction of Western 'high' culture initially to the circle of the European community. 
Thus, the early installation of European-style public primary schools,19 scientific 
infrastructure and social clubs (SociC/eit)/0 especially in the years immediately 
following the British restoration of the Indies to the Dutch in 1816,21 was oriented 
exclusively to cater for this community. 
In the face of a general colonial lack of interest ii1 nauvc education, the 
pioneering effort to introduce a modem (Western) education system to limited segments 
of East Indies' society was conducted by the Christian missions.22 The missionary zeal 
in education for evangelical purposes was accentuated following the end of the 
11 !his feeling coexisted with a prevalent European assumption of social evolution: that as modem 
societit..'S rise, religious faith and observances decline. Under the auspices of this assumpti011 it \Vas 
envisioned that excessive interfctt:nce in native (religious) matters could be eountcr-prodiiCtive for it 
might not only eVoke native insurrecti'lns but also obstruct the process of evolution. On the other hand, 
there had been much optimism that the successful Christianisation of the East Indies would solve the 
p,roblcm of Native cum Islamic troubles (Lombard t996a: 96; Suminto 1996: 9" 14). 
9 Inspired by the spirit of enlightenment, which emphasized the separation of education and religion, one 
European eleritentaty school was established in Weltevreden (now 7-~';,lleng), Jakarta, in February 1817 
followed by some others both in Java and outside Java. 
20 The Botanical Garden ~t Ouilcnzorg (Gogot) and its associated institutes were established in 1817 
followed somewhat l:ltet by the establishment of the Association of the Natural Sciences in the 
Netherlands Indies (Natamrkrmcligl! Vere~.:niging in Ncderlamlsdr-Jntlii!, est. 1850). Meanwhile, the tnost 
exclusive Socii!teit, Harnro11ie, h:1d appeared in \Vcltevrcden in 1815 followed by llie Concordia in the 
sante city (est. 1830), De l'ereeniging in Yogyakarta (est. 1822) and some others in Surabaya and 
Bandung. TI1e genesis of such institutions together with the emergence of the Outch press and scientific 
joumals (whether produced in the NEI or imported frotn Europe) as well as the growth of social clubs' 
libraries made the Europetu1 comntunity wcll-infonned and able to disseminate the intellectual and 
scientific achievements of the Western world (Lombard 1996a: 83-5). 
21 During the 'Napolenic' War the Dutch colonial officials sui'lendcred their territories to the British 'in 
order to keep Utcm out of the hands of the French' (Ricklefs, 1993: 112). The Oritish interregnum in 
Indonesia was tun undct •:1,. lradcrship of Governor Gcneral11tontas Stamford Rafilcs ( 1811-16). 
22 The inception of l11e mission01ty presence in the archipelago originated in the ambition of the VOC's 
Board of Direcmrs to meet the spiritual nr.cds of the Compauy'fi scr.• ;nts as well as to counter the 
influence of Catholicism and Islam. It was not until their encounter with a larger congregation that the 
missiOnaries started realizing a sort of mission sacrCc to run educational institutions in the Dutch East 
Indies. Tilis happened especially in dea1ing with the problem of teaching Ilible and religious catechismc; 
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Napoleonic war in 1816 that coincided with the emergence of the so-called 'Age of 
Mission' (Stecnbrink 1993: 98).23 Followh1g in the footprints of the Catholic mission,24 
from the 1820s onward the Christian missions and schools ranged broadly throughout 
the islands-except in areas where Islam was heavily cntrenched.25 Apart from stressing 
education both as a means for spreading the Gospel and attracting converts, these 
seho"ls also offered other benefits to new believers. 'Becoming a Christian', according 
to Gavin W. Jones, 'also meant becoming westcmized, and education was an integral 
part of westemization' (Jones 1976: 38). Later on, when the colonial administration 
began to pay more attention to native education, the mission schools were used as a 
springboard for further development (Stecnbrink 1994: 5-6). 
2.1.1 Western Education under the Liberal Policy 
The tuming point in the colonial govcmment's attitude towards native education 
in the NEI carne in the second half of the 19'h century as a result of the Liberal political 
influence in colonial rnc.ttcrs. In order to advance the Liberal economic interests in the 
colony, the enhancement of the govemment bureaucracy was ::ecessary. In this context, 
both the European and Native Civil Service of the Dutch colonial adrninistration26 had 
to imtrove _:. ·:: capacity and recruit a !orge number of skilled labours. This in turn 
prompted the colonial government to pay fHO&c :\ttention to education. The Organic Law 
of 1854 was put into effect imposing the responsibility for native education on the 
to new ·converts of native East Indies and Chinese r !ra11akat1 (East Indies born Q,irtcse) or even to 
children of the ::..ropcan pera1wk. · 1 with a poor mast~!)' of butch (Maier 1993: 51·9; Adam 1995: S-7). 
21 At this juncture, the independent efforts of foreign missionary societies flourished ih Wc3tertt countries 
from the beginning of the nineteenth ccntu.")'. In Netherlands, the hallmark of this development was the 
formation of the Nctlcr/andsch ZendclingcA Gcnoolsc/wup (Tile Netherlands Missionary Society) in 
1797, whose efforts in tlte NEI were begun in the 1820s (Jones 1976: 23). Subsequently, some other 
missionary unions operated in the archipelago with the Dutch Reformed Missionary Union becoming the 
most important (Stccnbrink 1993: 98; Coppcll986: l(o). 
2
" Before the coining of tltC Dutch and the Pm!~:;tat. tnissioils, the Pottuguel'e had been responsible for 
converting tlte islanders of the eastern part ofthc archipelago and inslnlcting them in the Catholic f.1itlt.ln 
so doing they had pioneered tnissimilry schools such us a Cuthohc seminary in Tenute in 1537. With the 
coming of the Protestant missions to the territori~s, the Catholic missions had been curtailed until their 
operation was admitted for the first time by the Governor General Hcnnan William Dacnd<ls ( 1808-
1811). Their activities weie not confiilcd to Europeans but also took place among tltc Er.st In.:!ies 
coihinunities of all chs~ses with their stronghold in Flores, Timor, and Ambon-not to forget their 
significant app.,r.trooc in Java (Fumivall1940: 218-9). 
"Operated bitially aonong the minority peoples of cc.,tcm parts of the East Indies (Maluk'U, Minahasa, 
and Timor). the mission schools tlten spread out to Tapanuli and Nias-Mcntawai (North Sumatra), parts of 
Kalimantan, West Papu:a, Central and South Sulawesi, and ports of Java. 'Ote number of these schools 
increased ;lowly to reach about 8,400 in 1871, rising to 15,750 in 1892 ((Jones 1916: 23-4; Coppcll9U6). 
26 Unlike British India with its tradition of direct administration and disregard, at least in theory, of racial 
differencr.:., in the ~!ctherlands Indies the practice ofadministrntion was chatactcrised by tlte presence of 
a dual system combining direct :md indirect rule and deliberately maintained racial segrcgottion. Thus, 
alongside tltc European Civil Service there was a Native Civil Sorvi' •• (Fumivall 1944: 175, 251 ). 
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colonial government, and in accordance with the Law, a Department of Education was 
set up in 1867. 
For the very nature of the colonial's worldvicw, education posed a dilemma. On 
the one hand, it was important to underpin the political ecollomy of industrialisation and 
bureaucratisation. 01\ the other hand, it was a potential mr:·nace to the 'mystique· of 
colonial supcriority.27 Such a dilemma was solved by grounding education along lines 
of ethnic segregation and status hierarchy.l. . f·>llowing this segregation and status 
distinction, the nature of early education polic:.-. in the Dutch East Indies was anti· 
assimilationist, elitist and dualistic in charncter. 
to cater for people of the highest status group, the prototype of the European 
style of primary education was reorganized to become scvcn•years of primary school-
offering instruction in Dutch and teaching other European languages-and was 
popularly known as the Europccschc Lagete Sciloo/ (ELS). Originally, this school was 
exclusively for European children (or those with equal Status to the European). Afier 
1864, hCJwever, in line with the colonial policy to incotporate the ttaditional ruling class 
(priyayi) into the colonial sphere of inlluence/9 this school was opened to a very select 
21 Ftoi'lt the very beginning, the Dutch h:td bccit quite aware of the inadequacy of the repressive state 
app:aratus to maintaiittotal control of the vast archipelago giVeit the limited rturrtbcrs in the coloni:i.l army. 
To cornpcnsate for this deficiency, 'hegemonic' (symbolic) weapons in Gramsci's sense were needed to 
co1tsttuct the mom I ~uthotity thtlt positioned the civilized European abo\'e the native. Pan of this strategy 
was the preservation of segregation and differences in tehlts of ctlinicity, cuhute and language. "i1te Dutch 
tried to cultivo:~te the belief that their colonized subjects were inferior in otdet to tnake Dutch-dominated 
rule somewhal easier. According lo II.M.J. Maier (t993: 4t), lhe exarnplc nflhe m,Vlh oflhe 'while race' 
that the colonial administration bad been cnetgcticaUy prcadaing sine..: the last par+ .~:the 191b century was 
tllc myth of Dulch takclijklrcitl. To borrow llenedicl Anderson' words (t966. : '/), tlris lertn can be 
described as 'a mystique ofinnate rarial superif'rity, ncar-maga·:.:al =ffi'=iehC)' and tho: .tt;arta of science', 
which •allowed the Dutch to maintain total coilttol of the vast archipelago with a cJionial army of less 
than 40,000 men'. 
21 Based oil article 6 of the Algcmecnc lJcpalingcn \'tih Wctgcvitig \'Oor Nedcrlandsch /ndii: (General 
Rules oi l.:rw Enaeunenl for tlte Nelhcrlanrls Indies) of t848, lhe people of Dolch Easl Indies w<tc 
rlassified inlo differenl calegories. Firslly, tlte Europeans and !hose who Were officially ltealcd os equallo 
the Europeans-that is nil Christians of the Indigenous people (i . . -_-.,;poctcra). Secondly, the 
Bo!!mi'poctcra nuJ those who were officially treated JJS equal to the BoemiJIUctcm-that is Arab, Moor, 
Chinese, and all Muslim believers and olhcr Wl'll:.tippers (Simboton, t99S:t2S:29). In ptaclice, litis 
classification was still mote complicated. The1c were several sub-stratum-; for each social category. 
Within the group theoretically assumed as cqualtt~ the European, there were levels of hierarchy: the full· 
blooded Europeans wero al tlle lop, lhe Eurasians (lmlos) allhe mid1te and lhe indigenous Chrislians al 
the bottom. A similar situation prevailed in the Bocmipocrcra group in respect to the individtul':o 
closeness to symbols of political power and authority. 11te hier.m:hy ranged from th<." gentry (higher 
priyayi, aristocrat); servants of leading European and !Jocmipoctcra families; lesser priyayis ot lower 
level civil servants, and wcll·to--do farrtilies; and finally, peasants, petty tradets and ulher commoners 
\Vnn Niell970: 22). 
' Following sevt'!!l n.•livc insurrcclions nombly tltc Java War (t825-t830) nnd tlte Pndri War (182t-38), 
the Dutch made an effort to curtail the innuence of Islamic zealots within the provir.ci:ll sphere of power 
by co.llpting and transforming the traditional ruling cl:tss, the priyayi (such as b11palis iu Java, pcnglmlus 
in Minangkabau and ulcCbalangs in Acch), into subordinate.'" functionaries oftla~ Dutch n::~.tivc ci\•il service 
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few of the top elite of the indigenous community. Furthennore, afier 1891 access to 
enter the ELS was also offered to 'qualified' descendants of the wealthy. The non-
Christian native participation in these European elementary schools steadily increased 
from nearly 400 students in 1883, to 762 in 1898, and rose to I, 870 in 1900 (Sutherland 
1979: 46; VanderVcur 1969: 1). 
To meet th~ needs of indigenous Christians (many of whom were soldiers in the 
colonial army), pa:ticularly in Ambon and other missionary enclaves, the govcmmcnt 
set up the so-called Speciale School (Special f.chool). The reorganization of fom1cr 
mission schools involved adopting the curricula of the ELS (Van dcr Vcur 1969: 2). 
Eventually the government established a school for 'Natives' (lJoemipoetera). 
Sometime in 1849 there had been aa experiment of running two elementary vcmacular 
schools and in !852 the number of these schools rose to 15. Using vcmacular languages, 
these new schools were designed originally to prepare the natives of priyayi origin for 
the colonial administrative service and also to restrict 1;1e native people to enter the ELS 
(Futnivalll94:i; 119).30 In fact, children ofthepriyayi favoured schools which offered 
instruction iii th~ Outch language so that they would have better prospects of 
employment and status. To respond to this demand, two tYjlcs ot' elementary school for 
segments of the Boemipoetera were introduced in 1893: the Eerste Klasse School (First 
Class Native School) and the Tweede Klasse School (Second Class Native School). The 
first was designed for the children of the priyayi and wcll·to•do families, and Outen 
language was taught in the early years and used as the medium of instruction in the final 
) .tr. The second one was f.:r the children of the population in general and did not offer 
the teaching of Dutch (Ricklefs 1993: 158). 
The Liberal regime also pioneered the introductio11 of secondary schools. There 
was no single public middle school in the NEt untilJg5o. At the end of the JO'h century 
there emerged three general sccordary schools in Java, which were well known as 
Hoogere Burger School (HBS, highl;t middle-class schools). One was the Gymnasium 
Willcm Ill in Bu.tavin (or,ened 1860), and others were established in Surabaya (1875) 
and Selmitang ( 1871). These schools were identical to high schoc·i> in the Netherlands. 
Not only did liley offer instruction in Dutch, they also followed a strict and high 
administrotion (Pangd!J Pradja). The priyayi fainilies wde allowed to participate in a lower form of the 
civilization of the colonial master (Lombard 1996a: I 03). 
30 The schod an~ngement reOected Go"emor General Jan Jacob Rooi•t•sse3's (1845-5t) attitude of 
continuing the old colonial policy ofensu:ing 8ocmipoctt:ra maintain~d their own r.ustoms and to ke_ep 
tlte languages of the colonial and the colonised people sep~rs:'.te and rti!i.i:1ently catcgori~!!d ~laier 1993: 
49). 
~~--~~-~~-
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standard curriculum equal to that of schools in Eu;~pc, so that the failure rate (even 
among Dutch students) was high. However, these secondary ~chools were intended 
almost exclusively for European (or equal) children. Only a handful of !lnmnipoetcra 
were allowed to attend these schools, their total number in 1890 being no more than 5 
pupils (Sutherland 1979: 46; Van dcr V cur 1969: 4·5). 
While the existing European school system remained highly biased towards 
Europeans and the higher priyayi, the access of the lesser born to better education wa> 
made possible by loopholes in the colonial discriminatory policy itself. As the 
expansion of the liberal bureaucracy t\ecessitatcd the support of technical staff, the 
government decided to establish the mkscllo/cn (vocational schools). The shortage of 
qualified teachers created a demand for a native teacher-training school (kwccksc/wol), 
which was initially established in Surakarta in 1851/52, with several others following 
both in m•d outside Java cspcciat;y aner 1870. The en:mncemcnt of government health 
~nd hy.,,cnc services necessitated ~emi·skilled n1edical workers. The medical training 
that had been begun in 1822 with courses for government vaccinators was expanded in 
1851 into the so-called 'Doktcr·Djawa' (native paramedical) school in Mentcng 
{Jakarta).3t Meanwhile, the need for a skilled native civil serVice prompted the 
government to open the lloofilclisclwlen (Chi~fs' Schools) popult. iy called 'Sekolah 
Racija' (school for the native nobility) which came into exi•tence in 1879 at Bandung, 
M?gelang and !>robolinggo. 
The vocational schools were initially designed for the s~ns of chiefs and other 
prosperous natives to prepare then\ for the new bureaucratic style of the native 
administration. 32 In fact, in the eyes of childr•:n of the higher priyayi the position of 
teachers and vaccinators was not regarded as a prestigious and promising career. 
Therefore, they preferred the Chief's' School and were rarely attracted to teacher• 
training and the Dokter·Pi:!Wa school. To attract enrolments to the latter schools, the 
government had to provide students with incentives ~uch as scholarships and promises 
31 The length of courses in this scho\11 '"'etc changed several titi1cs. From the beginning until 1863 it was 
only 1 two·ye:~.r (v:~.ccinatiun) cour.:e for scleclcd o;;tudcnts who were :~.ble to spe:~.k M:~.lny, using t.iulay as 
medium of iJi:iUUt.:tion, and it w:~.s them l'Xtendcd to three years in 1864. lh 1 S15 n refortn was proposed t ... 
extend the course of instruction to five yeats afl.-r some two years preparatoty course and to introduce the 
Dutch langu:~ge as medium of insti11ction at:~. t:ertain level. Subsequently, after 1881 the prep:uatory 
period was tiuee years, and theu nflcr 1890 the school was only open to ELS graduates (Junge 1973: 3; 
Toet t985: 21; Hadisutjipto 197' !9-.33). 
32 Initially d1e lc••gth of the course was two years with Dutch generally used as the medium of instruction. 
In 1893, th•: stwly was lengthened to five years ami scn'k: n:\:. subject.;; such .:13 JJ-.v ed..:ed to meet new 
requirem(";nts il~ .tdministtativc posts. The pupils of these schools ~'"t!rc mostly children of the Bupati 
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of governmental status. Insofar as the Dokter-D}mva school was concerned, a special 
arrangement was made after 1891 to allow students expressing an interest in this school 
to gain entry to the ELS free of charge. Many of those students came from lesser priyayi 
origins, and even frequently came from merchant and village families (Van Niel 1970: 
28,51). 
2.1.2 Western Education under the Ethical Policy 
Under the influence of the Ethical spirit, the education system of the Liberal 
period w~s r~organiscd and adjust.:d to rrcct new expectations. There were two 
complementary approaches in this project. Snouck Hurgronjc and the first Ethical 
director of education (I 900-5), J. H. Abcndanon, favoured an elitist education in line 
with their ambition to tmnsfornt the traditional aristocracy into'' Wcst•m cducJtcd elite. 
In their view, offering Western education to the native ruling class was of paramount 
importance to train a grateful and cooperative native elite whose members could handle 
some of the work of butch civil servants. Moreover, this could alSil cut administrative 
expenses, curtail Islamic 'fanaticism', and ultimately create an inspiring example for the 
lowest levels of East Indian society (Ricklefs 199:J: IS6). On the other hand, the 
Governor General J. 13. Van Heutsz (I904-9) and A. W. F. ldcnburg (1909·1916) 
supported more basic and practical education for the broader population to contribute to 
the success of the Ethical Policy (Van Niel, 1970: 47). The combination of such 
approaches resulted in a variety of edur.ational institutions and played a major role in 
dividing as well as uniting groups within colonial society. 
The early decade of the 20'h c~ntury brought with it the begin:ting of modem 
educat!on as 'light rays' of the Ethica·! Policy, which now began to penetrate the life-
world of the commoners and the village. Education based on status differences 
continued with different kinds of schools being provided for diflerent social levels. 
From 1907, for the cmlliMnctl and villagers, the govcmment instituted a three· 
year vernacular elementary school called volkssclwC'I or desaschoo/ (village school). 
Graduates from this school might proceed to a two·year extension, the Inlandsche 
Vervolgschoo/ (native senior school), which began to appear in I9IS. Next, the old 
Second Class Native Schools metamorphosed into SO·C~IIcd Stamlaardscho/en (standard 
schools) in I 90S. These sch<Jcls were intended for those engaged intrude or removed 
(Regents), :IS it was :~ssumcd that ,hr.y wouhl succeed their fathers in posts in the Native Civil Service 
(Sutherland 1979: 17; Van Nicl Jno: 27; Ric1dcfs 1993: 128). 
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from the agrarian or village life. All of these schools offered instruction in local 
languages or Malay (Vander Veur 1969: 2, 7; Ricklefs 1993: !59; Van Nicl 1970: 68). 
For children of the priyayi and well-to-do families, the govemment made efforts 
to enlarge their access to the European school system that offered Dutch as the medium 
of instruction. These efforts were driven by the 'association policy' and the growing 
demand of the priyayi and well-to-jo families who came to view this kind of school and 
the mastery of Dutch as a new way of maintaining or elevating their social status. The 
impetus for this consciousness was the deepening penetration of what Maier tcm1s 
'Dutchification' in the social life of the NI!I.33 The gravity of 'Dutchification' had been 
responsible for the overcrowding of the existing European schools.3' To deal with those 
challenges, a new school arrangement for native priyayi and well-to-do r.~milies was 
made. 
At tile primary level, the most important development was the transformation of 
the existing First Class Native School into the so"called llollcmclsclz-Inlanclsc/ze School 
(HIS, Dutch"Native School) in 1914.35 The medium for teaching in the HIS w~ local 
languages or Malay in the early years with a shift to Dutch in the higher grades. In 
theory, this school was intended for children of native chiefs and other prominent or 
well"to"do Boemipoe<"era.36 In fact, while the number of these schools increased, the 
children of higher native chiefs and wealthy local people contiilued to prefer the ELS. 
In effect, the majority of HIS pupils derived !rom lesser priyttyi and lower levels (the 
upper ranks of the lower class) of society (Van der Vcur 1969: 3, 26"9; Kartodirdjo 
1991: 339). 
33 Duich language and culture became increasingly important following the growth of European private 
enterprises, the erthartcefiteitt of the colonial bureaucracy and educational ittfrasttucturc, as well as th~ 
faster connections between Europe and the colony facilitated by the irttprovement of shipping technolugy 
and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. These developments led to a growing nuntber of people front 
the colony who spent their furloughs and ho1idays in Europe as '' .:11 as ail influx of new European 
migrants who brought with them white women with a rttission 'civilisatricc' to maintain superior 
European culJure. All this coniributed Io Ihe fading away of Malay language from Ihe fomul life of the 
EasJ Indies and iiS (partial) replaccmenlttfter 1 ~1)0 by Moii!etland Duleh (Maier 1993: 58·61). 
J.4 the Governor General, Van lleuts?, perceived the increasing delttand for the ELS as in danger of 
imposing unbearable burdens. The enrolmenl of Natives and Chinese in Ihe ELS had reached 17.8 per 
cent oflhe lola! enrolment in 1914-15 (Vnn der Veur 1969: 2). 
" Prior Jo the esJablishtneni of the HIS the govemmenl had begun to sel up a special primary school for 
Ihe Chinese Communily, the /lo/landsch-Cilinese School (HCS), in 1908 and special prilllllry schools for 
local royal families throughouJJhe archipelago in 1910. 
36 Theoretically, this category included the children ''fRegcJits and other high tndonesian officials down 
to the rank of 'assistant~wcc/ana (Sub~ District Officer,. The criterion for being well-to~do was a monthly 
income of about fl. 100 which at the time corresponded to the salary of an assistartt-wcdana (Vnn dcr 
Veur 1969: 29). 
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At the secondary level, an attempt was made to meet the natives' demand for the 
existing HBS,37 through the establishment in 1914 of the Mccr Uitgcbrcicl Lager 
Oncic11Vijs (MULO, More Comprehensive Elementary Education). This was in fact a 
local adaptation of the three-year Netherlands' lower secondary school. Then in 1918, 
the govemrnent introduced a three-year upper secondary school, Algcmccnc Miclclclbarc 
School (AMS, General Middle School}, intended to prepare students from MULO for 
more advanced positions or entry into university entrance lev.·! (Van dcr Veur 1969: 4). 
During this period, some vocational schools continue.! :o provide an opportunity 
for descendants of lower status to gain access to higher levels of education. In order to 
better meet the needs of the government bureaucrac:: and private fim1s, in 1900 the 
government reorganized the old lwofilenschool (Chiefs' school) and transformed it into 
a five year OSVIA (Oplciclingscholcn voor inlmulschc ambtenarcn, Training Schools 
for Native Officials). The descendants of priyayi co11ti11ucd to be the main recruits for 
this school, but it now began to accept any qualified Bocmipoctera who had finished th~ 
ELS (or its equivalent), regardless of their origin (Ricklefs 1993: IS6·S1).38 
In 1900·2, the Doktcr-Djawa school \vas turned into STOVJA (School tot 
oplciding Van inlandsc/Jc artscn, ~>chool for training native doctors). Soon after this 
transformation, the length of study in this school became six years oft he Gc'"'"skwulige 
(the core of medical studies) after three years of the preparatory section, anu the course 
Wa> laugh: i11 butch.39 After 1913 the course of instruction was extended further to 
seven years of the Gcncesk1mcligc after three years of the preparatory section. With this 
final reorganization the scLol was now equal to the Ncclcrlanclsch·lnclischc 
Artscnschool (NIAS, Netherlands Indian Doctors' School) that had been established in 
Surabaya in the same year. Both schools were now equivalent to a lower university 
level but were still classified a~ vocational schools, and graduates of these schools 
received the title 'IIICiischc Art~·. Indies Doctor' (Van Nicl 1970: 52). A similar 
37 Tiie HBS were not only limited irt nutilbCt but also h:id restricted eligibility criteria for natives to enroll 
~ven for those who held an I!LS certificate. Tite nurtiber of native pupils attending these schools in 1905 
··.·as no lllUte than J6 (Sutherland 1979: 46). . 
31 Ocsignt't !t• produce more qualified civil sen·ants, the course was now five yeotrs in Dutch nnd after 
1910 some new OSVIAs were opened reflecting :1 general trend tO\Viirds recruitment from a lower social 
stratum (Sutl1erland 1979: 51). 
39 After 1904 graduates from this school could gain entry to a mt.,tical school in the Netherlands, from 
which, after one and n half years attendance, it would be possible to obtain the European Medical 
Doctorate degree (Vander Vcur t969: 5; Van Nicll970: 52). 
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reorganization also took place in the native teacher-training schools (kweeksc!Joo/j. 40 In 
addition, the government also introduced new vocational schools.41 
Apart from t~c reorganisation ~nd the introduction of various schools in the NEI, 
it is worth noting that, on the eve or the 201h century, there had been a pioneering 
experiment to send a few highly selected sons of noble families to the Netherlands. 
Although it had never been deliberate government policy to encourage natives to 
proceed to Europe, Stlouck Hurgronje and J. H. Abcndanon made a special effort to 
pave the road for the sons of leading families to gain entry into the higher level of 
education in the Netherlands. Thus, in 1900 there had already been some five East 
ln<Jies students in the Nether!~nds. In the following years, the number grew more 
rn)lidly to reach around 25 in 1908.'2 
Whatever the motive for introducing and reorganising such a variety of schools, 
the immediate impact on the life·world of the East Indies was quite noticeable: western-
educated IJoemipoetera significantly increased. In 1900, the total 11ative enrolment in 
public and private schools of all types and levels was approxinJately 101,003. This 
figure had reached 310,496 in 191 0,'3 to be multiplied itt the succeeding years.'4 
Table I: Native Enrolments in the Ycmacular and European Scho0l Systems, 
1900·1910 
Ye_at V eiitacular European School Systclit Vocational TOTAL 
Schools I•ritlU_ty School Secondary School Schools 
1900 98,113 2.411 t3 316 101,003 
1910 303,868 5,108 50 1.470 310,496 
Source: Modtfied from Paul W. van der Veur (1969: 7, 11·11 a). 
40 With the advent ot viii age cducatimi and the en1ctgcnce of new European style schools, this kind of 
School after 1906 was reorganised and divided into two categories. First was the so-called norinaalscltool 
designed to producl! teachers for the vernacular schools. Second was the Kwecksclwol entry which 
requited the ELS (or equivalent). It was oriented to tnect the deiilaitd for teachers for European-style 
schallls at the primary and evert the lower secondary level that would ernerge in the next decade. 
" these included the Midclclbate Lartdborllt·school (Agricultural Secondary schools, est. 1903) and the 
four-ycor Neder/anclsch lncliscltc l'ecartsenijsc/wol (Veterinary School, est. 1907) in Dogor, lite 
Rechtsschool (Law Secondary School, est. 1908) in Ilalavia, and the five-year technical school, Koningen 
Wilhelmina School (est. 1906), in Datavia (Junge 1913: S8). 
"In Fumivall's account ( 1940: 251 ), the number was 23, while in '.'an Niel's (1910: 50) it was :l!. 
43 In 1900. the number of native cittolmettts in \'Cttliiculat public and private schools (Second Class 
Native School and l'o/ksc/wol) that o!Tercd instruction in Malay and local languages •vas 98,173. 1l1is 
figure rose to 303,868 in 1910. At the same time, the nurrtber of native enrolments j ..... ~ .. uc and private 
schools of the European school system that offered irtsttuctiort in Dutch was as follows. ln the primary 
schools (ELS, HIS, and Speciale School), the nuhlber was 2,441 in 1900 and increased to 5,108 in 1910. 
In the general second•ry schools (liDS), the number was 13 in 1900 and rose to 50 in 1910. In lire 
vocational schools, the number was 376 in 1900 and rose lo 1,470 in 1910 (Van dcr Vcur, 1969: 7, ll· 
Ita). Thus, the total number of •modem•educated' natives (for all types and levels) was approximately 
101,003 in 1900 and reached 310,49r. in 1910. As a comp>rioon,lhe total East Indies population in 1900 
\\'03 40,150,000,00 (Elson 1997: 76-0 ). 
4
" See next chaptet. 
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The growing number of Western educated Boemipoetera li~d an unintended 
consequence. The possession of new cultural capital led to an increase in their 
expectations th:<t put pressure on the government to accommodate their occupational 
interests as well as their aspirations for progress (kemacljoean). With the introduction of 
vocational schools and European-style native schools, many children of the lesser 
priyayi and those of lo\Vci status origins gained access to better education. It was 
educated people from these social groups who would become the backbone of the 
forn1ation of the Indies intelligentsia. 
2.1.3 Western Education and the Birth of the Intelligentsia 
Based on the figures for native enrolments in modern public and private schools, 
we may assume that the first generation of the Indies intelligentsia were emerging in the 
early 20\h century as a result of the Liberal policy of latter part of the 19'h century and 
the early stage of the Ethical era. Meanwhile, those who began to enter modem primary 
schools in the late 1900s and the ! 91 Os, who experienced a deeper exposure to the 
prt'~css of 'butchilication', would constitute the second generation of the Indies 
intelligentsia. These early generations of the Indies intclligcntsia-origiuJliag largely 
from the priyayi, shared the common cxpericricc of being exposed to Western ideas, 
spoke (snippets ol) butch among themselves, and were highly aware of their privileged 
new roles and status-created a new stratum of Indies society. 
The newly bom Indies intelligentsia fonned a relatively autonomous (but 
structurally differentiated) s~cial stratum in their own right because they were able to 
seperate themselves from both the <·./~hli~hcd class and estate system. As Harry J. 
Benda observed (1962: 240): 'It is the exception rather than the rule that the young 
aristocrat, the landowner's son or for that matter even the scion of a newly-established 
bourgeois class, once he has acquired a western education of any kind, becomes the 
defender and spokesman of the class of his social origin.' Most members of this new 
stratum became government officials, occupying lower and midc.ile rank positions while 
the Dutch dominated higher ones. 
The early generations of the Indies intelligentsia had been exposed to an intense 
process ofsecularisation as a result of both the secular nature of the Liberal educational 
policy and the 'association' policy of the Ethical regime. As a result of this process of 
sccularisation, most of this intelligentsia began to detach themselves from the religions 
community'~ thought world. Even for children of the devout Muslim priyayi, the 
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influence of Western education-embodied sccularisation was hardly escapable. This 
hrvaght a synchronic rupture in the intellectual development of the NEI. 
If we refer to the Gccrtzian trichotomy ('santri-abangan-priyayi ') of Javanese 
cultural streams, in which the life-world of the priyayi is depicted as non-Islamic,'5 
some of this new intelligentsia in fact came from devout Muslim priyayi families. A 
number of pioneers of the proto-nationalist movements, such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo 
{1885-1943), Sutomo {1888-1938), Tirto Adhi Surjo {1880-1918), and early products of 
Srtouck's 'association' policy such as the Ojajadiningrat brothers {Ahmad, Hasan and 
Huscin) as well as influential figures of the Sarckatlslam {Sl, the Islamic Union), such 
as Umar Said Tjokroamittoto {1882-1934) and Agus Salim {1884·1954), were children 
of the devout Mus lint pr(ray;:• 
·U ln Clifford Geertt's The Religion of Jam (1960), the three alirm1 (!ocio-cuhural 'streams') arc defined 
as fo1Jows. 11te prt)•ayi tradition is said to be an ideology of the court and 1itera1i oriented to Hindu-
Buddhist and Javanese Mystical world-views. l11e aiJangan tradition is a more popular syncretic ideology 
of peasantry heavily innucnced by Javanese anifilisnt, while the scmtri tradition is a pious Islamic world-
view shared by clements in both Javanese and Outer Island society. As Koer.tjaraningtat had pointed out 
(1963), this trichotomy confused a legitiittate division between two religious ttaliitions (Syncretist 
abangan and Muslim san ttl) by treating priyayi as a C<iltiparable category, when csscillially it tefers to a 
social class. "Iii actuality, jm)•ayi could follow either abangan ot smltri teligio-culturat traditions.' It is 
worth noting that despite the Dutch attempt to neutrali7.c the innuettce of Islam witliitt the rttilieu of the 
priyayi, inatly priyayi, especially those in the north Java littoral (pesisir) and in Priangan (West Java) as 
well as other provinces of outer Java, continued to be pious Muslims. For a furthe~- discussion of this, sec 
Sutherland (1975). 
46 Tjipto Mangunkusunto's grandfather \\'as an Islamic teacher (kjczi) who brought u!J his chih.lreit under 
lsla1ttiC tUtela!!l'- This Islamic innuencc remained in the Mangunkusumo family. Notwithstanding the fact 
th:J.t Tjipto's L ~·r had been educated in a Western school (most likely a teacher-training school) some of 
his children were given Arabic names such as Uadarb.h and Samsulma'arif. Moreover, Murtinah (the 
younger sister oftjipto) was not allowed to tnatry her beloved Christian boyfric1td. Afiez ,·.U, "Islam is the 
prime guidance ofti(e for this family' (Balfas 1952: 26-7). 
Sutotno's genealogy Cjfi be ttaCed bjck tu Sunan Giii (Maulana lskak) of Grcsik, m~e of the so-called 
'Wali Sangt~' (11ie Nine Saints)-prontinent Islamic ptoselytisers who are t'nrularly believed to ha\'C 
converted Java to Islam (Soetomo, 1984: 128-9). Concerning his grandfath.:· .tomo said that: •Jie was 
the son of a rich iilan who used to be headman there. Fat that reason, if one h • .-.s at his tiitte, he received 
an adequate education. He was sent frompesantrcr. to pestintrcn, \Vherevei' there were famous teachers' 
(Soetomo 1984: I 13-4; Anderson 1979: 228). 
Surjo's genealogy can be traced back to Raden Mas Said (Mangkuncgara 1), former adipali (chief of 
domain) of Surakana (1757-95). He was well knowil as Pa11gctan Sanrbcmyawll and led a series of 
rebellions ogainstthe VOC in the 1750s (Tocr 1985: to-ll). His Arabic name, Said, indicates that he was 
a devout Muslim by the Javanese standards of the time. Surjo's father continued this santri tradition. llis 
name was Hadji Mlihamrnad Chart tirtodhipuro (a government tax officer). Thus, he used the halite of the 
prophet Mohammad and had become a hadji. In addition, Surjo's elder brother was, again, given an 
Arabic name, R.M. Said. 
11tc Djajadinihgtat brothers were sons of a pious Muslim Regent of the former Ganten Sultanate who 
during their childhood studied lslain in pesanmm. About the religioc.s commitment of his father, Achmad 
wrote (1936) as follows: 'As I seemed to have on aptitude for tl1e study of religion, many people advised 
my father to let me continue n"' · My father appatcnlly liked the idea, because shortly afterwards 
he decided to send me ofict th ·baron (ledul Fitti) to the village of Knroendang, where one of 
my cousins ... was running '" f'f:1ken from the English version of Ahinad's memoirs as 
translatd by Penders [ 197i: 2. 
Tjokroaminoto's great ~H ~fu; 
Tegalsari (Ponorogo) cst1cu:·P- • i!· 
. /.asan Besari, was a fcunder of the wcll-knownpcsantreu 
•:· ofPakubnwana II (1726-1749). Tjokroaminoto's father, 
----~--~----------_,--
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Aficr intense exposure to Western secular education, however, the Islamic 
commitment of such children of the devout Muslim priyayi gradually faded. Agus 
Salim's confession reflects this changing religious attitude: 'Although I was born in a 
devout Muslim family, and given religious instructions in my early childhood, [aficr 
entering Dutch school] I soon began to suffer from loss of inum (faith)' (Salim 1926: 
26). Salim frankly admi\~<C: t!Jat the education he gained at the secondary school (HBS) 
had distanced himself from Islam (Panitia Bukt1 Pcringatcm 1996: 40). 
For some of the intelligentsia, however, the waning of their Islamic identity was 
not a fixed condition.<1 'Identity', argues Stuart Hall, operates 'under erasure' in the 
interval between reversal and emergence. It is subject to 'a radical historicit.ation, ami 
is c~ Jlltly in the process of change and transformation' (Hall 1997: 2·4). 
Discn, ntcd with the aristocratic life-world and the various discriminations of the 
colonial system, and/or having an opportunity to cnco:tntcr or rccncountcr members of 
the Islamic cpistcthic community, individual Muslim figures or Islamic socio·Cconomic 
networks, some of the intelligentsia IVerc able to rediscover their affinity with Islamic 
communities and identities. 
It is useful to recall relevant fragmcrts of the biographies of Agus Salim, 
Tjokro~rninoto and tirto Adhi Surjo to better understand the trarlsforrnation of their 
identities. Salim 11egan his modem schooling in the ELS of Riau, and continued his 
study in the HBS in Jakarta, where he lived with a Dutch faniily. In 1903 he graduated 
frcrn this school as the top student of the three existing HBS in Java. He wished to 
proceed to the medical school in Netherlands but his father could not afford this. R. A. 
Raden Mas Tjokroamiseno (Wedana of Kleco, Madiun), was a devout Muslim prr)'ciyi as reflected in the 
way he gave Arabie names to his children such Umat Jaman, Umar Said, Umar Sa bib, lstirah Moharnad 
Subari and so on. See Amelz (l952a: 48-50). 
Finally, Agus Salim's faU1et, Sutan Mohammad Sali!ll, was a devout Muslhn from the Minangkabau 
aristocracy. !n fact. the last great East lndies ulanra in the /raramaliJ (Mecca and Medina). Sjeikh Achmad 
Khatib, was a btotl1er of Moh•mrnad Salim's father. As a /wofiljaksa (chief native legal official), 
Mohammad Salim remained strongly committed to Islamic tutelage. lie was in fact one of the main 
contributors to the AI·Afunir lsl::~.mic nt.:lg:J.zinc (Junus 1960: 69). lie was accustolilcd to go to the surm1 
to read the Qur'an and oU1cr religious books. He was once impressed by the protagonist of a book he read, 
namely Masjudrll Haq. It was this n::~.me that was originally given to Ag\Js Salim. Furthcnrtore. as Agus 
Sa1int admitted: 'To be frank when my father sent roc to the Dutch school, t1tcte had been an u11roar in my 
village as people repeatedly asked him: 'do you want to make your son become Christian?" (Panitia 
Brtkrt Pcringatan 1996: 40). 
47 The reverse is also true that the Islamic mindedness of an individual was not necessarily n final 
condition. Abdullah Achmad (a great propagandist ofU1e reformist-nndemist idcoln~y of West Sumatra), 
for lnst:ucc, in last years of his life became closer to the Dutch with his support f.:.1 the Guru Ordinance 
(Stcenbrink 1994: 41). 
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Kartini (later known as the 'mother' of kcmadJocan)48, who had been granted a 
scholarship to study there but was not allowed by her father to do so, knowing that 
Salim was a bright student with a financial problem wrote a letter to Mrs. Abendanon 
asking her to reallocate the scholarship to him. Salim himself tried to get 'gelijkgcsteld' 
(equal legal statts with the Dutch) to pave the road to the Netherlands. All efforts failed. 
In the meantime, he was unwilling to work as a civil servant for the colonial 
govemment. 
Snouck Hurgronje offered him a promising alternative. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affair of Netherlands was planning to open a new consulate in Jeddah (the port for 
Mecca), and Salim was offered a staff position there as a translator. 11tinking that he 
would be working on behalf or Netherlands instead of the colonial government, Salim 
accepted this offer and arrived there in 1906. i'rcquent cont1icts with his Dutch superior 
propelled him doser to the Islamic epislemic community in Mecca It was there he met 
his uncle Achmad Khatib, the last great Indies ulama in the 1/aramaiu. !his encounter 
was described by Salim as the tuntillg point in rediscoveri•tg his Islamic identity 
(Panitia 1JuA11 Pcriltgatan 1996: 36-62). On his return home (in 1911), this internal 
conversion found all opportut1ity for expressioii when he 111et ljokroaminoto (the then 
chairman of the Islamic Union, Sarckatls/am) in early 1915, which led to his prominent 
role in the Sarckat islam from late 1915 onwards. Similar expcrict1ees in the context of 
the detachment mid re-attachment to Islam cart be seen in the biographies of 
Tjokroaminto and Tirto Ad!: i Surjo."9 
"
3 
nom into a higher Javanese priyayi family in 1879, Rader. Adjeng Kartini was a iuodel of the 
kehwtljoemr-otiented woman. She was permitted by her f~thet the unusual privilege of attending a 
Europe:::n elementary school until she was 12, which was rare for native women at the time. llaving a 
strong desire to continue her education, she was not allowed to do so by her father out respect for 
traditional culture. She then compensated for her disillusionment by maintaining and broadening her 
kcmadjocar~ outlook in the form of extensive reading and a voluminous correspondence with press editors 
and numerous Dutch Etilici and feminists including J. II. Abcndanon, II. II. Van Kol, Mcvrouw Ovink-
Socr and Stella Zcchandelaar. She conuncnced writing lcners in 1899 at !he age of20 and continued until 
the age of24 when she died in childbirth (or by poison'!) without accomplishing her long cherished dream 
to open a small school for Javanese girls (Gccrtz 1964). 
"
9 Tjokroali.tiitoto finished his study at the Magellng OSV!A in 1°0:2 He th::n joined the govctnrttetit 
administration as a sec1 ,;,ry of the Pati!J (native chief minister of a Regent) ofNgawi. He found he could 
not stay in this post. lie was bothered by the general resentment of old aristocrats towards educated 
priyayi among their subordinates and the requirement for lower government officers of the time to display 
an obsequious attitude and feudal gestures of obeisance toward their superiors. So, in 1906 he ten the 
government post aud joined n private European company, Kooy & Co., in Surabaya. While he worked for 
this company, he allcnded the Burgcrlijkc A'""d.!clwa/ (Night School), from 1907 until 1910, and began 
to write articles for local newspapers. After leaving this school he got a more lucrative job in a sugar 
factory near Surabaya, and work!!d there until mid-1912. During thi.c; period, to compc~satc for his 
expulsion from the feudal priyayi life• world, he established contacts with Islamic commercial networks in 
t11e city, at the very time when Islamic conunetcial associations sprang up throughout the archipelago. 
One of the leading Islamic merchant-activists in the city was lladji Hasan Ali Surati. He was a pc1"Juakm1 
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The encounter of some members of the intelligentsia with Islamic netwOtk5 and 
figures whether intentionally or unintentionally, for idealistic or pragmatic reasons 
provided a catalyst for their return to the Islamic comr.mnity. This return did not 
necessarily entail radical changes in their religious piety and ~rudition. It did suffice to 
reconnect them with the house of Islam. 
Afier the relaxation of the 'birth rights' (heredity) requirement in the 1910s, 
many children of the lesser (devout Muslim) priyayi and Muslim petty bourgeoisie 
(merchants and comtnercial fanners) obtained access to Europcari-Stylr. schools.l0 An 
unintended consequence of this educational refonn was to mcrcase the numbers of 
Muslim intelligentsia. 
!-laving had a secular education but unwilling to surrender their faith, these 
Muslim intelligentsia maintained their links with lslanJic intellectual networks. This 
gave rise to a hybrid intelligentsia that would later lead to the !ormation of the so-called 
'i11tclek·ulama' (modem intcllectual/int·'dligentsia who were literate ir religious 
knowledge). 
2.2 The isla11tie E:ducational Roots of the l\luslilll ('Clerical') lutclligcutsia 
The deepening penetration of colonialism and capitalism by no means led to the 
extiuction of the existing Islamic schools. Although butch control over coastal trading 
activities in the archipelago had devastated the socio•econoliliC underpinnings for 
lslalilic development in its early habitat (coastal cities), centres of lsbilic studies 
continued to survive by moving towards the himerlands and inland areas where the 
Indian Muslim who became tbc lcadct of the club of Tahi1'~·1 Mairike1ir. 1l1is club becarne a meeting place 
for local merchants and other people in which religious teachings wctc given and socio-economic 
problems were discussed. tjoktoainiiloto made contact with him aitd frequetuly came to this forum. Next, 
although he hituself established his own club, Pa:!ti lltJrsojo, he inaintained his links with Sur.ui's club. 
One day, four propagandists of the Sarekat Islam (Sl) from Sutakarta Ciihte to this club to promote the 
newly established associatic,;,:. ::: ;..1•c following day, Tjoktoaminoto, who had attended the rttccting, and 
Sutati were appointed hew iilCrbbCrS of the S/. niis event WilS the turning point in his life that would lead 
him to be a prominent !cadet of the catty Islamic political movements (KorVer 1985: 2t•2; Arnclz 1952a: 
50-1). 
TiM Adhi Sutjo began his schooling in the ELS and continued to the Doktcr-Djall'a schooi/STOVIA. 
Because of his 'scandalous• behavir.ur (in the eyes of the authorities), specifically in the context of giving 
a illegal drug prcs~ription to a very needy Chinese, he dropped out from this schcol in 1900. lie then 
devoted his life to journalism and social movements. To realize his ambition to establish a fully fledged 
native press and other activities he needed financial support. lie g~ined the support especially frortt 
Muslim traders or tl1e so~alled 'Kuocm Martlika' (Free People). From this intei'llction he became 
syrnpathetic to the plight und aspirations of Muslini titerchants. This provided the impetus for him to 
promote socio·Colilillcrcial associations under the banner oflslain. Thus, lie played a decisive role in tl1e 
establishment of the Islamic Comrtterci!!l Associatio:: (SDI) in 1908/09 and in other Islamic commercial 
networks, including in the early estabii~~u11eilt of the Islamic Union (Sl)-particularly in dealing with the 
legal mailers of this organizati·n l Toe< 1~85: 120-7). 
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agrarian networks of the pesantren-based 11/ama and Sufi brotherhoods, especially in 
Java, took over the role of Islamic .teaching (Lomt>ard 1996b: 124-48). 
At the same time, the contribution of the Indo-Malayan 'cpistemic community' 
(Ashhab Al-Jmvi;J•in) in the haramai11 (Mecca and Medina) to the reproduction and 
redistribution of religious knowlcdg~ remained. The endurance of this so-called Jciwah 
colony facilitated the continuous transmission of rcfonn ideas from the Middle East to 
tlic archipelago and inspired the emergence of r~fonn movcn1cnts in tareqal (Sufi 
brotherhood), Islamic doctrine, politics, artd schools. 
Towards the end of the 191h century, members of the new generation of Indies 
u/miw began to realise that the traditional.mcthod and mindsct of upholding Islam was 
incapable of dealing with the challenge of colo1liali~m ~11d modem civilization. Inspired 
by boill. the rise of Islamic refotlllism-modcmism in the Middle East and the 
introduction of Western cducatioil and associations in the homeland they began to 
promote the modernisation of Islamic schools. By combining the teaching of religious 
subjects \vith general subjects and adopting the methods and tcclutological apparatus of 
Western schools, these modernised islamic schools represented a new form of Islamic 
educational system called madrasah. It was the mculrasah that would become the 
breeding gtourtd for the emergence of 'clerical-intelligentsia' who came to be known as 
"ulama-imelek' (religious scholars who were literate in 1110dem scietllific knowledge). 
2.2.1 Islamic Education in the 191h Century 
Because of the colortial·State's lack of interest in native education until the first 
h:llf of the 191h century, traditional islatiliC schools were able to serve as the major 
educational institutions of the NEI. When the Libet"J! ccon01tiic forces focussed more 
attention on native education, the contradictory and discriminatory colonial policies 
towards Islam as well as the distrust of the salrtri (the devout Muslim) community 
towards Western institutions provided new ratiortales for the Islamic institutions to kee.p 
growing. 
The policy of the colonial-state towards Islamic education was ambivalent 
reflecting the ambiguity of the Dutch colonial attitude. There was a tension between the 
Dutch desire to avoid excessive involvement with native religious matters and the 
infectious residue of the unpleasant encounter between Christians and Muslims in the 
past. There Walo also a tension between the colonial govcmment's secular outlook and 
"'This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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its effort to curtail poteJtlial Islamic threats by supporting Christian missions. Such 
tensions pushed the politics of 'ne:Jtr&li!::' towards Islam onto ,;haky ground.51 
Initially, the colonial govcn:tnent attempted to be consistent with the policy to 
ensure Bocmipoctcr'l continued with their own traditional institut,ons. This, for 
iJ;stancc, Was rcf1ectcd in the instruction of the Governor General G. A. G. Ph. van der 
Capellen (1816-26) tgthe Residents in 1819to investigate the possibility of improving 
trnditional native education. Unfortunately, this effort resulted in no more than ofiTcial. 
reports OJ) the state of the pcsantrcn (Stcenbrink 1984: I 5'l; I 994: I). 
. . ' ' . 
When the Liberal movement reach~d the educational sector, lA. van der Chijs, 
:who was appointed the first colonial officer to develop native education, conducted · 
\ . - ~ 
research ill' 186/ particularly in Minahasa and Maluku. This research resulted in the 
policy in the Christian areas the g0vcmmcnt lvould improve and promote Christian 
missionary schools gradually by enlarging the teaching of 'secular' subjects. In the 
• 
Islamic areas, however, van dcr Chijs's fear (mixed with disdain) of Islam led to the 
decision that the goven1tt.ent would only promote Dutch·type public schools for the Iop 
elite of the indigenous people, to protect the Dutch front.what he called the 'lslatnic 
volcano' (Steen brink 1984: 160-1; Sockadri ·19/9: 80). 
Henceforth, · while the Christian schools becan!e a springboard for the 
development of the public school system this was JIOllhe case for the traditional Islamic 
schools. In contrast to the policy of i3ritish-Malaya where the govenaneJlt decided to 
develop afiemoon schools for Qur'anic leaching (Roff 1967: 26), the idea of developing 
Islamic schools in the NEI was rejected. In 1888 the r.utdl ~olonial minister refused to 
subsidise Islamic schools because the Governor General did not want to spend slate 
finances to develop an education system that might ultimately challenge Dutch authority 
(Steen"rink !994: 6·/).52 this policy of excluding lite Islamic school systei\J was in fact 
51 In the vety beginning ls1am was rnisundetstorJd hy thc·'Outch who thought that it h:d an ccch$iastical 
structure 1ike Christinnity, so that Mils1int ttavd to the Ceutte of tlie Islnrnic wor1d (Middle East) or even 
the spatial mobi1ity of the religious teachers within th.: country :'!hould be tC;itricted to prevent vetticn1 and 
horizontal inlegtalion of whal tltey called tho 'lsb~tic ptiesls'. Thus, alrClrly in !661 Ihe VOC had 
rcsJriclcd tltc procJicc of hadj (lhe pilgtinugc to Mecca). In t810 Governor-Gcnerol IIerman Willcm 
t>aendels (18QS .. Jl) !ssued n decree reqniriug k}ai (religious t.:nchcrs) to ha'.'C a pentllt for travel within 
tlte Nl!l (Suminlo 19%:8: Dholicr 19H2: 10). With Jhe chtcrgcnce oflhc scrialt•aJivc msntrcclions led by 
the returned hadjl and 1ocal tcHgiou!' scholars, the restriction on the practice of luulj nnd re1igious 
educationa1 activities found n new rationa1e. 
,
2 In resportSr to Utis policy, from the late 19u. ccutUty onward, there •.vas n dna~ tystem of cducntion in the 
NEI in which the ts1atnie cUucatilltt systtm wo1o; separated froin the Dutch education systern. 11ds is 
continued in post-colonial ludonesia, with n •sc·cu1ar• education systein under the Ministry of Education 
anti an Is1amic cducntiou sy.itein umlct 1he Ministij' ol Rclir,ious Affairs. Titus, the gcnera1 education 
system in lndonesin did no: emerge as~ rcsu!t of its adnptntion to traditiona11stamic cduc.ation. On the 
contrary, lhe Islamic education system as It nppenrs now is the rcsu1t of 3 gtadua1 trnnsfomtation from a 
~--~ -~--~-----------------
\ 
' 
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a continuation of earlier favouritism towards non-Muslims and non-santri aristocratic 
families in access to govcmllr~nt schools. 
The exclusion by the colonial education system of traditional Islamic schools 
was 1cciprocatcd by the general negative attitude of tile devout Muslim community 
I 
towards Western institutions. Aficr a series of' bloody native insurrcctions53 that 
involved ulama and their disciples, the mindset of the sa11tri community developed a 
- . 
kind of 'outsider'' mentality creating a symbolic boundaty with the life ·:. ',,! • • .. ·what 
they called the 'white infidel'. A vivid example of this kind of mindset was expressed 
by the dictum circulating within the milieu of the Acchncse religious community: 
''Those who write in the Latin alphabet w.ill find their hands cut off in the hereafter, 
those who follow the Dutch way belong to the infidels' (AJ"an 1987: 204). 
Being prevented from or reluctant to attend government schools, the m(''.•-
feasiblc choice for devout Muslim families until the late I 9'h ~entury was to attend 
traditional Islamic schools. The number of such schools, based on the 1831 government 
report on native educationai institutions in Java, was around I, 853 with abo11t 16, 556 
students. According to van der Chijs, most of these schools, however, taught students no 
more than Qur'anic reading with only a small nLmbcr of lhem learning Arabic writing 
(Dhoficr 1982: 35). From 1873, the-Office ofNnlivc Education Inspection (established 
by J. A. van d.~t Chijs) produced annual reports on the number of Islamic schools and 
students. Based on these reports, the number of pesamre11 \Yas reported as ave.-aging 
armmd 20 -25,000, while the number of students was about300,000.54 
Although the official statistics on the· development of the traditional Islamic 
. 
!>.:hool nrc questionable, it is safe to say that the number of schools grew significantly 
throughout the century. This is especially true 'when considering that most of the 
tmc.· ional sysl<:m, which has had lo respond to tl1e challenge oftl1e goncral educalion syslem (Sieenbrink 
~~ . 
n Examples oftltc native insurrections under the banner of Islam throughout the 19th century were the so· 
called Cirebon War (1802-06), lhe 'Java (Diponegoro) War' (1825-1830), lhe 'Padri War' in West 
Sumatra (182l·t838), lhe 'Banjarmasin (Antasari) War' (1859-1862), the 'Jihad in Cilegon' (9-30 July 
1888) and !he Aceh War (1873·1903) . 
. 
54 This figure, however, may be unreliable since some regions for some years did not report the n11mbers 
of tcdchcrs and students while sam: otLer regions repeatedlv fCported the same figure for some years. 
Furthennore, thC Dutch r.;purts Sm'letimcs dcscn'b_cd the • · :r. -·· ·: .:- of the Islamic schools as declining, and 
sometimes as increasing. T ':ffercnt conclusions ,, ::\·~·.: from different objectives. TI1e fvnner 
co:dusion was intended toP- b.t ti-e source ofpotenti .. ( ,;iutnic disobedience wus successfully under 
go\'cmmcnt control, while the latur !'I''C was inte.mlcd 10 convince the C'f"ntral government about the 
conliroing reality ofthe Islamic tim>:·,\:: :enbrink 1984: 161). 
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outstandingpesanlr<!l !hat remain today in East and Central Java were established in the 
191h century. 55 
1\S a result of the growing number of traditional Islamic scliools combined with 
the maintenance of intellectual and emotional links between teachers (kjai) and pupils 
(santri,) and between pesantrcn across regions, traditional Islamic intellectual networks 
were sustained. This facilitatcJ the continuity of Islamic education. Thus, despite the 
apparent colonial discrimination against and restrictions on Islamic teachings, in 1890 
Sn:mck Hurgronjc revealed the information that pesantrcn were increasing (Benda 
1958: 27). If twenty years later he celebrated the early victory of the Western-style 
schools over their Islamic counterparts he possibly underestimated the ongoing 
transformation of the Islamic schools and •l:e ability of Islamic intellectuals to cope with 
the changing environment. 
Apart from the development of Islamic teaching in the archipelago, learning in 
the Middle East particularly at the haramain (Mecca and Medina) was still considered 
by many devout Muslim families as the pest way to achieve high qualifications in 
Islamic studies. Among the Musl:r.• community of the NEI there had been a perception 
that however capable one might be in tcligious knowledge, without having studied for 
some years in the haramai:1 one could only be regarded as a teacher without real 
authority. 
This perception seemed to be in tunc with the wider Muslim tradition of 
knowledge transmission across generations. Person to person transmission wan at the 
heart of the transmission of lslm:.;c knowledge. Muslim scholars all over the world 
travelled from one centre of learning to another with the haramain being the most 
desired final destination, to receive in person authoritative religious knowledge (Azra 
1994; Proudfoot 1997: 167-8). 
The influx of East Indies students into the haramain that had been taking place 
at least since the 1500s continued to increase in parallel with the growing numbers of 
r;~,dns. For the Jdwah (all people of Malay race) ofthe time, the pilgrimage to Mecca 
''• '.·.icndcd not merely to visit the Holy City and the holy tombs but more importantly 
··.• .~ct:ty relieious practices and knowledge. As Snouck Hurgronje observed (1931: 
" For example, pcsantrcn Tennns in Pacilan (est. 1823); pcsantrcn Jampes and Bendo in Kcdiri and 
Pelangilan in Babat (est. 1855); pcsantrcn Tegalsari in Semarang (est. 1870); pesantrcn Tcbuircng in 
Jombang (est. 189~); as well as pcsantrcn Probolinggo, Bangkalan (Madura), Siwalan Pnnji (Sidorujo) 
and some other pesanlren:.· in Jombang such as Ngcdang, Kerns, T11mbak Berns, Den Anyar, Rejoso, 
Petcrongan, Sambong, Sukopuro, Watu Galuh originated in the 19~ century (Soekadri 1979: 19; Dhofier 
1982: 2). 
- -----_____________ __:__ 
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220): 'Older Jawah, who settle here either for life or for some years, wish to devote their 
last days to religious practices on the pure soil: younger ones devote themselves to 
religious studies.' 
With the conspicuous involvement of ltadji in the native insurrections in the 
archipelago throughout the 19111 century, the colonial government in 1825, 1831 and 
1859 issued various resolutions (ordomwntic) intended both to restrict the pilgrimage 
and to monitor the activity.·,< the returned ltadji (Dhofier 1982: 11-2; Suminto 1996: 
I 0). These restrictions, however, did not discourJge the Muslim desire to perform ltadj. 
To avoid Dutch regulations, the Indies pilgrims travelled via Singapore where British 
requirements we::·: Jess stringent (Roff 1967: 38). 
There were at least two reasons cand••cive to increasing the numbers of those 
undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca in the late 191h century. First, the introduction of 
steamships, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the operation of the profit-
oriented private shipping companies assisted the pilgrim traffic. Second, the worsening 
socio-economic conditions in the East Indies and the tightening control over religious 
activities following the native insuncctions provided the impetus for the religious 
revival. As Sartono Kartodirdjo observed {1966: 141): 
For several decades a large part of Java was swept by a religious revival that 
demonstrated a tremendous increase in religious activities, such as the 
observance of daily prayers, undertaking pilgrimages, furnishing traditional 
Muslim education for the young, establishing branches of tarcqats, the 
widespread distribution of sermons, etc. 
The impulse of religious revival along with the growing Muslim awareness of 
the potential shortage of ulama (as many of them had been kiiJcd in the insurrections) 
provided additional motivation for wealthy religious families to send their sons to the 
centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East (Abaza 1999: xvii-xviii). These factors 
Jed to the considerable increase of pilgrims in tl••; last decades of the century. While in 
the 1850s and 1860s, an average of 1.pproximately 1600 East Indies pilgrims travelled 
annually to Mecca, the number becdllle 2600 in 1870s, jumped to 4600 in the 1880s, 
reaching over 7000 at the end ofthe century (Ricklefs 1993: 130). 
Due to the growing influx of the islands pilgrims to Mecca, the Jciwalt colony 
(Asltltab al-Jawiyyin) by the end of the century was the biggest and most active one in 
Mecca (Roff 1970: 172). In the view of Hurgronje who stayed in Mecca in 1884/5: 
'There is scarcely any part of the Moslim world where the proportion between the 
number of the population and !t.e yeatly pilgrimages is as favourable to Mekka, as in the 
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Malay Archipelago' (1931: 217). In addition to the significant number of people, 
Hurgronje added (1931: 286}, 'the considerable number of Malay books printed from 
1884 till now in Mekka bears witness to the importance of the Jiiwah element in the 
Holy City'. 
The islands of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Moluccas were the most important 
sources of pilgrim traffic. Sumatra and the province ofBanten (West Java), the regions 
that had been extensively pounded by the wave of wars and religious revival, delivered 
the largest percentage of pilgrims and students (Hurgronje 1931:229, 268-289). 
The convergence of the diverse Jciwalz people in the lzaramai11 creat~ri a 
collective identity and a consciousness of the unity of their shared Islamised culture. 
This common identity and consciousness gave rise to the fonnation of a specific Jtiwalz 
epistemic community, 56 centred on outstanding rllama whose reputation was recognized 
even by the local Arabs. Apart from acting as religious counsellors for their fellow 
compatriots these ulama produced religious works in both Arabic and Malay that 
became the main reference for Islamic thoughts in the archipelago (Roff 1970: 172). 
Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 291) depicted this eloquently: 
All other considerations as to consequences arising from the Hadj sink in 
comparison with the blooming Jawah colony in Mecca; here lies the heart of 
religious life of the East-Indian Archipelago, and numerous arteries pump from 
thence fresh blood in ever accelerating tempo to the entire body of the Moslim 
populace oflndonesia. 
Until the late 19th century 'Islamic refonnism' remained the dominant discourse 
and ideology of the intemal!onal ulanra networks in the lzaramai11. This ideology had 
its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth century ulama and Sufis who ied the Muslim 
response to th~ st'cial crisis in the Muslim world. Beginning in Arabia and Cairo and 
then spreading out to other parts of the Muslim territories, infonnal ulama and Sufi 
study groups espu.sed a reorganisation of Muslim communities and the refonn of 
individual behaviour in tenns of fundamental religious principles. This refonn called for 
a purified version of Islamic belief and practice based on the study of the Quran, hadith, 
and law combined with Sufi asceticism. In this regard, these refonners idealised the 
Prophet Muhammad as the perfect exemplary centre. As such they sought to abolish 
saint worship ·and the more Gorid religious cults and ceremonies, :'"1 to dispel 
superstitious or magical beliefs and practice, while also opposing the temleney of native 
"For a good description of \he genealog: ·.· .. '!he 1iiwah epistemie communir; (ecumene) in \he /Jaramaln, 
see (Loffan 2003). 
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rulers of the Muslim countries to collaborate with the colonial infidel (Lapidus 1995: 
563). The most radical version of this Islamic refonnism was the Wahlliibiya movement 
founded by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92), which assumed control over 
Mecca early in 1803.57 This movement had inspired segments of the East Indies ulama 
to begin a similar project in the region.58 
Continuing the trajectory of the ulama networks of the previous centuries, the 
East Indies ulama who became important figures in the haramain in the 191h century 
were, among others, Muhammad Arsjad ai-Banjari (1710-1812), Muhammad al-
Nawawi ai-Bantani (1815-98), and Sjeikh Achmad Khatib (1860-1916).59 As part of the 
international ulama networks, the East Indies ulama at the Jawah colony could not 
escape from the dominant ideology of the time. The influence of Islamic refonnism is 
indicated in M Arsjad al-Banjari's correction of the qiblat (direction of prayer) of some 
Jakarta mosques and his rejection of the teaching of wihdatlll wtljud (pantheism) 
practised by a particular tareqat (Sufi brotherhood) in Banjarrnasin60 (Steenbrink 1984: 
95-6). This would even become clearer in the worr.s and political attitudes of Nawawi 
and Khatib. 
"At this time, the ll'ahhubiya control over Mecca did not last long. At the request of the Ottoman sultan, 
the ll'ahhabiya was brutally suppressed and forced out by the forces oftlte Egyptian viceroy Muhammad 
'All (r. 1805-48) in t818 (Loffan, 2003: 29).11owever, following the capture of Mecca by 'Abd al-i\ziz 
ibn Sa'ud in 1924, the Wahhabiya regained its control over this Holy City. 
"It is said that elements of Wahhiibiya teachings might have influenced a segment oftl1e ulama of West 
Sumatra resulting in religious connicts between the refonnist and conservative ulama, culminating in the 
Padri War, 1821-1827 (Dobbin, 1983). In parallel with the rise of Wahhiibiya movement in the haramain, 
the wave oflslamic reformism that had long reached the archipelago provided the impetus for religious 
revival. TI1is was reflected in the shift of the tarcqat (mystical brotherhood) adherents from the ee!tatie 
Syattariyah to tl1e moreshuri'a.friendly Naqsyabandiyah and Qadiriyyah and in the emergence ofreligio· 
political insurrections throughout the 19th century. For a further explanation of this issue, sec Steenbrink 
p984) and Loffan (2003: 29·31). 
'According to Azra (1994) the network between Muslims in the Middle East and in the archipelago had 
been initiated as early as the emergence of Islam in the fonn of religia.cconomic relations. 11lrough the 
extensive Isltomic propagation in the archipelago from the late 12th century and the dominant power of the 
Ottoman Empire nod otl1er Islamic kingdoms (such ns tl1e Mughaland Safavidl over the Middle Eas~ Red 
Sea and Indian Ocean since the second halfofthe 15~ and tltroughout the 16 century, this network wns 
extended to religio~potitical relo.tions. Furthennore, at least since the 17111 century this network began to 
transfonn itself into intensive religio-intellectual relations. TI1e important Indo-Malayan figures of the 
17ili century international ulama networks were, among otl1ers, Nur ai-Din al-Rnniry (b. 1658), 'Abd AI· 
Rn •ur al-Siukili (b.l615), and Muhammad Jusuf AI·Maqassari (b. I 627). TI1ose or the 18~ century were 
Sjihab at-Din b. 'Abd Alleh Muhammad, Kemas Fakhr al-Din, 'Abd a! Shamad al-Palimbani, Kemas 
Muhammad b. Ahmad and Muhammad Muhyi al·Din b. Syihab al-Din (from Palembang/Sumatra); 
Muhammad Arsjad al-Dandjari and Muhammad Nafis nl-Dandjari (South Kalimantan); 'Abd al-Wahhab 
al-Dugis (From Sulawesi); nnd 'Abd ni·Rnhman al-Mashri al-Datawi (Jakarta). 
60
.Examplcs of his h'rks were Sabil a/-Mulltadin and Pcrulaman Melayu written nrnund the tum rf the 
18ili/19ili century. 
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Nawawi's reputation as a doctor of divinity was based on his monumental work 
on the principal Shafi'itc manual ofLaw.6 t During his long life in Mecca, this son of a 
Ban ten pcnglm/11 wrote no less than 20 learned Arabic works.62 Some of his early works 
were published in Cairo, but with the emergence of the printing press in Mecca in the 
last decade of the 191h century he published his works there (Hurgronje 1931: 271). In 
Snouck's view (1931: 270): 'Under his inspiration, more and more Sundanese, 
Javanese, and Malays tum to the thorough study of Islam, and the politico-religious 
ideals of Islam gain, in their most highly developed fonn, increased circulation.' 
Concentrating himself on literary works, Nawawi did not forget to express his anti-
colonial sentiments. In this context Snouck had something more to say: 'The 
resurrection of the Bantcn sultanate, or of an independent Moslim stale, in any other 
form, would be acclaimed by him joyously' (1931: 270). 
While Nawawi was celebrated for his erudition in religious knowledge, Achmad 
Khatib deserves allcntion for his achievement as the Imam of the Shafiite school of 
jurisprudence at the Masjidil Haram and also as the prototype of an East Indies 11/ama 
who had some experience of the Dutch (secular) educational systcm.63 During his long 
life in Mecca, Khatib wrote some forty-nine books. Many of these books were on his 
special field, astronomy, and published in the Cairo press (Abdullah 1971: 7).64 Under 
the influence of the ideology of 'Islamic reformism', he and other fellow ulama 
believed they had to resist colonialism. He frequently depicted the Dutch as the infidels 
who had poisoned Islam in the heart of its believers. In his view, the relationship with 
the infidel colonial had been the main reason for the waning of the Islamic spirit 
61 Born in Banton, the son of a dislrict·pcnghulu, Omar ibn Arabi, he made the pilgrimage (with his other 
two brothers, Tamim and Ahmad) whilst quite young, after which he stayed about tltrCe years in Mecca. 
When he retuned home witlt strang religious credentials, he soon afterwards decided to return to the Holy 
City and to stay there permanently. Ilis first teachers in Mecca were the leading Jdwah u/ama from the 
previous generation, notably Khatib Sambas and Abdulgbani Bima, and then his real teachers were tlte 
Egyptian Yt1sufSumbulawcni, Nahniwi and Abd el-Hamid Daghcstiini (Hurgronjc, 1931: 268-9). 
62 Examples of tltcse were a Qur'anic commentary, Tafsir Marah Labid (published early 1880s), Syarh 
Kitab AI.Junimiyyah on Arabic grammar (1881), Lubdbu/ ai-Bayiin on linguistic style (1884), Dhari'at 
al-yaqin on doctrine (1886), Suluk al-jddah and Sui/am almundjdh on Islamic Law (1883 and 1884), and 
~arh Biddyat al-llldayah on Suftsm (1881) (Hurgronje 1931: 271-2). 
Born in Kota Gcdang, West Sumatra, his fath:r (Abdul Latif Khatib) was a descendant of the 
aristocratic family whose occupation was Djaksa Kcpala (chicfofnativclcgal officials) ofPadang, while 
his motltcr was a daughter of the well-known rcfonnist u!ama of the Padri group, Tuanku nan Rcntjch 
(Stecnbrink, 1984: 139). As u son of an aristocratic family, the young Achmad Khatib was able to attend 
tlte Dutch-sponsored primary school and tltcn the native teacher-training school in Bukittinggi (Nocr, 
1980: 38). His stronger interest in lslnmic studies, however, brought him to Mecca to study and then teach 
Islam there. N:xt, through his marriage witlt a daughter of an influential and rich Arab merchant he was 
appointed a religious leader .nd held the office ofShafi'i Imam at the Masjidil Haram (Abdullah 1971: 7; 
Ro!f1967: 60). 
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(Stccnbrink 1984: 146-7). Hts major contribution to the Jawah cpistemic community, 
however, lay in his position as the last great East Indies ulama in the haramain from 
whom East Indian students from diverse socio-religious backgrounds and territories 
learned traditional Islamic teachings and ideology of the previous generations of the 
internationalu/ama networks in the haramain. 
Apart from the persistent influence of Islamic reformism, the international 
ulama networks in the late 191h century began to be influenced by a new wave of 
'Islamic modernism'. This new ideology was first espoused by the Young Ottomans in 
the 1860s and 1870s and spread out to other parts of the Muslim world. While 
committed to the principles of Islam, this young Ottoman group called upon the 
endangtred kltilafah of the Ottoman regime to transform itself into a constitutional 
government imitating European forms of the state and civilization. A similar response 
came from (British) India. A modernist Indian Muslim thinker, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 
argued that for the Indian Muslims to survive under British rule they required new 
approaches to education to produce a new generation of Muslim lcadll s. While 
remaining loyal to the principles of Islam, these new leaders could also adapt 
themselves to the political and scientific culture of the modern world. In short, 'Islamic 
modernism' was the ideology of new elites in the Muslim world who were concerned 
about the renewal of the state and society through the adoption of modem methods, 
scientific and technological development, while still concerned for maintaining Islam as 
the cultural basis of power and society (Lapidus 1995: 557-67). 
Thus, Islamic modernism is different in some ways from Islamic reformism. 
Islamic reformism was the ulama project started in the 17th century in an effort to 
reorganise Muslim communities and reform individual behaviour. This project \\as 
based on the purification oflslamic belief and practice through a return to the perceived 
authentic 5ource of Islamic orthodoxy (Qur'an and Swwa) witl1 a strong tendency to 
reject Western culture. On the other hand, 'Islamic modernism' was the project of the 
new western-influenced Islamic generation to adapt themselves to modem civilisation 
while remaining loyal to Islamic culture. In other words, Islamic modernism was an 
interstitial space between 'Islamism' and 'secularism', which might return to the 
Islamism or transform further into the secularism, such as ln Turkey under the Young 
Turks, or continue to take a moderate position between extremes. In the NEI during the 
64 Examples of his works nrc Rauda a/ Hussab ji 'Jim ai-Hisab (Cairo, 1892) and AI.Jawahlr a/-Naqiyyah 
ji'l A 'mal ai.Jalbiyyah (Cairo, 1891)(Sie<nbrink 1984: 145). 
·r; 
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colonial period, as the Dutch attempted to detach the ruling class from Islamic tutelage, 
the Dutch education that favoured this class transformed the Indies' elite (in general) 
into a (moderately) secularised intelligentsia. Consequently, there were only few a 
Western-educated elite in the Indies who favoured 'Islamic modernism'. 
In Egypt, Islamic modernism took a different tum in the hands of a new 
generation of Al-Azhar-based ulama. For these ulama there were at least two reasons 
which resulted in an idiosyncratic approach to the issue of modernism. On the one hand, 
the ancient Al-Azhar Academy in Cairo continued to be a prestigious learning centre for 
local and foreign students seeking to acquire advanced religious knowledge. In thi!' 
regard, the u/ama as the vanguard of Islamic scholarship had a sort of missio11 sacrce to 
maintain Islamic learning. On the other hand, the strengthening superimposition of 
Western civilisation, particularly after Egypt came under British occupation after 1882, 
inspired some of the younger u/ama to take a strategic approach in order to better deal 
with the challenge of the modem world (Landau 1994: 122). To deal with this challenge 
they promoted the synthesis of the concept of 'Islamic reformism' as developed by the 
previous generation of u/ama with 'Islamic modernism' as formulated by the new 
modem-educated Muslim intellectuals. The result of this synthesis was the hybrid 
'Islamic reformism-modernism'. 
This new intellectual movement was inspired by the teaching of a distinguished 
wandering Islamic thinker, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97}, who resided in Egypt in 
the 1870s Gust before he started his Pan-Islamic activity).65 His major concern was to 
eliminate the ongoing Islamic paralysis and fragmentation and revive the true glory of 
Islam. In his view, to free Muslim societies from colonial encroachment necessitated the 
reform of Islamic belief and practice, because for him religion was the moral basis of 
technical and sctcntific achievement as well as of political solidarity and power. He 
believed that Islam was quintessentially suited to serve as the basis of a modem 
scientific society, as it had once been the basis of medieval Islamic glory. But to do this 
. required Muslims to employ a rational intcrpt~tation of their scripture. These efforts, in 
his view, should be grounded in the spirit of the Islamic solidarity, since the only way to 
respond properly to the colonial cncroacluncnt was to link the local resistance of 
" Born in Asadabad (han)-lhough he later clair..ed to be a~ l.fghan in order to ensure a favourable 
reception among SuMi Muslims-his rcligio·political career led him to travel across Islamic countries 
and Europe. Thus he visited Iran, Afghanistan, India, Hijaz, Egypt, Turkey, France, England, Russia 
before he died in Istanbul in 1897. 
Chapter 2- The Formation iJfthc lntclligcntsla 83 
Muslim countries to the international all-Muslim union (Lapidus 1995: 578-620; 
Landau, 1994: 13-5). 
Because of his erudition, writing ability, and charismatic oratory, at-Afghani 
attracted many admirers, some of whom considered themselves his disciples and 
continued to spread his message. Among his famous disciples was an Egyptian Islamic 
scholar, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905). He was born of an educated family and was 
schooled at Al-Azhar when li!!aily he encountered at-Afghani who often visited the 
university during the 1870s. Due to his involvement in the 'Urabi revolt of 1881, 
'Abduh was exil~d to France in I 882. It was during his exile that he joined at-Afghani 
in Paris to publish in 1884 a monumental magazine, AI- 'Unva al-Wuthqii (the 
Indissoluble Bond), which would become the cornerstone in the propaganda of the so-
called Pan-Islamic movement.66 
Henceforth, the idea of the Pan-Islamic movement became an embodiment of at-
Afghani's fanner dream of Islamic solidarity. In the eyes of al-Afghani, Pan-Islam and 
Nationalism could be mutually complementary in their 'liberationist' aspects. The grand 
design of Pan-Islamic politics in the long run was the establishment of an international 
Muslim bloc in the fonn of a confederation of semi-autonomous Muslim states with the 
Ottoman Sultan as their suzerain. In the shorttenn, however, the priority was resistance 
to fcreign aggression. Efforts were made to institute study circles near the mosques or 
religious schools as catalysts for mobilising public opinion and linking Pan-Islamic 
networks. In this respect, 'Abduh complained that the practice of the pilgrimage had 
bec0me focussed solely on religious ends and had lost its power as the medium for 
igniting the spirit oflslamic solidarity (Landau 1994: 13-26). 
Both at-Afghani and 'Abduh agreed that the primary purpose of the Islamic 
movement was political revival. To attain this objective, however, while at-Afghani 
emphasised the pragmatic need for political alliance, 'Abduh pursued the same goal by 
emphasising educational, legal, and spiritual ref ann. 'Abduh seems to have realised that 
a united Muslim &late was politically impractical. Moreover, on his return to Egypt in 
66 Tite tenn Pan-Islam was actually of non-Muslim origin. Tite first extensive use of the lenn was made 
by Gabriel Channes, a pmlific French journalist interested in the Ottoman Empire, who employed the 
tenn as a variant of existing terms such as 'Pnn-Siavism', 'Pnn~Gcrmanism' or 'Pnn-Hcllenism' (Landau 
1994: 2). Even so, the idea of (international) Islamic unity itself had been circulating among a secret 
society of the Young Ottomans established in 1865 that used tl1e tcnn lttihad-i Islam (Union oflslam) in 
the late If, 60s. 1l1is tenn was then generally rendered as Wahdat a/.Jsliim (or a/-Wnhda ai-Jsliimiyya) in 
Arabic, Md Inter as Jiiml'at a/-Jsliim, which all mean Islamic unity or Islamic union. AI-'Unra al-wuthqii 
was rcspor,dble for the early usc of these Arabic terms in one of the articles of the magazine published 
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1888, he wa~ appointed judge and later mufti (chicfoflslamic law) from 1889 to 1905. 
In such a formal position, it was perhaps important for him to remain on good terms 
with the British administration. He then withdrew from active involvement in politics, 
although he did call on Muslims to unite against their enemies. Henceforth, his 
endeavours as mufti were directed toward modernising Islamic law and revising the 
curriculum of Al-Azhar to include modem history and geography. His later concern was 
to maintain the vitality of Islam while Muslims were adopting Western ways. He 
proposed the reformulation of Islam in order to distinguish the essential from the non-
essential, preserve the fundamentals and discard the accidental aspects of the historical 
legacy. He called for Muslims to return to the Qur 'an and the Swma as God's guidance, 
but in mallets not expressly covered in both sources he argued that ijtihad (indepcnd~nt 
reasoning and judgment) was essential in order to better respond to the challenge of 
modem society. Inherent in this project was the conviction that Muslims should not 
hesitate to draw on modem science and logic to deepen their knowledge and to 
demonstrate the compatibility of !slant with modem scientific thought and progress. In 
so doing he b~came the trailblazer of a hybrid Islamic reformism and modernism under 
the banner of the so-called Salafiya movement (Lapidus 1995: 621: Landau 1994: 25-6). 
The great tremors of the Pan-Islam and Salafiya movements speedily spread out 
to North Africa and the Middle East providing a new inspiration for various rcligio-
political movements in the r~gion. In the last decade of the 191h century their influence 
had also reached the heart of the Islamic epistemic communities in the haramain. For a 
new generation of Muslim students in the Holy City who had become politically aware 
of the detrimental effects of Western encroachments in their respective home countries 
the idea of Pan-Islam both in the political and educational fields was very stimulating. 
In the vk'l ofSnouck Hurgronjc: 'Those who at home have studied in thepesantrens, 
soeraus, mandarsah 's [sic] (institutions for the religious instructions of native Moslims) 
or in the ll:osq'"~: arc most open to Pan-Islamic influences' (Hurgronje 19~ •· ~J.J'. 
Achmad Khatib, as the last great Jiiwah ulama around the tum 'Ji ·· ., ~entury, 
reacted to the growing influence of 'Abduh-inspircd reformism-modc:mism with 
scepticism. Although he had been influenced by Islamic reformism, his position as the 
guardian of traditions of Shiifiitc teaching made him critical of 'Abduh's notion of 
ijtilzad and modernism. He allowed his students to read 'Abduh 's works, but he did this 
ond edited by al-Afghani and • Abduh in 1884 at the very time when Ute term Pan-lslarn was increasingly 
employed by Gobriel Channes nnd oUters in France (Landau 1994: 2-4). 
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with the intention thai his students would reject 'Abduh's ideas (Noer 1973: 32). Many 
of his students were in fact not only reading 'Abduh's works but also admiring his 
thoughts. As such, Khatib funclionec\ as a bridge between tradition and innovation. In 
such a 'limina1'67 position he was able to serve as a midwife for both the upcoming 
generation of the reformist-modernist ulama and inlcllccluals such as Mohd. Tahir b. 
Djalaluddin, M. Djamil Djambck, Abdullah Ahmad, Abdul Karim Amrullah (Hadji 
Rasul), M. Thaib Umar, Achmad Dachlan, and Agus .<::alim as well as conscrvativc-
lradilionalisl ones such as Sjcikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli and Hasjim Asj'ari.68 
Through reading materials, encounters with pilgrims from Egypt, or perhaps 
through contact with Indo-Malayan students in Cairo,69 the Pan-Islamic and rcformisl-
modcmisl concepts soon became a new dominant discourse among the Jawah students 
in the haramain. M. T. Djalaluddin had already left Mecca for Cairo early in 1893 to 
study astronomy at Al-Azhar. In Cairo he spent four years being deeply exposed to the 
:.~achings of' Abduh and formed a close relationship with his most enthusiastic disciple, 
Mohd. Rashid Ridha (Roff 1967: 60). Other Jtiwah students subsequently followed in 
Djalaluddin's footsteps leading to the gradual exodus of Indo-Malayan students from 
Mecca to Cairo. This change in the preferred study destination reflected a shift in the 
religious paradigm thai would have a significant impact on the development of Islamic 
studies and Islamic education in the NEI. 
In 1897 M. Thaib Umar had established a reformed surau (Islamic school) in 
Batusangkar (West Sumatra). AI this juncture, the 'graded classes and classroom 
leaching'70 as well as general modem subjects had t>ot yet been introduced, but all texts 
67 TI1e tenn 'liminal" derives from the word 'limciJ ', me~ning threshold or an •in·between' space. In 
anthropological studies the term was coined by Arnold van GeMep ( 1960) to refer to transition rites 
between the rites of separation from a previous world and the ceremonies of incorpoliltion into the new 
world (p. 20-21). In post -colonial studies dlis term is ofi<n used in referring to the lmns·cullural space in 
which there is a continual process of movement and interchange between different states (Ashcroft ct. at., 
1998: 130). 
"These students nrrived for the flrSI time in Mecca respectively as follows: Djalaluddin in 1881, Thaib in 
the early 1890s, Asj'ari in 1892, l!adji RllSul in 1894, Aclunad in 1895, Djambek in 1896, Daehlan in 
1889, and Salim in 1906. Interestingly enough, three ofthem before going lo Mecca had been exposed to 
a Western education system. Djambek and Achrn:1d had atlended modem F!irrt:lry schools, while Salim 
was a gradUllle of the HBS-Ihe only (general) secondary school available in d1e NEI at the lime (from 
various sources included Noer 1980: 39-54; Rolf 1967: 60; Sleenbrink 1984: 146; Junus 1960: 45; 
Syaifullah 1997: 28). 
69 Acc::uding to Mona Abaza, based on the historical account written by an Egy;:·tian historian, Mubarak. 
J1ero hod been some 11lndo·Molayan students at Al-Azhar in the nlid-19 century (1999: 31). 
70 The system of teaching using the gmdcd classes nod classrooms wns alien to the traditional pcsanlrcn, 
a! least until early decades of the 21" century. TI•e system ofleaehing applied in the tradilionalpesanlren 
was a combination of the so-called sorogan an-.1 wclon(atl), Sorogan is a method of individual-centred 
learning in which a student (santri) sits in front of• religious scholar (kjai) to read a religious text Wcton 
is a method of teaching in which students sit in n circle in front of the scholar working on various texts. 
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used in the school were printed books and the curriculum was adapted to that of Cairo's 
Al-Azhar. Slowly but surely the influence of 'Abduh's school of thought spread in the 
archipelago (Junus 1960: 45-53). In later developments, these reformed schools would 
lead to the fomlation of what were popularly called madrasah. 
2.2.2 The Reform oflslamie Schools during the Ethical Era 
It was Snouck's boastful prophecy that ·:n competition with the attractions of 
Western education and cultural association, Islam could not but be the loser' (Benda 
1958: 27). Until this stage, however, there remained much more to be done if Western 
civilisation was to win the race against Islam in the archipelago. 
For a religion that has no effective hierarchical organization, and for the Islamic 
community in the plural society of the NEI, education had a key role to play in the 
struggle of Islam. The absence of ecclesiastical structure in Islam left the Islamic school 
as virtually the sole means of itnparting the doctrines of the religion. In the East Indies 
context, there were at least tlm'e additional reasons for the Muslim promotion oflslamic 
schools. First, given the multiplicity of competing beliefs and value systems in the 
archipelago, the Islamic school played a key role in establishing a clear and positive 
identity for East Indies !shun. Second, Islamic education was an essential Muslim 
ideological apparatus in response to the discrimination and oppression of colonial 
policies. Last but not least, the lack of oppo.tunilies for the admission of sa11tri children 
to government schools combined with the colonial government's lack of interest in 
promoting Islamic schools forced the ulama to develop schools oftheir own. As Islamic 
schools were the bastions of Islamic struggle to survive, Islamic leaders made every 
effort to ensure their survival. 
The fact that education was a powerful ugcnt for socializing Islamic ideals and 
doctrines led the colonial administration to 9ay more serious attention to Islamic 
education. Various measures were taken to control the development of Islam and 
Islamic schools in particular. In 1905 the government for the first time is~ued the so-
called 'Guru Ordinance' that obliged Islamic teachers to apply for a teaching permit 
from the government. As well, the. government controlled the movemeut of ulama 
within the NEI b:v """uiring them to apply for special passes. Furthermore, while in 
theory !he state. · ••:: ;.;,sed to assume as neutral a position as possible in religious 
The kjal calls on various students to recite and clarify what they nrc reading. The latter method is also 
called bandungan in West Java and halaqah in Sumatra. All of these activities were commonly conJucted 
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matters, the colonial ambition to rein in 'wild' Islam led it to empower the institution of 
peag/m/11 (religious judges and leaders of the main mosques) as instruments of 
government control (Steenbrink 1993: 89). Henceforth, alongside the positions of 
independent kjai (religious teachers) and ulama, the position of penglmlu (kadi) was 
created to provide religious officials of secular rule (Benda 1958: 15). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the expansion of modem 'secular' schools and these 
various restrictions, traditional Islamic schools survivcd.7t The rejection of the colonial 
ideological apparatus and the pressure of modernisation invoked a defensive mechanism 
on the part of established ulama to commit themselves to what they perceived as 
authentic indigenous religious traditions. So, long-established (traditio:>nal) Islamic 
schools continued to be organized and nurtured by conservative-traditionalist ulama.72 
Of course the features of the traditional schools were by no meant static as they 
always creatively (and gradually) adjusted themselves to the chan<oing cnviTonmcnt. 
This adjustment, however, was intended to remain in harmony with the established 
traditions. It took some dec.1Jcs for the body of the conscrvotive-traditiona!ist ulama of 
the traditional Islamic w :ools to accept clements of modcn. schooling. Umil the early 
decades of the 201h century the adoption of modem subjects and technologies-such as 
European languages, Rom~n script, arithmetic, 'the graded classes and classroom 
teaching' and even the usc of desks and blackb~'ITtt·-'-''''-' '~~::ll'ded by the pesaatrea 
community as lwram (forbidden). Even the li;mou; Ha£jim ,, sj'ari-led Pesaatrea 
Tebuireng (est. 1899), whh 1 ·.;as regarded as t~e exorr.r-:2ry ~entre •Jfthe tradit;c·nulist 
Islamic school, took some 20 ·: . ~ to adopt clements ot ""J<k<n s~hooling (Dholicr 
1982: 1 04). In the face of the :;...>;·.-ing number of modem .~cc.,har schools as we!' . •s the 
emerging madras ali in urban areas, the traditional pcsaatrea, surau aud the like retained 
their stronghold in the more traditional, less accessible countryside. 
In the period when the conservative-traditionalist 11/ama such as Sulaeman al· 
Rasuli and Hasjim Asj'ari refused to accept the imparted body of Western educational 
curricula and apparatus, the initiative for cultivating the new breed of Islamic 'clerical-
in the mosque. 
71 In 1984/1985 the Department of Religious Affair:~ of Indonesia reported tlmt the total number of 
pcsantrens tluoughout the country nt the time w.ts 6,239: some seven percent of these were estab!Lihed 
before I900, around 25% were founded;~ between 1900 and 1945, and more than 62% emerged after 
1945 (Mastuhu 1994: 24). 
72 Conscrvntive in this context r..cans a p~ferencc to .:onsCrvc established local traditions of Islam 
including those that tolerated syncretisDL Conserva~\ve Muslims lcl\ded to lind the reformists' project of 
Islamic purification based on Islamic orthodoxy anllthema. While 'tra..iitionaUst' in this context means a 
person who tends to be in favour of preserving establish:d religious teaching, methods and L~trumcnts. 
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intelligentsia' was taken by' Abduh-inspired reformist-modernist 11/ama. Fuccd with the 
superimposition of Western modernism, the conservative-traditionalist ulama expressed 
their resistance through the fetish of 'Islamic indigcnisation'. On the other hand, the 
new reformist-modernist ulama exhibited a fetish of 'Islamic authcnticisation' 
· ambincd with the strategy of 'appropriation'. The term appropriation refers to the way 
in which the dominated or colonised subjects imitate aspects of the imperial culture-
language, forms of writing, education, technology, modes of thought and argument-
that may be of usc to them in articulating their own social and cultural idenlities or in 
resisting the imperial political and culturJI control (Ashcroft, et. al. 1998: 19). 
The early spearhead of the reformist-modernist ideology and madrasah in the 
East Indies came originally from the Arab community. The pioneering efforts of this 
community wcr;; extended by returned native students from the Middle East, especially 
those who had been exposed to 'Abduh's ideas or had been directly in contact with him 
andlc his disciples in Egypt. In echoing 'Abduh's ideas, the main agenda of these 
reforntist-rnodernist ulama of the Arab and native community has been described by 
Julia Bluhm-Wam (1997: 296) as follows: 
Purification of Islam from all accretions (hlda ') am\ a return to pristine Islam 
ba5cd on the Qur'an and srmna; liberation·'" ;lam from the blind acceptance of 
dogmas of formers scholars (IJqlld}; reopening the drn,-• of independent 
reasoning (ijtihiid) to enable I~lam to respond to the cxiget· .. i:S of modem life; 
reformation of Islamic education to accommodate secular subjects and 
methodology and; the r~vival of Arabic language sciences to facilitate 
interpretation of the Qur'iln and swma. 
The Arab connection with the archipelago was of long standing, going back to 
the seventh century. With the arrival of economically advantageous conditions in Ute 
archipelago in the nineteenth century as well as of better sec communications with the 
Middle East particularly after the opening of Ute Suez Canal in 1869, the Arab clement 
in the East Indies population began to increase. By the turn of the century their 'lUmber 
WIS 27,399 (Mobini·!':esheh 1999: 2i). By far the largest part of this community was 
from a single area, the Hadramawt. While they lived in the archipelago the Arab 
community continued to maintain their spiritual and intellectual orientation to the Arab 
world. This orientation became even stronger in the face of the awakening of Indies 
proto-nationalism. N•:' ·lie Mobini-Kesheh put this succinctly (1999: 14-5): 
Th-, adoption of an ctlmically defined nationalism among luuonesians from the 
wid-I910s featured an emphatic rejection of the Hadrarnis as 'foreigners'. This 
rejection, in turn, sharpened the Hadramis' sense of separateness from the local 
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population, ·,md was a decisive factor in compelling them to turn to their own 
homeland, Hadrarnawt, as the source of their identity.73 
Through reading books, periodicals and newspapers from the Middle East or 
through the pilgrimage to Mecca these Hadramis were able to follow current Islamic 
thoughts and developments in the centre of the Islamic world. In this way a circle of this 
Arab community was susceptible to the c•lrrer.t 'Abduh-inspired rcfonnisl-modcrnist 
ideology. 
Under the influence of this new intdi~cwf.l rr.ovcmcnt, in 1901 the Arat: 
community in Batavia formed an organizat:on c~!.ed AI-Djumi'at ai-Chairijalt {better 
known as Djami 'at Chair), which successfully t:~t: . ~. . . new typ~ of Islamic school 
in 1905. This school adopted Western curricula and · .·. · ol.'tcaci.ing combined with 
the curriculum of religious schools. It was open to natlv~ East Indians, while son1e of its 
teachers were importe':! irom the Arab World, including many who had been cxpo,;ed to 
'Abduh-inspircd rcforn1ist-modcmist ideolugy.74 
In further developments, pcranakan Arabs of the non-sayyid {lesser) class, 
because of internal conflicts with the sayyid {higher hom) deserted the Djami 'at Chair 
and e;~o:blished a new association in 1 915 called Al-Irsyad (AI-Djami'at a/-Js/alt wa/-
Irsjad, Union for Reformation and Guidance). Supported by non-sa)yid traders, the 
most import1mt figure of this organization was Sjcikh Ahmad Soorkatti, a Sudanese 
born ulama aild a follower of 'Abduh's t•."chings. In promoting education along 
reformism-modernism line, AI-Irsyad's 111 ... asah taught in Malay, Arabic, and Duich 
and was open to native East Indians. Its branches spread to other cities mostly in Java 
(Noer 1980: 68-75). 
The native segment of the first generation of the Indies reformist-modernist 
ulama was composed particularly of former students of Achmad Khatib. Upon returning 
home these new ulama-ilitelc~ began to establish reformed schools (madrasalt), 
periodicals and associations as a means for implanting and disseminating the reforrnb! · 
' 
modernist ideology and historical projects. 
The first h:or>:rtant personality of the first generation of r~forrnist-modcrnist 
. ' 
ulama (idama-intelek) is Mohcl. Tahir b. Djalaluddin {b. 1869). After studying in Mecca 
(12 years) arid Cairo-A1-Azhar (4 years) as well as two years of teaching in Mecca, he 
"Mobini-Kesheh added tbat'this pattern was reversed in the-1930s, when n group of young, Indies-born 
. Hadrnmis elected to proclaim Indonesia as their homeland' (1999: 15). 
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returned to the archipelago in .1899. Because of his opposition to the matrilineal system 
of Minangkabau adat, he decided to move to Singapore where he and scme other 
reformist-modernist comrades began to publish a new periodical in Malay entitled At-
Imam (The Leader, first published in July 1906). The establishment of At-Imam was 
inspired by AI-Maniir (The Light, 1898-1935), an influential reformist-modernist 
magazine published in Egypt by 'Abduh and his most enthusiastic disciple, Mohd. 
Rashid Ridha (1865-1935).75 In 1908, Djalaluddin helped establish the Madrasah ai-
Iqbal al-Islamiyyah (a reformist-modernist school that combined Western curricula and 
religious subjects), run by an Egyptian, Othman Effendi Rafat (Roff 1967: 60-6). 
With Djalaluddin being domiciled in Singapore, the tb~ ulama-intelek who 
pioneered the modern Islamic school in West Sumatra was Abdullah Achmad (b. 1878). 
After attending a western primary school, he spent some four years in Mecca (1895-
1899) and then made a short visit to AI-Azhar. Upon his return to West Sumatra in 
1899, he began introducing the reformist-modernist ideology to students of his father's 
.•urau in Padang Panjang. Several years later he moved to Padang and began to give 
public lectures in mosques and surau and make close contact with local students of 
Government schools. Recognising the outmoded character of !he traditional surau on 
the one hand, and the elitist nature of the government set.<> ;:; on the other hand, in 1909 
he decided to establish a new religious school (madrasah) in his own right, namely the 
Adabijah school.76 This school began to introduce 'the graded classes and classroom 
tea~hingm as well as offering 'general' subjects side by side with religious ones 
(Steenbrink 1994: 37 9). From 1915, the school received a subsidy from the 
government, changed its name to Hollmulsch Maleishe Schor/ Adabijah (HIS Adabijah) 
and acquired a Dutch headmaster. Although this HIS was the first HIS in Minangkabau 
that included religious subject to its curricula, Abrullah Ahmad's closeness with Dll1 ;:• 
14 Even one of the teachers, Muhammad Noor, had studied directly with' Abduh in AI·Azhar (Noer 1980: 
68-75). 
75 Due to its 'dangerous' influence on -the East Indies u/ama, ai-Afaniir was banned by the Dutch colonial 
government in the archipelago. However, it wa> smuggled in and remained in circulation among a limited 
number of ulama and provided a new landmark for them pr0\'1!0 by the fact tltr..t one of the many names 
given to the reformist group in t11e archipelago of the period was 'Kaocm ai-Manar', (the AI~Man.ar 
community). Just before leaving Al-Azhar, Djalaluddin had <ontributed nrtieles to this magazine and on 
his return to the archipelago he and colleagues nttempted to imitate its spirit and messages by establishing 
a new magazine in their own right (Rolf 1967: 59). 
76 Before establishing the Adablja!J school, Achmad visited his colleague, Tahir Djalaluddin in 1906. Titis 
visit was intended, among other things, b' learn about tl1c planned model of the Madrasah al-lqbal al-
Islumiyyalt which wns about to be established. · 
77 See footnote 70 abr.ve. 
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officials resulted in his school losing its status as the spearhead of the Islamic 
reformist-modernist movement (Noer 1980: 52; Junus 1960: 54). 
The most influential reform schcol in West Sumatra was the Thawalib school 
under the leadership of Abdul Karim Amrullah (b. 1879), who was known as Hadji 
Rasul. Titis school grew out of a traditional surau, Surau Jembata11 Besi, which had 
been established at the end of the 19th century. After more than seven years living in 
Mecca, Hadji Rasul returned home in 1906, and became an itinerant missionary who 
travelled across the territories between Maninjau and Padang Panjang. In his lectures he 
forcefully attacked local customs and the adat authorities for their deviation from true 
Islamic doctrine. After 1912, he devoted himself to reforming Surau Jembatan Besi 
with the support of Abdullah Ahmad. The curriculum of the surau was altered to 
emphasise the teaching of i/mu a/at (the key of knowledge = Arabic language). 
Furthermore, beginning in 1916 the 'graded classes and classroom teaching' as well as 
general subjects were introduced and after 1920 this surau came to be known as the 
school of Sumatra Thawalib, associated with a confed~ration of reformed surau in West 
Sumatra with Surau Jembata11 Besi being its exemplary centre. Hadji Rasul continued 
his missionary activities by travelling to Malaya (1916) and Java (1917). In Java he 
established contact with leaders of the Sarekatlslam and Muhammadiyah. On his return 
to West Sumatra he became the main propagandist of Muhammadiyah (Noer 1980: 44-
55). 
Still in West Sumatra, similar work was carried out by Djalaluddin Thaib,78 
Zainuddin Labai al-Junusi79 in Padang Panjang; M. Djamil Djambek80 and lbrnhim 
Musa,81 and Latif Sjakur82 in Bukittinggi; M. Thaib Umar and Mahmud Junus83 in 
71 Djalaluddin Thaib wJs a disciple of lladji Rusul who carried out a further reform in Sura11 Jcmbatan 
Besi by introducing the usc of desks, chairs, and modem curricula as well as extending tlte spirit of this 
reform to other surau in West Sumatra. 
"Al-Iunusi established the so-called Dinlah School in 1915 for fenule students. Following the curricula 
of AI Azhar, the Diniah School was wrlcorned by Minangkobau society proven by the speedy increase in 
similar schools to become IS in 1922. _ 
10 M. Djarnil Djarnbek, after spending some 9 years (1896-1903) in Mecca, returned horne in 1903. His 
early religious teaching was given through a series ofpub1ic speeches, rtlllinly hi. Bukittinggi, in which he 
expressed his criticism of the practice of t~rcqat and his advocacy of return to Islamic orthodoxy. To 
extend his dakwah (religious propagation) he established a close relationship with local leaders and 
students of the local ieacher-training school. Finally, in 1918 he founded a reformed surau tlmt carne to be 
known as Surau lnjik Djambck (Nocr 1980: 42-4; Iunus 1960: 69). 
"Ibrahim Musa studied in Mecca first from 1901-1909 and then from 1913-1915. Upon his first rehlm in 
1909 be began to reform n traditional srtrart in Pambek. TI1is surau had close coMections with Surau 
Jcmbatan Bcsi and later would join the network of the Sumatra Tllawalib (Nocr 1980: 48). 
11 After four years of study in Mcccn, Lotif Sjakur rchlmcd horne in 1902. Upon his rehlm he began to 
reform n traditional SllrOII in niaro. Beginning with introducing desks and blackboard to the existing 
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Batusangkar. All these refonn s11ra11 created an elaborate network of madrasah based 
on refonnist-modernist ideology. A further step in consolidating this network was 
achieved in 1918 when the union of madrasah Islamic teachers, known as Persailla/1 
G11nt·G11r11 Agama Islam (PGAI), was established with Zainuddin Labai AI-Junusi as its 
first chainnan. Initially, this association attempted to accommodate conservative-
traditional 11/ama. In fact, the latter 11/ama soon responded to the presence of the PGAI 
by establishing their own association, lllihac/111 Ulama (the union of 11/ama), led by 
Sjeikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli (Junus 1960: 81-2). 
In Java, an early native effort to modernise traditional Islamic school began in 
1906, when the Central Javanese Prince Susuhunan Pakubuwana established a new 
model pesalltrell in Surakarta. Mamba11l Ul11m. 1n this pesa/1/rell, students were not just 
offered 'religious' subjects-such as reading and rn~mo:ising the Holy Qur'an-but 
also 'general' subjects such as astronomy, arithmetic and logic (Steenbrink 1994: 35-6}. 
This pesantrc11 made a very important contribution to the education of 11/ama-illtelek 
and illtclek-lllama. Future prominent Islamic figures such as Ahmad Baiquni (a famous 
Indonesian physician) and Munawir Sjadzali (a Minister of Religion, 1983-1993) were 
educated at this pesalltrell. 
The development ofrefonnist-modernist madrasah among native people in Java 
was spearheaded by Achmad Dachlan (1868-1923).84 The son of a khatib85 at the Sultan 
ofYogyakarta's mosque, Kjai Hadji Abubakar, he first stayed in Mecca from 1890 until 
1891 to deepen his religious knowledge particularly under the supervision of Achmad 
Khatib. After returning home for a while he then returned to Mecca in 1903 to stay for 
another two years at the very time when 'Abduh's refonnist-rnodernist ideas gained 
popular acceptance among the international11/ama networks in the haramain:86 
After his first return, Dachlan ignited an uproar in the local Muslim community 
over his correction of the qiblat (direction of prayer) in the Sultan of Yogyakarta's 
traditional surau, in i9t2 he finally established his own madrasah called AI-Tarbiyah a/-Hasanah, in 
which the 'gmdcd classes and classroom teaching' were applied. 
" H. M. Timib Ulllllr who had pioneere.J tlte refomt of traditional surau in Datusangkar in 1897 continued 
his refomt efforts by establishing in 1910 a madrasah called Madras School in Sungajang (Datusangkar). 
Further reforms in this school were continued by Mahmud Junus (Junus 1960: 54). 
" He did not obtain formal training in the Western school system (Nakamura 1976: 110). Growing up 
within the milieu of tlte Yogyakarta Sultanate, however, he seems to have been exposed to modem 
systems of knowledge. His association with local leaders of Budi Utomo and students ofa local native 
teacher-training school afier 1908 seems to have improved his literacy in the Latin Alplmbet and modem 
scientific knowledge. · 
"Khatib is the person who gives the sermon aduring tlte Friday communal worship. 
16 In his second stay in Mecca, Dachlan was fortunate to meet with RashTd Rid« and had an opportunity to 
discuss with him issues concerning Islam and the international Islamic ummah (Syaifullah 1997: 31). 
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mosque. The second time he retumed he established an experimental madrasah in 
which Arabic was the medium of instruction along with the usc of desks and 
blackboard. He then became a member of several associations, including Djami 'at 
Chair and Budi Utomo, to which he gave religious lectures. Through his activity in Budi 
Utomo he was asked to give religious lccll·res to students of the local teacher-training 
school and of the OSVIA in Magelang. Next in 1911, with the help of students from the 
teacher-training school he established an elementary school in the prccints of the 
Yogyakana royal palace, introducing a curriculum which general and religious subjects 
were taught side by side (Nakamura 1976: 116; Darban 2000: 32-3). Dachlan's work 
culminated in the establishment in 1912 of the prominent reformist-modernist 
association, Muhammadiyah, with its elaborate networks of madrasah, schools and 
other modem Islamic institutions. 
All these developments represented the early formation of a new form of Islamic 
school popularly called madrasah in the NEI. In many cases, early protagonists of 
madrasah began to conduct their activities in a traditional school, until they were able to 
gradually reform this school or <:stablish a new school in its own right. In adopting 
Western educational methods, curricula and apparatus, the emergence of maclrasah 
represented a new Islamic effort to cope with the challenge of modem Western-style 
schooling. Although access to government schools had become easier following the 
Ethical Policy, there were insufficient schools to accommodate the numbers of native 
students wishing to attend. At the same time, many Muslims remained reluctant to enter 
secular schools. Thus, the maclrasah offered an alternative education for those who were 
unable or unwilling to enter the government (secular) schools. 
The maclrasah were located in an intermediate position between the traditional 
religious and the modem secular schools. The establishment of reformist-modernist 
associations promoted a netwcrk of maclrasah which taught general subjects 
(arithmetic, history, literature, geography and so on) and used modem organisational 
methods (regular class hours, examination, marks, diplomas), employed 'lay' (non-
ulama) teachers, and even educated girls. In this way, the maclrasah managed to remain 
in tunc with the kemacljoea11 project but at the same time they managed to be rooted in 
the Islamic worldview. Clifford Geertz puts this succinctly (1965: 106-7): 
A strong and active parochial school system (if I may adapt this Catholic 
Christian term to Muslim uses) is not, in an Islamic country and certainly not in 
Indonesia, an enemy but an ally of the secularist modernizing elite. It is an ally 
not because it promotes the ideals of a militant and totalistic secularism (ideals 
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that only a small minority of these elites themselves hold) but because it allows, 
and in fact encourages, an established religious tradition with a powerful hold on 
the minds of the population to come to terms with the modem world, neither 
simply rejecting nor simply capitulating to it but becoming part of it. 
The emergence r,f madrasah represented a new Islamic historical trajectory. The 
new school was an embodiment of the reformist-modernist plan to recuperate and 
rejuvenate Islamic society. For its campaign to reform the Muslim society through the 
return to Islamic orthodoxy, this school represented ideas of Islamic reformism. For its 
adopdon of modem approaches and instruments-such as modem rationalism, Western 
curricula, and modem apparatus, this school represented ideas of Islamic modernism. 
For offering both religious and modem scientific knowledge, the madrasah functioned 
o:s the main breeding grc>und for the formation of th~ 'clcrical-intclligcntsia', popularly 
referred to by Indonesian Muslims as 'ulama-ilrtelek', who would become the main 
counterpart of the intelligentsia in leading Indies society along the path of ken..,,,:oeall. 
2.3 Discursive Practices and the Making of Collective Id~ntity 
The intelligentsia as a distinct social stratiJm is much more than just a group of 
people who shares certain educational and occupational criteria. More importantly, it 
shares certain intellectual interests, attitudes and identities (Gclla 1976: 13). But this 
isomorphism docs not just happen. It has to be constructed especially by discursive 
practices. 
'Discourses,' according to Sara Mills (1997: 15), 'structure both our sense of 
reality and our notion of our identity'. As Michel Foucault eloquently shows in the 
Archaeology of K11ow/edge (1972), discourses do not just reflect or represent social 
entities and relations, they construct or constitute them. A prominent theorist of 
discourse, Norman Fairclough, had identified three aspects of the constructive capacity 
of discourse (1999: 64-5): it contributes to the construction of social identities (identity), 
social relationship (relational), and sys:ems of knowledge and belief (ideational). 
Because of its constructive effect, ideological struggle is the essence of discourse 
manifestation. As a site of the constant contestation of meaning, 'discourse', according 
to Michel Pf:chcux, 'show's the effects of ideological struggle within the functioning of 
language, and, conversely, the existence of linguistic materiality within ideology' 
(quoted in Fairclough 1999: 30). 
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Discursive practices of the first generation oflhe Indies intelligentsia began as a 
means of expression for the self-interest and self-actualisation of the newly .educated 
stratum of the Indies society. Modem educational allainment led to an increase in their 
expectations. Initially, their expectations centred around the issue of kemadjoea11 
(progress). 
2.3.1 Discursive Practices of the Liberal Era 
By the end of the 191h century, the impact of Liberal education on the genesis of 
a new East Indies elite was evident. Graduates from the missionary, European and 
Native public schools, and especially vocational schools produced the prototype of the 
homilies 11ovi of civil servants and intelligentsia of the 20111 century. Notwithstanding the 
fact that graduates of the vocational schools were often not descended from the higher 
priyayi families, their elevation to the status of public servants in the colonial 
administration granted them the aura of priyayi (new priyayi) of some standing in the 
eyes of the East Indies people. For those who were already of priyayi status, the 
acquisition of new qualifications strengthened their position within the priyayi group. 
For a few of them, however, the old-fashioncdpriyayi might have lost their fascination, 
for as new professioi!als they became obsessed with personal and social prestige 
allachcd to new roles in the service of the modem colonial bureaucracy (Van Niel1970: 
29). 
For this embryo intelligentsia, moving from the edge of the colonial as well as 
the feudal world into the whirl of modem bureaucratic machinery, obtaining these new 
roles meant changing their life-world. Educational cultivation seemed to have drawn 
them into the process of 'vicarious learning' resulting in a degree of self-reflexive 
power to measum how far they had stepped forward compared to the acr'r' ••.,ent of the 
'others'. What seemed to be the state of the art of human achievements ofta1e time was 
modem techniques and new industrial enterprises brought into the East Ir.,:lie-1 as a by-
product of the Liberal economy. These were exemplified by the introduction of more 
elaborate and innovative communication systems such as new shipping technology, 
railways, telephone, telegraph, post office, printing industry and newspapers. The 
introduction of modem systems of communication was concomitant with the growth of . 
urban centres and a metropolitan super-culture marked by the expansion of industries, 
biinks, extension services, and warehouses containing imported items from centres of 
.1:~• ,,apitalist world in Europe (Adam 1995: 79; Shiraishi 1990: 27; Cr.ertz 1963). 
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In the face of such astonishing modem phenomena, the homines novi we,·e 
simply fascinated and accepted them as symbols of the kemadjoean that they had to 
achieve. In this trajectory of progress, the achievement of the 'others' was simply 
incommensurable. The Europeans as wealthy planters and newly emerging bourgeoisie 
of the urban centres had of course been well-exposed to modem education, new media, 
luxurious properties, carriages, and 'civilized' social clubs. Even the Chinese, because 
of their greater wealth gained as middlemen in commercial transactions and their 
dominant power in retail trade as well as their exposure to missionary schools, moved 
forward along thi: trajectory. This was signified by their remarkable achievement in the 
realms of publishing, education and associations. 
Under such historical conditions the issue of how to catch up with kemadjoean 
{progress) became the dominant discourse of this emerging intelligentsia. For them, 
kemadjoean expressed an ideal loftiness of one's social status whether as an individual 
or as an imagined community encompassing many other things: educational 
improvement, modernization {widely associated with Westernization), respectability, 
and success in life. As a measure of the obsession with kemadjt:ean, Dutch wu:ds, as the 
icon of the progress itself, were increasingly used in the daily conversation of the 
homines novi. Thus, to use Shiraishi's description (1990: 27), 'the words lignifying 
progress- ·::••r.h as voon1itgang (advance), opheffing (uplifting), .? :.'wikkeling 
(developlfi~nl), and opvoeding (upbringing)-cmbellished the language of the day 
together with bevordering van welvaart (promotion of welfare).' It is worth noting that 
the proliferation of this discourse was made possible by the genesis of the embryonic 
public sphere of the intelligentsia in the form of the foreign-owned vernacular press and 
the Western-inspired and localized social clubs. 
For those who were preoccupied with the idea of kemadjoean, the kernel ofth,•ir 
aspirations reflected the gap between the rising expectations of the elevation of their 
self-esteem and the actual constraints they had to face. The major constraint they felt, as 
reflected in the vernacular press, was the imbalance between the desire for schooling 
and the real shortage of schools. The fact that until 1882 there were only about 300 
schools in Java and no more than 400 in the outer provinces with the total number of 
students being no more than 40,000 (Furnivall 1940: 220) provided the amn.unition to 
demand government action.· 
Numerous letters from native readers were sent to the press complaining that the 
government was not providing enough opportunities for native children. In addition, the 
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press also frequently raised issues of the poor conditions of pupils' food, hygiene and 
conscientiousness in their schoolwork. The spearhead of thio criticism was formed by 
graduates of the native teacher-training schools. Thdr disparagement was reflected 
especially in educational journals published as a response to the growing interest in 
native education, such as Soeloel; Pengadjar (The Teachers' Torch) of Probolinggo 
(first appeared in 1887) and Taman P.~ngadjar (Teachers' Garden) ofSemarang (about 
1899-1914). These journals played si1:nificant roles in articulating native teachers' 
aspirations for the alleviation of discr!mina:ion in the provision of education, the 
improvement of the teaching of the Dutch language in native teacher-training schools 
ni!d the availability of Dutch to all native children. 
In addition to the criticism of government policy, the vernacular press \vas also 
reflecting covert tensions and crises in the gestation phase of the constitution of the new 
intelligentsia. The emerging intelligentsia, nurtured in the western education system, 
living in big new cities, using snippets of Dutch in daily conversation and adopting 
aspects of Western life style, were unlikely to be comfortable in the habitus of their 
elder aristocrats. Meanwhile, in the eyes of tl1e old aristocracy the professionals were 
nothing but newcomers who were demanding recognition and acceptance by the 
traditional establishment. In this regard, they were expected to adopt the life style and 
hierarchical order of the 'feudal' priyayi, which included showing lwrmat (respect) to 
the old (higher) aristocrats (Kattodirdjo 1991: 341-42). Moreover, because the 
educational qualifications of the new intelli~entsia were superior to those of the 
traditional aristocral~, the European administration often tended to deal directly with 
them, bypassing the traditional hierarchy and procedures (Van Neil1970: 29). 
This all led to a strained relationship between the old aristocrats and the new 
professionals. Selomprel Melajoe, No. 143-155 (30 Novcmber-28 December 1899), for 
instance, carried a complaint from the Regent of Demak, Raden Mas Adipati Ario Hadi 
Ningrat, who begged the government to pdoritise the improvement of education for the 
children of Bupati (Regents) and reminded them that the time was not ripe yet for 
appointine non-(higher) aristocrats to high bureaucratic posts. On the other hand, 
Taman Pengadjar Nr •. 4 (15 October 1899) ran an article which the embryo 
intelligentsia criticised what they considered as the humiliating practice of having to 
show feudal gestures of obeisance towards the upper priyayi. 87 
17 For most oftbe quotations from material published nt the end oftl1e 19,. and early 20" century, lam 
indebted to the work of Ahmnt B. Adam(l995). 
Chapter 2 ·'l11c Formation of the lntclllgcnlsla 98 
The emerging intelligentsia was also by no means monophonic. Although most 
of them came from priyayi circles, a covert tension existed between those derived from 
the lesser priyayi and those from the higher. Descendants of the lesser priyayi who 
could not achieve high position,; :, the traditional status hierarchy were in fact still 
unable to attain aprmpriate status in the modern sector of the rationalized bureaucratic 
structure. While most of the children of the higher priyayi were favoured for admission 
to the Chiefs' schools and thus ensured of a secure career and of having better status and 
salary, children of the lesser priyayi could only choose other vocational schools which 
were usually looked down on by the former and were less promising in terms of prestige 
and salary. The lesser p;·iyayi were dissatisfied with this dual-system, and publicly 
criticized it in the press of the time.88 This meant that the ongoing discordant 
relationship between the emerging intelligentsia and the old aristocracy coalesced with 
the internal frictions within the nucleus of the embryo intelligentsia. 
Until the end of the 191h century the role of teachers in promoting the discourse 
of {;emadjoean was very conspicuous, fo. at least two reasons. The ter.ching profession 
at this juncture was compoc~d of the largest portion of the best educated natives and as 
educators they were most highly imbued witlt a sense of missio11 sacree to enlighten 
their fellow cou;<trymen. Additionally, the fact that this profession was less respected 
compared with administrative positions might have stimulated them to be the 
articulators of the concept of 'kemadjoean' in order to construct a new gauge for 
determining social privilege. The conspicuous role of teachers suggests that the 'organic 
intellectua1'89ofthe germinal intelligentsia of the 191h century was mainly derived from 
the circles of teachers. 
It is worth noting, however, that until the end of the century this embryonic 
stratum of the intelligentsia had not yet constituted a distim~t collective entity in its own 
right. Its presence remained hidden under the thick shadow of the old aristocracy. Not 
only because their number was still limited, but also because they had not yet 
discovered a special 'code' to represent a collective identity that could incorporate the 
emerging intelligentsia from diverse sectors into a particular community. This factor, 
"To give an example, Blntung Tinrnr, No. 103, 29 December 1880, ran a complaint from a graduate of 
the Dokter-Djawa school stnting that a graduate from this school could only become a vaccinator or nt 
best a Dokter-Djaiva witlta maximum rate of pay per month of around II. 90 (afier about twenty years of 
service). On the other hand, a graduate of the Chiefs' school had a better prospect of being appointed as a 
mantri polis/, assistant wedana, wedana, pat/IJ orjaksa, nnd even the possibi1ity of ultimately becoming n 
rcgenl 
"For the meaning of;':e term in this context, sec chapter I. 
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along with restricted social mobility and limited numbers and circulation of media, 
confined the voices and movements of the kemadjoean to a narrow and localized sphere 
of influence. This was, however, only a temporary circumstance liable to be changed in 
the ncar future. 
2.3.2 Discursive Practices ofthe Early Ethical Era. 
The idea of kemadjoean that was becoming a new touchstone of social privilege, 
social relations, and ideational system among the East Indies elite in the late I 9111 
century Liberal era continued to be the dominant discourse ~mong the community of the 
newly formed intelligentsia of the early 20111 century. A synchronic dimension of this 
discourse lies in its emphasis on the organic institutionalisation of the idea. 
As the Dutch vocational schools continued to be the major agent providing the 
native !ndics with advanced Wcstcmiscd education, protagonists of the discourse of 
kemadjoean continued to emerge chiefly from vocational schoo!s. Leading 'organic 
intellectuals' of this period were now predominantly students and former students of the 
STOVIA. With a nine-year period of study, the STOVIA was U1c highest level of 
education available in the NEI until the first two decades of the 20111 century. This 
generated the cultural capital for students and fom1cr students of this school to take 
over the leadership of the new intelligentsia that had nreviously been borne by the 
teachers. Prominent personalities among former Dokler Djawa/STOVlA students in the 
first decade of the 20111 century were Wahidin Sudiro Husodo, Abdul Rivai, Tirto Adhi 
Sutio, Tjipto ManguO:;usumo and Suwardi Sutianingrat. 
Imbued with the idea of kemadjocan, the expectations of this intelligentsia 
concerning elevation of their social status began in fact fo Imp them in a queue and 
force them to face a bitter reality. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of graduates 
was still limited there was no guarantee that they would be automatically appointed as 
bureaucrntic officials. Already in the early years of the decade, the dual-administration's 
clumsiness in responding to socio-economic developments in the NEI, particularly in 
absorbing the output of educational institutions, resultr.; in n long waiting list of 
qualified candidates seeking entry into desired posts (Fumivall ! 940: 252). 
The situation was even more disillusioning for the STOVIA graduates. Having 
attained the highest educational level, the social prestige and economic rewards of the 
STOVIA graduates were not as high as they had expected. They were the first victims 
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of their own kcmadjocan, as the.-.·.· :;,:tic system could not be applied properly 
within the context of the colonial discriminative policies. 
In the first fourteen years of the 20'h century the STOVIA had produced 135 
graduates (Van Niel 1970: 52). The figure would have been even greater if it also 
included graduates from the former Doktcr-Djawa school. Based on the data from 
Jaarlijks Vcrslag School to/ Oplciding Van flllalldsc Arisen 1904-1905, enrolments and 
graduates of the Dokter-Djawa school/STOVIA during the 1875-1904 were respectively 
743 and 160 students. To derive more meaning from this figure, Jet us now take the 
social background of their parents into account. From the total enrolment of 743, 146 
were from the higher priyayi and well-to-do,90 278 from the Jesser priyayi middle 
income earners, and 319 from the lower class. From the total graduates of 160, 41 were 
from the higher priyayi and well-to-do, 64 from the Jesser priyayi and middle income 
earners, and 55 from the lower class (Penders 1977: 218-9). Thus, most of enrolments 
and graduates of the lJoktcr·~iawa/STOVIA system came from the Jesser priyayi and 
lower class. This indicates th;;t, at least until the early years of the 201~ century, the 
Doktcr Djawa schooi/STOVIA could not be categorised as s/al!dcnschool (status 
school) for the most privileged social group, because the profession of vaccinator or, at 
best, 'Indies Doctor' had never been considered as prestigious. 
To make matters worse, in the Doktcr Djawa school/STOVIA, the awareness of 
inferiority was maintained by making it compulsory for the non-Christian students to 
wear traditional dress. Their lower status was reflected also in the way they were 
addressed by staff. They were not called 'lccr/illg' (pupil, used in the lower schools) o~ 
stlldcn/c/1 (student, used at the university level) but instead were referred to by the 
French word e/cvc, which connoted a !~vel in-between pupil and student. In fact, 
different status and treatment also prevailed among the cleves. In school ceremonies, 
only ihe senior t!leve was permitted to give a speech in Dutch, while the juniors had to 
translate it into Malay or other local languages (Toer 1985: 21). 
Aller finishing school, the STOVIA graduates-Jet alone their Doktcr-Djawa 
predecessors (before 1900)-could never gain the socio-economic rewards they 
expectr.d. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the position of the government's 
Dokter-Djawa was considered about equal to that of manlri (overseer). Their primary 
role as vaccinal;',•::. could not command the same respect as the graduates ofOSvlA in 
the native administrative posts. Moreover, the salary of STOVIA graduates aflcr a 
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period of nine years of study was generally only about one third of that of OSVIA 
graduates-whose period of study was only fiv-.: yc;:rs, 
1hc moocl of intcr-gro•Jp resentment wan exacerbated by the government policy 
after !900 ofpr-:Jviding more oppor!L'Ji..i~s for the Jesser priyayi to enrol in the OSVIA. 
With this provision the special privilege of the higher priyayi's descendants came under 
attack. This increzse the resentment of the higher born towards the lesser born. 
The mainstream intelligentsia of higher priyayi origin was inclined to remain on 
good tcnns with old aristocrJcy. Even so, exceptions were possible, cspcci~.lly for those 
who were not well-accepted by, or could no longer feel at home in, the circles of the 
gentry. The exceptions or 'deviants' together with the lesser born as the victims of 
discrimination were mo':t likely to ~ccomc what Indonesia's most prominent historical 
novcli!.t, Prntrtoc:lya Ananta Tocr, wa.< !qter to charnctr.rizc as a 'Minke' type human 
being who was trapped in limbo.9l People of this kind were likely to he positioned in the 
state of 'mimicry' which contains both mockery and a certain menacc.92 Having 
observed Wcstem ideas and values through education and the print media, but being 
frustrated by disctiminativc colonial practices, some progressive intelligentsia were 
disposed to dismaratle the master's house with the master's tools. Meanwhile, being 
mortified by the traditional establishment, they were the ones most likely to repudiate 
the feudal hierarchy. 
These feelings of deprivation and humiliation were exacerbated by the global 
economic crisis of 1903 that harl u severe detrimental tffcct on labour conditions in the 
NEJ. The socio-economic discontent of the intelligentsia found the impetus for 
historical action in the arrival of the so-called 'Azialisch Revei/' (The Asian Revival), 
symbolised by Japan's vi.:tory over Russia in 1905, the 'Yeung Turk Revolution of 
1908 and other emancipation and nationalistic movements i,t Asia (Blum berger 1931: 
12). 
To better articulate their discontent and ideals, t!1e intelligentsia of the lesser 
born and of the 'deviants' turned their attention to the construction of the new 
,. See footnote 36 above. 
91 Minke is a prolngonist of lhe famous Bun1 telrlllogy of Pramoedyu Ananta Tocr. Bam U1c •on of a 
'priyayi', he had privileged access to western education and civilization, but had nc•1cr been able to fully 
integr3te into the Dutch colonial system. At the same time, having been exposed to liberal western ideas 
be was also unable to cope wiU1 lhc feudalistic manners of indigenous 'priyayl', his own milieu. · 
91 Mimicry is tthe process by which the colonised subject is rcproduc:d as almost the same, but not quite' 
(Bhabha 1994: 86). 'The r..opying of the colonizing culture, behavior, manners and values by lhc 
colonil.ed contains J, .<·: mockery and a certain "menace", so that mimicry is at once resemblance and 
menace' (As~ :ilcL< ',998: 140). 
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intelligentsias identity anJ community. The organic intellectuals of the intelligentsia 
stratum bc'~·:·.ed that the idea ofprogrr,ss should be planted on a distinctivG social base. 
This social base was to be constituted from possessors r' ·'' '••:•al capital' such as 
educational qualifications, technical and l~nguagc 5kitls. 
In this effort, intellectuals of the new intelligentsia were forced to invent an 
imaginary spatial boundary between themselves and ihe old aristocracy by constructing 
special signifiers for members of both groups. The designation for members of the 'old' 
was now 'bangsawan ocsoc/' (the nobility by birth) and that for the 'new' one was 
'bangsawan piHmn' (the nobility by intellect). Coined by a graduate of the DokJer-
Djawa school, Abdul Rivai (son of native teacher}, as an editor of the magazine Bintang 
Hindia (The Star of the Indies},93 the tenn 'bangsawan pikiran' was echoed by other 
East Indian joumalists to become a slogan among the first generation of intelligentsia 
associated with the movement towards kemadjoean.94 In the first issue of the magazine 
in 1902, Rivai wrote an ar;!.)Je on 'bangsawan pikirar. ' in which, after identifying two 
kinds of nobility found in European society, namely 'bongsawan uesor:l' (th·~ r,.Jbility 
by birth) and 'bangsawan pi kiron ·(the nobHity by inteiicct}, he then r.uggP.sted: 
There is lillie need to prolong our discussion on the 'bangsawan oesoe/' because 
its rise was predestined [takdir]. If our forefathers were born arisiocrats we too 
could be called bangsawan even though our knowledge a• d :,!chicvement may 
just be like the proverbial 'katak da/am tempoeroeng ·, frog under the coconut 
shell ... Now it is achievement and knowledge which ·will determine one's 
~tanding. It is_ t_his ~i~d of situation_ ~hat !lives rise to the emergence of the 
bangsawan ptktran (mtellcctur) !.•.'hthty}.9 
Once the new intelligentsia fo· ,.,,, .• special name, this created a 'code', a 
template for marking the differences, and ( .• iap providing the actor with an orientation 
and instructions about what to expect and what to do. Although such codes of o'er only an 
arbitrary simplifica''·''l of a situation. soci;,: r~ality and struggle cannot be expressed 
and perceived without code.; Only 11--"-.. •1gh the existence of social referents arc process, 
action, and communication conceivable. As the Gemtan sociologist, Bemhand Giesen, 
points out: 'Codes of social classification are the core cll'ment in the construction of 
n Owned by a Dutch romantic· idealist, Henri Constant Claude Clockener Brousson and Wiled by Rivai, 
this vemaeular magazine wns published in Amsterdam and circulated i~ the l':·.tlndies between 1902-
1907, becoming the mouthpiece of the new intelligentsia. 
" For proof Chat the term wns echoed by other journalists and tl1e younger generation ofthe time we may 
tum to a commentator upon contemporarY Javanese society in the Sinar Djawa, No. 52 (4 March 1914) 
who said: 'With the char.ge or the times a new type of bangsawan has risen, namely the bnngsawan 
f,ikiran' (Quoted in Adam 1995: 173). 
'Quoted in Adam (1995: 103). 
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communality and ot:tcmcss, of collective identity and differentiation. No boundary 
would have substance w'ithout codes' (Giesen 1998: 13). 
Baser) on the. invc'nt;on of the self-defined code 'bangsawan pikiran ', a further 
construction was m~·.i·· •o incorporate the 'bangsawan piki•·an' into a new imagined-
community and collective identity. While members of the 'oeso.1/' (hereditary 
aristocracy) were associated with the community of 'kaoem toea' or 'kaoem koen.'' (the 
old community), proponents of the 'pikiran' (intellect) were incorporated into the 
community of 'kaoem mocda' (the ne1•· progressive community). This last tcnn was 
also introduced by Abdul Rivai in Bintang Hindia. In Volume No.14 (1905: 159) of this 
magazine, Abdul Rl vai defined 'kaoem moeda • as 'all people of the Indies [young or 
old] who arc no longer willing to follow the obsolete system [fllocran kocno} but arc, on 
the contrary, anxious to achieve self-respect through knowledge and the sciences 
[ilmoe] ·.~6 
The t~.m kaoemmocda soon became commonplace especially in the coverage of 
the press and the discourse of the newly born 'bangsawan pikiran'. It represented a 
collective ~ntity of those .vho shared a common denominator in their ambition to 
rejuvenate Indies society along kemadjoccm lines. 
In expressing a commonality, proponents of the kaoemmocda were by no mr.c•:-: 
homog~nous. Coming from diverse social origins and subject positions within the Indies 
plural society, members of the kaocm moeda exhibited internal fragmentation. This 
resulted from differences in educational background and occupations within the stratum 
of the intelligentsia as well as from the interaction of this educational and occupational 
criteria with other categories of status groups, such as religion, ctn·.~icity and heredity. 
The instigator and perpetuator of this internal fragmentation, however, was the colonial 
policy of social discrimination and segregation. 
Discriminative and segregative situations ofic.1 placed the intelligentsia in the 
ambiguous position of being both forward and backward lookiug and between 
independence and dependence. In such circumstances, the effort to create a 
kemadjoean-Oriented intelligentsia along Western secular values and principles was 
subjected to its antithetical tendencies once members of the intelligentsia found a way 
back to their own moorings. Thus, alongside the preser":·~ of a 'secular-oriented kaoem 
moeda ', there emerged 'adat-oriented kaoem moeda' and 'Islamic-oriented kaoem 
moeda ', They di(>~- d from each other in tenns of their cultural and economic 
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foundation< as the basis for progress. The cultural base of the scc11/ar-oriented kaocm 
mocda was western secular values, while its economic underpinning came from the 
government bureaucracy and the Western sector of the economy. The cultural base of 
the adat-oricntcd kaocm mocda was local customs and syncretism, while its economic 
underpinning came from the old aristocracy and the governm"nt bureaucracy. The 
cultural base of the Islamic-oriented kaocm mocda was Islamic refonnism-modernism, 
while its economic underpinning came especially from the Muslim petty bourgeoisie. In 
short, the kaoem moeda was a collective expression of 'identity in difference' and 
'difference in identity'. It expressed both commonality and difference. 
2.4 The Invention of the Modern Jodie~ Public Sphere 
The fact that the foregoing discursive practices and symbolic constructions took 
place in the press anc! ;ocial clubs indicates that the constitution of the 'bangsawan 
pikiran' and the construction of collective identit:,: of the 'kaocm mocda' were made 
possible by the .existence of a public sphere. The tcnn 'public sphere' means a domain 
of social life 'in which such a thing as public opinion can be formP,l' (Habcrmas 2000: 
288). 
In the European context of the 17'h and 18'h century, this public sphere was 
centred around a critical discourse on literary works r.~ the audience-oriented bourgeois 
family in the newly formed social institutions of the public realm: clubs, journals, 
periodicals, coffee houses, salons and cenacles. This kind of public space was a meeting 
place for intellectual circlc3 of urbanising European (mercantile) society in wl:ich 
private individuals assembled 'for the free, equal interchailge of reasonable discourse, 
thus welding themselves into a relatively cohesive body whose deliberations might 
assume the fonn of powerful political force' (Eagleton 1997: 9). 
Tl1e gestation of the modem Indies public sphere was made possible by the 
Liberal economy of the later part of the 19'h century, which had been responsible for the 
establishment of the vernacular press and the dissemination of Western-style social 
clubs. Through eduction and mimicry and from reading the European and then Chinese-
established vernacular publications as well as joining associations, the native 
intelligentsia was fina!!y able to create a public sphere in its own right. 
The foimation of the native Indies public sphere was somewhat different from 
that of the European. In the Western European context, the emergence of this public 
,. Quoted in Adam(t995: 104). 
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sphere was part of the rising of the (moneyed) bourgeois class, from whom it took the 
name 'bourgeois public sphere'. On the other hand, the Indies public sphere grew out of 
the activities of the intelligentsia as a new stratum of the Indies society. It is therefore 
more appropriate to refer to it as the 'intelligentsia public sphere'. Moreover, since the 
East Indies intelligentsia had never been a cohesive social stratum, the Indies' public 
sphere tended to be more fragmented. 
In analysing the development of social instil· 'ons and collectivities of the 
public sphere it is important to consider the theory of 'political process' and social 
movements. The central focus of the former theory is the relationship between 
institutional political actors and action, and the importance of the so-called 'political 
opportunity structure' for the emergence of collective actions. Theoreticians of social 
movements share a concern for at least four characteristic aspects of social movements: 
first, informal interaction networks, composed of a plurality of individuals and groups; 
second, shared belief and solidarity; third, the existence of cultural and political 
conflicts and oppositional relationship between actors; and fourth, the growing process 
and life-cycle of social movements (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 14-5).97 
Based on these theoretical perspectives, the development of the Indies 
'intclligcnt~ia public sphere' can be seen to be inextricably linked with the nature of the 
political opportunil)' structure. It was sensitive to interactions between state and society 
as well as between various groups wiUtin society. It also went through a kind of life 
cycle, from gestation to formation and consolidation. 
2.4.1 The Gestation of the Indies Public Sphere in the Late 191h Century 
As in the case of the early promotion of Western education, the Liberal economy 
was a major impetus for the gestation of the modem Indies public sphere. Following the 
rudimentary printing activities of Christian missionaries and the VOC13 as well as the 
emergence of the first printed newspaper, Bataviasche Nouvelles in 1744, down to the 
97 Concerning the growing process and life.cycle of social movements, Eyt "'.T~n and Jamison add the 
following: '(I) Social movements go through a kind of life cycle, from ~;<station to fonnation nnd 
consolidation. Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require long periods of 
pr~~- ;tation. (2) No social moVement emerges until there is n po!:tical opportunity available, a context of 
social problems as well as a context of conununication. opening up the po~ential for problem articulation 
nnd knowledge dissemination. (3) No social movement can emerge until individuals nre ready to take part 
in it, willing to transform private troubles into puolic problems, ns well to enter into the process of 
collective identity fom1:1tion' (1991: 56). 
91 Christian missionaries and the VOC had been operating printing presses since the r:arly 17th century. 
For further discussion, see Adam (1995: 1-15). 
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inception of liberalism (around 1854),99 the Liberal era brought a new impetus in these 
activities by encouraging the development of vernacular newspapers and periodicals. 
The genesis of the vernacular press in the East Indies with mostly using 'low 
Malay' represented a centrifugal force which differentiated itself from the mainstream 
centripetal force of colonial policy. The tide of the Liberal eco.10my accompanied by 
the expansion of the colonial administration, educational institutions, literacy and 
printing activities was conducive to discursive unifom1ity and standardisation. Because 
of the very nature of the dualistic approach of Dutch colonial rule, the need for the 
standardisation oflanguage had to be translated into several different lines of action. For 
the European Civil Service and European school system the government had to 
introduce the 'true' and 'correct' Dutch language. Meanwhile, for the Native Civil 
Service aud for the Dutch officials dealing with this corps as well as for the vernacular 
school system, the government had to standardise the most widely used vernacular 
languages, Malay and Javanese. However, from 1860 onwards the main focus was on 
Malay. During the second half of the 191h century the Dutch invented and standardised 
the 'true' and 'original' Malay by creating dictionaries for 'high' Malay (the language 
of the Malay heartland of the Riau archipelago, the Malay Peninsula [Malaka, Johor], 
and the west-coast of Kalimantan). This language had been used by great Sumatran 
mystics of the late 161h and 171h centuries, such as Hamzah Pansuri, Sjamsu'l-Din al-
Pasail and 'Abd al-Rauf ai-Singkili, in the writing of their manuscripts; it had also been 
used as the language of 'Malay Bible' during VOC times. It was this language which 
the Dutch promoted by using it for official communications. 
In contr:.st to this policy, the kind of Malay language that was widely used in 
cities of the coastal areas-where most modem commercial and governmental activities 
were run and most of the Europeans were living-was pasarlbazaar Malay ('low' 
Malay). too The deepening penetration of capitalism under the Liberal economic forces 
from around the middle of the 191h century cn~ouraged the influx of foreign newcomers. 
The arrival of these immigrants, notably Chinese and Europeans, tot had a significant 
99 The chief feature of tltis period was the advent of the advertisement-oriented and official (government) 
press, which used the Dutch language, was o\vncd and edited by Dutch people ns well as targeting Dutch 
readers. 
100 This colloquial fonn of Malay is a 'simple lillguistic structure, almost no redundancy, without n clear 
standard, but sufficient for communication between people who had a beller knowledge of another 
language' (Maier, 1993: 46-7). 
101 In the early 19~ century the number of Chinese in Java was estimated at 100,000. In 1850 tltere wero 
already some 150,000 in Java, and by 1900 there were 277,000 in Java and 250,000 in tlte Outer 
Provinces (Fumivall, 1944: 47 & 213). Titere were only a few thousand Europeans in the early 19,. 
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impact on the development of the vernacular language. The mo.>t salient was the 
growing popularisation of bazaar or 'low' Malay that slowly became the first-learnt 
tongue of the growing number of inhabitllllls in the coastal cities of the archipelago 
(Maier 1993: 47). Already in 1858 a well-known Indo-Malayan litera/us, Radja Ali 
Hadji, commented critically in the draft of his Kitab Pcugetalmau Bahasa (Book of 
Linguistic Knowledge) upon the ways in which Malay life was changing: 'values were 
endangered by outside forces, customs were decaying, and language was becoming 
debased with the increasing prevalence of bazaar usage' (Andaya and Matheson 1979: 
110; Rolf, 1969: 47). In his view, this was a dangerous situation, for the neglect of 
language would lead to the neglect of established tmdition, which would inevitably 
destm:• 'the arrangement of the world and the kingdom, kerajuau' (Matheson 1986: 6). 
'The proliferation of the usc of bazaar Malay was reinforced by the introduction 
of print-capitalism. Printing, as noticed by Lucien Febrc and Henri-f~an Martin, tended 
to favour the development of literature written in the vernacular (Fcbrc & Martin 1997: 
319-32). When the Liberal economy touched the press sector, the consideration of a 
potential market and the perception of the simplicity and flexibility of 'low' (colloquial) 
Malay gradually made this language the major medium ofjournalisrn.102 
From 1854 until 1860 there emerged a few vernacular presses owned and edited 
by the Dutch.103 Between 1860 and 1880, in parallel with the expansion of the Liberal 
economy and the increase in literacy, the number of vernacular newspapers and 
periodicals increased rapidly. 104 During this period, although the owners of the presses 
continued to be Dutch ami Eurasian, there had e!ready emerged a few Chinese editors 
Gournalists). 105 From 1880 until the cml of the century, the Chinese and then native 
century. Tite figure became 22,000 in 1850 and jumped lo 75,700 in 1900 (Fumivalll944: 347; Lombard 
1996a: 78). 
101 This is not to forget the existence of a small number of presses that used Dutch, Javanese and High 
Malay languages. 
103 Titese were lhe High Javanese:language weekly Bromartanl in Surakarta (1855-1857) and 
Poespitamantjawcirr.a in Surnb1ya (1855), tlte first (low) Malay-language Newspaper Soerat Kabar 
Bahasa Melajoe in Sumbaya (1856), the first (high) Malay-periodical Bintang OetacJ printed in 
Rotterdam but circulated in the East Indies (1856-1857), and the (low) Malay-language Newspaper 
Soerat Clrabar Betawie in Jakarta (1858). 
104 Exaroples of these are Se/ompret Me/ajoe in Semamng (1860-1911), Bientang Timoor in Sumbaya p 862-1887), Blntang Timor in Sumatnl (1865-1865), and Bintang Barat in Batavia (1869-1899). 
" It is said thatt~e participation of the peranakan Chinese in· tltc vernacular press commenced in 1869 
wheri Lo Tun Tny assumed the post of editor for the bi-weekly newspaper, Maraharic, in Batavia. It is 
also worth noting that the major Chinese contribution to the development of the vernacular press was as 
subscribers and advertisers. 
-------------- --- ------ - --------------- ------- --------------- -------------- - -- ------------------- --- ------- --- ---------- -- ---------- - --- -- . 
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editors (journalists) 106 became more dominant and the full-fledged representation of the 
Chinese press107 appeared (Surjomihanljo 1980: 43-4; Adam, 1995: 16-78). 
The potential readers of 'low' Malay vernacular newspapers and periodicals 
ranged from European merchants, soldiers and missionari~s who had used this kind of 
language in their contacts with the indigenous population, to the growing number of 
literate Chinese familiar with so-called Sino-Malay as well as the emerging newly 
literate !Joemipoetera who had long been exposed to Malay.108 Surprisingly enough, it 
was through this subaltern 'low' code that the discourse of 'kemadjoean' and the native 
political consciousness finally found its medium of articulation.109 
The shift towards the kemadjoean-orientcd press was initially driven by the logic 
of capitalism itself. In the proliferation of the vernacular press, the competition to win 
subscribers became fierce. This especially happened when the peranakan Chinese 
began to establish their own presses to attract Chinese readers away from their former 
Dutch/Eurasian counterparts. In the face of this new challenge more serious efforts were 
made by the Dutch!Euras;an-owncd presses to attract native subscribers. In this respect, 
the press was not only re:T•l•lding to commercial interests but also catering for the 
aspirations ofthe emerging intclligcntsia.110 
tU6 Examples oflndies r~tives who had been involved in the press field before Ute 1900 were Dj• Endar 
Muda as an editor oflhc Chinese-owned bi-weekly paper, Pertja Barat (1894-1898), Sulan Daharudin as 
an odilor of daily Sinar Menang-Kabau (1894-1897), Tirto Adhi Sutjo as a correspondent of the 
newspaper Hindia 01/am/a, (1894-1896), Datuk Sutan Mahar.tdja as an editor of the twice weekly Warta 
Bcrita (1895-1897) and Wahidin Sudiro Husodo as an edilor of Ute Javanese and Malay twice-weekly 
Retnodhoemilah ( 1895-1906) 
107 The peranakan Chinese started ruaming their own vernaeul:ar presses in the period following the 
er.onomic crisis of 1884 which forced some of the Dutch and Eurasian press owners to sell their 
enletprises. Thus, from December 1886 the ownership of the printing firm and the right to publish the 
well-known paper of the time, Bintang Timor, was in the hands ofaperanakan Chinese, llaba Tjoa Tjoan 
Lok. This was followed by other Chinese-owned ve~cular presses such as Pembrita Bee. •wi (from 1886 
u.r.to 1887), BintangSoerabaia (from 1887), and several others (Adam 1995: 58-124). 
1 1 Before the coming of the Dutch, the use of Malay language had been strongly rooted in ihc main cities 
of the coastal area throughout the archipelago, spread by Ute Islamic trading and ula• . networks 
\Lombard 1996b: 153). . 
09 Tilis in turn enhanced the status ofthe baz.nr Malay as a Hngua franca of the archipelago. 
110 Words used to name the vernacular press from 1854-1900 seemed to reflect the emerger-ee of the 
liminal space in which the old and t11e new worlds as well as multi-layers of consciousness and interests 
interchanged without a common political orient:ation. Initially, it was tammonplacr •o use tenns such as 
kabar, cltabar, pewarta, berita (news), bentara (herald), pcngltentar (medium), se/ompret (trumpet), 
courant (newspapers). This was likely to indicate the liberal economic world view in which the press was 
simply regarded as a medium· of information produced by privntc enterprises for the sake of economic 
interests without any reference to a particular collective identity. Secc::Jiy, the local-territorial signifiers 
such as Betawie, Semarang, Melajoe, Soerabaja, Mc:nangkabau, Sum.ttm, Prajangan, and Dj:1wi were 
frequently used perhaps to reOcet the dominance of U1e provincial outlook and orientation of the press. 
Titirdly, symbolic references to Ute past such as Batara-lndra (Indian legend), primbon (divining manual) 
and some other Javanese archaic literary tenns were still used seemingly to indicate the continual 
presence of a pre-colonial cosmology. Finally, U1e 'enlightening' symbols such as blntang (star), 
mataltari (sun), tjaltaja, pa/ita, slnar (lights) ond soeloelt (torch) toJclher with the professional 
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In concert with the discourse of kemadjoean, which was reflected in and ignited 
by the vernacular press, there sprang up embryonic and localized native-interest clubs as 
alternative spaces for actions. Spurred by the existing Dutch and Chinese clubs, these 
clubs also revolved around the issue of kemadjoea11 either as spaces for displaying the 
new modem-life style or for impr~; ;,g the knowledge and education of their members. 
These clubs initially emerged w:th\n the communities of priyayi and teachers. The first 
club that seems to have been recorded by the vernacular press was called 
'Mangkusumitm', formed by teachers in Semarang in 1882 (Adam 1995: 97). 111 Just 
before the end of the century the most influential teacher's society was formed, called 
the club of 'Mufakat Gunt' (Teachers' Discussion Group). Branches of this club 
appeared in various districts and residencies in Java. The aims of 'Mzifakat Gunz' were 
basically 'to pave the way for teacher unity and encourage discussion of problems of 
common professional interest such as teaching, matters relating to pupils, and school 
administration. Issues such as education for girls and ways to encourage parents to send 
their children to school were also discussed at meetings held by the Mufakat Guru' 
(Adam (1995: 89). 
Intelle~tual discourses in these clubs largely dealt with common professiona, 
interests, such as language and school improvement, social discriminations and ideals of 
the kemadjoean. It was the existence of these embryonic Indies public sphere and 
discursive practices that made possible the development of the native intelligmtsia 
public sphere in the early 20th century. 
2.4.2 The Formation of the 'Intelligentsia Public Sphere' 
As early as the first decade of the 20th century, the embryonic emergence of the 
19th century public sphere was transformed into the formative phase of the intelligentsia 
public sphere. Insofar as the development of the vernacular press is concerned, the first 
decade of the 20th century was the most momentous in the history of native engagement 
in the field. While at the end of the 19th century there had emerged a few native editors 
and journalists who worked for the Dutch/Eurasian and Chinese-owned presses, the 
desiglllltion such as pengadjar (teacher), so/dadoe (army) and pengadilan (court) were widely used 
possibly to represent the obsession wilh the new orientation: kcmadjocan. 
111 Similar clubs also appeared within the milieu of priyayi inSemarang, such as Langen Samltro (est. 
t888) and Langen Darmodjojo (est. 1891). From Semarang, the associations spread to otloer cities such 
McdatJ Perdamian in Padang, Pcrkumpulan Sukamanalr in Batavia, Abi Projo in Sumknrta, and Langen 
Hardjo in Surabaya. 
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native role in the early decade of the new century was much more substantial. Apart 
from the increasing number of native editors and journalists, members of the native 
intelligentsia had now started establishing a fully-fledged native owned press. 
The most prominent native journalists of the time derived from students or 
former students of the Dokter-Djawa schooUSTOVIA. Among others, Abdul Rivai {b. 
1871) and Tirto Adhi Smjo (1880-1918) deserve to be more celebrated. Coming from a 
family of teachers, the Sumatran-born Rivai was a graduate of the Dokter-Djawa school 
who had left for the Netherlands at the end of 1899 with the intention of continuing his 
medical studies. While waiting for permission and taking preliminary examinations to 
gain entry into University (in Amsterdam)-which was made possible for the STOVIA 
graduates after 1904-he engaged in journalistic activities. During this time, he worked 
as an editor for several Dutch-owned periodicals which espoused the 'ethical' ideal and 
soon became the epitome of the kcmadjocan-oricnled press. He relentlessly criticised 
outmoded traditional values and stressed the need for a 'catch-up' psychology by 
introducing as well as idealising the terms 'bangsauan pikiran' and 'kaocm moeda ', 
Moreover, he started to arouse the national consciousness of the people of the East 
Indies by popularising the term 'bangsa Hindia' (Indies nation/people). In Bintang 
Hindia, No. I inaugural issue (1902), for instance, he wrote: 'When we compare the 
"bangsa Hindia" (the people of Indies) with the white-skinned race, there may be 
discerned a variety of dilfcrcnces .. .' By promoting the term 'Indies nation' he 
suggested the importance of 'national pride' as a basic driving force towards 
kemadjoean (Abdullah 1971: 12). 
Meanwhile, Tirto Adhi Smjo was, to borrow Chairil Anwar's phrase, a 'wild 
beast' expelled from his own original community and the C1;'.< •. '" • c/ould bcrmnc t11e 
model for the protagonist Minke, in Pramocdya Anania Toe, s •,;. ::c .,1 novels. Born in 
Blora (Central Java) in 1880 he came from a fan1ily of the '''·6:.~r jJi·.~vayi (holding tl1e 
office of Regent) that for some reason had a bitter relationship with the Dutch 
(especially his grandfather and grandmother who brought him up). Graduating from the 
ELS in 1894 he took a somewhat erratic patl1 by continuing his studies in the Dokter-
Djawa school (STOVIA) instead of the Chiefs' school (OSVIA)-and as such departed 
from the mainstream of the higher priyayi's descendants of the time. In 1900 he was at 
the fourth level of the school after studying for six years including two/three years in the 
preparatory section. During this time, his interest Jay more in journalism rather than in 
study. Added to this was his 'scandalous' behaviour (in the eyes of the authorities), 
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specifically in the context of giving an illegal drug prescription to a very needy Chinese, 
which led to his expulsion from the school (Toer 1985: 11-21 ). 
Aller leaving the school he became more enthusiastically engaged in journalism. 
Bused on his experience as a correspondent for the lfi11dia Ola11da in 1894, he was 
appointed an editor of the Pembrita Betawi (1901-03) while also becoming an assistant 
editor of the Wama Sari as well as a correspondent for the Bromarta11i and the Pewarta 
Pria11ga11. ·n1ese activities were a galvanising moment for his transformation into a 
resistance journalist. His social criticism, especially as an editor of the Pembrita Betawi, 
connected him to the touchstone of the European intellectual movement of the time. In 
this newspaper he was particularly responsible for the t·~'iumn 'Dreyji1sia11a ' intended to 
expose abuse:> of jlower by the Dutch and native civil servants and which used 
journalism as a new weapon for the insurrection ofthe colonised people. 
The word 'Dreyfusiana' chosen for the column referred to the well-known 
'Dreyfus Affair' in late 19th century France, which gave rise to the so-called 'mat~ifcste 
des illlellectuals' (the manifesto of the intellectuals) and became a milestone in the 
history of intellectual movements in Europe (sec chapter I). The fact that the word 
'Drcyfusiana' was chosen for a column which highlight~d the abuse of power in the 
East Indies indicates the influence of the European intellectual movement in the 
region-though the word 'intellectual' itself had not yet been commonly used in the 
public discourse of the new 'bat~gsawall pikira11 ', 
A m3jor step occurred in 1903 when Tirto Adhi Smjo, with the financial support 
of the Cianjur Regent, R. A.A. Pra~. iradiredja, was able to run his own Cianjur-based 
weekly, Sot:1rda Berila. This vernacular weekly became the first indigenous publication 
owned, edited, and managed by a native. For personal reasons the lifespan of the 
Soe11da Berita was only two years,. but Surjo's pioneering effort was followed in 1907 
by his successful launching of a new colloquial-Malay Batavia-based weekly, the 
Medan Prijaji (Priyayi's Arena). Financial support came from the Chief Jaksa of 
Cirebon, Raden Mas Ten;~nggung Pandji Arjodinoto and somewhat later from a devout 
Muslim merchant, Hadji Mohammad Arsjad, with political protection from the Dutch 
Governor General Van Heutsz. With this backing, the Meda11 Prijaji soon became the 
champion of national consciousness of the native East Indies people. Support from the 
political establishment did not discourage Surjo from inflaming the spirit of 
emancipation and resistance. In Shiraishi's words (1990: 34): 
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TirtoadhisoeJjo created his own journalistic style in Meda11 Prijaji, militant and 
sarcastic in tone ... Though the title of the newspaper was Meda11 PrijaJi, it v. .; 
no longer the forum for only the prijaji, but as its motto says, 'the voice for all 
the (native) rulers, aristocrats, and intellectuals, priyayi, native merchants, and 
officers as well merchants of the subordinated peoples made equal (in status) 
with the So11s of the Country'. 
The original motto of this press was: 'SOEARA bagai [sic] sckalia11 Radja-radja, 
Bangsawan asali da11 pikiran, Prijaji dan saudagar Boemipoetra da11 officier-officier 
serta saudagar-saru/agar dari bangsaj:mg terprentah laeujaja11g dipe;·samakall de11gan 
Anaknegri, di seloeroeh Hindia Olanda' {emphasis added]. This motto vividly 
expressed the new native creed that invoked national consciousness and solidarity by 
converging all of the East Indies people into the same category as 'ba11gsa ja11g 
terprentah' (the subordinated nation) and the same status as 'Anak11cgeri di se/oeroeh 
Hi11dia Ola11da' (fellow citizens of the East Indies). In responding to the centripetal 
force of the deepening Dutchiricat.on of the East Indies life-world, this native press 
~:sed the subaltern colloquial Malay as a means of introducing the 'language' of new 
nationalism and of igniting a new spirit of egalitarianism. 
The motto also highlighted the difference between the 'bangsawa11 oesoe//asali' 
and 'ba11gsawa11 pikiran ', indicating that both tem1s had currency in the public sphere. 
This symbolic construction, which implies the politics of exclusion (either one belongs 
to the bangsawan 'oesoe/' or 'pikiran '), through discursive practices in the public 
sphere, introduced the public to a process of subjectification and a fantasy of 
incorporation. This in tum enabled the new intelligentsia to find their own imagined-
community and collective identity. 
Thll!l, the presence of vernacular presses, particularly the native ones, provided 
symbolic constructions and the expression of a collective identity, forum for 
exchanging ideas among the new idealist intelligentsia, and also a tore·, inspiration 
from the outside world that could ignite new desires and actions. With the spread of the 
vernacular press, definitions of social reality available to the intelligentsia community 
might now originate increasingly from distant persons, from groups geographically, 
culturally, and historically distant, and might be contrasted to those provided by local 
established elite and colonial regimes. 
The source of emanation was in fact not only the West as the embodiment of 
kemadjoea11 but also the East that had been awakening from its sleep. J. S. Furnivall 
(1940: 238) expresses this vividly: 
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The Chinese aml Japanese went to war like Europeans; the Filipinos rose against 
Spain; the Chinese in the Boxer Rising braved the power of Europe; there was 
trouble i" British India, events in Turkey were shaking the Moslem world, and 
in 1'1'1;, the victory of Japan over Russia started an impulse which was to 
trar;,·(·Jrm the peoples in Netherlands India, as in other tropical dependencies, 
from th~ extreme of acquiescence to the extreme of self-assertion. 
These developments motivated the ba11gsawa11 pikira11 to translate the abstract 
idea of kemadjoea11 into more concrete action. Moving in that direction the idealist 
intelligentsia transformed the germinal social clul'S nf the 191h century into {further) 
generative socio-cultural movements. That these movements could come into being was 
in fact a sign of the pivotal role which the communicative sphere was playing in 
penetrating spatial boundaries. The new professional intelligentsia, especially those 
caught up in a small town setting, were socially trapped in a segmented community with 
little room for either horizontal or vertical integration. The expansion of transportation 
networks and the growth of the press, in addition to educational and professional links, 
allowed them to transcend such community boundaries {Kartodirdjo 1991: 343). All 
these channels made possible a communication network that paved the road for the 
genesis of the formative phase of social movements that opened new spaces for the 
intellectual struggle and became a prime mover of the integrative process of the new 
elite. 
Led or inspired notably by the 'journalist-intelligentsia' who functioned as the 
organic intellectuals of the time, the major agenda of these movements was how to 
improve the quality of indigenous life in a more sensible way. It included appealing for 
better working conditions, opposing educational restrictions {as well as social 
restrictions inherent in the colonial relationship), promoting a scholarship bureau to 
support education for a larger community, and empowering the entrepreneurial capacity 
of native merchants. 
Titus, there emerged in 1906 a kemadjoea11-oriented movement among the so-
called 'Young Malays' of West Sumatra led by Datuk Sutan Maharadja, a Padang 
aristocrat and journalist who had graduated from the Government poimary school. He 
nicknamed his group the 'kaoem moeda' and labelled his opponents the 'kaoem koetro '. 
This movement represented the voice of the adat-oriented kaoem moeda as it was 
intended to revitalise the tradition of the 'a/am' Minangkabau {the Minangkabau life-
world) and to remove the gulf between the rulers {the so-called 'first class' human race) 
and the ruled {U1e second class). In a more concrete sense, Maharadja and his group 
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espoused the cause of woman's education by establishing the first vocational school in 
Padang in 1909 (Abdullah 1971: 12-3). 
In the meantime, Tirto Adhi Sutjo initiated the establishment of the Sarckat 
Prijaji (the society of priyayi) in Batavia (Java) in 1906. Triggered by the complaints of 
some aristocrats concerning the plight of indigenous welfare, the principal aim of the 
society was to improve the education of priyayi descendants. This would be achieved 
through the formation of a scholarship bureau, providing student accommodation, Dutch 
courses, library development and financial assistance for the needy, and through 
publishing (Toer 1985: 109-11). 
This trajectory was enhanced further when the society of 'Budi Utomo • (BU, 
Glorious Endeavor) was established in Batavia on May 20, 1908. Originating from the 
nucleus of the Javanese students in Batavia, the emergence of this sociely had been 
inspired by the victory of Japan over Russia (1905) and various forms of discrimination 
in the colonial situation. The actual motivation for these students, however, was ideas 
ofWahidin Sudiro Jiusodo, a retired Doktcr-Djawa and editor of Rctnodhoemi/ah, as an 
established 'bangsawan pikira11 ' of the time. ttl The idea of establishing this association 
was initially circulated among students of the STOVJA such as Sutomo, Suradji, 
Mohammad Saleh, Suwamo, and Gunawan Mangunkusumo (a younger brother of 
Tjip,_.,, and then spread to students of other schools. 113 Representatives of these various 
schools were brought together to the hall of STOVIA on 20 May 1908 to declare the 
establishment of this society (Nagazumi 1972: 38-40). 
In criticising the older priyayi for failing to look after the interests of the people, 
the BU originally intended to bypass the traditional establishment and their elders by 
taking over the leadership of the priyayi community (Penders 1977: 216). Impressed by 
the intellectual spirit of the young students, more radical members of the intc! lii1entsia 
such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1885-1943) and Suwardi Sutjaningrat (1889-1959)-
both were former students of the STOVIA who had shown thr.i.r public spirii by 
abandoning a lucrative medical practice for epidemic prcve. ': Woti; for the 
government-spontaneously supported the society. In tact, the influence tf the 
established priyayi remained strong. Budi Utomq was soon =~vamr.ed by cons•:rvative 
"'Wahidin had toured Java in 1906 to gain tlte support ortocal civil administmtors for his attempt to 
establish a 'Studiefonds' (scholarship funds) to aid talented Javanese students and to dmw attention to the 
backwardness oftlte Javanese o" the patlt of kemmijoean. · 
113 Among Utese other schoo!s were Ute Agricultural nnd Veterinary school at Dogor, the OSVIA at 
Magelang and Frobolinggo, tlte native teacher-training schools at Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Probolinggo, 
and tlte Burgeravondscltoo/ (the citizens' evening school) at Sumbaya (Soewarno 1918). 
------------------- --- ---- -----~·· 
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priyayi who impressed their paternalistic stamp on it and kept it on a tight rein focu~i;og 
on narrow educational and cultural issur"t· To keep the society running alcng 
conservative lines was actually in accordance with the mindsct of the Ethical colonial 
interests embodied in the political opportunity structure set •!p by Govemors General 
Van Heutsz and Idcnburg (Shiraishi 1990: 35, Tocr 1985: 118). Thus, for most of its 
career the BU was very conservative and had no pretensions about establishing a 
'nation' in a wider sense, only a narrow Javanese nationalism (Van Nicl 1970: 56; 
Furnivall, 1940: 243). The members were mainly drawn from the upper and middle 
status group of central and cast Java whose main concern was to promote 'a 
paternalistic program that emphasised the duty of the aristocracy to lead the masses 
towards enlightenment' (Sutherland 11979: 59). 
What seems to have been the innovativ · . '·ature of this organization was that it 
was the first native organization run on Western lines, i~, t·.e sense that it used modem 
techniques ol organization and was supported by the best Westem-eduCllted 
intelligentsia available at the time (Van Niel1970: 56-7). Realising that the organization 
had been appropriated by the conservative priyayi. the radical members of the 
intelligentsia such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo who had joined it as a political shelter 
within the mantle of the priyayi soon withdrew in disillusionment. 
In parallel with the establishment of Budi Utomo, some privileged East Indies' 
tertiary students in the Netherlands founded in the same year the 'Indisclze Verccniging • 
lindies Association). Befor.: that, Indies students in that country, such as the well-
known Abdul Rivai, had been 'lone fighters' or had joined the 'Vereeniging Oos/ en 
West'lfhe A&Sociation of the En~t and the West). Encouraged by J. H. Abendanon, thf 
Indies Association was originally oriented to being a social and cultural fonim 'whP.re 
the small nuntoer of East Indi~s students could relax togethe~ and keep up to date with 
news from home' (Ingleson 1979: 1). In this year, some twenty students became 
members of this society. The Indies men of higher learning in tho: Netherlands up to this 
period were almost exclusively from royal and Regent families except for the STOVIA 
graduates whc lmd i1cen allowed to proceed to universities in the Netherlands after 
1904.114 
114 They were, amo~g others, sons of the royal family ofPakun' .. ' 1 (R.M. Aria Kusumo Judo, R.M Ari:> 
Surtio, Surjoputro), so~ of the royal family of Notodirodjo {1'4i.o;·.;..~'".Voro, Notodiningrat, GondoW:~oto, 
and Nolo Suroto); one son of tloe royal family of Pnngerun Haa;widjojo VI; two son• of the Kutai 
Sultanate (Ruden Badaruddin and Raden Mnhamud<iin; sons of Regents such as g,,,..~~e!iono (elder 
brother of R.A. Knrtini, son of the Jcpam Regent), Tjokroadikusumo (son of the MJgei"ng Regent), 
Husein Djaj:idinigmt (son of the Banten Regent), Mnhamdja Sutan Knsajangan Soripada (son of tl1e 
- --- -- -- --- -- --- --- --- - - '• "' 
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In short, the 'bangsawan p1kira11' up to this stage had already succeeded to ~orne 
extent in expanding their network of cCJmmunication and horizontal integration going 
beyond the realm of kinship affiliations. Nonetheless, the horizon of the social 
movements they set up to promote their ideology remained so far unable to transcend 
the influence of the old aristocra~y and ethnic boundaries. 
Symbolically, the cod~ 'bangsawan pikiran ', u~cd to proclaim their historical 
actions, implied that in part they were still rooted in the noble earth of 'bangsrnvan' 
(aristocrat), while soaring to the adventurous ~ky of 'pikiran' (intellectualism). Wi'hin 
the cultural 'cocoon' of the aristocracy, the 'bangsawan pikiran' made attempts to form 
societies based on non-ascriptive qualities. Membership of these societies was 
characterised by a com'ilonality based on the kemadjoean orientation, language, 
education :md habitus. It was obvious, however, that the sphere of influence of these 
social movc:",ents, and the reprodu• ticn of their ideology up to the first decad~ of the 
201h century, were still confined mostly io the innermost circle of 'bangsmvan pikiran' 
and 'bangsawan oesoel' or those who had been plunged into the whirl of the modem 
life-world. So ther~ was not such a clear distinction between the organic intellectuals-
as the articulators of a collective identity-and their public, as the public was still 
confined to the community of intelligentsia that shar:d a broad common ground. In 
other words, the public in the wider sense of the masses remained an anonymous,. 
faceless, and an indifferent third party. 
Economically, the livelihood of the 'bangsmvan pikiran' was still 
disproportionately dependent on the public sector of the colonial administration. In 
~ddition to th~ Dutch as the: ~onglomerate of power, status and wealth, the backbone of 
the c..,!,nial native administration remained strongly under the control of the 'old' 
aristocrats:· It took a long :ime for the new emphasis on official training to have any real 
impact on the regional civil services. Heather Sutherland cites a good case of this. 'In 
1907 only ten of 260 n?.li·,: officials in Rembang Residency were OSVIA graduates, 
while a year later in Kediri 75 per cent had had no for:nal schooling; ;,~ Cirebon it was 
92 per cent' (Sutherland 1979: 55). As the production relations of the new intelligentsia 
remained under the control of the old aristocracy; the financial support for the 
installation of both native publications and social movements were heavily dependent 
' on the blessing of the 'elders'. Given the fact that they were typically provincial and 
Tnpanuli Regent); ntong witl> graduates of the STOVIA such as Bunjamin, Asmaun, Johan E. 
Tchupeiory,and W.K. Tchupeiory(Siniholon 1995: 516). 
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conservative in character, the social movements of the tim~ rould hardly transcend the 
boundaric~ ofthcir respective ethnoccntrisms and regionalisms. 
Politically, the opportunity structure available to the 'bangsawan pikiran' to 
organize social me vcmcnts was confined to the framework of the colonial structure. In 
the colonial worldview, however magnificent the mission sacrce of the Ethical and 
association ·project, its 'hidden transcripts' remained consistent with the goal of 
maintaining1lie status quo. Within this framework, there had been a meeting of interest 
between the colonial apparatus and the conservative aristocracy to keep progress 
running along the lines of the feudalistic social and pr·!1•ical order. Wiih the dominant 
feature of conservatism as the ideology of the ruling class the social mov.::ncnts could 
hardly pursue a radical course, let alone revolutionary actions. 
2.5 The Islamic Kaoem Moeda and the T ransfonnation of the Public Sphere 
The Islamic kaoem moeda played an important role in extending the modem 
public sphere beyond the milieu of the priyayi. Organic intellectuals of this community 
were a combination of the rcfonnist ulama-intelek ('clerical-intelligentsia') and the 
modernist intelek-nlama (intelligentsia), both by-products of the 'association' policy. 
Being highly exposed to discourses of religious issues, the ulama-illlelek tended to 
prioritise the agenda of 'Islamic rcfom1ism' to rcfonn Indies society by a return to 
Islamic orthodoxy. Being highly exposed to discourses of secular issues, the intelek-
ulama of this first generation tended to favour 'Islamic modernism' by prioritising the 
agenda of modernising the Islamic commurily. A~ such, the modernist intelek-ulama 
tended to be less obsessed with the idea of purifying IslamiC belief and practice. Both 
groups, however, shared some common ground in the impon ~nee they gave to 
rejuvenating the Islamic community througb ulending Islamic spirit and orthodoxy with 
mo,fern sciences and rationalism. 
Unwilling to desert Islamic faith and culture, yet seeing the advantages of 
Western civilisation, both groups sought to gain the best of both worlds. This peculiar 
nature of the Islamic kaoem mgeda placed it on an interstitial space between {Islamic) 
tradit!onalism and (Western) modernism. In such a position, this community represented 
both mimicry and menace to other identities and communities. It was a potential threat 
to the colonial government and Christian mission~. a potent rival to the Wcstcrnised 
sccui..r kaoem moeda, a critic of thr conservative-traditionalist ulama as well as <>f till 
conservative aristocracy and at!at-oriented kaocm moeda. 
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The socio-economic basis of the Islamic kaoem moeda was rooted in the milieu 
of indigenous urban merchants and commercial farmers. In the arbitrary colonial system 
of social stratification, this group of (old) Muslim petty bourgeoisie belonged to the 
lower status group. Moreover, with the deepening penetration of European enterprises 
and the expansion of Chinese trading houses especially from the late 191h century 
onward, the bargaining power of Muslim merchants and commercial farmers tended to 
become eroded. Richard Robison expresses thts succinctly (1978: 19): 
Throughout the colonial period, Dutch power secured for the Dutch trading 
houses and, later on, banks, cstat~s, and shipping and mining companies, 
effective monopolies in international trade and large-scale investment. Chinese 
merchants were cultivated as intcrmcdimies for the domestic Indonesian market. 
This stnt~mrc exciuded the asli [indigenous] merchant bourgeoisie who, without 
the protection of the state, remained lCickcd into small-scale trading and 
commodity production in rural areas and small towns, and who fought a largely 
unsuccessful rcarguard action against th~ incursions of Chinese production. 
In the face of such a troublesome situation, the idea of Pan-Islamic solidarity and the 
ideology of Islan1ic refonnism-modcmism provided the Muslim petty bourgeoisie with 
a new ground to underpin its redemptive process. 
In the triangular interaction between ulama-intelek and intelek-ulama (as a new 
i!:lflgsawan pikiran) and Muslim merchants/commercial farmers (as an old ['moneyed'] 
petty bourgeoisie), there emerged an alternative public sphere outside the milieu of the 
priyayi. This in tum paved lhc road forth~ intelligentsia's encounter with the masses. 
It has to be borne in mind that in Muslim society, at least in this p~riod, there is 
no clear cut distinction between the religious and the political sphere. So that religious 
discourse and interests of religious communities can penetrate thr. public sphere, while 
r~ligious institutions and forums can also function as the public sphere. Besides, in the 
NEI where more than 90% of the population were Muslims, Islamic institutions and 
forums wr.re theoretically accessible to a greater part of the population (public). 
Furthermore, in the NEl where class formation was far less clearcut or consolidated than 
in Europe, the public sphere was noisy with the voices of cultural solidarity groupings. 
If the mode of social incorporation is highly based on cultural solidarity groupings 
(instend of class solidarity), religious forums and institutions can also function as the 
public sphere, at least for the santri political community. 
In contrast to the public sphere of the conservative-traditionalist ulama, which 
remained heavily reliant on oral and face-to-face communication-mediated by the 
traditional networks of mosques, prucmtrens, Sufi brotherhoods, and religious 
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festivities-the public sphere of the Islamic kaocm mocda was multifaceted. Apart from 
using those kinds of traditional networks, it had developed a more structured network of 
madrasah in which the reformist-modernist ideology could be grounded more 
systematically. Supplementing the network of madrasah there emerged supporting 
institutions in the fom1 of Islamic publications, clubs, foundations and associations, 
which by the interrelationship among them facilitated the dissemination of new ideas 
and the consolidation of the movement. To transcend the boundaries of ural 
communicatio;•, the Islamic kaoem moetla had begun publishing printed books, 
brochures, newspapers and periodicals that extended the transmission chain of its ideas 
across spatial borders. The Islamic kaoem moctla was thus able to develop modem 
systems of' communication and social institutions through social learning from the 
European-introduced print-capitalism, publications and societies. 
2.5.1 The Muslim Adoption of Modem Printing Technologies and Social Clubs 
Until 1800, the world oflslam rriected the printing press and remained a world 
of oral and manuscript communication (Messick 1993). With the introduction of the 
colonial government printing activities and print-capitalism of the Liberal economy 
around the middle of the 191h century, in concert with the adoption of printing presses in 
other parts of the Muslim world, liS the East Indies Muslims became interested in 
printing technologies. 
At the outset, Muslim printing in the archipelago used the new lithographic 
printing resembling the successful technique used first in India and then in the Middle 
East (Proudfoot 1997). In the early stages·, the Muslim preference for lithography was 
based on the r.onsideration that this technique could preserve the graceful (Arabic) script 
and style of the Muslim manuscript tradition. The first Indo-Malay Muslim book printed 
with this teclmique was a beautiful edition of the Qur'an published in Palembang in 
1848, followed possibly by the publication of the kitab Sharaf ai-Anam (The Best of 
Men}, the Malay version of a well-loved text in praise of the prophet Muhammad, in 
Surp!)aya in 1853. Thenceforward, Muslim publishers enlarged their activities to mass-
proti,;ce books of religious knowledge (kitab) and other literature such as hikayat 
(folktale) and syair (verse) published by personally conducted cottage industries. A few 
other Muslim religious texts were printed in Java from the late 1850s and early 1860s, 
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but the most important development of Muslim printing for the rest of the century took 
place in Singapore, which since about 1860 had emerged as the centre of the region's 
Muslim publishing activity and the first centre of Malay-language Muslim printing 
anywhere in the world. 116 Outside the archipelago, beginning in the 1880s, Malay-
language Jslantic literature was &!so published in other Muslim lands such as in 
Bombay, Cairo and Mecca. 117 This development had contributed to the considerable 
reproduction of the old religious manuscripts and the multiplication of new religious 
works, which with the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1869 enabled a growing influx 
of religious books into the archipelago. 
A shifl from manual to mechanical reproduction of the book inescapably 
entailed a change in what Terry Eagleton called 'the literary mode of production' 
followed by a change in the social position ofthe literati and the social consciousness of 
society. In the manuscript mode of production, book copying was costly, labour 
intensive and scarce. Under these conditions, it was difficult for the author to make a 
living in the market by selling his book to a larger audience. This meant that manuscript 
reproduction could only be afforded by a handful of literati derived from the (devout) 
wealthy families, mostly under the patronage of the royal family or feudal lords. Of 
course, there had been a market for and/or commercialisation of the manuscript. Such a 
market re••tion, however, remained marginal to the primary relationship between writer 
and patron. Thus, in the manuscript mode of production the concern for the welfare of 
poets and writers never went beyond the institution of patronage (Milner 1996: 96; 
Auerbach 1965: 242). In the traditional Islamic polity, this explained the symbolic 
interdependence between the sultan and the Islamic clerisy. The sultan benefited from 
the religious legitimacy of the clerisy, while the clerisy acquired royal patronage for 
their welfare and works. With the introduction of the printing press (firstly lithography 
and then typography), book reproductions became easier, cheaper and abundant. 
Outside the court there now emerged alternative power centres for supporting the 
reproduction of the book. Apart from the presence of colonial masters as new possible 
patrons, the most powerful supporting agent was now the owner of a printing press 
115 In following the lrajectory of British-Indian Muslim printing which had adopted litl10grnphy since at 
least early in the 19th century, by mid-century tlterc emerged printing aetivii.ies using the same technique 
iu Cairo and Istanbul followed by others in Mecca notably afler t883 (Proudfootl997: 163-182). 
116 Examples of books published \n Singapore from 1860-1870 were Sabil al-Mulrtadin, Bidayat a/-
Mubtadi, Usul ai-Din, Tanbilr a/-~klnmn, Slrat ai-Mustakim, Kawaid ai-ls/am, Taj a/-Mrrlrrk, Syair 
Mckka/r, and Syair Hakikat (Proudfoot1993: 28). 
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through whom the authors could gain for their works a guarantee of possible commodity 
exchange between writer and reader. Under the new mode of production the patronage 
system was replaced by a system of commodity relations that brought about historically 
unprecedented fonns of highly individualised literary production and consumption. This 
resulted in the gradual disengagement of the Islamic literati from the historic ruling 
class. 
The change in the literary mode of production also changed the social position 
of the literati. The traditional literati deri vcd much of their authority from the scarcity 
and uniqueness of the manuscript. This scarcity entailed a social perception of the 
authenticity of the manuscript that in its association with the divine message of the text 
gave this traditional literary work a sacred 'aura' (Benjamin 1973: 225). This aura in 
tum bestowed a special privilege on a few people who had ace ess to the manuscript, 
which enabled the old religious clerisy to command high social prestrge. As Walter 
Benjamin observed (1973: 223), it is this aura that 'withrr. :n the :!!;~ of mechanical 
reproduction.' This aura possibly was still sustained in th~ lithographic book production 
since it was mostly based on the reproduction of the old religious manuscripts. Yet,lhe 
multiplication of books in circulation through the help of lithography had now begun to 
entail the decentralisation of knowledge-possession. This in tum led to the gradual 
demotion of both the sacredness of the manuscript and the aura of the traditional clerisy, 
particularly in the eyes of the literate community. 
The challenge of mechanical reproduction became even more serious following 
the Muslim adoption of typographic printing from the 1890s onward, in the wake of 
earlier uses of the teclmique by government agencies and private producers of 
newspapers and periodicals. With the capital costs for typography equipment being 
higher than for lithography the economic and managerial pattern of this technique was 
underpinned by fonnal business enterprises rather than personally conducted cottage 
industries. With the new technique and style of m•nagement, the scale and speed of 
book reproduction was simply incommensurable :·.is in tum changed the nature of 
literary production. Since the lithographed books were mostly based on the reproduction 
of old manuscripts, lithographic materials mostly dealt with traditional ~ubjects and 
histories. By contrast, to optimise the capacity and speed of the machine, typographic 
printing favoured contemporary works, particularly works related to the recent history 
117 For tlte publication of Malay-language Islamic literatures outside the Malay world, see Proudfoot 
(1993: 27; 1998: 46). 
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oftocal events (Proudfoot 1993: 46-54). Furthermore, the usc of Arabic or Jawi (Arabo-
Mclayu) script in lithography was soon challenged by the dominant usc of mmi 
(Romanised) script in typographical production, although for some fifty years more 
Arabic and Roman script continued to be used side by side. 
All these phenomena not only contributed to an explosion in the amount of 
reading materials but also seriously challenged the status of the traditional subjects and 
knowledge that had a subversive effect on the previous social prestige of authority of 
the traditional clerisy. After all, the explosion in the amount of printed materials was 
~onducive to both promoting the literacy rate and, more importantly, to increasing the 
number of equal 'citizens' of the 'Republic of Letters' (Respublica lilleraria). This in 
tum significantly changed both the social status of the traditional religious clerisy and 
the religious consciousness of society. 
Alongside the adoption of new print technologies, in the late 191h century there 
also emerged early Western-style Muslim social clubs. A good example of one such 
club was an Islamic study club, the Rusjdijah Club, which emerged within the milieu of 
the Bugis sultanate in Riau. Established in the early 1880s, this club was equipped with 
a library .md a printing press tc print members' works and religious texts. It also 
organized regular social events and sports days (Matheson 1989). 
The Muslim adoption of printing technologies and Wcstcm-stylc social clubs 
embraced a new regime of truth, a new mode of production, a new religious 
consciousness and new relations of knowledge and power. This threatened the 
establishment of the traditional ulama, while facilitating the rise of new Islamic 
reformist-modernist ulama. Printing technologies and modem social clubs provided a 
foundation for the Islamic kaoem moeda of the early 201h century to extend tl1c public 
sphere, transcending the boundary of the priyayi environment. 
2.5.2 The MusE:n Expansion ofthe.Public Sphere 
In the realm of media, the Islamic kaoem moeda of West Sumatra took an 
important step in extending the target audience of the vernacular press beyond the 
priyayi community. From their inception they established some journals which used 
Malay language written in Jawi script which was readable by a larger audience of the 
Indies people at the time. Inspired by the presence of the first reformist-modernist 
periodical in Singapore, At-Imam (The Leader), since the 1906, Abdullah Achmad with 
the support of local traders such as Sutan Djamal at-Din Abu Bakar, established AI-
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Mwrir (Ar. The Radiant) in 1911. Its contributors included other local figures of the 
ulama-inte/ek and intelligentsia such as Hadji Rasul, M. Thaib Umar, Djamil Djambek, 
Agus Salim's father, Sutan Muhammad Salim, and even Datuk Sutan Maharadja-
before the journal showed its blatant support for campaign of the reformist Muslims 
(Abdullah 1972: 216-29). Promoting the ideas of 'Abduh and Rida, this journal became 
a mouthpiece for the Islamic kaoem moeda. While arguing for the compatibility of 
Islam with modem sciences and rationality, articles in the journal called the Islamic 
community to return to Islamic orthodoxy through the eradication of taqlid, the 
promotion of ijtilrad, and resistance against the practice of bid'alr, klwrafat and the 
ecstatic tareqat. 118 
The emergence of AI-Mwrir had a snowball effect. There soon emerged other 
journals of the similar type in this region, such as the Adabiyah-owned ai-Aklrbar, the 
Sumatra Tlrmvalib-owned AI-Bayan, AI-Imam, AI-Basyir, AI-Ittiqan, and AI-Mrmir el 
Manar (Junus 1980: 82). In 1916, Abdullah Achmad collaborated with the then Sarekat 
Islam chainnan, Tjokroaminoto to establish a Jawi periodical, AI-ls/am, in Surabaya. 
This journal marked the beginning of Muslim acceptance of the use of the r•mri script, 
as the journal began to introduce this script in a minor part of its publications (Laffan 
2003: 178). This transfonnation signalled a new development in the Indies public 
sphere. The mmi script and typographic printing provided not only a key to open and 
disseminate modem (Western) civilisations but also exploited a medium for large scale 
production and reproduction of publications, which could expand the scope of the 
public sphere. The Islamic kaoem moeda adoption of this script marked the phase of 
consolidation and also of fierce contestation among the community of bangsawan 
pikiran. 
In the realm of social associations, a milestone in the expansion of the public 
sphere beyond the orbit of the established aristocracy was the formation in 1909 of the 
Islamic Commercial Association (Sarekat Dagang /s/amialr, SDI) in Bogor. Initiated by 
Tirto Adhi Smjo, this association was led by former students of the STOVIA and other 
intelligentsia and ulama-tradcrs of the peranakan Arab and Boemipoetera.119 
111 TI1e tenn taqlid here refers tO a blind adherence to the teaching of the conservative 11/ama and dogmas 
of the eslablished jurisprudenlial schools, while ijtihad refers Ia lhc usc of iadcpendent reasoning to 
enable Islam Ia respond Ia !he exigencies of modem life. Bid'ah here means illegitimale innovnli~n in 
religious practice; klmrafat means superstition; and tar/qat means mystical brotherhoods. 
119 The executive of this association consisled of Ute Prcsidenl: Sjeikh Achmnd bin Abdulralunan 
lladjcnel (an Arab mcrchnnl); Vice Presidcnl: Mohammad Dagrim (a Doktcr-Djawa); Secretary cum 
Treasurer: Tirto Adhi Surjo (n joumaliSI); Commissioners: Sjcikh Aclunad bin Said lladjcnel, Sjcikh 
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The constituency of the SDI wu:; based on what Tirto called the 'Kaocm 
Mardil.a' (free people) or the 'Vrijc Burgers' (free citizens), people whose livelihood 
did not derive from service to the colonial government. The principle aim of this 
association ,according to Tirto's article in Medmz Prijaji 3 (1909), was to improve the 
deteriorating conditions of native (Muslim) traders/businessmen in order to catch up at 
least with the achievements of Chinese traders, if not the Europeans. On the urgency of 
the establishment of Muslim chamber of commerce, Tirto stated: 'In order to uplift the 
position of our traders of the bangsa Islam (Muslim nation) in the East Indies, it is 
essential to set up a foundation of traders, so that ilmu sanvat (political-economics) can 
be applied properly and the fragile 'splintered rib' can no longer be broken since they 
arc now united.' Unfortunately, the sustainability and sphere of influence of this 
association was circumscribed by the suspiciousness of the colonial apparatus of any 
movements perceived as embodying the spirit ofPan-Islamism. 
The emergence of the SDI was followed by the establishment of similar societies 
with diverse orientations in other parts of the NEJ. During the second decade of the 201h 
century, there emerged, among others, the Djaja Upaja (Successful Endeavour) in 
Batavia, Tsamaratul Iklnvan (Fruit of Brotherhood) in West Sumatra, tile Baji Minahasa 
(Minahasa Welfare) in Makasar, and the Setia Usaha (Faithful Endeavour) in 
Surabaya tlO The primary aim of these associations was to promote Muslim/native 
welfare, education, and solidarity by using Islamic ide;.tity as a social glue and 
promoting correct Islamic teaching and practice as a guidance lor life. 
The greatest achievements in the fonnation of associations abased on Islamic 
kaoem moeda principles were the emergence in 1912 of Muhammadiyah and Sarekat 
Islam. Established in Yogyakarta by Achmad Dachlan with the support oflocalu/ama-
tradcrs, leaders of the local Budi Utomo and also students of the native teacher-training 
school (Nakamura 1976: 115-6), 121 Muhammadiyah was oriented to strengthen the unity 
Galib bin Said bin Tebe, Sjeikh Mohamod bin Said Badjenet (all arc Arabic merchants), Mas Railus 
(native land clerk), Sulaeman {native bookbinder) and Hadji Mohamod Arsjad and Abdullah {native 
merchants) (Toer 1985: 120-t). ~ 
120 Other similar associations in Batavia were the a/ Hello/ a/ Ahmar (Red Crescent Society), the ltmatul 
Khairljah (perfection of Welfare), tl1e Denno lhlas (D; ·:.led Charitj·), ""~ the Sumatra-Batal'ia a/ 
Khairijah (Sunutro-Batavia Charitable As.c;ociatioil). An1:~.er similar Df,!;::tcJation iu Makassar was the 
Maidjitil Islam {Islamic Funeral Welfare Association). Oth" associaticn< 1n West Sumolra were the 
Abdullah Abmad-led Djam/'ah Adabiah (Civilised Community), Ibrahim Musa-led Muzakaratullklni'Dn 
{Discursive Brotl1erhood), and Hadji Rasul-led Sumatra Thawa/ib {association of Sumolra Islamic 
students). Olher associations in Surabayn were the Podo Rosa {Mutual Feeling) and the Tamaa Manikem 
\Garden of Precious Stones). See Adam { 1995: 160-1 ), Korver {1985: 21-22) and Iunus { 1960: 54-69). 
"Leaders oflhe Yogynkllrt:l Bud/ Utomo (BU) were composed largely of teachers of the local tearher-
training schools. Among leaders of the BU and teacher ofthe teacher-training school who supported tl1e 
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and power of Islam in the face of colonialism and missionary activities through the 
strategy of appropriation. By adopting modem methods and apparatus as well as the 
tactics of Christian missionary groups, Muhammadiyah played important roles in 
introducing Wcslcm-lypc social institutions to a broader community of the native East 
Indies. 
Embarking on the establishment of an elaborate-network of madrasah around 
Yogyakarta, the Muhammadiyah 's scope of activities with the support of Muslim pclly 
bourgeoisie spread to other sectors and to many parts of the NEI over the subsequent 
decade (Nakamura 1976: 116). These other sectors included 'sckolah' (the schools in 
Western educational system), publications, orphanages, clinics, hospitals and other 
humanitarian institutions. For most of its life, this organization has conccntralcd more 
on socio-cultural movements-though its individual leaders might join political 
organizations. In the early decades of il5 .·t.pcarancc, it stayed on the periphery of 
nationalist politics-U10ugh its branches in Sumatra tended to be more political-in 
order to remain on good terms with the colonial administration. As a result, the colonial 
government began in 1915 to subsidize Muhammadiyah schools. 
While Muhammadiyah focused on socio-cducation activities, Sarckat Islam 
concentrated on economic and political advocacy, as will be discussed in the following 
section. 
2.6 Power Games: Consolidation and Cont~station 
Discourse and the J>Ublic sphere arc sites where power struggles arc played out 
and where identities and communities arc constructed. The main driving forces for the 
intelligentsia's power struggles and construction of identity-communities at this time 
were their improved economic standing along with discriminatory colonial policies 
which produced different socio-economic impacts for different subject positions of the 
intelligentsia. Under U1ese conditions, various groups of the intelligentsia allempled to 
consolidate their collectivities and identities resulting in severe political conlcstalions. 
Political consolida:ion and contestation marked the beginning of real (political} power 
games. These power games look place both along the axis of slate and society relations 
and in the interaction of different subject positions oflhc intelligentsia within society. 
cstnblishmenl of the Muhammadiyah were Dwijoscwojo, Djojosumarto Budihardjo and Sosrosugondo 
(Sacfullah 1997: 68-76). 
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On entering the second decade of the century, the new intelligentsia (bangsawan 
pikiran) gained new momentum to empower their social leverage and their public 
sphere. The political opportunities for the development of the intelligentsia were 
primarily conditioned at this time by the age of war. World War I (1914-18) deeply 
affected the Netherlands and its colonies. The pressure of war forced the British to 
circumscribe neutral shipping resulting in a tenuous link between the Netherlands and 
the East Indies. The immediate implication of this communication barrier was the 
growing independence of the colony from the motherland. Fortunately, the two 
Govemon: General of the East Indies during the war namely, A. W. F. Idenburg (1909-
1916) and his successor Van Limburg Stirum (1916-1921), belonged to the progressive 
Ethici who had great concerns about native progress and were widely accommodating 
of native interests. 
Such concerns coexisted with the need of the government and private 
bureaucmcy for greater number of skilled labourers, resulting in the two Governors 
improving the quality, and extending the recruitment, of educated Boemipoetera. This 
not only led to a gradual expansion of schools with Western standards, but also forced 
the government to relax the 'birth rights' (heredity) requirement in order to draw more 
students from the somewhat lesser born. The OSVIA, for instance, progressively drew 
its pupils from the middle and even lower priyayi. Whereas af the beginning of the 
century over half the pupils' fathers held native civil service positions of assistant 
JVedana to Regent, by 1915 the proportion of those from lesser ranking families had 
markedly increased (Sutherland 1979: 54). 
With the relaxing ofthe entry requirements, the number of enrolments in various 
levels and kinds of educational institutions grew considerably. This in tum was 
responsible for the growing number of educated young pecple trained for white-collar 
jobs and able to enjoy the accompanying prestige, regardless of their social origin. The 
augmentation of the new native professionals' role in the bureaucracy helj•ed blur the 
narrow identification between high status and the native civil administrator (Sutherland 
1979: 54). 
The bargaining power of this new native professional group increased as an 
unintended consequence of discriminative colonial policies. In response to the global 
economic crisis around the tum of the century, government offices instituted systematic 
and detailed bookkeeping procedures that necessitated Department Heads to monitor 
their expenditures more rigorously. Pressured by budgetary considerations, the 
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Department Heads had no real alternative but to hire less expensive native professionals 
in preference to the Indo-Europeans who were paid according to the European salary 
scale. The same pattern was followed by private enterprise (Van Nicl 1970: 64-5). 
These greater opportunities for the native professionals demonstrated to the commoners 
that the native administrative corps was no longer the sole track for upward mobility, 
and that the traditional priyayi habitus was not the only exemplary centre of the good 
life. 
Meamvhile, although the greater bulk of the intelligentsia in this decade still 
worked as government officials, some of them had discovered a new field of livelihood 
beyond the iron cage of the colonial administration. Thus, a new kind of intelligentsia, 
one which followed Tjipto Mangunkusumo's choice of abandoning the lucrative 
positions in the colonial government bureaucracy began to flourish. They became 
known as the 'Kaoem Mardika' (Free Community). !leather Sutherland describes them 
(1979: 56) in this way: 
They lived on the fringes of indigenous and colonial society, working in the 
embryonic institutions of middle-class urban native life, as teachers or 
journalists, moving from place to place and job to job. They joined a 
heterogeneous mixture of peranakan (locally born, acculturated) Chinese and 
Arabs, Eurasians, uprooted priyayi and liberal samri who were drawn together 
by similar attitudes, common experiences, nascent political grievances and often, 
too, a shared enthusiasm for speculative economic ventures. 
With the increased social leverage of the new professional intelligentsia as well 
as the emergence of the 'Kaoem Mardika ', the 'bangsawon' designation had lost much 
of its aura. Benefiting from this situation, the intelligen!sia found the momentum to 
consolidate their own distinct communities separated from the old aristocracy. In !his 
context they began to question their former identification with the code 'bangsawan 
pikiran'. As one commentator in ·the Newspaper Sinar Djawa (No. 52,4 March 1914) 
noted: 
With the change of times a new type of bangsawan has risen, namely the 
bangsawan pikiran. But i( the bmrgsawan pikiran were merely the offshoot of 
the bangsawan oesoe/, then changes would not occur and no associations could 
be born. But if the wong cilik (little people) were to get out ofthe milieu of their 
race and refuse to be exploited br their original aristocrats then this would be the 
beginning ofthe momentum ... 12 
ou Quoted in Adam (1995: 173). 
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As the flame of the tenn 'bangsawan pikiran' began to flicker, fresh and 
invigorating new tenns emerged. The intelligentsia now preferred to describe 
themselves through evocative phrases such as 'kaocm tcrpe/adjar' (educated 
community}, 'pcmoeda-peladjar' (student-youth), 'pemoeda' (the youth), or the Dutch 
word 'jong' (the young). Coined by late-comer intellectuals of the first generation, such 
as Satiman Whjosandjojo (b. 1892, a student of the STOVIA}, these tenns began to be 
commonly used as an identity code for the second generation of the intelligentsia, 
composed of those who were born generally during the period 1900-1915. With the 
invention of these new rubrics or codes, the earlier abstract spirit of 'kaoem moeda 'was 
now embodied within the vigorous, educated younger generntion. 
Having been widely exposed to the Dutch language as a consequence of the 
deepening process of Dutchiflcation, this intelligentsia, especially the younger 
generation, was accustomed to reading publications and writing in the Dutch language. 
During this process, they beg.m to discover and adopt the Dutch tenn 'intellectueel(en)' 
(intellectuaVs). In a tribute to the late Wahidin Sudiro Husodo, for instance, Suwardi 
Sutjaningrat wrote an article ir. the Nederlandsch Jndii! Oud & Nieuw I (1916-1917) that 
contained the following: 'There were not many illlellectt<~elcn who had such knowledge 
of the nationale cnltuur (national culture) ofthe Javanese as Dr. Soedirohoesodo.' 
Smjaningrat's statement indicates, among other things, that the tenn 
intellectr;eelen used in this historical period remained associated more wilh the 
possession of knowledge than with a historical caliin~ to political liberation. Thus, the 
historical content of the tenn intellectuce/en at this juncture remained related to that of 
the tenn 'bangsmvan pikiran' or 'pemoeda-pelad; · namely designating knowledge 
(kemadjoean) as a new parameter of social status. In addition to the link with 
knowledge, however, Sutjaningrat had also already connected the tenn illleilectucelen 
to the construction of 'de nationale cul/llur' of the Javanese. This indicates that the 
second decade of the twentieth century was the turning point from the obsessive 
discourse on kemadjoean to the emerging consciousness of proto-nationalism. In other 
words, it was the transitional phase from cultural to political movements. 
2.6.1 The Genesis ofthe Proto-Nationalist Associations 
At this point of transition, the ir,iellig:ntsia movements were multifarious 
representing a variety of c•Jitural streams, <il~ archaeology of knowleoge and the 
intensity of political awareness, especially as a reaction to the colcnial politics of social 
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segregation. Culturally, the movements mig!;i represent diverse ethno-religious national 
consciousnesscs. Cognitivcly, they might reflect a different degree of exposure to 
modem education and civilization. Politico-psychologically, they might be the 
extension of the progressive, the moderate, and the conservative alike. The c~· ~ssion 
of these various movements in the public sphere had been both enabled and ~ ··', · •itcd 
by the existing political opportunity •!ructurc, by external influences as well as internal 
dynamics within the community of the intcllig~ntsia. 
The political opportunity structure of the time reflected the idiosyncratic 
character of 1hc Dutch Governor General !den burg. On the one ham!, he was a staunch 
supporter of the Christian parties from whom the Christian missions expected much 
help. On the other hand, he was also a strong devotee of the Ethical policy, which 
welcomed the emergence of aative associations outside the Christian fold. 
In the years after Jdcnburg assumed power, Christian mission groups rapidly 
expanded their activities in the archipelago. Their operations in the broad realm of 
education, cultural progress and economic welfare among the indigenous people were 
given assistance by the State. The government formulated some policies to advance 
Christian principles in the daily operation and administration of the East Indies, such as 
the 'Sunday Circular' and the 'Market Circular' (Van Nicl 1970: 83-4).123 This 'green 
light' from the government helped galvanise the vitality of Christian propagation 
efforts. 
Nevertheless, what made the flame of resentment ignite into a rage was the 
collision course between the intensification of Christian propagation with the swelling 
of the Islamic reform movement. Inspired by both Islamic reformist-modernist and Pan-
Islamic ideas in the Middle East, the.wave of the movement that had already reached the 
East Indies at the tum of the century had now become the tidal flow that powered the 
turbine ofthe Islamic resurgence: 
In addition to Christian and Islamic zeal, the intensity of the religious sentiments 
in the Indies' public sphere had become overheated by the propagation of new spiritual 
orders and religious sects such as the 'Theosophical Society' (Theosojische 
123 Tile 'Sunday Circular' suggested it was improper to conduct State festivit;es on Sunday and !'Cquircd 
all administrators and civil servants to refrain from official or semi-official activities on Sundays. The 
'Market Circular' rcconuncnded the restriction of holding I11donesian markets when these fell on a 
Sunday (Van Nicl1970: 84). 
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Vcrceniging) 124 and the Ahmadyah (Noer 1978: 242; Saidi 1990: 2-4). During the 
second decade of the century these kinds of new religious societies actively recruited 
mcmbcn; from segments of the uprooted urban communities-ranging from Eurasians 
who were seeking spiritual support for their project of multicultural Indies nationalism, 
to Javanese aristocrats who found a new medium for articulating their Javanese 
mysticism, as well as alienated members of the intelligentsia. 
Apart from these factors, what caused the atmosphere of the public sphere in this 
decade to become overheated was the growing strength of. the Indies Chinese self-
assertion. The rising self-consciousness and social expectations of the Chinese was 
driven by a combination of the strengthening of their economic bargaining power and 
their educational impcovcment.125 When the Chint.lc revolution led by Sun Yat-scn took 
place on the mainland in 1911, the Indies Chinese saw this event as evidence of the 
resurgence of the powerful and modernised Chinese state whir.h helped boost their self-
confidence. It is said that the Chinese now dared to say to the Bocmipoctcra that the 
new republic would soon expel the Dutch and that the Chinese would become their 
rulers and masters. This sott of Chinese swagger ignited native sentiments leading to a 
growing native national consciousness (Shiraishi 1990: 35-S). 
Last but not least, the public sphere in ;his decade was stirred up by the direct 
engagement of the Netherlands' political organizations in the political affairs of the 
NEI. Most importantly, it was in this decade that the seeds of revolutionary Marxism 
and communism were systematically planted in the East Indies. Whereas in the first 
decade of the century there had appeared sever~) labour unions of government 
employees led cxclu:;ively by Europcans,126 in the second decade of the century there 
had arrived some propagandists of Marxism and Communism, especially former 
activists of the Netherlands Social• Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) and the 
'" Founded in New Yo:~ in t875 the Theosophical Society's teaching was based on the coneepls of 
universal brother:oood, syncretic religion~ and the mystic potencies of life. Ute East Indies branch of this 
society was established in 1905 as a part df tloc Netherlands chapter. 
115 Following the emergence of the Chinese vernacular press in the late 191h century as welt as the 
establishment of the Chinese eullural association, 7jong Hoa Hove Koan (fHHK, Chinese Association), in 
1900, Chinese awa'rc:ness of their own distinct identity, hierarchy and expectations increasingly led to the 
cry fot abolition of political barriers that hampered their vertical and horizontal mobility. Titis growing 
consciowness coupled with tbe strengthening of their economic baigaining power, as well ns the signs of 
political support from the Chine;e authority on the mainland, foreed the Dutch to respond Jo tlteir 
demands. The pass system-which restricted the horizontal mobility of tloe Chinese·-was relnxed in 
19r.~,the Hollar.dsch-Chinc.rc School (HCS) was provided by the government in t908, nnd moreover the 
Chinese gained their freedom for commercial nclivities and investment in sugll! plantations, local 
industries as well as · ina II shops and commerce • 
. 
1
" Examples of tltes: early labour unions were Staats Spoor Bond in 1905, the Post Bond in 1905, U,e 
Cultuur Bond in 1907, t'te Suikcr Bond and Vcrceninging Van Spoor en 1l'am Pcrsonecl (VSTP) in 1908. 
,' 
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Netherlands Social Democratic Party (SDP). In 1913 a prominent young Dut;:h labour 
leader, Hcndricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Snccvlict, arrived in Java ancl soon joined 
his fellow socialists such as D. M. G. Koch and Adolf Baars in the project of 
communicating Marxist messages to the colonized masscs.127 
In the shadow of contested social consciousncsscs and interests, varieties of 
social movements appeared and expressed the heterogeneity of social habitus and social 
paradigms. This heterogeneity began to create an embryonic fracture in the Indies 
public sphere that in tum would lead to the fracture of the intelligentsia's collective 
identity. With the ;trcscnce of the significant 'others', each group now began to activate 
its own distinct illcntity as a defence against the discourse and actions of other groups. 
The first real East Indies political party with a multicultural base was founded in 
Semarang on 5 October 1912, namely the lmlische Partij (JP, Indies Party). Born out of 
the lnsulilllie, a Eurasian oriented association founded in 1907, this party was originally 
motivated by the dislocation of the Eurasian (Indo) community in the social segregation 
of the colonial ~tructurc. Although Indo-Europeans were theoretically equal to 
Europeans of pure blood, there was in fact a clash of interest between the blijvers 
(permanent residents) and the trekkers (tempomry residents), and in some matters the 
blijvers stood closer to the Boemipoetera than to the trekkers (Furnivall 1944: 244). 
What made the Eurasian community become more radical in this decade was the 
increasingly exclusive European community coinciding with the economic threat from 
the growing number uf educated Boemipoetera who could be hired on a lower wage 
scale, which threatened the lndos' job opportunity in the labour market. Led by an Indo 
journalist, E. F. E. Douwcs Dekker, a great-nephew of Multatuli, the Eurasians sought 
to overcome these disadvantages by establishing an alliance between Eurasians and 
educated native indians to secure rights equal to those of the European population. In 
this regard they began to promote the so-called 'Indies nationalism', which idealised a 
common identity based on residence in the Indies rather than ctlmic or religious criteria. 
The cultural (religious) counterpart of this project was the Theosophical Society that 
had a tremendous influence on the circles of alienated East Indians (McVey 1965: 18; 
VanNie[ 1970: 63). 
Prominent figures of the native iutclligcntsia of the first generation who joined 
the JP were, among others, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi SuJjaningrat. Together 
with the JP leader, Douwcs Dekker, they became· known as the 'iiga serangkai' 
127 For a fragment of the biography ofSneevliet, sec Me 'Icy (1965: 13-22). 
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(triumvirate) wi1o were able to cr~ate the party as the most radical and politically well-
developed of the no!t-European organizations, at least in th~ first part of the second 
decade. Worried about its potential radicalism and its snowball effect on cxbting 
indigenous movements, Governor General Jdenburg banned the party and imprisoned 
the three leaders in 1913, despite support for them from the SOAP leaders who objected 
to the government's abrogation of their civil rights. This was also ironic since the pru:ty 
hardly had a gateway to the East Indies masses given the long standing native-Muslims 
distmst of the Eurasian community (McVey 1965: 18-9). Aficr that ill-fated party's 
dissolution in 1913, the stmggle of the party was continued under the old banner, 
Insu/inde, until its name changed to Nationaal lm/isclre Partij (NIP) in 1919 
(Pringgodigdo 1964: 22). 
While more progressive associations had been born, an older association 
inherited from the previous decade, the Budi Utomo (BU), represented itself as a 
moderate as5ociation. The radical group headed by Tjipto Mangunkusurno and Suwardi 
Surjaningrat dropped out of this association in 1909, believing that i: had been too 
conservative. Ironically, what had been too conservative for the radicals had been too 
radical for the greater bulk of the conservative Regents. They too th~!l gradually 
withdrew from the association and formed the Regentenboml (Regents Union) in 1913 
aimed at achieving greater local autonomy and greater recognition of their traditional 
position. Aficr the withdrawal of the two groups, the BU was dominated by the at/at-
oriented kaoemmoeda such as Radjiman Wediodiningrat (1879-1951) and Mas Ngabei 
Dwijosewojo (Van Niel 1970: 61-2). Under the leadership of this kind of intelligentsia, 
the BU strongly favoured a mission of achieving cultural progress within the framework 
of Javanese nationalism, and retaining Javanese mysticism as its main religious focus. 
Being a relatively 't:npopular' (elitist) organization, the BU remained the home for the 
most highly educated intelligentsia of the decade. It was no wonder that when the 
government-sponsored 'Peoples' Council' (Volksraad) appeared in 1918, the native 
representatives in the Council disproportionately came from this organization. In the 
first period ( 1918-1971 ), the BU took six scats from the ien of the native elected 
members of the Council plus one representative as an appointed member (Suradi 1997: 
15-6).128 
121 In comparison, the Sarekallslam only took one seat a. a elected member (Abdul Muis) and one scat as 
an appointed member (P~ Umar Said Tjokroaminoto). 
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A major shift in the historical development of the BU was undertaken by 
Satiman Wiljosandjojo.129 Having finished his study at the STOVIA in 1914, this son of 
a pious Muslim merchant from Sutakarta, could not feel comfortable with the 
narrowness of the BU that had failed to break through the bounds of Javanese 
ethnocentrism. This failure made people from different ethnic groups, such as the 
Sundancsc, feel strangers in the association. In 1914 they established their own union, 
namely 'Pagzifuball Paszmda11' (Sundancse Community), with its headquarters in 
Bandung and Tasikmalaya (Blumburger 1931, 38-9). Satiman also opposed heredity as 
the criterion for entry into the leadership group of Indies society and preferred to make 
educational qualifications the new touchstone. He therefore proposed the establishment 
of a 'pemoeda-pe/adjar' (student-youth) association from which young members of the 
BU could be recruited. The association was born in 1915 and named initially Bo11d va11 
Studeere11de11 Vall Java e11 Madoera (The Union of the Javanese and Madurese 
Students), 'Tri Koro Dharma' (Three Noble Goals). 130 Aile; its first Congress in 
Surakarta in 1918, it was renamed, using the Dutch phrase, 'Jo11g Java' (Javanese 
Youth), in order to better represent the membcrshifl of Sundanese and Madurcsc 
students. The basic aim of the association was to unite the native students at secondary 
schools and vocational institutions; to enlarge the general knowledge of members; and 
to awaken a sense of fraternity among all languages and cultures of the Indies 
(Pocrbopranoto 1981: 23-6). In fact, such a student union could not avoid various free 
riders. The association soon became a contested sphere of influence esp~cially between 
the conservative priyayi, the Christian missionaries and the propagators of Islamic 
rcformism-mode.nism, not to mention the sccularising missionaries of the ethical 
.'association' policy. 
The existence of the Jo11g Java mad<! students of the different ethnic and 
religious origins aware of their own distinct identities. The expression of such 
awareness was the rise of various student-youth associations along ethnic and religious 
lines such as Jo11g Sumazra11e11 Bo11d (1917), Jo11g Celebes (1918), Jo11g Mi11ahassa 
(1918}, Sekar Ru/am (1919}, and some others. The genesis of such student-youth 
associations added to the multifarious nature of the Indies proto-national consciousness. 
1
"-' D~m in 1892 hr. actually belonged lo the first generotion of d1e intelligentsia, but could be rightly said 
as tlte forerunner of the second generation reflected in his initiative to form the first East Indies youth 
orglt.Dization that came to be known as Jong Ja1•a. 
no The three were 'sakti' (inner strengd1), 'budlli' (noble charncter), and 'bakti' (devotion). 
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In parallel with the rise of the youth associations, the propagandists of 
Marxism/communism responded to the tension in the public sphere by setting up leftist 
associations. The spearhead of the genesis of such associations with a radical program 
was Snccvlict. Embarking on a campaign of socialism through his journalistic activities 
and his involvement in a railroad workers' union (VSTP), Snccvlict moved further by 
organising a meeting of sixty social democrats in Surabaya on 9 May 1914. This 
meeting resulted in the fommtion of the Jndische Sociaa/-Democratische Vcrccniging 
(ISDV, Indies Social Democratic Association) as the embryo of what later became the 
Indonesian Communist Party. In a further development, the ISDV developed 
revolutionary tendencies that caused its more moderate clements under their leader Ch. 
C. Cramer to split off to form the Indian Social Democratic Party as a branch of the 
SDAP in the Netherlands (Fumivall 1944: 248). 
Although members of the ISDV-as well as the lSD P-at least for some years 
to come were composed almost entirely of Netherlanders, the ideology of 
Marxism/Leninism had landed in the East Indies, influencing public discourses and 
inducing the emergence of a group of the native socialist/communist intelligentsia. 
Subsequently, the first East Indies socialist group, 'Sama Rata Hindia Bcrgcrak' (The 
Indies on the March toward Equality) was founded in Surabaya in 1917 under the 
initiative of Adolf Baars. The association had only 120 members and after about a year 
it quietly expired (McVey 1965: 17-8). The collapse of this first Indies socialist group 
by no means terminated the influence of ISDV -sponsored communism. The most 
powertid weapon developed by the ISDV at the time was the so-called 'bloc within' 
strategy, whereby the communist cadres entered a particular organization or mass 
movement and worked to seize control of it from within (McVey 1965: 21-2). 
The establishment of leftist associations in the East Indies tempted other 
political groups in the Netherlands to do the same thing. The appearance of the ISDV 
was soon matched by the installation of the Neclcrlandsch Indische Vrijzirmige Bond, 
(Liberal Union, NIVB) in late 1916, corresponding to the moderate Liberals of the 
Netherlands, and aiming to unite moderate progressives of all races. Next, in opposition 
to the operation of these secular parties in the East Indies, the Christelijke Etlrische 
Partij (Christian Ethical Party, CEP) and the Jndische Katholieke Partij {Indian Roman 
Catholic P211y, IKP) were respectively formed in 1917 and 1918, rcprcscn·,ing the two 
main branches of the Dutch Clerical Party. The aim of the CEP and the IKP was to 
promote a wider autonomy of the East Indies with a strong 'association' with the 
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Netherlands and to make Christianity the ideological basis of the state. In addition to 
these parties, the Politick Economische Bond (Political Economy Bond, PEB) was 
lot.iled in I 0 1 C) corresponding to the Vrijheidsbond in the Netherlands. Having common 
ground •·,1:;. ~ •• e CEP and the IKP in terms of promoting the autonomy of the Indies 
under the association policy, the PEB strongly criticised what they perceived as the 
over-progressive tendency of the Ethical policy (Pringgodigdo 1964: 25-6; Fumivall 
1944: 248). All these organizations recruited a mixed membership composed of blijvers, 
trekkers, foreign orientals, and members of the East Indies elite alike.tJt 
However, the most important development in the awakening of the native proto-
national consciousness was the rise of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) in 1912. It was 
founded by H. Samanhudi (1880 (?]-1856), a local batik trader with a Second Class 
Native School background, who had the assistance of Tirto Adhi Surjo in formulating 
its statutes. Born out of the Sarckat Dagang Islam (SDI) which rose in Surakarta in 
191 I, this union initially resembled the former Bogor-based SDI, in its aim to defend 
the interest of local Muslim merchants, especially in facing Chinese competitors in the 
batik industry of central Java. 
The emergence of the SI (SDI) was a watershed in the development of the idea 
oflslamic nationhood as a form of proto-nationalism. For the first time the word 'Islam' 
was explicitly used as the name of association, which indicates that Islam had now been 
activated as the basis of a collective identity and as an ideology for the (proto) 
nationalist movements. Coming from the nucleus of the Kaoem Mardika this union 
represented the expansion of the kemacfjoean movement away from the milieu of the 
priyayi. Its emergence around the royal capital of Surakarta signified the changing 
location of Islamic movements from countryside to urban areas. Its leadership in the 
hand of traders and then intelligentsia reflected the transformation of Islamic political 
leadership from charismatic ulama to non-ulama (Kuntowidjojo 2001: 9). 
Ill Tite East Indies counterparts of Netherlands associations that promoted Christianity in li11~ with the 
'association' policy for the Indies po!ity emerged earlier among indigenous Cbristitm communities. One 
example was the so-called 'Wilhelmina' associalion for the 'A11ak-anak Ambon-Mc11ado' (the Amhonese 
and Menadonese). Established in 1908 (and officially recognised in 1912), this nssociation emerged 
nround the mililary setllement in Magelang (Centrnl Jnvn)-for ~uny Ambonese and Menadoncse were 
recruited ns mililllry pcr>onnel-led by J.P •. Risakotla. A 1imilar project wns continued with tl1c 
eslablislunent of the 'Ambonsch Studicfo:ufs' (Scholmhip funds for tl1e Am'>onese) in 1909 (officially 
recognised in t911); the Ambo11's Bond (The Union of tl1e Ambonese) for Ambonese government 
employees in Amboina in 1911; tl1e 'Rulam Minallasa' (est. 1912) and the 'Mcna Murla' (est. 1913) 
respectively for the Christian-Minahnsanese nnd Ambonese in Scmnrnng (Biumburger 1931: 46-7, 
Pringgodigdo 1964: 21). As;ociations of this kind were by nnd large oriented to improving tl1e progress 
and welfare of the respective communities within ll1e framework of ellmo-retigious identity with o. strong 
'association' with the Netltcrlands. 
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The resurrection of this native urban commercial class soon attracted many 
alienated progressive intelligentsia of the first generation. Thus, prominent radical 
figures such as Suwardi SUijaningrat,132 along with other new progressive activists, like 
Abdul Muis, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, and R.M. SUijopranoto (a younger brother of 
Suwardi SUijaningrat) soon joined the Sl. For some progressive figures of the 
intelligentsia who were critical of the old aristocracy and were unwilling to work with 
the colonial government, the genesis of socio-political consciousness within the Kaoem 
Mardika of the Muslim community provided a new social ground for implanting new 
ideologies and historical actions. As George Rude has argued, insofar as any social 
movement must have an ideology for collective mobilisation, this ideology can only be 
effectively absorbed if it is planted in ground that has already been well prepared (Rude 
1970: 28-30). A bewildering array of native insurrections under the banner of Islam in 
the previous centuries, followed by the growing socio-political consciousness within 
new Islamic clubs and associations, provided fertile soil for cultivating a new ideology 
needed to mobilise proto-nationalist movements. For these reasons, the formation ofthe 
SI was so promising for them. 
Moreover, the fact that Surnkarta with its strong tics to traditional Javanese life 
was the scene of increased Christian missionary activities, meant that strict Muslims felt 
drawn towards the union as a medium for an Islamic counteraction. The lesser priyayi 
who tended to oppose the conservatism of the Regents and the princely regime in 
Surakarta also found a medium for sclf-actualisation in the Sl. As well, mar.y 
tradt:,,:.nalists who were disappointed with the program of Westcmisation elaborated by 
the yuung intelligentsia of the BU turned to SI as a new vehicle for their aims (Van Niel 
1970: 91; McVey 1965: 10-1). 
In the face of such a rapid development and heterogeneous membership, the Sl 
was soon reorganized and its leadership was gradually transferred from batik traders to 
the wc!:tcm educated intelligentsia. Thus, after 1914, the role of Samanhudi was 
eclipsed and he was replaced by Tjokroaminoto, supported by several other members of 
the intelligentsia. In addition to· Tjokroaminoto, other intellectuals who became 
prominent leaders of the SI in its formative phase (1912-6) were R. Gunawan (a 
graduate of the OS VIA who left a government post to t>ecome a journalist), Abdul Muis 
(a former student of the STOVIA who left a government post to become a journalist), 
Ill Suwardijoined tho SI of the Bandung branch in 19t2. Afier t913, however, he became more active in 
tl1c lndisclle Parti} (Dcwantara [a nickname ofSuwardi]l952: 31). 
Chapter 2 • 771'! Formation of the lnlclllgcntsla 137 
R.M. Smjopranoto (a graduate of the OSVIA and the Lmrdbomvscltoo/ who Jell his post 
at the court of Paku Alam and his position in a private sugar plantation to become a 
labour activist), R. Hasan Djajadiningrat (a graduate of the HBS who preferred to be a 
social worker), and Agus Salim (a graduate of the HBS who Jell his post in the 
government to become an educator). 
Concerning the education and religious background of these SI leaders, Van Neil 
concluded that among early leaders of the SJ (inr": .':'lg the aforementioned 
individuals}, 'almost none of them belonged to the best cduc •• ..<. segment of indonesian 
society,' and 'none was descended from active sarrtri, or religious, families' (Van Nicl 
1970: 113). In fact, the HBS, the OSVIA, the STOVIA and the Larulbouwsc/rool were 
the best educational institutions available in the NEI up to the end of the 1910s. It has 
already been mentioned that Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim came from sarrtri families 
(sec footnote 46 above). In addition, Abdul Muis' family was in fact closely related to 
Salim's and to Achmad Khatib as well (Noer 1980: 122). Leaders from 11/ama 
background3 such as M.H Abdulpatah, A. Achmad Sadjeli, Said Hasan bin Semit, K. H. 
Achmad Dachlan, H. Achmad Hasan Zaeni certainly came from active sarrtri 
families.:ll The truth is, only a very H·r,;,,.! segment of the best educated Indies people 
joined the Sl, since the greater part of ih~ intelligentsia had been secularised. Members 
of this segment were mostly trom sarrtri families. 
Under the leadership of the intelligentsia, the early SJ emphasis on the 
empowerment of Muslim merchants was shilled towards a general advocacy for the 
economic and socio-political rights of the native common people in the framework of a 
loosely organized social movement. This shill was signalled by Tjokroaminoto's 
statement on 26 July 1915 that 'de Islam is de godsdierrst varr de arnrerr err de 
verdrukten' (Islam is the religion of the poor and the oppressed). Inspired by this 
statement, the SJ began to adopt a populist ideology leading to a rapid increase of its 
membership (Koentowidjojo 2001: 10). By 1919, SJ claimed two million members 
across the islands, 134 and had the biggest membership of all associations formed during 
this period. 
The sphere of influence of SJ began to embrace a wider public of the masses as a 
result of the growing social· disruptions in the countryside. During the decades of war, 
133 For a dclaitcd dcscriplion of tl1e socio-cducalionat background of early leaders of lhe Sl, see Korver 
\f985: 231-65). 
" Ricklefs disputes the figure claiming it 01:11 the true number probably did not exceed half a million 
(Ricklefs 1993: 166). 
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rapid social changes, and techno-economical developments, the deepening penetration 
of the money economy further broke down village life and the sense of security, 
fOllowed by the failure of the traditional ruling cla.1s to offer adequate leadership for the 
people (McVey 1965: 8-9). In such critical conditions, Islam could fill the gap between 
the old ways and the new. In Fred R. von der Mehden's words (1963: 9): 'It presented a 
recognizable entity which many felt could reunify the fractionalized social order.' For 
most of these deprived people, their new awareness of Islam probably had little to do 
with schools of Muslim thought or the new Islamic reformist-modernist ideology. The 
main attraction of Islam for them seemed to come from their collective memory of 
Islamic insurrections, either in the struggle against the Hindu caste system centuries 
before or against the colonial caste system more recently (Wertheim 1956: 205). 
To some extent, however, reformist-modernist values had contributed to the 
Indies-wide SI membership and its subsequent awakening of proto-national 
consciousness. The reformist and modernist emphasis on individualism and rationalism 
in the hierarchical, feudal, parochial, and foreign-dominated society of the East Indies 
was conducive for creating a new fantasy of social incorporation. As has been well 
argued by von der Mehdcn (1963: 17): ' ... the individual identification with national 
values first necessitates the breakdown of the particularist, feudal, and ofien hierarchical 
social order of the village and region.' The traditional hierarchical order was further 
weakened by the reformist-modernist insistence on the equality of man. The fact that 
the leadership of Sarekat Islam was composed primarily of people with modernist 
learning indicates the compatibility of refom1ist-modemist values with the spirit of a 
proto-national consciousness. 
With its ability to touch the plurality of human conditions, the SI presence 
represented a multilingual socio-political aspiration. It soon became the first native 
association with Indies-wide scope operating under a general nationalist ideology witll a 
religious tinge (Wertheim 1985: 85). Tjokroaminoto, in his speech before the Sl 
National Congress in Bandung (June 17, 1916), stated: 'We love o:.tr nation and by the 
strength of our religion {Islam) we must struggle to unite all or at least the majority of 
our people' (TjQkroaminoto 1981: 14). The word 'Islam' in the name of the Union was 
tile signifier of nativeness, as was the case with the Christianity of the Dutch arad 
Confucianism of the Chinese (Shiraishi 1990: 43).135 A~ McVey writes (1965: 10): 'In 
"'Agus Salim supported this argument by saying tlmt tlae terms 'inlander' or 'Boemipoetera' used in 
fonn:allanguage of the time were commonly translated as 'orang Se/am' (Muslim) in the informal daily 
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the absence of the concept of an Indonesian nation-and this idea was generally lacking 
among the peoples of the archipelago at the time, Islam appeared to be the most likely 
source of unity against foreign rule' (McVey 1965: 10). It was not only because the 
majority of the East Indies population were Muslim, but also the fact that Islam in the 
NEI had long been the rallying cry for native resistances. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the SI cxhibi!~d its own internal magnetism, the 
explosive development of the Union was made possible by the political opportunity 
structure of that time. The political backing for the survival of this Union came from 
both traditional and colonial authorities. The SI gained a blessing from the royal palace 
of Surakarta afier Prince Hangabchi was appointed an adviser to the Union 
(Koentowidjojo 2001: 9). Meanwhile, unlike the great majority of the European 
residents in the NEI who perceived the SJ phenomenon as a disruptive force, Governor 
General ldenburg saw it as representing the popular awakening that was a goal of the 
Ethical Policy. 'We,' he said, 'must therefore rejoice over it, even if we find this 
somewhat difficult. We wanted this-at least we said we did-and have encouraged it 
through our education' (McVey 1965: 12). He was convinced that his optimism was 
justified by the fact that the Sl in its early formative stage proclaimed its loyalty 
unconditionally to the Dutch regime. Tjokroaminoto, in his speech before the Sl 
congress in Surakarta in 1913, stated that the SJ 'is not political party, and not a party 
that desires a revolution' (Korver 1985: 56). 
In the matter of the Governor General's positive response towards the Union, a 
Dutch rarlical, Mr. Fromberg. depicted it as comparable with the behaviour of a well-
known figure in Alphonse Daudet's novel, Tartari11 de Tarasco11 (Wertheim 1995: 84). 
He then described it as follows: 
Tartarin returned from North Africa to his native village Tarascon in Provence, 
and his co-villagers gaped at him: behind him a camel was strolling, led by 
Tartarin with a rein. To anyone who asked: 'Is this camel yours?', he replied 
with pride: 'Yes, it is my camel. ' But when afier a while the camel ran wild and 
started to commit mischief by damaging cornfields, and villagers again asked: 
'Tartarill, is this your camel?', he threw stones at the animal, and retorted: 'Oil 
110, 110t at all!' 
Tartarin's behaviour in this story resembled ldenburg's treatment of the St. He proudly 
became a patron of the Sl in its early days. Nevertheless as soon as the movement began 
language of the East Indians. Other groups ofthe non-Muslim had their own nicknames such as lnlandse 
Cilristenen (Salim 1952: 15). 
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to go out of control, the Dutch officials began to tranFiate SI as 'Salah Jdcnb11rg' 
(Idenburg's Mistake). 
SI members began to exhibit their radical tendencies during the second half of 
the decade. They mobiliGcd labour strikes and sporadic attacks against local authorities 
(pangrch pradja). Aller 1916, the Sl referred to its annual meeting as a 'National 
Congress'. According to Tjokroaminoto, 'this was intended to awaken people's 
consciousness to move to the level of 'natie' (nation), which could be gradually 
achieved through the struggle for demanding self administration or at least the right to 
express their voices in political matters' (Noer 1980: 126). Yet, it was not until 1924 
that the Sl moved from the politics of cooperation towards non-cooperation signalled by 
its withdrawal from the Vo/ksraad. 
The escalation of SI radicalism was not merely a response to colonial-cum-
capitalist exploitation. It was also affected by the growing tension in the public spherfl 
resulting from both internal and external competitive struggles. With its massive 
influence, the SI became an 'island of temptation' for political opportunists. Among 
others, it was the ISDV leaders who quickly saw it as a potential seedbed for breeding 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. The SI branches in volatile cities (with rapid url··anization 
and proletarianisation) such as Scmarang, Jakarta, Surakarta, and Surabaya were soon 
infiltrated by the 'bloc within' strategy. Young leaders of the SI branches such as 
Semaun and Darsono (Semarang), Alimin and Muso (Batavia), and H. Misbach (Solo) 
were soon attracted to the teaching of communism. The Semarang br.iileh was the most 
highly infiltrated, causing Semaun and Darsono to join the ISDV in 1917. Under the 
influence of Marxiom-communism, young radicals began to criticise the cooperative 
politics of the SI and called on tlie leaders to take a more radical line. Their criticism 
provoked several reactions. First, the SI responded to the critics by developing more 
radical programs. Second, realising the intrusion of the 'other' into the Union, other SI 
leaders such as Agus Salim and Abdul Muis b~gan to activate Islam as a counter-
ideology and a sole identity of the Union. 
The consolidation of an Islamic identity for SI was reinf0rced by conflicting 
relationships with members of other associations. The difference in cultural streams and 
interests ::nd the competition to recruit new members ofien led to a battle of discourse in 
the public sphere. To give a few examples: a leader of the BU, Radjiman 
Wediodiningrat, writing in De Jndische Gids (1914: 65-6) doubted the efficacy of 
religion as the cohesive force for a mass movement. He predicted that the SI 'is only a 
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temporary movrmcnt of hadji, santri, and stupid people'. As Islam was identified as the 
collective identity of the Sl, a large segment of SI members reacted to such a negative 
definition of Islam. Thus, when the Surakarta-bascd Newspaper Djawi Hisworo 
('Javanese of the King') ran articles by Martodharsono and Djojodikoro 
(9&11/0111918) depicting the Prophet Muhammad as a drunkard and opium smoker, the 
· SI quickly reacted by setting up the so-called Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad (Anny 
of the Vencmted Prophet Muhammad). Following this over-reaction, proponent~ of the 
newspaper and Javanese cthno-nationalism accused the SI of politicising religion and 
soon established the so-called Comite voor het Javaansche Natiollalisme.(Committcc 
for Javanese Nationalism), which published a pamphlet condemning Islamic fanaticism. 
Muis rejected this label and suggested that the SJ remained consistent to its character as 
a 'nationalistisch /slamistisch' (nationalist Islamic) organization (Ricklefs 1993: 176: 
Nocr 1980: 143-4). 
A literary theorist, Diane Macdonell, has argued (1995: 43): 'Discourses arc not 
at all peaceful; they dcvclojJ out of clashes with one another.' As a defence ?.gainst 
discourse. of 'Others', especially when members of a particular group arc conscious of 
being defined in a negative way, a collective identity may find its galvanising moment 
through the mobilisation of the resources of history and culture. In this way, to borrow 
Stuart Hall's phrase (1997: 4}, 'Identities arc constructed within, not outside, discourse, 
we need to understand them as produced it. specific historical and institutional sites 
within specific discursive fonnations a~~. practices by specific enunciative strategies.' 
In other words, the tendency of radicalism or fanaticism as the cognitive structure of a 
particular social movement seems to be the product of a series of social encounters, 
within a movement, between movements, and even betwc~n a movemen: .• td its 
established opponents. Once such a cognitive structure emerges in the public sphere, 
this may provide a new model and open up a new space for later social mowments in 
different socio-historical contexts. Thus, the growing radicalism of the SI became a 
springboard for the succeeding East Indies intellectual movements. 
2.6.2 The Genesis ofthe Proto-Nationalist Press and Literary Works 
The growth of such a variety of associations and the increasing expression of a 
proto-national consciousness in .tum changed the character of the pa'CSS as another 
domain of the public sphere. The heightening of native awareness had boosted the 
development ofthe native-run vernacular press and conden~ned the non-native press to ~ 
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difficult situation. "Wltile the Chinese press could still survive by relying on the 
peranakan Chinese readership, the Eurasian-editrd and Dutch-owned Malay 
newspapers became gradually alienated from the public, or otherwise had to readjust 
their r~porting policies and style in order to deal bcllcr with the changing mood of the 
public sphere. Yet, this strategy could not last indefinitely. Responding to the new 
awareness of their nat:ve readers, many vernacular presses run by these agencies had to 
admit that things were fast changing and were forced to close. Early in the decade 
(October 1911) the Se/on:;.>rct Melajoe, one of the most popul~r papers of the 19th 
century, stopped publication. Next, more of the smaller Eurasian papers disappeared and 
by the end of 1913 even the once popular and rather pro-native papers such as Tamau 
Sari ·md the Pcmbrilc Bctawi were experiencing o.lifficultics because they could not 
compete with the new native-run newspapers. In the meantime, some Chinese 
publishers, realising the change of socio-politi~al mood in the p1:.ulic sphere, began to 
sell off their prcss~s and printing equipment. As the non-native press was gradually 
eclipsed, the native-run newspapers and pcriodi~als began to mushroom {Adam 1995: 
17S·6). 
In the midst of the decline of the non-native vernacular presses, the colonial 
government was able to introduce another ki• :d of government-sponsored publication by 
establishing a 'book publishing house', which would have a significant impact on the 
development of 'people of leiters' (literati) in la!cr East Indies history. In 1908 the 
government appointed a commission to advise on the provision of reading matter for 
'native and native schools'. This project, according to Maier, was part of the relentless 
effort by the colonial state to reinforce 'correct' high Malay by separating it from the 
'heteroglossia' of pidgin Malay. In addition, this policy can also be interpreted as the 
Dutch colonia! attempt to lay dow·,, slate-sponsored literary ethics, aesthetics and 
politics {Sen and Hill 2000: 22). In 1911 the commission submitted its report followed 
by some initial publication:. under its auspices including versions of local stories and 
legends, and translations from European literature such classics as The Three 
Musketeers and The Count of Monte Cristo {Johns 1979: 32). In 1917 the publishing 
housr under th~ auspices of this commission was named 'Balai Pus taka' {BP, the Hall 
of Good Reading). 
Whatever th~ hidden agenda of the commission, the existence of the BP was 
responsible for the provision of inexpensive reading materials for the public throughout 
the 1\rchipclago. Moreover, in the view of the literary critic, A Teeuw, the coming into 
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being of the modem Indon~s:l!n liovel, and its popularity, was largely made possible 
through the existence of Balai Pus taka. Even most of the nationalist-oriented writers in 
the following dr.r.ade were, surprisingly, former employees, for longer or shorter 
periods, of the BP, or at least had some of their works published there. The literature of 
the BP in early years of its establishment remained 'apolitical' in character. This was in 
the sense that the prominence of contemporary political issues had not yet found 
expression on a large scale in BP publications, due to the lack of facilities or the strong 
preventive and repressive measures of the Govcm:nent (Tccuw 1986: 14-5). The 
significance of the government-sponsored (book) publishing house at this juncture was 
in its function as the training ground for members of the intelligentsia to mimic western 
literary activism. This process of mimicry paved the road for the incorporation or" the 
East Indies intelligentsia into the universal spirit of the 'Respublica /itteraria' (Republic 
of Letters). 
While BP literature remained prcdominant:y apolitical, a genre of political 
literature found its medium of expression in vernacular papers and periodicals in the 
form of serialiscd literature. Examples of the genre of political novel published in the 
decade were Mas Marco Kartodikromo's Student Hidjo (Hidjo, a student) and Scmaun's 
Hikajat Kadirocn (Story of Kadiroen). While the former was published in the 
Semarang-based Sinar lfindia in 1918, the latter was published in the same paper in 
1920. Student Hidjo is basically the story of a native East Indian c,verseas student in the 
Netherlands who becomes involved in a love affair with a Dutch girl. Finally, however, 
he detaches himself in an honourable manner and returns to the East Indies where he 
marries a native East Indies girl. The Hikajat Kadiroen-written during the author's 
stay in jail on account of a 'presdelict' (offence against the press) in 1919-is about a 
brilliant young intellectual (Kadiroen) who e1n1s rapid promotion in the native colonial 
administration. N~vertheless, because of his frustration in realising the gap between his 
ideals and the existing discrimination and the misery of the ordinary people (ra 'j,;t) he 
turns to communism. The release of these two serials in the newspaper reflects the 
predominant role ofthe vernacular press in championing the language of nationalism. 
The changes in the media-sphere were not only changes in shilling media 
ownership and journalistic activities from non-native to na,tive_ agencies but also 
changes in the character and content of material published. Differing somewhat from 
previous decades when the press had been mostly run as a private business, the new 
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native vernacular presses were now mostly nm as the mouthpiece or organ of particular 
associations.136 
Notwithstanding that the major charactelistic of the vernacular press in this 
decade was as the mouthpiece of particular associations, most of the presses had a 
common denominator in setting a new discourse and agenda for the public; that is in 
emphasising issues affecting the gen~ral welfare of the little people and in pioneering 
the awareness of the need for 'national unity' of the indigenous people under Dutch 
rule. While the interests of association~ in this period we.re still focused within racial, 
ethno-religious or ideological boundaries, the press had initiated the construction of 
what later became a 'historical bloc' in Gramsci's sensc.137 
With the expansion of the public sphere (the proto-nationalist associations and 
the press) which transcended the spatial boundary of the priyayi and even the 
communities of the intelligentsia, organic intellectuals gained a mediating realm from 
which to spread their ideas. following in the footsteps of the 'clerical-intelligentsia' 
(ulama-brtclek), progrc!:sive organic intellectuals of the first generation of the 
intelligentsia began to make contact with the masses. The masses in this case may be 
described as the collectivity of cultural solidarity groupings in Gccrtz's sense (1960), 
the 'class' in the Marxist-Leninist's sense (1977) or the 'youth' in Ortega y Gasset'& 
tem1s.138 
Thus, by the end of the 191 Os intellectuals of the first generation of the 
intelligentsia had succeeded in communicating with the masses. Meanwhile, the 
apdicnce of intellectuals of the second generation was still restricted to their fellow 
students. The political function of the second generation of the intelligentsia at this stage 
was to be the main political public for the first generation. In other words, the earliest 
generation of the intelligentsia provided a role (intellectual) model for later generations 
ofthe intelligentsia. 
136 Thus, newspopers and periodicals such as Boetli Oetomu ( 1910-1913) ond Djawi Hisll'oro (1906-1919, 
it became the mouthpiece ofth~' Budi Utomo in the second decade of the century were the mouthpiece of 
the Dudi Utomo; a/-Munir (1911-1913) and a/-Akllbar (1913-1914) were those ofthelslamie retbrmist-
modemists; Octacsan Mc/ajoc (1911-1926), Socloc/r Mclajac (1913-?) and Soeara Mclajoc (1913-?) 
were d1ose of the odor-oriented Kaacm mocda; Saratomo (1912-1915), the Octocsan /linda (1912-1923), 
d1e Koocm mocda (1912-1942) the Him/io Sarikot (1913-1914), the Pantjaran Warta (1907-1917, it 
became the moud1piece of the Sl after 1913), and the Sinor Djall'a (1913-1924) and ai-ls/am (1916-?) 
were those of the Sl; De Express (1912-?) nnd 1ja/rala Timocr (1908-1908) were d10sc of the lndisc/rc 
Partij (Indies Party); Soeara Mcrdiko (1917-?) and S ·.·< RaJat (1918-~) were d1osc of the ISDV and 
its socialist offshoots. 
137 See next chapter. 
m For Ortega, the objec: :'If his intellectual message \\·~: 'youtb', whom he saw as the educated elite 
among d1c upper and middk dass (Eyem10n 199·1: 51-7.). 
Chapter 2 ·11tc Formation of the lntclllgclltsla 145 
2.1 Conclusion 
So many historical lessons can be learned from the drama of East Indies life 
between the late 191h century and the first two decades of the 201h century. Rewinding 
the 'film' of critical events in this period, we can sec the colourful nnd contradictory 
character of human beings. The 'civilised' colonial masters could not gain ground 
without civilising the colonised people; discriminatory policies spawned reactions 
which returned to haunt them; oppressors could at the same time become protectors; 
'enemies' might alr.o function as sources of inspiration. Hegemonic power created 
countcr-hegemoay. There was no concept of self and individual identity without the 
presence of >ib'llificant others; and in the encounter with others identities were ~ubjcctcd 
to radical changes and transformation. 
Viewed in ~low motion, it is clear that the main protagonist of this historical 
drama was 1hc intelligentsia and 'clerical-intelligentsia'. The form of social learning and 
symbolic practices in 1he public sphere served as a social setting in which the 
intelligentsia and 'clerical-intelligentsia' organised and reorganised the symbolic 
universe and cognitive structures in their struggle for historicity. 
With the improvement of their cultural capital, changing economic relations, 
and the c!:Jnccs made possible by the political opportunity structure, protagonists of 
kemadjoean were able to create their own collective identities and communities, and 
distance themselves from the old aristo~racy. In the formativ~ phase they began to 
deconstruct the 'nobility b) birth' (bangsawan uesoel) by constructing the 'nobility by 
intellect' (bangsawan pikiran) along with the effort to create a distinct community for 
the latter that came :o be known ru: !he lra'-cm moedo. in the process of this construction 
they began to fortu the public sphere under tim il'''ronagc of the old aristocrats. Until the 
first decade of the 201h century, this public '; •• cr~ remained confined to circler. · f the 
priyayi and members of the 111tclligentsia communit)'. The public, in the wider sense of 
the mas~ 
indiffere. 
nained, in the eyes of the new intelligentsia, an anonymous, faceless, and 
;oarty. 
In entering tltc 1910s, the genesis of an Islamic kaoem moeda and the rise of the 
kaoem nmrdika were responsible for the expansion of '.he public :.pherc to reach a wider 
constituency. About the same time, the emergence of a youol,llCr generation of the 
intelligentsia gave rise to the new intelligentsia's desire to dissociate itsei: from the 
nobility (bangsawan) by inventing new codes namely, 'educated community' (kaoem 
terpelar['ar) or 'student-youth community'(pemoeda-peladjar) or 'jong' (youth). These 
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developments led to the transformation of the public sphere, moving away from the 
orbit ofthe old aristocracy. 
In their encounter with the wider public of the voi~·:lcss, uneducated and 
alienated masses, the intelligentsia found themselves as a distinct social group which 
was inspired to serve the 'nation'-howevcr they conceived of this term. Such a missio11 
sacn!e was directed to the improvement of general welfare, to provide a political 
education, and to set moral standards against the alien established authority. In their 
interaction with the public, the abstract notion of kemadjoea11 was gradually 
transformed into a spirit of proto-nationalism. At this juncture, it probably makes sense 
to delineate the Indies intelligentsia in terms ofwlut Karl Mannheim (following Alfred 
Weller) called the 'freisclnvebellde illtc/ligclltz ·(free-floating intelligentsia). That is the 
social groups in every socic:y whose special task is to provid~ an interpretation of the 
world for that society (Mannhcim 1936: I 0). Thus, towards the end of the second 
decade of the 20th century, organic intellectuals of the first generation of intelligentsia 
had paved the way for a particular role of the intellectual as public educator. 
In fact, though united under a common obsession with kemadjoea11, members of 
the kaoem moeda varied in terms of their cultural and economic underpinnings for 
implementing this path of progress. Thus. ~"ere emerged secular-oriented kaoemmoeda, 
adat-oricntcd kaoem moeda, and Islamic-oriented kaoem moeda, which contributed to 
the polyphony of the Indies public sphere. Such a polyphony became more noisy as the 
competitive ideological struggle in the Netherlands was extended to the East Indies 
public sphere along with the growing Indies Chinese determination for sclf.:!Sscrtion, 
the intensification of religious revivalism and missionary activity, the introduction of 
new forms of religious spiritualism, and the growing discontent ofthc Indies Eurasians. 
This polyvalence of the public sphere in tum contributed to the growth of proto-
national consciousness. At the same time, the intensifying clash of discourses stimulated 
the formation of '.listinct collective identities. Thus there emerged the prototype of 
Indies nationalism, nationalism based on Indies-Netherlands association, ethnic 
(Jav:mcse) nationalism, and Islamic mlionalism, with the last, at this stage, appearing to 
be the most influential. 
Despite the heterogeneity and conflicts, however, there was some common 
ground and unifying factors. There were at least two factorn that can be identified. First 
was the presence of a common denominator in the public agenda centered on the issue 
of kemadjoea11, general welfare and the importance of national unity set up by the 
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discourses of the presses. Second was the existence of multiple affiliations (overlapping 
memberships) which functioned as b1idges between associations. 
As mot: proto-nationalist movements of the time did not begin as structured 
political parties but rather as loosely organized social movements, it was quite common 
for individuals to hold membership in two or more associations at once. Thus, 
individuals like Suwardi Surjaningrat became a member of the BU, and then the SI and 
the IP. Achmad Dachlan was a member of the BU, Djami'at Chair, the Sl and 
Mulrammadiyalr. A gus Salim firstly became a member of both the NIVB and the ISDP 
and then almost immediately joined also the Sl and Mulrammadiyalr. Dwijosewojo was 
a leader of the BU as well as a strong supporter of the Mulwmmad(valr. Semaun was 
both a member of the Sl and the ISDV. 
Through their multiple affiliations, activists of the proto-nationalist movements 
created bridges between associations, making it easier for infonnation, agendas and 
resources to circulate. This seems to have facilitated the constitution of strategic 
alliances such as the so-called 'Radical Conccntralic' (Radical Concentration) in the 
government-sponsored 'Peoples' Council' (Volksraad) in 1918. This bloc was 
composed of the European socialist representatives (lSDP), lnsulindc (the successor to 
the IP), SI and BU, and wa3 oriented to achieve further concessions on the road to self-
government and a liberalizing of the administrative process of the East Indies. This 
potential fusion of diverse subject positions of the intelligentsia provided a catalyst for 
the creation ofthe 'historical bloc' in the next decades. 
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MAKING INTELLECTUAL POLITICAL TRADITIONS 
For us, Indonesia expresses a political objective, 
as It signifies lwpcs for a father/ant/ in the fuh~re, 
anrl to make it come tnte every Indonesian will struggle 
with all their effort and ability. 
Mo1omunad Halla (1928)1 
The result of this treacherous (Dutch) policy has bce11 a kim/ of thinking widt•sprc:ad among us, 
~ namely, that itr our cozmtry there arc: different groupings . 
... Titus we ha\'C created mutually cxc/usil'C types. YOu could only be one or the other, 
not be a Muslim and [yet] love your country [etc.] ... 
But actually we arc all of us nationalists and patriots, and we all of us arc also Muslims/ 
Masjumi Circular (1944)2 
From the second decade of the 20111 century, the intelligentsia had found the means to 
communicate with the masses. Recognising the misery of the masses, the high-sounding 
ideas of kcmadjocan inherited from previous decades lost their magnetism. In the face 
of increasing social dislocation it became important to translate ideologies into practical 
programs of action and to resist colonialism. 
The deterioration of the post-war Indies economy ami the great economic 
depression of the 1930s provic!ed a fertile soil for rampant radicalism. In the growing 
spirit of political resistance, many f01mer proto-nationalist associations abandoned their 
socio-cultural aims and bec1.:r.• more concerned with the adoption and formulation of 
political-ideologies. In response to contesting political ideologies, the less-structured 
proto-nationalist social movements' of the early two decades of the 20111 century began 
to be transformed into structured 'political patties'. 
As political radicalism spread, the 'Ethical Policy' became a faltering creed. In 
the first decade of the 20'" century, members of the Etl:ici such as Snouck Hurgronje 
Fublicly vowed: 'We cannot rest content with measures which serve to strengthen our 
rule by preventing discontent and opposition. Our goal is not the quiet, formerly so 
valued, but progress.'3 In the early 1920s, however, mainstream Dutch public opinion 
regarded progressive Indies intellectuals as disturbers of colonial public order. To curb 
1 Quoted fromHalta (1998: IS). 
'Quoted from H. Benda (1958: 176). Rcfercn<:: to tl1e 'treacherous (Dutch) polk;·' •;eem5 nimcd nt the 
'association' policy. For discussion oflhe 'association' policy, see chapter 2. 
'Quoted in Fumivall (195G: 465). 
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this potential public disobedience, the regime of ntst en orcle (tranquillity and order) 
was even more strongly er.forced by the colonial administrators. Rather than 
encouraging the rule of Jaw, mst en orde was a euphemism for the deployment of a 
repressive colonial state apparatus that negated the idea of due legal process. 
By the end of the World War I, there had been indications that the social-
democratic revolution in Germany would overflow into the Netherlands. With the 
strong possibility of the Dutch Social Democrats coming to power and forming 
government in The Netherlands, the so-called 'Radical Concentration' in the Indies 
Vo/ksraad (People's Council) demanded thai the government reform the fundamental 
principles and structure of the Council and the Indies administration in order to deal 
better with the interests of the East Indies people.• In response, Governor-General Van 
Limburg Stirum (1916-1921), who probably knew that the status qu~ in the homeland 
was safe, promised to set up a Reform Commission to investigate possible reform in 
those fields within the existing political structure. In fact, because of severe criticism 
from the European community in the NEI, as well as from politicians in the Netherlands 
who described the Commission as an irresponsible concession to the fear of revolution, 
the Reform investigation failed to be implemented (Ricklefs 1993: 173-4; Van Niel 
1970: 184-85). 
These so-called 'broken promises' of Van Limbung Stirum seemed to represent 
the end of support from sympathetic ethical policy makers. This was confirmed in 1918 
and 1919 when the colonial government began to rcpt~;;s all local political activism 
fearing radical movements were getting out of control.5 
With the deterioration of the post-war Indies economy, the succeeding two 
Governors General, Dirk Fock (1921-1926) and Simon de Gracff(l926-1931), found a 
rationale for further strengthening the repressive colonial regime. The 1922 
const!Mional reforms failed to make any significant chan<. s either in the Volksraad or 
in the structure of udministra<ion. In 1925 the Statr.s-Gcncral rejected the clause 
' In fac4 thi• socialist political manoeuvre in the Nctltcrlands failed and the status quo was maintained. 
' Fearing the communist orientation of tlte ISDV with its ability to gather at least 3000 soldiers and 
sai1ors into soviets, mainiy in Surobaya, the government crushed these soviets, exiled Sncevliet, and 
exiled or arrested other leaders of this union. Next, after the r.!! . .,gcd involvement of communists in early 
1919 rural troubles in Surnknrtn, the government arrested •:., lji Misbach ('red badji' of the Sl) and 
Douwes Dekker as well as banishing Tjipto ManguniMumo from all Javanese-speaking areas. 
Furthermore, following the murder of a Dutch Contro/cur at Toliloli (North Sulawesi) in May 1919,just 
after Abdul Muis of the Central Sarckatlslam (CS1) had made a speaking tour in the region, Muis was 
arrested. Soon afterward, a shooting incident at Garut (West Java) led to the discovery of the so-called 
secret Sectionn of the S1 and resulted in tlte arrest of Sosrokardono of the CSI togetlter with some 
members ofthe ISDV (Ricklefs 1993: 174). 
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allowing a native Indies majority in the Volksraad (lnglcson 1979, 8). Moreover, Fock 
made an effort to increase government income through taxes. The communist uprisings 
of the 1926 and 1927, which were partly driven by the economic and political malaise 
of the NEI, had provided strong reasons for Simon de Graeff to crackdown on political 
movements. 
As the world economic depression continued through the 1930s with severe 
effects on the NEJ,6 the next two Governors General, Bonifacius C. d~ Jongc (1931-
1936) and Stachouwcr W.L.T van Starkcnborgh (1936-1945), maintained the 
crackdown, On assuming office in September 1931, De Jongc warned political activists: 
'Political slogans, which arc of some benefit in limes of prosperity, arc now of no usc' 
(Quoted in Jnglcson 1979: 177). In his view, unrealistic political agitation in a time of 
economic difficulty could only make economic conditions worse. His successor, Van 
Starkcnborgh, was a rather more flexible man, but brought no significant change 
(Ricklefs 1993: 188). Under the two Governors nothing was more important than 
maintaining more firnily public 'peace and quiet'. During this period, the vernacular 
press was heavily censored, public meetings were tightly controlled by secret agents, 
and sonw leading political ligures were arrested and exiled. Thus, the fledging pubJ;c 
sphere was soon 'imprisoned' by the iron cage of the 'security' regime (ntsl c11 ordc). 
The repressive political control continued and even became worse during the 
Japanese interregnum (1942-45). The Japanese military government forbade any 
discussion or organization connected with the politics or administration of the e<Junlry. 
This severely affected pre-war political organizations which speedily disappeared from 
the public scene. 
These series of historical events altered the political opportunity st.· .~lure and 
the public sphere, dramatically changing the opportunities available ·;or the new 
nationalist movements. On the hand, these changes provided the ':\'\!;•:: us for the 
emergence of common ideas which led to the formation of 'Indonesia' as a new 
imagined community and a code of an historical bloc. On the other hand, these changes 
also affected slalc-so"iety interactions and sharpened the competition between various 
political groupings. These tensions led to the formation of various intellcctual_political 
traditions. 
6 As lngleson observed (1979: 176): 'The depression nlfected Indonesia later tlmn most other countries, 
largely because it was the st:cvndary agrieu1tuml commodity crisis rather than the initial financial crisis 
that ),r 1 the major impac\ un it. But its effects lingered longer nnd had a profound influc:.?-~i' •;..::. :!.;; social 
:md economic structure of the country.' 
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This chapter covers the timcframe of 1920-1945, a period when the notion of 
Indonesian nationalism and state was discussed among competing groups of the 
intelligentsia and when intelligentsia of higher learning began to take a major role in the 
leadership of the nation. Discussions will show that it was during this period the notion 
of a 'Muslim intelligentsia' was consolidated along with the construction of Muslim 
intellectual-political tradition and the fragmentation within the Muslim intellectual 
tradition. The boundary between 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' was constructed through 
the discursive practices, the fommlation of Islamic political ideologies, and the 
emergence of Islamic parties and associations of Muslim students. The chapter ends up 
with a discussion of the failure of political Islam at the birth of the indepenJent 
Republic. 
Following the previous chapter, focus of attention will be given to the 
rducational field, discursive practices, the public sphere, and 'power games' 
(consolidation and contestation) of the intelligentsia. With the formation of intellectual-
political traditions in this period, special attention will also be given to the formation 
and inter-generational transmission of Muslim intellectual political traditions. Like the 
previous chapter, the structure of writing is not purely chronological. It is combined 
with a thematic approach. Thus, the chronology follows the sub-topics of the chapter. In 
other words, the chronology within sub-topics is self-contained and discrete. 
3.1 The Advancement and Disruption of the Secular Schools 
The period between the 1920s and the Japanese occupation in 1942 was the 
golden age of native access to modem education with a European-standard quality in 
the 201h century. Under its influence, Indies students became more cosmopolitan. Their 
mastery of European languages provided them with passports to enter the Western 
'Resp11blica littcraria' (Republic of letters), the main source of modem scientific 
knowledge and cil ; : isation. 
The introduction of new European-style public schools for the native East Indies 
in the 1910s, namely HIS (primary school}, MULO (lower secondary school) and AMS 
(upper secondary school), resulted in increasing numbers of the native intelligentsia (of 
the lesser born) lcmning European languages and gaining better educational 
qualifications. This advancement of East Indies education culminated in the 
establishment of tertiary institutions (colleges) from the 1920s onwards. Thereafier, the 
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role of STOVIA as the main producer of leading intellectuals of th.~ int~lligcntsia was 
taken over by the universities. 
These developments were, however, interrupted by the Japanese occupation. The 
Japanese introduced a distinct education regime which gave more emphasis to military 
mid parmnilitary training. This provided a catalyst for the inculcation of militaristic 
mentalities and the future fonnation of a military intelligentsia. 
3.1.1 Educational Improvement at the Primary and Secondary Levels 
By the 1920s, the Ethtcal and 'association' policy in education had begun to 
produce a clear impact on the native educational profile. In 1920, from around 
48,428,711 of the total East Indies population at the time, the total native enrolment in 
public and private schools of all types was around 829,802 pupils,7 an increase of 
519,306 from the figures of the 1910. This figure did not include students in the so-
called 'wi/de schoolcn' ('wild schools'), which began to spring up in the 1920s.8 These 
were schools, which were not recognized by any official agency, established usually by 
idealist members of the intelligentsia who did not wish to work for t:c colonial 
government, in response to the demand for Westernized education {Van Nic11970: 219-
20). 
Table 2: Native Enrolments in the Vernacular and European School Systems, 
1910-1920 
Year Vernacular Eurooean School System Vocational TOTAL 
Schools Primary School Secondary School Schools 
310,496 1910 303,868 5,108 50 1,470 
1920 781,284 43,411 t,l90 3,917 829,802 
Source: Modtficd from Paul W. van dcr Vcur (1969: 7-12). 
Compared to the numbers in 1910, there had been a huge increase in the native 
enrolment in the European school system at all levels. Indies Children in this school 
system cmnc mostly from fathers who were employed by the government. Only a small 
7 The number of native enrolments in the vernacular public and private schools of all types 
(Standaardsclwo/, Volkschool, and Vervolgschool) in 1920 was 781,284, while in Ute 'European school 
system (public and private) they were as follows: in the primary schools (ELS, HIS, Speciale School), the 
native enrolment \\as 43,411; in Ute secondary schools (HnS 3, HnS 5, Lyceum, MULO and AMS) it 
was 1,190; and in the vocational schoolsH was 3,917 (Vander Veur 1969: 7-12). 
1 The post-war economy and the great economic depression of the 1930s resulted in n reduction :. 
government spending on education that forced East Indians to tum their desire for cdu~tion to 
independent and r.nsubsidiscd schools, tcnned 'wild schools' (lngleson 1979: 205). The number ofwil~ 
schools in the !at: !930s was estimated nt 2,200 wiUtan enrolment of 142,000. The most famous of the 
independent schools were those belonging to the Taman Si.nva (Garden of Pupils) system founded by n 
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portion of these pupils whose fathers were employed by European private companies or 
came from indigenous economic sphcre.9 
Most of Indies students who sought a Western education continued to be 
motivated by the desire to gaining positions in the government bureaucracy and the 
Western sector of the economy. A government survey in 1928-1929 of urban areas 
showed that over 83 per cent of Western-educated natives worked for wages (only 2.1 
per cent of their employers being native East Indians),lcss than 2 per cent of them were 
self-employed, wh!ie the remainder was unemployed (Kahin 1952: 29-30). On the other 
hand, the absorptive capacity of the government service and the Western sector of the 
economy for those with only lower levels of education had been saturated. Affected by 
the post-war economic situation, both the government and private economic sectors 
were urged to put a rationalization policy into effect. Consequently, a primary school 
certificate that would have sufficed for entry into the lower ranks of the civil service in 
the previous decades would no longer be the case in this decade (Van Niel1970: 218-9). 
By the late 1920s, graduates of the primary and even those of the secondary schools had 
outnumbered the available positions, leading ;o the development of a sort of 
'intelligentsia proletari~t· (Vander Veur 1969: 7-11 j. 
3.1.2 The Promotion of University Education 
While the enrolment in primary and secondary schools steadily increased and 
the absorptive capacity of the job market for the output of these levels had been 
saturated, the colonial government response in terms of providing university education 
as a part of the solution was exceedingly slow. It is \rue that some higher education in 
the East Indies had been provided by higher schools such as the STOVIA and NIAS. 
Nevertheless, under the strict Dutch criteda of what constituted university education, 
these schools were r.lassified as vocational schools (Van dcr Vcur 1969: 5). 
The earliest demand for higher education came from a small group of blijvers 
(permanent Dutch settlers). To persuade the colonial government to establish a 
university, in 1901 the group start~d the lndische Universiteitsvereeniging (University 
9 Even though the pupils at different types of prim:1ry schools exhibi;cd different characteristics of 
parental occupations. Dosed on the Report of tl1e Educational Conunission of tl1e 1929, Van der Veur 
(1969: 25) concluded: 'TI1e parents of pupils attending the ELS, like the Europeans, are almost 
exclusively wage earners (453 of 484), predominantly in government service. The Schake/schoo/, on the 
other band, draws the greater part of its pupils (715 of 1,173) from quite a different social environment, 
i.e., from the indigenous econom!c sphere. TI1e HIS with 10,747 wage-earning parents out of 11,909 is 
-------- ------------- ---- ----- •. I 
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Association of the Indies). This effort, however, did not achieve a significant response 
from the government. The reason given at the time was that the number of secondary 
school graduates was still too small to justify a university. By the 1910s, however, when 
there were sufficient numbers, there was still no firm government intention to establish 
the university. When a university finally did begin to appear, its raison d 'etre was not in 
response to public demands for higher education, but rather b~cause the colonial 
government was unable to attract enough recruits from the mother country, especially 
personnel needed in the technical, medical and administrative fields of the post-war East 
Indies bureaucracy (Junge 1973: 3). 
The breakthrough once again reflected the effect of capitalist interests. In 1920, 
a foundation of Dutch private enterprises took the initiative to establish the Teclmisclre 
Hoogesclwol (THS, College of Engineering) in Bandung. The original purpose of the 
THS was to produce civil engineers for irrigation and road-construction jlrojects as well 
as young technicians for the plantations, since the supply of trained engineers from 
Europe had dwindled during and after World War I. In 1924, the government took over 
the college from the foundation to operate it as a government institution. 
The urgent need for lawyers in the East Indies civil service following the 
shortage of attorneys in the immediate post-war years and the difficulty of attracting 
lawyers from Europe, even with substantial bonuses, forced the government to establish 
the Rechtslwogesclrooi (RHS, College of Law) in Batavia i'l 1924. For similar reasons, 
the increasing demand (especially of the European plantation community) for better 
medical personnel, which could not be expected to be provided from The Netherlands, 
prompted the government to upgrade existing medical training. Thus, in 1927 the 
Geneeskundige Hoogesclwol (GHS, Medical College) was started in the Batavia. Aller 
the opening of the GHS, the STOVIA was gradually absorbed into the college, while the 
NIAS in Surabaya maintained its o:iginal status. 
It was a characteristic of these early universities that they did not arise as large 
establishments, but grew out of a 'faculty', around which other faculties Clustered 
(Junge 1973: 3). Furthermore, considerable evidence suggests that in the beginning 
these colleges were intended chiefly for the Europeans (including Eurasians) 
themselves, with a certain share reserved for the Chinese and a few pr~vayi-born 
Indonesians who had adopted Dutch ways (Thomas 1973: 19-26). 
somewhat in between these two types although closer to the ELS as far as the nature of the social positior. 
of the parents is concerned.' 
Chaplcr 3 . Making lndanr.sla l55 
As the introduction of tertiary education was exceedingly slow and did not 
provide full professional status, many of best young East Indies graduates decided to 
continue their studies in the Netherlands. This was especially true in the years 
immediately afler World War I. The Netherlands government adviser for students 
estimated the number of East Indies university students in the Netherlands at the end of 
1924 to have been 673 (Ingleson 1979: l-3).to Compared to their ~·ieaecessors, most of 
these post-war students derived from lower status groups (Van Nid 1970-2l3-4). Many 
of these students were able to study in the Netherlands because of scholarships provided 
by the Netherlands government or local communities." 
It is also worth noting that in p~rallel with the introducti·Jn of university 
education there were a growing number of Dutch-run research institutes in the NEI, 
many of which had high international reputations. 12 Apart from the government-
spon~ored institutes, some of these research institutes were fur.ded by the private 
capitali~t community. 13 Unfurtunately, the naiive engagement in those variot> research 
institutes re:;1ained insignifican:. ScientHie research for most educated Indonesians 
remained a luxury, and the intellectual core of the leading intelligentsia of the time was 
generally limited to university study. 
A further increase in native enrolments in higher education in the NEI was made 
possible by the opening of new colleges in the live years before the Javanese 
occupation. A college fm training Indonesian officials for local administration, tb:: 
Bestuursacademie (Administrative Academy), was established by the colonial 
government in 1938. Next, the Colle;;e of Letters and Philosophy was opened in Batavia 
10 
"Ibis seems to include the East Indies Chinese stut.lents. For further insights we may tum to the 
statistics of Indonesian students at Leiden University compiled by Harry A. Poeze (t990: 57). In 1920-
1924, the number of native Indonesian students in this university was 60, while the Chinese was 28. 
Based on this account, we may assume th:\l the total number or native university students in the 
Netherlands at the end of 1924 did nr.t reach that number (673 students). 
11 Mohammad Halla, for instance, Y'3S able to study in the NeU•crlands because of the financial support of 
local Minangkabau community. 
11 These research institutes were established as parts the university or as independent bodies TI1e most 
notabl:: research institute in this period was the· Eijkmann (Medical Research) Institute in Jakarta, named 
after Dr. C. Eijkmann (1858-1930) who won the Nobel Prize in 1929 for his discovery of vitamins, 
because his experiments were carried out in military hospitals in Jakarta. TI1e quantity and quality or the 
East Indies research institutes was globally recognised especially following the influx of Europea•• 
scientists (mostly Dutch) to the NEI during the sreat economic depl\.ssion of the 1930s and after Lie 
Ge11113n occupation of the Netherlands in 1940. By the early 1940s, there were 26 research institutes in 
the country some of which produced outstanding journals (Masser 1991). 
"Examples or research institutes rounded by owners or private plantations were the Dosscha Observatory 
in Bandung (funded by a tea planter), the Central Rubber Research Institute, and the Research Institute of 
the Sur,latril Planters' Associations. 
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on I October 194014 follow~>d by the establishment in 1941 of the College of 
Agriculture in Boger. Shortly afterwards, as a consequence of the Nazi invasion of the 
Netherlands in early May 1940, some educational institutions, notably military ones, 
were relocated to the NEI. Thus in 1940, the Dutch established the Military Cadet 
School in Bandung on the model of the Royal Military Academy in Breda (Netherlands) 
followed by the installation of the Marir.e Academy in Surabaya (Thomas 1973: 35; 
Redaksi SMT, 1998: 29-30). In February I \'42. the Dutch govemment issued a decree to 
unite all the colleges scattered in various cities, excluding the military ones, into a single 
Universiteit (university). This decree remained only on paper as the Japanese invasion 
interrupted its implementation (Junge 1973: 4). 
Thus, despite economic recession and political repression, the sustained demand 
of the govemntent and private bureaucracy for skilled labour allowed the educational 
sector to enjoy unprecedented advancement. Just before the installation of the Javanese 
interregnum, the educational statistics for 1940 showed that th~ total native enrolment in 
the public and private school of all types and levels in the NEI was around 2,325,174 
(including students of universities, excluding students of wild schools). 1 ·~ This number 
was about 3.3% of the total E3St Indies population of the time. 16 At the same time, the 
total enrolment in four higher institutions (the THS, RHS, GHS, and Bestuursacademie) 
was 1,246. Almost half of the enrolments, however, were of Europeans (including 
Eurasians) and Chinese students, while the total native enrolments were only 673 (Van 
DerVeur 1969: 5-15; Thomas 1973: 11-2).17 
During this period there had also been some hundreds of native graduates from 
both domestic and overseas universities. Up until 1940, from domestic higher education 
system, the total number of native graduates (excluding graduates from what were 
recognized as the vocational schools such as the STOVIA and NIAS) was only abJut 
55. Although the total number of native graduates during the period remained lower 
than the combined numl,o.r of European and ChincF~ graduates, the tendency for natives 
to dominate the domestic university scene started in 1940. In that year the number of 
14 A strong case to esbblish n fa.:~l!y fer Indonesian languages and literature had been put by the Director 
of Education, J. Hardeman, in t927, but it did not materialize untill940 (Van dcr Vcur t969: 5). 
" The number of native enrolments in the vernacular public and private schools of all types 
(Standaardschoo/, Vo/ksc/wol, Vcrvo/g.rc/wo/, Sc/wkc/scoo/ [est. 1921] and Vernacular MUL·;, test. 
1937]) was 2,220,513, while tlutt in the 'European school system (public and private) was as follows: in 
the primary schools {ELS, HIS, Speciale School), the native enrolment was 88,023; ir. ihe secondary 
schools {HBS 3, HBS 5, Lyceum, MULO and AMS), it was 9,975; in the vocational schools it was 5,990 
\Van dcr Veur, 1969: 7-12); and in the university, it was 673 (Thomas 1973: 11-2). 
'According to Ricklefs {1993: 161), the total population of the East Indies in 1939 was about /0 million. 
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graduates for each population group was respectively 39 for the Native, 23 for the 
Chinese, and 19 for the European. Meanwhile, d!!ring the period 1924-40 the total 
number of native graduates from universities in the Netherlands was estimated at 344. 
However the Indies Chinese graduates from that country were estimated at 360, which 
indicates the larger proportion of the Chines~ graduates compnred to the native ones 
(VanDer Veur 1969: 5-15; Kahin 1952: 31-2). 
It is clear that the native intelligentsia with higher learning at this juncture was 
very small. Their small numbers guaranteed that they would have high status and would 
be called on to play decisive roles in the leadership of the national political movement. 
To signal the genesis of the higher educated Indies people, the term 'iutc/lcctuccl(cn)' 
(literally= intellcctual/s) b~gan to become popular as a new code of the intelligentsia. 
3.1.3 Educational Impact on the Second Ge10·~; at ion of the Intelligentsia 
Those who entered university in the 1920s and 1930s along with other 
intelligentsia who were born mostly during the first fifteen years of the 201h century 
constituted the second generation of the Indies intelligentsia. This generation was 
possibly the most erudite and productive generation of the entire 20m century. It was 
comprised of people with a high standard of Western education, fluency in some 
European languages, ar. exposure to modem intellectual culture and cii~course, a 
cosmopolitan mindset and extensive networks and an impressive production of 
intellectual works of high quality (at least by Ir.donesian standards). 
As a direct product of the 'a<sociation' policy, the intelligentsia of this 
generation was also the most intensely secularised intelligentsia. With the relaxation of 
the 'birth rights' (heredity) requirement for entry to the European school system, 
however, intelligentsia of the Islamic lesser priyayi and Muslim petty. bourgeoisie 
families in this generation began to increase. 
Exposed to the reformist-modernist tea~hiilgs, during their childhood or during 
their study in the secondary ami tertiary education, many children of these Muslim 
families were able to maintain their relieious spirit and identities Thus, there emerg~d 
prominr.nt Muslim personalities such as Raden Sjamsuridjal (b. 1903), son of pe1oglmlu 
(religious official dealing with Islamic affairs); Mohammad Natsir (b. I c;us), son of a 
pious junttu/is co111roleur (clerk of a Dutch district senior of1iccr); Kasman 
Singodim~djo (b. 1908), son ofn /ebai (village religious functionary): Mohamad Roem 
17 Of the professors, 91 were Europeans, 19 Indonesians, and IS other Asians (Thomas 1973: 12). 
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(b. 1908) and Prawoto Mangkusasrnito (b. 1910), sons of pious village heads; Jusuf 
Wibisono (b. 1909), son of a mantri ulmr (surveyor). 18 
Consequently, the numbers of Muslim intelligentsia of the second generation are 
much greater than for the first generation. The landmark of the significant presence of 
Muslim intelligentsia in the second generation was the emergence of the association of 
(the secondary school) Muslim students, Jong Is/amieten Bond (JIB) in 1925, and the 
Islamic study dub of Muslim university students, Studemcn Islam Studieclub (SIS) in 
1934. 
3.1.4 Secular Education under the Japanese Occupation 
The Japanese occupation, with its focus on military efforts, provided a new 
political opportunity structure for the development of the intelligentsia. While 
disrupting the advancement of Western education, it promoted a new kind of 
educational regime. 
The Japanzse military gc.vemment clo~cd down all schools, though some of 
them were gradually reopened in line with the interests of the new regime.'9 While the 
Japanese appeared to be half-heartedly paying attention to the development of 
conventional schools, they energetically introduced a new kind of education which they 
considered was urgently needed for the Japanese war effort-military and paramilitary 
training.20 It was the introduction of this military/paramilitary cdu~ation which led to 
11 For further infonnalion, see Soebagijo (1980), Glmz:lli et.al.., (198E), Panitia Pcringatan 7S Ta/11111 
~':alntan (19R" Panitia Pering,,tan Mollammacl NatsirlMollamnd Rocm 70 Tallun (1978). 
19 Under t' · I· ·.anese adminiitrntion. the school was reorganized nnd renamed in Indonesian and 
Jap>nesc. the tanner lower s.condary school (MULO) was renamed Sckolalt Mcncngah Rcndah (in 
indonesian) or C/mgakko (in :apanesc). :Jmosl all types uf the general and vocation upper-secondary 
school were fused imo and renamed tlte Sckolah memmgah Tinggi (SMT, in Indonesian) or Kotto Clut 
GaUo (in Jopancsc). The former NIVAS (.econdary veterinary school) in Bogar survived in its own right 
but changed its r:nne to Bogar Zui Gakku. The teachers were now caned I::11gku and came mostly from 
the graduates crthe higher teachers' training school. Otherwise, since prof~ssioni'lt teachers were limited, 
they also were rccruitod from fonn" studonts of the TJIS and GHS. At the univernity levrl, the Japonese 
only renpened tl10 Gt!S (in i943) and THS (in 1944). TI1e GHS was renamed lka Doigaku, wltile the THS 
became Kogyo Dalgabt. For the Jka Dalgaku, a de~artment of pharnacology was added to its original 
GHS, and stndc•Jts of the NIAS in SulBbaya w<re Uansferred to Jaka.m. Meanwhile, tbe fanner STOVIT 
(dental secondary school) was upgraded to a tl!fee-ycar college courne and given a Japanese title lka 
Daigaku Sltlka Jgakubu. Next, to replace the f01.ner Bcstuurracadcmlc (Administrative Acedemy), the 
Japan.se sci up a new advanced institute for training public offioials in 1944 called Kcnkoku Gakuin and 
about the same time also launched the Advanced Teacher.;' Training School (Sckolalt Gum Tinggi in 
Indonesian or Kootoo Shiltan Gakko in Japanesej. 1110 plan to open ::n Islamic univernity which lmd 
emerged in eorly 1942 to win Muslim support for Japanese interests came into existence on 8 July 1945. 
TI1e univernity was named Scka/alt Tinggl/slam (Advanced Islamic School) and was governed by a board 
of well-known Muslims with Mohamm:1d !latta as the ehainnan (Rcda!rsl SMT 1998: 33-7; 2enda 1958: 
187; TI10mas 1973: 38-9; Junge 1973:66, Hatjono 1997: 12-3). 
"The range oftl1e Japanese military and paramilitary training will be discussed !ater in this chapter. 
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the emergence of a new generation of intelligentsia who generally lacked Western 
erudite knowledge but were highly imbued with the spirit of nationalism and 
independence. 
:'· . .! 'fhe Advan<ement of Islamic Schools 
Generally speaking, the emergence "f inte!/cctucc/cn with university educations 
widened the gap between the ulama and intelligentsia. As Sukiman Wirjosand}ojo (b. 
1896)21 in his memoirs admitted {1984: 27): 
It was true in the past that intcl/cctucclcn did not like to study Islam, because the 
majority of lsla'llic teachers, ulama and kjais lacked general scientific 
knowledge. He-•-. ~he intcl/cctucc/cn were unable t'l mix with them. 
Conversely, lsJ,•cni; 1 Jachcrs and the like were unable to mix with the 
intcl/cctucc/cn, b<.u .. sc their frame of reference was different :rom that of the 
latter. 
Furthermore, beca•!sc the Muslim intelligentsia tended to be closer to the reformist-
modernist community, the relations!•=" between the Muslim intcllectuecl~!i (wito were 
literate in religious knowledge) and traditionalist ulama also dctcriotJtcd. 
The position of ., ~ditionalist ulama was under the threat from above and below. 
From above there was 1.!1e growing influence of the Muslim intelligentsia as leaders of 
;\1uslim politics; while from below there w~s the deepening cultural penetration of the 
rdormist-modcrnist activities that began to reach the villages. These threats forced 
many traditionalist ulama to re-consider their position. Some of them responded with 
positive results. In order to survive, they copied tim tac,: ' and methods of their 
opponents. Thus, they now began to introduce madrasah to the pcsantren, usc local 
languages (mixed with Arabic) in the Friday s•:!n;.:ms, teach genernl subj~cts, read 
newspapers using the Latin alphabet, "~opt '"odcrn cducationaltcchnoh1gy, and so on. 
As a result of the introduction ol" madrasah and general subjects in the 
traditionalist cpistcmic community, there emerged a nucleus of traditionalist ulama-
intclek, who would play impoib1i wlc• in the leadership of this community. Alongsidn 
this developmcn~ the rcformi~t-modernist schools experienced a rapid development. In 
addition to the madrasah system, l11e reformist-rncdernist community began to establish 
21 Sukiman wos a younger brother of Soliman (Ute pioneer of Jong Jam). BoUt were sons of Muslim 
merehauls and both were graduates t'om lhe STOVIA. After (covin;; the STOVIA, Sukim:.n was nblc to 
proceed to a university in the Nclherlands in early 1920s. Upon his rclum he immdiately joined the 
SIIPSI, and henccfomnrd was well·la1own as a leader ofM\1slim politics. 
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the 'scko/all' system. 22 In the long ilmn, the edueationnl efforts of these Muslims would 
narrow the gap between u/ama and illtcl/cctucc/cll. 
3.2.1 The Modernisation of the Traditionalist Schools 
The pioneer of the madrasall educational system in the milieu of the 
traditionalist community was Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (b.J888). Afier his return from 
his study in Mecca (1909-1914),23 he initially collaborated with Mas Mansur (a former 
student of Al-Azhar .<.i;o would join the Mullammadiyall in 1921) to establish in 1916 a 
society (jam 'iyall) of the Nalldlatul IV.~tlla11 (the Rise of the Fatherland) in Surabaya. 
The aim of thr. society was to upgrade the quality of cducatioto for the Islamic 
e'lnomunity by establishing the Nalodlatul Watlla11 's modern Islamic schools which had 
a nationalistic outlook.24 
However, the main exemplary centre for the modernisation of the traditionalist 
Ci)i~temic community in Java was the pesantrcn Tcbuircng at Jot.~!: mg. East Java. 
Established in 1899 by Hasjim /,sj'ari (1871-1947), a former student of Achmad 
Khatib, :his pesantrcn wru. soon well known as a centre for the advanced study oflslam 
especially arnong the tradititmalist community. For almost twenty years aficr its 
establishment this pcsantrcn had retained its traditional methods of :caching such as 
soroga11 and wcto11. Then in 1916, Kjai Ma'sum (the first son-in-law of Asj'ari who had 
studied ill Mecca) introduced the madrasalz system within the milieu of the pcsantrc/1, 
which later in 1919 carne to be known as mad rasa II 'Salafifall Syafi 'ijall '. From its 
inception, this madrasall adopted the graded classes and classroom teaching. However, 
it was not until 1919 that r.cncral subjects were able to be introduced because internal 
resistance towards everything that smacked of modernity remained strong (Dhoficr 
1982: 104). 
22 Selrolah refers to schooHng :atcorporating Western cducttional methods and cmphasizitag the teaching 
of secular subjects. 
" During his study in Mecca, Wahab pl•yed a m'ljor role in establishing the loeal branch or Ute Sarckat 
Islam. 
2.f Is!htli .c Schools of tltc Nalldltatul Watllan 's networks nppcarcd with difl:rcm ~tnt.; in Surobaya 
Wontlkromo, Jagalan, Pncarkeling, Gresik, and other places in East Java. Aplrt from this school network, 
from 191~ Wahab also organized a discus~ion group on Islamic matters among traditionalist ulama in 
Surabaya that came to be known as Tasjwirul Ajkar (the exchange or idea.<). Moreover, in the early 1920s 
Wahab also set up within the traditionalist community a youth organi1..ation, S)11bbanul Watlra11 (tlte 
Youth or the foatherland) and a merchant cooperative, Nalldhatul Tujjar (Tioe Rise or the Merchant). 
Beyond the tmLi:tior.lllist community, he nude I!R effort to socialize witb nahonaHst inttllc:.:tual networks 
through his involvement in Sutomo's Indonesischc Studieclub (Soekadri t979: 6·\•6; ·,:,n Bruinessen 
t994: 34-6). 
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A further effort to modernise this matlrasah was carried out by Mohammad Iljas 
(b. 1911, a son of the elder sister of Asj'ari's wife). His educational background was 
unusual in traditional Muslim circks. He studied allhe public HIS in Surabaya (1918-
1925) then after finishing this modern schooling he chose to deepen his religious 
knowledge at Pesa11tre11 Tebuire11g. In 1929 he was appointed the lura/r (the functionary 
in charge) of the pesa11tre11 and the headmaster of the matlrasah 'Salafijah Syafi'ijah'. 
Under his policy, the curriculum of the matlrasah gave more emphasis to the teaching 
ofi/m11 a/at (Ambic language) and more importanlly began lo introduce general subjects 
and to improve the sludrnts' general knowledge through the introduction of newspapers, 
periodicals, and books wrillcn in the Latin alphabet (Sockadri 1979: 56). 
This policy of modernisation was continued by a son of Asj'ari, Abdul Wachid 
Hasjim (1913-1953). Beginning his studies in his fathe;'spesa111rell and several others, 
he then taught himself Dutch and English and also to read newspapers and periodicals 
wrillen both in Arabic and Latin scripts, before spending a year of study in Mecca 
(1932·3). On his return he established a modern matlrasah wi~hin the milieu of his 
fc.ther's pesa11tre11 called matlrasah 'Nidhomiyah'. About 70% of the curriculum of this 
matlrasah was devoted to general Sl•bjects with a special emphasis on the teaching of 
foreign lmguages and literatures such as Dutch nnd English-as well as Arabic. In 
~ddition, h~ began to establish a library that subscri:,ed to various newspapers and 
periodicals espocially those wrillen in lh~ Latin alphabet Courses on public speaking in 
Dutch and English as well as typewriting were introduced to students (Dhofier 1982: 
I 06; Soekadri 1979: 57). 
The modernisation taking place in the pesa111re11 Tebuireng was contagious and 
spread to other traditionalist pesantreliS. By the 1920s, Pesa11tre11 De11a11yar in Jombang 
· and Pesa11tre11 Si11gosari in Malang established special pesa11tre11 l'Jr women offering 
gencr:ll subjects (Dhofier 1982: 41-2). Henceforward, there emerged two kinds of 
pesa11tre11. First was the so-called 'Pesantre11 Sa/aft' (traditional pesmrtre11). This kind 
of pesa11/re/l continues until thu pre:;ent day and maintains the teaching of classical 
Islamic t~xtbooks without introducing general subjc':ts, though it also adopts teaching 
methods of matlrasah. 1'he second kind was the :;o-called 'Pesantren Khalaji' (modern 
pesa11tre11), in which religious and general subjects were taught side by side along with 
the adoption the graded classes and cl~ssroom teaching. 
In West Sumatra, the challenge posed by modernist-reformist teachings also 
stimulated some traditionalist ulama to modernise their tra,\iiionalist .sura11. As early as 
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1918, Siradjuddin Abbas of Padang Lawas had begun to introduce modem teaching 
methods into his suraus, while retaining their traditional religious teachings. In 1928 he 
persuaded other leading traditionalists such as Sulaiman al-Rasuli of Candung and 
Muhammad Djamil Djaho of Padang Japang to organise networks of local traditionalist 
schools. As a result, traditiouuust sch"l~rs founded in 1930 the Persatua11 Tarbiyah 
Jslamiyalz (Perli, Union of Islamic Education), a social organization to which the 
schools were linked (Kahin, 1999: 84). Perti successfully influenced the modernisation 
of the traditionalist surau in Jambi, Tapanuli, Bcngkulu, Aceh, Kalimantan Barat, and 
South Sulawesi (Nocr, 1987: 72). 
Through modernising c ~traditionalist schools, the traditionalist community was 
able to meet the challenge of secular and reformist-modernist schools. The adoption of 
1he madrasah system and the introduction of general subjects made religious studies in 
pesa11tre11 more attractive and probably contributed to the significant increase in their 
student numbers. In the 1920s the average number of students in a big pesa11tre11 in Java 
was about 200. In the early 1930s, however, many of pesa11tre11, such as Tcbuireng, had 
more than 1500 students. A survey by the Sln/mubu (Japanese-sponsored Religious 
Affairs Office) in 1942 revealed that the total number of pcsa11trc11 and madrasah in 
Java alone was 1871, with 139,415 students (Dhofier 1982: 40). This survey result 
indicates a decline in the number of Islamic schools in general compared to that of the 
Dutch report of the 191h century (sec chapter 2). These figures, however, seem to reflect 
the declining popularity of the traditional pesamre11, as the modernized ones continued 
to attract a large number of enrolments. 
3.2.2 The Expansion of the Reformist-Modernist Schools 
While the traditionalist community 1 to adopt the madrasah ·system, the 
reformist-modernist schools experience.· .~pid expansion, offering the native 
populatiOil a major alternative educatic· , ;I em to the (secular) government school 
system. The Ml,/:w;ullfldiyah with it~ .<l•:gy l\f abstaining from direct engagement in 
political activities achieved the most impressive development. Already in 1925, it 
operated 55 schools, serving 4,000 students; lWO major medical clinics; an orphanage; 
and a poor house (Federspiel 1970: 58). Its schools afier 1923 were not only madrasah, 
but also schools in the sekolah system. This wa.; especially true afier the establishment 
of the Muhammadiyah HIS and the teacher-training schools in Yogyakarta and Jakarta 
in the mid-1920s (Alfian 1969: 267-8). By 1932 Muhammadiyah already had some 207 
Chapter 3 ·Making Indonesia 163 
sekolails in Java and Madura alone, composed of 98 vo/kssclwleu, 28 Staudardscilo/er., 
23 Sclzakelscho/eu, 50 HIS, 4 MULO/Nom:aal HIK, and 4 Kweekschole11 (A!fian 1989: 
190). With such an impresslve record of accomplishment, the Muhammadiyah soon 
became the most respected association in the reformist-modernist line. 
The reformist-modernist effort to develop modem Islamic schools was 
strengthened by the emergence of other associations with similar aims. Among others, 
in 1923 a group of merchants in Bandung under the leadership of a Singapore-born 
Tamil reformist merchant-ulama, Ahmad Hassan (b. 1887), established the 'Persatuau 
Islam ' (Persis, Islamic Union). As reflected by its acronym 'Persis' (which means 
'precise' or 'punctilious'), this organization was stricter than other reformist groups. It 
denounced anything that smacked of superstition and 'bid'ah' (illegal religious 
bnovation) and opposed the idea of secular nationaiism on the grounds that it divided 
Muslims based on politico-territorial boundaries (Federspiell977). 
Apart from establishing madrasah, the main concern of Persis was to 
disseminate its ideas by h~luing public meetings, conducting sermons and study groups, 
publishing p:unphlets, periodicals, and books (Noer 1973: 85). It also promoted public 
debates and polemics mediated especially by its own publications.25 
In Aceh, some leading ulama under the kadership of Acehnese patriot, 
Mohammed Daud Beureu'eh (1899-1987), founded in 1939 the All-Aceh Union of 
U/ama (PUSA). The union was intended to defend Islam as \'.'ell a:. to promote the 
modernisation of Islamic schools in opposition to the Dutch-backed u/ei!balaug 
(aristocrat) m!!ninistratoro (Ricklefs 1993: 200). This made it closer ideologically to the 
reformist-modernist position, at the same causing internal Islamic disputes betwe~n the 
proponents of modern and traditional1slamic schools (mermasah). 
Apart from the expansion of modem Islamic schools, the emergP.nce of public 
universities anr the growing influence of the secular intelligentsia with university 
backgrounds provided the impetus for Muslim intelligentsia and u/ama-illlclek to 
establish their own Islamic university. Muilammadiyail took the lead in cltal!lpioning 
this idea in the mid-1930s. The idea was brought to the Mul'rammadiyah congress of 
1936 and resulted in the recommendation to establish the ~o-crJ!cd Seko/ah Tiuggi Islam 
(Advanced Islamic School) with the faculty of commerce :i[.rl industry being the first 
priority. Rather surprisingly, when this plan bega11 to take on a more del.ir.it~ shape, the 
" The Most important periodicals of Persis were Pe:rrbe/a Islam (Defender of Islam, 1929-1933), Al-
Fatwa (l1te Fa twa, 1931-?), and AI-Lisaa11 ('llte Tongue, 1935-41 ). 
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Dutch government, probably hoping to contain the rising influence of nationalist 
(secular) politicians, promised to subsidize the new venture: (Benda 1958: 96). 
In 1938, Sukiman Wiijosandjojo look the initiative of calling a meeting of 
u/ama and members of the intelligentsia which resulted in a plan to establish Islamic 
tertiary education. His elder brother, Satiman (now a prominent figure of th~ 
Mul:ammadiyalt) followed up this idea by presenting the plan to the existing federation 
of Islamic organizations, the Suprem~ Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIA!, est. 1937). 
This led to the establishment of the so-called Pesantren Lulwr (Advanced Pesantren) in 
1939 with its supporting secondary education, lslamiliscltc Middclbare Scl:ool (Hmjono 
& Hakim 1997: 4-5). Outside Ja•ta, the first Islamic college was opened in Padang 
(West Sumatra) on 9 Decem be! l NO u:·d~r the guiu~nce of Mahmud Yunus and 
'vlurhtar Yahya (gradualts of Cairo's al-Aziiar). Intended to train ulama in a higher 
level of education, this college cc.mprised two faculties, Theology, and Education and 
Arabic Studies (Junus 1960: I 03). Unfortunately, all these early initiativen were 
interrupted by the Japanese occupation. 
3.2.3 Advanced Islamic Studies in the Middle East 
In the absence of an Islamic university in the NEI, Cairo's Al-Azhar university 
continued to attract those Indies' 'clerical-intelligentsia' who could afford higher 
learning. In the early 1920s, the popularity of Cairo as destination for advanced Islamic 
studies for Indies smllri seemed to have overtaken that of the l:aramai11 (Mecca and 
Medina). 
The reason was as follows. The domestic political affiictions of the NEI had 
motivated many samris to find new ways for expressing their political discontent 
(Abaza 1999). The ideals of movement for Pan-lslamism 211d 'Abduh-inspired 
reformist-modernist ideology in Egypt, centred on Al-Azhar, were attractive to some of 
the NEI santri and led them to Cairo. In addit'on, while Rector of 31-Azhar, 'Abduh 
succeeded in modernizing Islamic education, by adding general subjects to the curricula 
of the university. Thus, in Mecca students could only study religion, but in Cairo they 
could also be exposed to general subject• and politics as well. By 1919 there were about 
50 or 60 Indonesian students in Cairo (Rofn 970: 74). Most of them came from West 
~ ;matra and Yogyakarta, two regions that had long been affer1P.d by reformist zeal. 
After the capt~re of Mecca by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and his Wahhiibiya 
regime in 1924, which tended to be hostile to traditional Islamic teachings, many mlllri 
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from traditionalist pesattlren backgrounds returned en masse to the NEI but also began 
to migrate from the ltaramailt to Cairo. The Jiiovalt community in the ltaramain was 
depleted but continued to rccmit Indies students. But it was now less attractive than 
Cairo. All the aforementioned factors, together with the improvement of rubber prices 
and parental C!15h incomes towards the middle of the 1920s, led to a sizeable increase in 
the numbers of East Indies students in Cairo. By 1925, there were at least two hundred 
Southeast Asian students (mostly from the East Indies) in this city (Roff 1970: 74). 
3.2.4 Islamic Education under the Japanese Occupation 
During their period of occupation, the Japanese used both stick and carrot in 
their approach to Islamic education was confronted with the combination of stick and 
carrot. At the outset, the Japanese military administration forbad the teaching of Arabic 
language in all religious schools and some were forced to close. By the end of 1942; 
however, the Japanese seemed to realize the impossibility of denying Muslims the right 
to teach the Qur'an in the holy language. Moreover, since all Islamic education on Java 
was non-governmental, it was very difficult to control. Arabic wa3 then allowed to be 
used for purposes of religious instruction-on the condition that those schools should 
accept Ute government standard curriculum in non-religious subjects and the teaching of 
Japanese in addition to Arabic. This allowed more and more Islamic schools to reopen 
(Benda 1958: 127-131).26 
The Japanese strategy of controlling Islamic education did not prevent them 
from wantir.g also to win the hearts of the Muslim comrr.unity. Aware of Muslim 
leaders' long cherished dream of establishing an Islamic university, as early as the first 
months of the occupation the Sltrimubu promised to support the development of a 
university modelled on Cairo's famous al-Azhar. As part of realising this promise, a 
'Centre of Islamic Literature and Culture' was opened in Jakarta in August 1942. Its 
first head was an Indonesian Muslim, Zain Djambck, but then a Japanese official, N. 
Noguchi, took over the directorship b April 1943. On 20 November 1944, a special 
preparatory committee for the establishment of the Islamic university was set up under 
26 The general pattern of Japanese control over the Islamic educational sector is well described by Benda 
who wrote (1958: 131): 'Tite pattern which gmdually emerged OlJdc it clear that, while the Japanese 
would be content indirectly to control religious schools at the lower levels, tl10y would reserve all 
secondary education, teacher training, and higher institutes of learning to their OM\ direct management. 
Thus it is significant tlmt in May 1943, the authorities forbade non-obligatory religious instruction in 
govem:nental scconJaJ)' schools. In the same month, nil Islamic teachers were organized in a new centrnl 
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the aegis of the Japanese-sponsored federation of Islamic organizations (Masjumi) with 
Mohammad Halla as its chairman.27 Finally, this Ir.lamic University, one of the greatest 
hopes of the Muslim community over the previous decade, op•:ned its doors on 8 July 
1945. This was just a few weeks before the Japanese surrender, providing in Benda's 
words 'the last gesture of generosity of the last infidel overlords to their Muslim 
subjc~ts on the island' (Benda 1958: 187). 
The university was named Sekolah Tinggi Islam (STI, Advanced Islamic 
School). Its objective was 'to provide aJvanced teaching and education both in religious 
and general knowiedge in order to become a centre of Islamic excellence that would 
have a significant influence on the development of Islam in Indonesia' (Harjono & 
Lukman !997: 8). The university was open to graduates of the general secondary 
schools (AMS, HBS, HIK and SMT} as well as to those graduating from the madrasah 
of the secondary level (madrasa 'aliya). The leadership and lecturers of the STI 
comprised the best available in!elek-u/ama and ulama-intelek both of the first and 
second generaticn, with a conspicuous role given to former activists of JIB/SIS and 
graduates of al-Azhar. 28 
With the establishment of the STI, Muslim students of the madrasah and 
sekolah system were provided with their own path to become intelligentsia of higher 
learning. It was this university that would become a breeding ground for leaders of the 
succeeding generation of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
body, the Pergaboengan Goeroe Islam Indonesia (Federntion of Indonesian lslantic Teachers), and 
f,'!dually more and more Islamic-and Arab-schools reopened their doors.' 
7 Members of the committee were, among otl>crs, Wac hid Hasjim (a young leader of the NU and The 
chairman in charge of the Masjunti), Satiman Wirjosandjojo and Sukiman Whjosandjojo (who had 
pioneered the same project in late 1930s), Mohammad Natsir (a former JIB activist), Fatl>urrnhman 
Kafrawi and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (former Djaml'all Cllairialr activists), Mas Mansur, Farid Ma'ruf 
and Kartosudarmo (of the Mullammadiyalr), Suwandi and S. Mangunsarkoro (of the government 
educational office). 
21 The university's board of governors were ··com[.tised of Drs. Muhammad llatta as the Chainnan, 
Mohammad Natsir as tl>e secretary plus some other famous mmes such as Prof. Dr. Husein Djajadingrat 
and Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo as the members. The Rector oftl>e university was Abdul Kahar Muzakkir 
(a former activist of the C.airo-bascd Indo-Malayan student association, Djama 'air al-Chairiall nnd later a 
senior officer of the Shtimubu). The senate of the university comprised the Rector ns the chainnan, 
assisted by Mohammad Natsir and Mr. Prawoto Mangknsasmito (the last president of SIS) respectively II!' 
secretary and vice-secretary along with some other members including Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo am' 
Mr. Abdul Karim (the former fifth president of SIS), Prof. Dr. Pourbotj•roko, Prof. Dr. SlanlCt lm•· 
Santoso, Mr. Mohammad Yamin and some others. Among lecturers oftlte universi1y were a famous nttai, 
from the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia, Agus Salim (Harjono & llakiem 1997: 8-9). 
··: 
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3.3 Discursive Pnctices ~nd the Making of an Historical Bloc 
As the vociferous discourse of kcmadjocan gradually quietened, the theme of 
'nationalism' and 'independence' replaced it as the dominant discourse in the public 
sphere. The main protagonists of these new themes were intellectuals of higher learning. 
The emergence of native university students both in the colony and in the 
Netherlands heralded a transfornmtion in the political leadership of Indies society, 
Imbued with the spirit of the 'pcmoeda·pe/adjar' associations ana familiar with 
Western (European) intellectual discourses, progressive clements of this 'higher' 
intelligentsia now presented themselves as though they were the 'Dreyfusards · 
(defenders of Dreyfus)29 in an East Indies context, when they started popularising a 
new self-generated nickname 'intcl/cctuccl(cn) '. 
The pioneer of Jong Java, Satiman Witjosandjojo, one ·gain showed his 
initiative by leading the establishment of the first East Indies uniLn to usc the term 
'intcl/cctuce/en', namely the 'Bollllmnlntellcctucclcn' (The Intellectual Union). It was 
once again born out of di~appointment with the performance of Budi Utomo. In his eyes, 
the hegemonic influence of its administrators and civil servant membership caused the 
BU to cling to old ways and traditions. The Bond wm lntcl/cclllcclcn aimed to offer an 
alternative space of expression for the expanding group of progressive intelligentsia; 
those who were imbued with a sense of mission about 'guidir;g the Inrii<!S p~ople on the 
path of a new life' (Blumberger 1931: 34; Van Niel 1970: 214-5). Subsequently, the 
term 'intello?ctuce/ (en)' with its derivations and various spellings became commonly 
used in the discourse of the vernacular press.Z0 
"For discussion of the Dreyfussards (in the European context), see chapter I. · 
30 To give examples, the communist-oriented press Pancloc Mcrall in its first edition of 1924 carried an 
article entitled 'Sarckat Orang-Orang lntcl/cctue/ di Indonesia' (Association of Intellectuals in 
Indonesia), which associated U1e term 'intcl/cclllcl' witl1 highly educated people. In December 1929, 
Sukamo wrote an article in the PNI's journal Pcrsatocan Indonesia, 'Kcwadjiban Kaocm lntcllcctuccl' 
(TI1c Responsibility of U1e Intellectual). In U1is article, he defined intellectual ns those whose mind· 
capacity (akaljikiran) is higher than that of the ordinary people, and criticised people wiU1 this higher 
intellectual capacity for being apolitical and lacking of nationalisn~ while idcalising the union of U1e 
intellectual and the people. Later on, Sutan Sjahrir (1909-66)-who later became U1c firnt Prime Minister 
oflndependcnt Indonesia-wrote a similar art'.cle in the Newspaper Daulat Ra'jat (November 10, 1931), 
'Kaocm lntcl/cctuecl dalam Docnia Politik Indonesia' (ll1c Intellectual in the Indonesian Polity), which 
again connected the intellectual to the political leade.~hip of the people. Thereafter, tenns 
'intclleclueclcn', 'intclleclualismc' a.nd 'intcllcclllalistis!J' were widely used in the literary and cultural 
writings of the so-called 'Pocdjangga Baroe' (U1e New Poets) especially in tl1eir 'Polcmlk Kcbuclajaan' 
(polemics on IndoncsiJn culture) of the 1930s. The tcnns featured prominently in the work of Sutan 
Tnkdir Alisjahba.na. a.nd his polemicist counterpart, Sutomo. Ta.kdir associated the tenns with the capacity 
and function of U1e man of ideas to interpret U1c world analyticllly and objectively to discover a new 
intellectual foundation for the newly imagined pan-Indonesian nation (Kartamihard;a 1954). 
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In the public discourse of the period, the tcnn 'intcllcctucc/cn' was generally 
defined as the 'engaged-intelligentsia', both in the political and the cultural field, for the 
sake of the national good. In fact, the engaged-intelligentsia in the colonial situation was 
always a critical minority-for the greater bulk of educated people preferred to secure 
their careers. as functional elites (bureaucrats). For this reason, there was a recurring 
tendency among the self-conscious intet:igentsia to define 'intellectual' in te1ms of its 
social function and responsibility rather than in terms of educational qualif1cations.31 
Nevertheless, because those who engaged in the discourse of the intellectual were 
almost exclusively derived from the highly educated intelligentsia, and because 
intellectual leadership of the nation had been dominated by the people of higher 
learning, the tenn 'intellectual' in the perception of the general public was commonly 
associated with educational criteria. 
The popularity of the tenn 'intcllcclllcclcn' in public discourse coincided with 
the rising tide of resistance ideologies of nationalism. The accelerator o! this 
strengthening national consciousPess was, among others, the socio-economic 
deprivation of the intelligentsia. This was largely due to the mismatch between the 
supply and demand sides of the educational sector, which resulted in the 
'proletarianization' of the intelligentsia. This situation provided the impetus for the 
proliferation of more progressive and radical political movements. 
The rising tide of radicai intelligentsia and political movements io:creased 
tension in the pubt:c sphere, involving clashes between intellectual-led civil societies 
versus the (colonial) state as well as clashes of ideologies within the multifarious civil 
societies. When they realised they were enduring common difficulties because of the 
economic malaise and political repression, intelligentsia with diverse ideological 
inclinations and social networks began to unite in a single historical calling: the struggle 
for political independence. 
The will to independence necessitated U1e construction of a new imagined-
community. This in h•:n required the invention of a new code as a guide for the 
orientation of the national struggle and for the convergence of multiple-subject po~.;lions 
into what Gramsr: called an 'historical bloc'. 
This notion of 'historical bloc' originated from Gramsci's understanding that the 
political moment in the making of collective will can be broken down into three stages. 
The first and most primitive moment called 'the c.c.onomic-corporativc' stage, is a 
" See, forinsl•nce, Sukamo (t929) and Sjahrir (1931). 
I 
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moment when members .of the same category express a certain solidarity toward each 
other but not with other categories of the same class. A second moment is that in which 
solidarity of interests is shared by all members (categories) of a social class-but still 
purdy in the economic field. The third moment, which Gramsci calls 'the most purely 
political pha~c',marks the transcendence of the 'corporate limits of the purely economic 
class,' and the inauguration of a broader coalition that reaches out to 'the interests of 
other subordinated groups too.' This moment also marks 'the decisive passage from the 
structure to the sphere of the complex superstructure' (Radhakrisnan 1990: 92; 
Adamson 1980: 160-61). Gramsci used the tenn 'historical bloc' to dcEcribc the union 
of structure and superstructure in which an ensemble of ideas and values is shared by a 
number of social sectors. 
In Laclau and Mouffc's view (1985), Gramsci's notion of a historical bloc 
transcends the Leninist notion of political leadership within class alliance. In their view, 
Gramsci believed: 'Political subjects arc not ... strictly speaking classes, but complex 
"collective wills" and where the "collective will" is a result of the politico-ideological 
articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical forces' (1985: 67). The organic 
ensemble of ideas, beliefs, values and practices, ideology, they add, provides the means 
by which the new historical bloc can be cemented, its intellectual-moral leadership 
articulated in the field of political contestation and its hegemony exerted over the rest of 
society. This accordingly removed the problem of attaining unity among diverse 
subordinate groups from the field of class structure and supplanted the principle of 
representation with the principle of articulation (1985: 67-77). 
By adding their concept of 'subject positions' to Gramsci's theory, Laclau and 
Mouffe move further by taking the idea of the historical bloc beyond the class conc~pt. 
The concept of subject position assumes the existence of other points of antagonism and 
social contestation, as well as rccogni~ing the multiformity and non-unitary character of 
the subject. Here, the subject is recognised as a multifaceted, dctotalised, and deccntcrcd 
agent, constituted at the point of .intersection of a multiplicity of subject-positions, 
between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation and whose articulation is 
the result of hegemonic practices. Thus, the bloc in this context looks for multiple 
positionings, multiple determinations and multiple alliances rather than for single 
unifying principle or essence, for example, 'class' in the context of orthodox Marxism.32 
"For commentaries on Laclau and Moutfe's view of the historical bloc, see Radhak'risnan (1990: 934) 
an1 Yanarella (1993: 87-8). 
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Thus, we can argue that in the NEI between the 1920s and 1940s, intellectuals of 
diverse ideological inclinations and spatial positions shared a common ground in order 
to create an 'historical bloc' in their own right. 
3.3.1 From Perhimprman Incionesia to the Construction of an Historical Blor. 
Early efforts in this historical self-invention were carried out by a nucleus of 
Indies students in the Netherlands. In the later part of the 1910s, the existing East Indies 
cultural association, Inclische Vereeniging (IV, Indies Association, est. 1908)/3 began to 
pay attentiou to political matters. The arrival of the triumvirate of IP leaders, Douwes 
Dekker, Suwardi Smjaningrat and Tjipto Mangu:1kusumo, as political prisoners in 1913, 
had provided political inspiration for some of the IV activists. Already in 1916, this 
association published a journal, Hinclia Poetra (Indies Sons). as a medium for debating 
the political issues ofthe NEJ. 
The nationalistic fervour of Indies students in the Netherlands also flared 
following the arrival of new students from lower social backgrounds (in comparison to 
their predecessors) who were mo•e aware politically because of their exposure to the 
early awakening movements in the homeland. The forerunner of these new politically 
aware students was a young revolu!ionary, Tan Malaka, who would become a legendary 
communist-nationalist.figure. 
Born in 1896-7, Tan Malaka was actually a man from a transitional generation 
between the first and second generation of the East Indies intclJigentsia but closer in 
terms of age and political experience to the second one. A graduate of the Kweckschoo/ 
in Bukittinggi, this son of a local Minangkabau aclat chief arrived in Holland in 1913 to 
upgrade teaching qualifications in a Dutch teacher's college, Rijkskwccksclrool, in 
Haarlem. Du~ng his six miserable years of study (often ill and lonely) in Holland 
(1913-1919), he was impressed by the self-reliance of a working class family with 
whom he lodged and particularly attracted by the success of the Russian Revolution of 
the 1918 which stimulated him to begin his deep study of Marxist literature. Because of 
his anti-feudalistic beliefs (Alfian 1978: 149), he was/reluctant to get involved in the IV 
33 It is worth noting that the Jndischc Vcrccniging \\.IS not the only student association which was 
concerned about develo~ments in the East Indies. TI1ere were also the Indies Chinese student association, 
Chung Hwa Hui, and tile group of Dutch students who studied nnd were concerned nbout the East Indies, 
Groeven van lndo/ogisllesrudenlen. In 1917, under the sponsorship ofthe Dutch Ethici, there had been nn 
initiative to set up a federation of the three associations called 'Jmloncsisc/r Vcrbond van Studcercndcn' 
('The Federation of Indonesian students). This federation, ho\\ever, only survived for five years due to 
unbridgeable differences in political orientation nnd interest (Diumburger 1931: 183-4). 
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activities, probably because this organization was still dominated by sons of the 
royal/regent families. Just before he lefi Holland in late 1919, however, he was 
3ppointed to represent the IV at congress of East Indies youth and students of Indalvgy 
at Deventer to report on the n~tionalist movement in the homeland (Malaka !991: 19-
32; Anderson 1972: 270-72).34 
The presence of Tan Malaka heralded the emergence of th~ new generation of 
Indies students in the Netherlands, in the immediate post-war years,35 who were more or 
less influenced by Marxism. Most of these students had been well-known as leaders of 
social movements and student-youth organizations in the homeland and were largely 
from lower social status groups (Van Niel 1970: 223-4).36 Excellent examples of 
students from this milieu were the two Mangunkusumos, GunawJn and Dannawan 
(younger bothers of Tjipto, sons of a Javan~se school teacher) as well as Mohamm;;d 
Halla and Sukiman Wiljosanvjojo (sons of-::~; chant families). 
The highly educated people from this social milieu generally felt mo~c insecure 
in their battle for upward mobility within the discriminative environment of colonial 
society. This feeling of insecurity e.1gendl·rcd a kind of crisis of identity. For some, 
uprooted from their village or small town .md plunged into the metropolitan super-
culture of Batavia or Bandung and then into the vortex of the cosmopolitan super-
culture of Europe, there were problems of 'self-perception' (Ingleson 1979: 2-3). 
Attempts to cope with the combination ofpoli~ical repression and identity crisis became 
3
" Upon his return to the Indies in November 1919 Tan Malaka took up a position teaching cooties 
contracted to the Senembah Corporation. Anderson describes his intellectual venture as follows- 'In Jum: 
1921 he moved to Jnva, where he was at once taken up by the growing radicnl movement. He was brought 
to Semarang by Semaun, the chairnl3n of the PKJ, and nskcd to start a school there. His success in 
~eveloping tlte school...was a IIIJjor factor in his elevation to the chaifiiiJnship oftltc PKI n: the party's 
eighth congress in December tlt:tt year. Altltough he was 25 years old, he ted the party vigorously enough 
to draw rapid repressive action from the colonial government. In March 1922 he was exiled from the 
Indies. It was to be twenty year.: l·cfore he again set foot on his native soil' (Andercon 1972: 271). During 
his exile and imprisonment he wrote some books, the most important being his political autobiography, 
Dari Pendjara ke !'endjara (From Jail to Jail), and his political philosophy, Madilog (Materialismc, 
Dia/ektikD, and Logika = Materialisn~ Dialectics and Logic), 
" In 1919 Gunawan Ma:tgu!lkusumo and Sutomo (former founders of the Budi Utomo) arrived in 
Netherhmds and soon became mcnto75 for their fellow junior students. At the same time, Nazir Pnmontjak 
(a former activist of Jong·Sumatrancn Bond). Achmad Subardjo Djojoadisurjo (a fonner activist or Jong-
Java), and AJex Andries Marnmis (a former activist of JotJg·Minalmssa) also atrivcd. In follov.ing years, 
many more fanner student ar.tivi~ts continued their study in the Netherlands such as Hennen 
KartowisusU'O, lwa Kusuma SuiiiJntri, Moha=d Hatta, SukiiiiJn Wirjosandjojo, Gatot Mangkupradja, 
Darmawan Mangunkusumo, Sunarjo, Abdul Mndjid Djojoadiningrat, Sartono, Ali Snstroamidjojo, 
Setiadji~ and Sutan Sjahrir (Simbolon, 1995: 321-9). Most of tltesc students would pia:• decisive role~ 
both during tl1e Independence movement and in the early decades of post-colonial Indonesia. 
~ It ha.li to b:; bumc in mind that social stratification in the colonial situation was not bast!d on material 
owncrshi~ (land or wealth) but on the individual's proximity to symbols of power •nd authority. thus, 
ind!g!nous merchant families belonged to the lower status group, though financially they might be 
wealthy. 
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possible in the free European bourgeoisie public sphere of the NetherlanJs. In this 
public sphere they could interact with European politi'cal activists and became familiar. 
with contemporary humanist thought. Moreover, these activists from diverse cthno-
rcligious backgrounds for the first time were able to interact intensely with each other 
resulting in a mutual understanding of common interests and leading to the search for a 
n~w collc~tivc identity. 
I 
Aware of the discrepancies between th~ •upcriority of the coloni2( ~tate and the 
inferiority of the coloni!cd people ::.,d '"~"1>·-·•ing the powerl~ssncss :. ,. the national 
movements in the NEI due to lack of cohesiveness, thrse students tricc1 lo find a new 
icon for the construction of the national bloc. In this spirit. Liley felt strongly that the 
term (F~st) 'Indies' was inappropriate. It was not only an ambiguous tcrm~because it 
might be confused with the well-known British 'Jndia'-but also a colonial 
construction. For this reason, they began to promote a :• ,,,lt term, 'Indonesia'. 
The word was actually a neologism which was already used in ethnology and 
anthropological studies. Based on the term 'iltdu-ltesians ', which was coined by a 
British scholar, George Windsor Earl, in Singapore in 1850 and popularised by his 
compatriot, James Richanlson Logan, the word had initially been used '"to idcmify a 
particular geo-culture characterised geographically by the ar~hipclago (nus a in Malay or 
nesos in Greece) and culturally by the term ludic (Jones 1973: 93-ll8}.37 In th~ hands of 
the Indies students in the Netherlands and the progressive intelligentsia in the homeland, 
however, the term was reformulah:d specifically I<• refer to the particular politico-spatial 
context of the NEt and to provide a new political orientation for the nationalist 
movements. In Halla's words (1928; 1998: IS): 'For us, Indonesia expresses a political 
objective, as it signifies hopes for a fatherland in the future, and to make it come true 
every Indonesian will struggle with all their effort and ability.' 
The reinventi.1n of the term highlighted a departure from its original sense, 
which reflected lhe struggle for self-construction.38 For the students it icpresevted the 
" TI1is included the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Slr.lits Settlements (Malaka, Singapore, Penang 
nnd the '"rroundings), l1ritish Borneo (Sarnw-dk, Brunei, British North Borneo Company) . and 
Madagascar. 
31 A well-known Dutch scholar, Van Vollcnhovcn, criticized the use of the tcnn 'Indonesia' ns a synonym 
for t11e Dutch East Indies. According to him, even though the largest number (about 49 million) of tl1e 
'Indonesian' (in former nnthropological sense) people at tlmt time lived in tl1e Dutch East Indies, there 
werr nt least IS million lOving outside this territory. Responding to tllis criticism, Hatta (InS) drew an 
analo~y with tl1e USi• ·::- ·. \!though tl1e geographical notion of the term 'America' i•: a signifier for n 
new continent strctct~ ·.· >.:'I !·.-:tween two poles to inch1dc some ~>tiles and -:-:·~ions, in fact there is only one 
1;tatc occupying only · .. · ... . t.:..1er of the entire continent which derive.c: its name from \he name of thr-
"r:Ont:nent. Its rmr.1e is not only 'Americ1', but even the United States of America, which 1113Y refer to the 
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basis for tl1c making of a collective identity and the beginning of creating one nation. In 
this respect, the genesis of an Indonesian nation was somewhat different from the 
. experience of most Western Eu"opean and Central/Eastern European societies. In 
Western Europe, the dcvclopmcm of national consciousness ran largely parallel to the 
constitution of the nation-state, while in Central/Eastern Europe the constitution of the 
nation-state was generally a reaction to an already existing cthno-cultural nntional 
consciousness (Giesen 1998: 2-3). In the Indonesian context, however, the state 
(colonial state) came earlier, and the national consciousness as well as the constitution 
of the onc-nationcss was a reaction to the existing alien (colonial) state. Thus, from the 
very beginning th~ constitution of indonesia was not a constitution of the 'natio'l-statc', 
but rather the 'state-nation'. In this embodiment, the state-bred intelligentsia turned to 
nationali•m in their struggle for independence from the repressive (colonial) state. As 
such, the state in the Indonesian context was likely to be the main rationale for both tho 
construction and destruction of nationhood. 
To highlight this shifi in consciousness, the Imlische Verecniging (Indies 
Association) changrd its name to Indonesische Verecniging (Indonesian Association) in 
: n1, pioneering the usc of the tcim (Indonesische, Indonesia) by a native association. 
The development of a new national consciousness and the need to create a boundary 
between the colonizer and the colonized world, necessitated a change in the symbolic 
universe. Thi5 was reflected in this statement by SunaJjo's (a Lcidcn law student): 'I am 
disgusted with what the Dutch have done and I intend as soon as I return to the 
Fatherland to find a teacher who will try to remodel my very neglected Malay and 
k:ancsc, for they are in a very regrettable condition' (lnglcson 1979:8-9). 
The Indies students believed that to usc Dutch words for the name of the 
association was now out of tune with the new Indonesian identity. To express the spirit 
of nationalism, in 1924 the Indonesische Vereeniging (IV) was again renamed, using 
Indonesian (Malay) words, 'Perhimpzman Indonesia' (PI, Indonesian Association), 
and its journal, Hindi a Poetra, became 'Indonesia Merdeka' (Free Indonesia). 
It is worth noting that the IV's membership represented only a tiny minority of 
Indies stt:dcnts in the Netherlands. To give an example, in 1926 at the peak of its 
political activities, the PI's total membership was only 38 out of more than 673 
Indonesian students at the time (lnglcson 1979: 2). In addition, the political outlook of 
federation of all states in the continent. According to llntta, the naming of America to refer to an 
individual state is acceplllble, not only due to the usage of the USA people but also as other st:ltes in tl1e 
Chaplcr 3 - Making Indonesia 174 
its members was by no means homogenous. For students such as R. M. Nolo Suroto 
(son of Notodirodjo from the royal family of Pakualam), to maintain the status quo of 
the East Indies under the Dutch colonial empire was the preferred option. For 
Maharadja Sutan Kasajangan Soripada (son of the Tapanuli Regent), the union of the 
East Indies with the Netherlanus was preferred (Simbolon 1995: 319-.''). But for the 
true believers in an Indc:pendent Indonesia, a radical departure from the colonial ties 
was the only way ahead. it was the true believers in Indonesian independence who 
finally played dominant roles in transfomting the PI into a sort of seedbed for 
conccptualising 'Indonesia' as, to use Anderson's words, a new 'imagined-community'. 
The dominant personality among these protagonists of an Independent Indonesia 
was Mohammad Halla (1902-1980).39 Imbued with the idea of independence and a 
national b!l: , he and his comrades carefully watched the nationalist movements in the 
homeland and were dismayed by their fragility. Not only had they failed to create a 
strong mass based organization to challenge the Dutch but they were also trapped in a 
spiral of rivalries among themselves. 
Th~ disputes between the Islamic and communist intelligentsia both inside and 
outside the SI were unbridgeable (sec below), and neither of two streams impressed 
most of the PI members either ideologically or strategically. For the more advanced 
students with considerable exposure to a secular education system, the SI tendency to 
stress increasingly it~ Islamic base was obviously dissonant with their habitus and life-
world. On the other hand, despite the fact that most of them were ideologically 
socialists--altl'l!cted to a Marxist interpretation of colonialism as the child of 
continent have their owti specific names (llatta 1928). 
"Born in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) in 1902, llatta's original name was Mohammad Ibn 'Attn•. This 
name was inspired by Mohammad 'Atta'·i 'l-Lah al-Sakandari, tl1e author of Al-llikam (the Wisdom), a 
book on Islamic mysticism t..'tat was well known among communities linked with lhe traditional Islamic 
schools (Madjid ~IJ02). He came from a strong religious and wealthy family. His grandfatl1er, Syeikh 
Abdurrahul:ln (l'/:'7-1899), was tl1e grand founder of the famous surau Butuhampar (Payakumbuh), 
which was well k!;own as a teaching centre of the Naqsyabantliyah mystic•! order. His father, lladji 
Muhammad Djamil (Sjeikh Batull:lmpar), was a prominent local u/ama-mcrcl.r.nt, while his mother was a 
descendant of the richest family in town (Nocr 1990: 15-6; Alamsjah lY52: 32). Witl1 his well-to-do 
background, Hatta was able :o enrol in the ELS and MULO in Padang, and then continued his study to the 
Prins Hentlrik Hande/s School (SecondarY Commercial School) in Jakarta. During his childhood and 
schooldays in West Sumatra he had been exposed to botl1 Islamic mysticism 1"-_.~·ht in his father's surau 
and the reformist-modernist Islamic teaching given especially by Dj01pjt Dja;:•~.' ··: in Bukittinggi and 
Abdullah Achmad in Padang. Apart from this- religious exposure, however. fro' 1 i!tJ second year of his 
study in MULO (1918) he became interested in a student youth organization, .! .. ·ig Sunralranen Bond. 
This interest became more serious during his schooldays in Jakarta until he lefi for the Netherlands in 
1922 to continue his study at the Handc/s-Hoogesc/wal (College of Economics) in Rotterdam (Noer, 
1990: 21-2). Having a strong religious upbringing but long exposed to a secular education and 
environment, Halla became a religious nl:ln personally but 'liberal' (embracing inclusive values) 
politically. 
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capitalism-the Indonesian communists' ideals and methods of class struggle and the 
usc of violence were not shared by most PI members. For the students who mostly came 
from the historic ruling class and wealthy families, and for those with higher education 
who aspired to new elitist roles and status, the struggle for the new Indonesian 
imagined-community in class terms was ipso facto discordant with their ideals. 
Moreover, these PI intellectuals believed that the PKI tendency to usc violence and 
popular uprisings prematurely would only result in a futile Joss of Indonesian Jives 
(Ingleson 1979: 10-3). 
Having rejected the ideology of Islam an\l Communism as well as ethno-
nationalism as the basis for an independent Indonesia, the PI came up with a new 
ideological conception that emphasized the primacy of the political goal of 
independence. This conception did not mean that the PI approach down-graded socio-
economic questions. The majority of PI members also realized the multicultural nature 
of Indonesia and envisaged the future adoption of a federal state system in order to 
rescue the national heteroglossiu from the iron cage of the centralized colonial statc.40 
For them, however, independence had to come first, and only a united Indonesia which 
put aside particularistic differences could break the power of the colonizers. 
According to the PI's conception, the political goal of independence should be 
based on four principles: national unity, solidarity, non-cooperation, and self-help. 
Natio11al 1111ity meant the necessity of setting aside particlilaristic and regional 
differences to form a united battlefront against the Dutch. Solidarity meant eliminating 
differences between Indonesians while cssentializing conflicts of interests between the 
colonizers and the colonized people-this conflict could be symbolized in racial terms 
(the brown versus the white). No11-cooperatio11 meant the necessity of seizing 
independence through Indonesia's own effort--as the Dutch would never grant it 
voluntarily. This necessitated ignoring offers of cooperation with the Dutch, for 
example, through participation in the 'Peoples' Council' (Volksraatl). Self-help meant 
the necessity of developing an alternative national, political, social, economic and legal 
st111cture, deeply rooted in indigenous society, parallel to that of the colonial 
administration (Ingleson 1979: 5). 
The PI's enunciation of the ideological principles which were the basis of the 
mdependent Indonesia was the beginnin~ .:fan 'historical bloc'. The PI's conception of 
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'national bloc' as an historical bloc tended to emphasize the ensemble of multiple 
'subject positions' which might include both class alliances and cultural (solidarity) 
alliances. In this conception, the project of an independent Indonesia needed to 
transform the commonality of Indies people from economic to moral-intellr.ctual 
alliances, since the concept of class alliances was considered inappropriate to the 
situation in Indonesia where class formation had never been the main basis of social 
incorporation. 
The will to construct a national bloc could not in fact be built from scratch, but 
rather necessitated the incorporation of the previous irleolo<J;ies of major political 
movements (parties). Thus, in spite of their disagreement with the aims of 
previous/existing political movements (parties}, the PI ideological principle was by and 
large a further synthesis derived from its predecessors. National unity was the major 
theme of the bu/ische Parlij, non-cooperation was that of the Communist political 
platfonn, and the self-help was that of the Sarekal Islam. Solidarity was the only the 
thread which linked these major themes. 
To implement the PI's ideals in Indonesian society, its members recognized the 
importance of building a new united nationalist party as a national body, which the 
radical nationalists of all political persuasions could join. The intellectual leadership of 
this national bloc was expected to be in the hanrls of the new generation of politkally 
conscious Western educated intelligentsia. Because of their superior training, awareness 
of the nature of colonial oppression, and ability to free themselves from 'colonial 
hypnosis', the young intelligentsia were expected to take the initiative in awakening 
popular power and providing a theoretical basis for collective actions (Legge 1988: 23-
4). 
As a national body of this kind did not yet exist, the task of the PI members was 
to socialize the PI's ideas among Indonesian youth organizations and poiitical 
organizations as well as to promote student circles similar to the PI to provide cadres for 
the leadership of new nationalist movements. To create a network between the 
nationalist's brains-trust in the Netherlands and the political activists in the fatherland, 
former PI members who had returned to the homeland were expected to play a role as 
cataiysts in parallel with the distribution of the PI's publications as mediums for 
exchanging ideas. 
"At the PI meetings on 7 and 28 March 1926, Sunarjo raised the issue of the form of a tree Indonesian 
state. Halla and tl1e majority of students in Amsterdam preferred a federal state system because of tl1e 
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What enabled the PI's ideals to lind fertile ground was the emergence of a fresh 
generation of university students both in other overseas countries and in the homeland. 
Following the PI appearance, Indies student associations in some other countries outside 
the Netherlands, such as in Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Japan, and even in the USA 
began to rename their associations incorporating the term 'Indonesia' (Biro Pcmocda 
1965: 46). Similar decisions were taken in the homeland. 
3.3.2 From Djama 'all al-Chairiall to the Construction of an Historical Bloc 
The experiences of Indonesian students in Egypt deserves attention in order to 
understand the incorporation of Muslim intellectuals into the Indonesian 'historical 
bloc'. In 1922, Indo-Malayan students in Cairo began to establish the Welfare 
Association of the Indo-Malayan students (Djama 'all al-CIIairiall al-Talabiyyall al-
Azllariall ai-Djawall, popularly called Djama 'all al-CIIairiall). The leading figures of 
this association, among others, were Djanan Thaib, Muchtar Lutfi, Jljas Ja'kub and 
Mahmud Junus (of West Sumatra), Raden Fathurrahman Kafrawi (of East Java}, Abdul 
Kahar MuZilkkir (of Yogyakarta) and Othman Abdullah (of Malaya). Started as an 
agency to further the social welfare of university students, by 1925 this association had 
distinguished itself by adopting increasingly radical views, critical of both Dutch and 
British colonialism. These radical views were affected by both the political 
developments in Indonesia and the increasing nationalist fervour in the Middle East. 
Early in the 1920s Egypt itself was pounded by a wave of anti-colonial sentiment and 
constitutional change that gave rise to continual political ferment (Rolf, 1970a: 74). 
The growth of radical views among the Indo-Malayan students found their medium for 
articulation in the emergence of the association's most influential monthly journal, 
Serocan Azllar (Call of Azhar,}. Produced from October 1925 until May 1928, the first 
director of this journal was Fathurrahman Kafrawi who would become a prominent 
Muslim leader with NU affiliations. 
The views of the Seroca11 Azllar were perceived as threatening the colonial 
establishment, so that the colonial government soon banned its circulation in the NEI. 
Even so, it continued to be widely read in Malaya. The major themes of this journal 
centred around three main concepts: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Malayanism (union between 
Indonesian and Malaya}, and .:mti-colonialism (Rolf 1967: 88-9). In an introductory 
editorial, Mahmud Junus as one of its editors wrote: 'All our pcople ... whcther in Java, 
diversity ofNEI cultures (Inglcson 1979: 12). 
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or in Sumatr~. or in Borneo, or the Malay Peninsula, must unite and share a common 
purpose and agreement to strive for advancement, seek the best ways of doing this, and 
on no account allow ourselves to split into separate parties' (Roff 1970a: 77). 
Meanwhile, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, as president of the association and director of the 
journal in 1925-1926, wrote in Seroean Azhar, II, 13 (October 1926): 'The first steps of 
the indigenous movement of Indonesia and the Peninsula have been taken .... Young 
Indonesians and Malays have given thought to action both within and without by 
mingling with other peoples. In short we can say that we have joined hands with the rest 
of islamic world .. .'(Ro!T, 1970a: 79). 
Activists of this association also maintained contact with intellectual movements 
elsewhere, including with the Netherlands-based Pcrhimprman Indonesia. Under the 
influence of these discourses and networks the association began to be obsessed with 
the idea of creating an historical bloc. Initially, it even imagined the unity of Indonesia 
and Malaya. To express this, it changed its name in 1927 to 'Pcr~11111p11lan Pcmuda 
Indonesia Malaja (Pcrpindom, Association of Indonesian-Malay Youth). 
The Pcrpindom, however, did not last long. Indonesian students became more 
engaged in domestic political issues in the Indies. This was especially so following the 
failure of the Caliphate conferences in Cairo and Mecca and following the communist 
uprising on the West Coast of Sumatra (January 1927), in which so many Muslim 
students of the Sumatra Thawalib were involved. A controversy arose concerning the 
extent to which the journal should engage directly with radical nationalist movemen:s. 
This controversy provided the impetus for a split within the association notably between 
the Indonesian and Malay students. 
In September 1927 Iljas Ja'kub ceased to be editor of Seroean Azhar, and in the 
following month he established Pili/ran Timocr (Choice of the East). Both journals, 
however, only survived until 1928. Following this event, the Malayan students left the 
association, while the Indonesian student~ came out with a new association, 'Pcrsatuan 
Kcmerdekaan Indonesia', The Union for Indonesian Independence (Thomas 1973: 32-4: 
Abaza 1999: 49). This choice of name made the Indies (Muslim) students integral part 
of the creation of the historical bloc. 
3.3.3 From Domestic Student Movements to the Construction of an Historical Bloc 
Following the establishment of three colleges in the 1920s (THS, RHS and 
GHS), some clubs for university students began to appear in the Indies. Most of the 
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student clubs in the early 1920s were oriented towards rccrc.1tional activities dominated 
by Dutch students. A good example of this was the Corpus Studiosontm Bandungcnse 
(the Bandung Student Body, CBS) that had appeared in 1920. Outside the mainstream 
recreational clubs, however, there emerged some study clubs among a nucleus of 
politically conscious students especially in Bandung and Jakarta that had the potential to 
become counterparts of overseas student associations in the creation of an historical 
bloc. A prominent personality among these politically conscious students was Sukarno 
who entered the THS in 1921.4 t 
Former activists of the IV/PI played important roles in the early formation of 
study clubs in Indonesia. The first study club in th~s context was the lttdot:esisclte 
Studicclub (ISC, Indonesian Study Club) with its magazine Soeloclt (Ra )at) Indonesia 
(Torch of the Indonesian People). Established in Surabaya in July 1924, the founder and 
driving force of this study club was the well-known Sutomo, who had returned from the 
Netherlands in 1923. Aimed to promote the consciousness of Indonesia as a nation and 
a sense of socio-political responsibility among Western-educated Javanese, this club 
emphasized the practical value of the knowledge in seeking solutions for the nation's 
problcms.<2 
The formation of the study club in Surabaya was contagious. The movement 
spread to other cities such as Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Batavia, Scmarang and Bogor. The 
best known of the clubs, however, was the Algemene Studieclub (ASC, General Study 
Club), that came into existence in Bandung in November 1926. An early figure in this 
Club seemed to be lskaq Tjokroadismjo, a fonncr PI activist who had returned home in 
1925. The most active promoters of the club, however, were the Bandung tertiary 
41 The 'ion of a schoolteacher of lesser priyayi lineage-who g<tLt1ed access to the European education 
system (ELS) wid• the help of a Dutch private teacher, Sukamo had io~g been fluent in the 'language' of 
natiomtlism. His r.:uly exposure to the youth organization, 'Trl Koro Dflanno' (Jong Jam}, might have 
fuelled his concern for national problems, but the early training in the language of nationalism was his 
encounter with the ~:1 grand leader, Tjokroaminoto, when he was a student of the HBS in Sumbaya. 
Tjokro was not only well·known for his tendency to 'agree with all mcn'-·and political activists from 
diverse ideologies were welcomed to his house-but also the fact tl~at he had been a landlord for students 
of a diverse political inclination. Not only Sukamo lived in his house, but also Muso and Alimin (later 
became leadm of the PKI), Kartosuwiijo (!ater became a leader of Islamic militant (DUTil]), and 
Abikusno "I:iokrosujoso (later became a leader of the PSII) (Amelz 1952: 55). It was probably his early 
interactions with political activists of diverse backgrounds as well as through his reading about the 
contcmpt;rary fracture among tltc major political parties tlmt made Sukamo aware of the weakness of the 
f:roto-nationaiist movements. · 
'Instead of restricting itself to theoretical disc•lSSions and advice, the ISC empllaSizcd Ute practical value 
ofkn~wlcdge in seeLing the solution to the notion problems. In so doing, it promoted the establishment of 
schools, banks, health clinko, t\,undling homes, and so fortlt. The activists of this Club came from 
returnees of former PI members, Western educated Javanese-many of whom had been memXrs of the 
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students, notably two engineering and architecture students from the THS, Sukamo and 
Anwari. Besides the involvement of former PI members and radical students in 
Bandung, this club had also been supported by the presence of the grand old nationalist 
mentor, Tjipto Mangunkusumo. In its formative stages lskaq became the inaugural 
chairman of the club. Later, however, Sukamo became the dominant personality of the 
Club. 
Like overseas student activists who had been obsessed with the idea of the 
national bloc, Sukamo and his fellow domestic activists also shared the same ideal. In 
1926 he wrote an essay in the journal of the ASC, Indonesia Moeda (Young Indonesia), 
entitled 'Nasionalisme, lslamisme dan Marxisme' (Nationalism, Islam ism and 
Marxism), idealizing the synthesis of those major ideologies for the sake of building the 
national bloc. This reflected the thinking of many membcrr 'lfthe ASC. 
A further step in the promotion of the national bloc was the creation of 
Perlzimpwzan Pe/adjar-Pe/adjar Indonesia (Association of the Indonesian Students, 
PPPI) in 1926. Drawing on the circle of politically conscious tertiary students of 
Jakarta, mainly activists of the RHS, which had appeared in 1924, the PPPI membership 
was extended to recruit a large number of tertiary students in Jakarta and Bandung. The 
significance of this association was its role in bringing together various (lower-level) 
student-youth associations in which the PPPI members were regarded as respected 
senior-comrades (Pringgodigdo 1964: 99). At the same time, the attempt to create a 
national bloc was taken by the ISC when it sent its secretary, R.P. Singgih (former a PI 
activist), to promote the establishment and unity of study clubs on his extensive tour of 
Java around the mid 1920s. This campaign was echoed in Bandung when various study 
clubs and student-youth organizations, as well as social and political organizations (the 
BU, SI, Mulzammadiyalz, Paszmdan), formed the 'Komitc Pcrsatumz lltdonesia' 
(Indonesian Unity Committee) in 1926.43 
To counter Ute growing influence of the politically oriented study clubs and 
student associations, Dutch conservative professors (especially in Batavia) reacted by 
sponsoring the establishment of purely academic and recreational student associations. 
Examples of the latter type were the Uzzitas Studiosonmz Indonesia (Association of the 
BU but who, like Sutomo, found that the Javanese-orientation of this organization was no longer in line 
with the new national spirit-and tertiary education graduates in Dandung and Batavia. 
" The executives of tllis committee were predominantly ASC members (Sartono as Chainnan, Suprodjo 
as vice--chairman, Sukamo as first secretary, Sjahbudin Lntif as second secretary, and Mas Usm:m as 
lreasurer). Besides being ASC members, Sartono, Suprodjo and Sjabbudin Latif were also fanner PI 
· members (lngleson 1979: 22; Pringgodigdo 1964: 60; Biro Pemoeda 1965: 46-7). 
------ ----------------- ------------------ -------------
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Indonesian Students, US!, est. 1932), the Indonesischc Vrouwclijkc Studcntcn 
Vcreeniging (Association of indonesian Women Students, est. 1933), and even the more 
conservative Dutch-dominated Studenten Corps (Union of Students), which also 
emerged in the decade (Pringgodigdo 1964: 168; Mrazek 1994: 226). 
Althou:;li H1~se Dutch-sponsored student associations successfully recruited a 
large membership, this did not deter progressive students from their struggle for 
historical-self invention. The emergence of the Indonesian Unity Committee inspired 
activists of various student-youth associations to hold the First All-Indonesian Youth 
Congress (30 April--2 May, 1926) in Jakarta. Despite the shortcomings of the 
congress-its committee represented individual voices rather than official 
representatives of the student-youth associations and also the Dutch language continued 
to be used in its meeting~ (Purbopranoto 1987: 314)-it paved the way for the 
strengthening of alliances among student-youth associations and for further acceptance 
of the concept of a national bloc. In a similar spirit, students in Bandung under the 
patronage of the ASC, who felt no longer at home within the constn:: .. ~- Jf ethno· 
religious groupings, established in early 1927 a student-youth organization named Jong 
Indonesie (Young Indonesia). The organization had its branches in several big cities and 
published ajoumal Jong Indonesie. By the end of the year, the name of the organization 
and its journal were renamed Pemoeda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth) together with the 
creation of its sister organization, Ptllri Indonesia (for women), to relle-:.: ,:1e growing 
enthusiasm for spreading Indonesian. 
A giant step in the creation of an historical bloc was the establishment of two 
political associations. The first was Pcrscrikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNT, Indonesian 
Nationalist Association) in July 1927 with its aim to achieve Indonesian 
independence.44 This was followed by the fonnation of Permzifakatan Perhimptman-
Perhimpwtan Politik Kcbangsamt Indonesia (Federation of Political Organizations of 
the Indonesian People, PPPKI) in December 1 'll7 45 Allem!lting to create an all-
Indonesian nationalism, this federation ;.. ~-.·c il ~~ew convi~tion to !!1c nationalist leaders 
44 A year later this association ci!dnged its. name to Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian 
Nationalist Party), tho first political party led by intellectuals with higher education. 
"This federation was composed of the PNI (reprcscnt•d by Sukamo and lsl"Dq), ASC (Sartono, Dudiarto, 
Samsi), PSI (Sukiman and Sjahbudin Latif), DU (Kwumo Utojo and Sutopo Wonobojo), Pa.mndan (Oto 
Subrata, Dakri Swjaatmaja and S. Scndjaja), Sarikat Sumatra (Parada Hamhap and Dachlan Abdullah), 
Kmmr Betawi (M. Husni Timm.;n), and ISC (Sujono, Gondol11Sumo and Sunjoto). The majority of the 
representatives in this federation were now obviously those with tertiary education. 
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that a united Indonesian nation was possible, though the federation itself did not last 
long.46 
The emergence of the PNl and PPPKI stimulated activists of student-youth 
organizations to hold the Second All-Indonesian Youth Congress. Under the leadership 
of the PPPl, the Congress was held on 26-28 October 1928 and resulted in a 
monumental ~ornerstone in the formation of the historical bloc. This was the declaration 
of the so-called 'Soemp 1/r Pemoeda' {Youth Pledge), which contained three ideals: one 
fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, Bahasa Indonesia. 41 
Thus, despite the ongoing polarization between the secular and Islamic intelligentsia as 
well as fragmentation both within the secular and Islamic intellectual community, there 
was a collective will to create a common historical bloc in the cause of achieving 
Indonesian independence. 
3.3.4 From Literary Activism to the Construction of an Historical Bloc 
The road to the formation of this historical bloc was in fact not only a political 
trajectory but also a cultural one. The 1920s/1930s saw the development of national and 
cultural self-awareness in the literary field.48 The most important expression of this was 
the emergence of a literary magazine called Poedjangga Baroe {PB, the New Poet) in 
46 A competitive power struggle between Muslim and nationalist lcadero: to win the leadership of the 
rolitical movement in general and the PPPKI in particular led to the breakcio\\n or the rcderation. 
'The committees of the Congress were composed of representatives of the PPPI (Sugondo Joyopuspito), 
Jnng Jam (Joko Marsaid), Jor.g Sumatra (Muhammad Yamin), Jong Batak (Amir Sjarifuddin), Jong 
ls/amictetl Bane/ (Johan Muhamad Tjaja), Pcnweda Indonesia (Kotiosungkonol. Jong Celebes (Scnduk), 
Jong Ambon (1. Leiu>el\l'.), and Pcmactla Kaum Betawi (Rohjani). 
"' In the race or a whote series or social and political developments and the need to renew the rabric of 
Indonesian socialli!"c and identity, significant changes took place both in the ronn and content or literary 
works. In 1920·2, Muhammad Yamin began to abandon the traditional pantun and syair (verse) forms 
when he published the first truly Western influenced modem poems followed by tl1e publication of early 
modem Indonesian novels such as Mcrari Siregar's Azab clan Scngsara Anak Gadis (The Trial and 
Tribulations of a Young Girl) and Marah Rusli's Sitti Noerbaja (Miss Nurbaja) both published by the 
Dalai Pustaka (BP) respectively in 1920 :md 1922. The production of such modem literary works was 
made possible by tl1e govcmment·sponsored BP. It was probably too much to expect critical {political) 
works to be supported by this publishing house since the colonial government was suspicious ofanytl1ing 
connected with the nationalist movement. Yet, the BP had unintentionally served as the springboard for 
the development of nationalistically criented literary works. The major themo of the BP's literary works 
in the 1920s/1930s was the crisi• of personal identity experienced by members of the intelligentsia who 
were trapped between the modtm and the traditional world. Beyond this major theme, despite 
government restrictions on anything associating itsctr wit~ the name Indonesia, some books that were of 
importance within tho framework of nationalism were unexpectedly published. In Abdul Muis' novel 
Salah Asocilan (A Wrong Upbri~ing, 1928), Sanusi Pane's collection of poems Madal1 Kc/ana 
(Wonderer's Song, 1931), and in Habib SL Maharaja's novel Nasib (Fate, 1932) the tenn Indonesia was 
freely used (Teeuw, 1986: 234). Outside tl1c BP literature, the serial publications in tl1e vernacular press 
continu-.d to provide a major alternative for publishing more critical (political) literary works. The 
rcpresC".H.ativc par excellence of serials publication wus again Mas Marco Kartodikromo's no\·cls Rasa 
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1933. The main protagonists of this magazine were Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (b. 1908) 
and Armijn Pane (b. 1908); the fonner was a graduate of the RHS who had worked with 
the Dalai Pustaka (BP), the latter was a fom1er student of the STOVIA and NIAS who 
had also worked as an editor of the BP. Although it was called a literary magazine, the 
PB was concerned ,.·ith general cultural issues which were often interwoven with 
current political ones. Alterations of its sub-title throughout its lifespan indicated the 
metamorphosis of its concern from literary towards general cultural issues and then to 
the constitution (•rthe national bloc.49 
For about eight years of its publication-u~til the time of the Japanese 
occupation-the PB became a prominent discursive arena in which intellectuals could 
exchange ideas concerning new cultural and intellectual foundations for the construction 
of a new and fecund pan-Indonesian imagined connrntnity. The most monumental 
achievement of this magazine was its major role in triggering the unfolding "polemik 
kebudajaa11' (cultural polemic) in several newspapers and periodicals on the so-called 
pan-Indonesian culture of the 1930s.so 
St. Takdir Alisjahbana and Sutomo proved the most important personalities of 
the polemic for each represented an extreme of contradictory views. Instead of idolizing 
the glorious past as an inspiration for the future Indonesia, Takdir perceived the pre-
Indonesian era as the period of 'jallilijall' (ignorance), which had been 'mali semati-
matillya' [.ls dead as dead can be). As the past could not provide a good foundation for 
the building of a new Indonesian nation, he saw the key to the future Indonesia ia the 
spirit of dynamism that to him was the source of Western progress. As the key to this 
Western progress was the spirit of 'illtel/ectualisme', 'illCiividua/isme' and 
'materialisme', the Indonesian young intelligentsia should not be afraid to follow this 
Merdika (the Feeling of Freedom) and Kromo Bcrgerak (tlte Massos on the Move) published in Sinor 
Hindia respectively in 1924 and 1931. · 
<4
9 Iu the first year of the magilZine, its sub-ti:le was 'Madjalah ke.(!ocsasteraan dan bahasa scrta 
kebocdajaan omocm' (Magazine for liternture and language togetlter with gcncrnl culture). From tlte third 
year and for a few years to come its sub-title was 'Pembawa scmangat baroe dalam kcsocsastcraan, scni, 
kcbocdajaan dan soal masjarakat ocmocm ·(Dearer of a new spirit in literature, art, culture and general 
social issues). Later it went so far as to become 'Pcnrbinrbing semangat baroc jang dinamis oentock 
membcntock kcbudajaan baroc, -kebocdajaatt per .. ·atocn Jnrlone.sia' (Conveyer of a new, dynamic spirit 
for the formation of a new culture, a culturo oflndonesian unity) (Teeuw1986: 29·30). 
50 Titc polemics began with a provocative artieie of St. Takdir Alisjahbana, 'Menoejoe Masjarakat dan 
Keboedajaan Baroe' (Towards a New Society ond Culture) puolished in the PB in August 1935. This 
soon invited other polemicists-such {lio 3an11Si Pane, Sutowo, Suwal\l. Sulj~ningr.1t, Purb:~tjar.tkn, 
Cindarbumi, and M. Amir-to cng3g" in the ;:olemir and involved some other presses such as Soeara 
Omoem, Pewarta Deli, and Wasita (Kart.1mihardja 1954). 
Chapter J • Making Indonesia 184 
way.51 On the other hand, Sutomo perceived that Western culture and education had 
poisoned Indonesian society, which had produced the uprooted intelligentsia whose 
members were destitute of any cultural aspirations and interested only in safe jobs as 
clerks. Furthermore, he viewed Western education as only offering instruction, instead 
of providing education in the proper sense of the word, i.e., moral training, character 
development, and a sense of mutual responsibility. Thus in contrast to Takdir's 
preference for Western education Sutomo was in favour of the traditional religious 
school system, the pesmztren (Kartamihardja 1954; Johns 1979: 23-5; Tceuw 1986: 
37).51 
The polemic was a showcase for the ambivalent relationship between the 
colonized intelligentsia and the Western colonial masters. In dealing with aspects of the 
imperial culture-language, modes of thought, knowledge infrastructure, etc., there had 
been two main contradictory strategies for achievin[ lc.doncsian independence. In the 
terminology of post-colonial studies, this contradiuion r~·! b~ described ~s the 
opposition of the proponents of 'authenticity' versus that of 'Jp·, ... ,priation' 53 Whatever 
their strategies, however, ;-.. c;l shared a common spirit in understanding the importance 
of cultural foundations for the construction of the historical bloc. 
Thus, on the eve of the Japanese occupation, 'Indonesia' as an imagined 
community had been ;,,..,,,,:d, the idea of historical bloc had been grounded, and the 
language of n'''"""l.:;f": :>:;d :·.<:··n proclaimed. The political or9ortunity structure of 
· .~.y the tenn 'intellectualism.-: >~ m~;~.·! the capacit:. to look at the world objectively and analyticaJiy; 
:r•! ienn 'individualism' means ti;~ r:;tn3cy of thC' ir.divic'!•al rights as ov~r against the corporate r.roup; 
tmd the term 'materialismc' means 11 healthy acqui:;itive att,,.idc t(l material comfons. 
52 The fact that Sutomo, a produ-:t of ovtrsel!s study (in Europe), was in favour r;f 'L\c pre.colonial 
traditions and Takdir, a product of the domestic one, valued d1e Western traditions indic<J.tcs that exposure 
to the master's house was not a guarantee of individnal submission. The individual response to the 
imperial culture seemed to depend on the specific personal experience in the encounter with the master's 
house as well ns on the social origin and social networks of the particular individu:1l. 
'
3 For the proponents of 'authenticity', the demand for a rejection of all things to do with colonialism 
through programs of decolonisation invoked the idea tlmt some forms and practices o~ imperial culture 
were perceh·ed ns 'inauthentic' and so ham1ful. In this view the return to the perceived •authenticity' in 
the fonn of the recuperation of authentic prc..colonial traditions and cultures Y.'3s preferred. TI1e problem 
with this view was that its supporters onen became entangled in an essentialist culturnl position in which 
fixed practices becan:e ieonizcd as authentically indigenous and others were excluded as hybridized or 
contaminated, ignoring the possibility that cultures might develop and clmnge as their conditions changed. 
To counter the view that the usc of the colonialist's culture inescapably imprisoned the colonized within 
the colonizer's conceptual paradigm, a second stn:!egy emerged, that of dismalttling the nustcr's house 
witt, LIJc master's tools. According to this view, colonized subjects could uso the imperial culto.~ fr.rough 
•ap,:.:\lprlution' to artic•datc their own social and cultural identities. The master's house was always 
adaptable and the same tools mi~ht offer a means of conceptual tninsfol11Ultion and liberation. In addition, 
through 'nbro6ation' the dcminal-:d or colonized culture could use ihc tools of the dominant di~:oursc to 
resist its politiea! or cultural control (Ashcroft 1998: 5-22). 
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Japan~se administration would provide a decisive moment for the consolidation of these 
historical projects in their journey to national independence. 
3.4 The Fractured Public Sphere and the Making of Intellectual Political 
Traditions 
All historical actions in the making of the historical bloc were renected and 
affected by the public sphere of the period. In this period, the public sphere became a 
contested space between commonalities and differences. There was indeed a common 
concern to fom1 an historical bloc. However, there •.verc also ideological rivalries and 
connicts of interest between groups and organizations. In this respect, the public sphere 
was no longer the domain of critical discourse between private individuals, rather it had 
become a force field of competing collective expre~sion: of identity politics. 
3.4.1 The Ccmmonalities in the Public Sphere 
Despite experiencing acute political cleavage·>, ail political parties supported the 
idea of the national bloc as an historical bloc. Proto-nationalist associations of the 
previous decade gradually changed their names renecting their acceplcnce of the idea of 
Indt>ncsia-ncss. r; · 'he 1930s, nil political parties added the word 'Indonesia' to their 
names. 
During this period, the tendency of the press to be an extension of social and 
pnlitical organizations remained. What appears to be a new feature in the public sphere 
of the 1920s-1930s was the press disposition, regardless of political affili~tions, to take 
up and amplify the catchwords and discourse of the national bloc. Examples are the 
frequent use of words like bergerok (to move), fllcrdeko (free), ra 'jal (people), and 
Indonesia as titles of publications. From the titles of publications, we can trace the 
constmction of the national bloc as a gradual metamorphosis from the word 'bergerak' 
to 'mcrdcko' to ra 'jal and finally to 'llldOIIesia '. 
The term 'bergerak' (to move, he on the move) began to be u:.ed in the title of 
publications around mid-1910s when the paper Doc11ia Bt.•gerak appeared in Surakarta 
(191411915) as the organ of the JJB (League of Native Journalism) but then became the 
mouthpiece of the SI and the IP. This was followed by the SI's mouthpiece Islam 
Bergerak (est. 1917), the Padang-based newspaper Soemalra Begerak (est. 1922), the 
Red SI's Ra 'ja: Bcrgcrak (replacing its predecessor Doe/u'l Baroe in 1923), and so 
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forth. This tenn reflected the desire ofthe Indies people to move awn)' from the colonial 
situation. 
The tcnn 'merdeka' (independence) first appeared in the title of Be11i11 Menleka, 
published in Mcdan in late 1916, as a mouthpiece of the SI. lt was followed by n 
communist oriented Soeara Merdika in 1917. Thereafter, it featured in the titles of Si11ar 
Merdeka in North Sumatra in 1919, Sora- Mardika in Bandung in 1920, Sora Ra'jat 
Merdika in Gamt in 1931 and some others. 
T · ; ~nn 'ra :iat' (the people) seems to have been first used by the communist 
oriented Socuro Rc;'al 1'tat was established in 1918 'ollowcd by the Red SI's Ra'jat 
Bergerak in 192 ~-- Next in ! 930s there appeared the PSI oriented Sora Ra 'jat Merdika 
(est. in Garut in : · ~- ·' 
PNI Baroe's Dauil. · 
r'artindo's Fikira11 Ra'jat (est. in Bandung in 1931), and the 
· m.d K.:dart/ata11 Ra 'jat (est. in Jakarta respectively in 1931 
and 1932) and several Jthcrs. 
Finally, the incorporation of the tcnn 'bulo11esia' in the title of publications seems 
to have been pioneered by the PI when its journal changed from Himlia Poetra to 
llldo11esia Merdeka in 1924. Operating in the Netherlands under full protection of Dutch 
law, this journal experimccd much more freedom of expression than its counterpart~: in 
Indon·~oia and played an important role in the dissemination of the idta of~"· .,otional 
bloc. The word 'Indonesia' was used by the ISC's paper, Soe/oeh (Ra 'jalj resia 
(est. 1924), the ASC's journal, lndo11esia Maeda (est. 1926), th. Jong 
lndonesie's!P··'lloeda Indonesia's journal, Jo11g llldol!esia/Pemoeda l11donesia (est. 
1927), thr :- ·.edan-based Matahari brdor!esia (led by a former PI member, Iwa Kusuma 
Sumantri, est. 1929), the PSI's newspaper Oetoesa11 Indonesia (replacing its 
predecessor Octoesan Iiindia in 1932), anJ some others. 
The appearance of these 'code' words signified the changing of intellectual 
discourse as well as the transformation of the nationalist movement from static or 
localised to dynamic (bergerak), which stimulated the intelligentsia to move from a 
mindset of repression to one of freedom (merdeka). l•• "O doing, the intelligentsia took 
the nationalist movements from the elitist periphery to the heart of the ordinary people 
(ra 'jat) followed by the attempt to draw all proto-na:ional bonds into .. the new 
Indonesian imagined community as a common historical bloc. 
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3.4.2 Disputes in the Public Sphere 
This process of making Indonesia a new imagined community and historical 
bloc, however, was conterminous with the ongoing political disputes among the 
intcliigentsia of different ideologies and/or intellectual networks. The clash of 
ideologies occurred as a result of the growing radicalisation of politicised intelligentsia 
and as social movements of the previous decades transformed themselves into political 
parties. 
At first, the ideological discovery was needed not only to give a solid theoretical 
foundation to resist the repressive colonial state, but also to give a cogr.itive structure 
and collective identity to particular collective actions. Nevertheless, once that ideology 
was taken up by a structured )'<llitical party-that entailed specific rules, a code of 
conduct, chains of command and party discipline-a mental, linguistic, and spatial 
boundary had been automatically created to define the border between us and !he'll, in-
group and out-group (collective) identities. Different ideologies would in tum lead to 
different intellectual political traditions. 
The presence of 'tradition', according to Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger 
(1983), is invented. The construction of Indonesian intellectual political traditions was 
propelled by the growing economic and political frustrations of the intelligentsia. This 
frustration was a result:;; me Indonesian economic malaise from the time of the end of 
World War I up till the great economic depression of the 1930s and th1: colonial state's 
deployment of a msl en orde regime. During tb;-. period of politico-economic 
oppression, intellectuals (of the intelligentsia and 'clerical-intelligentsia') as the 
'creators and carriers of tradition' (Ei&enstadt 1973) began to translate their id~ological 
formulations into various intP-llectual-politicaltraditions. 
A. The Birth ofti•e Communist and Modernist Mu~r,. Intellectual Political Traditions 
First of all, the growing economic and political frustrations made radical 
ideologies very attractive. In the early 1920s, the seeds of radical socialism which had 
been gathered by the ISDV and then planted in !he fertile soil of the SI (through the 
'bloc within' strategy) in the previous period, began to bloom. For the deprived 
intelligentsia, the phpnomenon of its growing 'proletarianization' can be identified as 
one of the factors that drew it to communism. For the frustrated masses, !he 
perseverance of the leftist intelligentsia in supporting the working dass and peasant 
interests through labour unions, strikes and rallies magnified the ;;itractivcness of 
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'communism'-whatcvcr their understanding of this term-as a sort of apocalyptic 
hope. 
The educational background of native communist leaders, such as Scmaun and 
Darsonc·, provides a typical example of the formal cducatior~al qualifications of many 
members of the communist intelligentsia. While Scmaun (b. I S99) had only studied at 
the 1\veetle K/asse (Second Class Native primary school) with an additional course in 
Dutch language, Darsono (b. 1897) was a drop out of the native primary school. 
However, he was able to transfer to the vocational school of agriculture in Sukabumi. 
Similar educational patterns appear among many of the internees of the communist 
uprisings of the 1920s. As Van Nicl's observed: 'None of the internees could be classed 
as belonging to the highest Indonesian intellectual level... The degree of failure among 
them to complete secondary school training is unusually high even when compared with 
the general average of failures' (Van Niel1970: 234-5). 
For many of the intelligentsia of this kind who were barred from entry into 
adequate bureaucratic, professional and business positions, working as professional 
revolutionaries was u feasible choice. Alienated from the government bureaucracy, 
Western sector of the economy, the old aristocracy as well as the Muslim petty 
bourgeoisie, they began to identify themselves with the urban working class and rural 
poor peasants. In this context, some aspects of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of 
communism appear to have satisfied their desire for an histo!lcal self-invention. 
Few of those intellectuals who called themselves Marxists had actuaily studied 
Marx. 54 Besides, only a part of communist theories of revolution was workable in the 
Indonesian context.55 Nevertheless, the Marxist-Leninist perspective of colonialism as 
the child of capitalism and the understanding of Dutch colonialism as a historical phase 
in the development of Western European 'sinful' capitalism was intellectually and 
emotionally satisfying to these radical intellectuals (Mintz I959: 5; I965: 8). 
Under these conditions, the ISDV was able to expand its native constituencies. 
From late 1917 (aflcr the second national congress of the SI) the ISDV-influenced 
Semarang branch of the SI had gradually drawn the CSI to take a radical socialist 
direction. Encouraged by such a promising result, in May I9I8 the ISDV decided to 
s.c A~~~"!! to Mintz m.1ny of the ideas that the Indonesian Marxists frequently attribute to Marx nrc 
essentially those of Leninist doctrines (Minlz 1959: 171; 1965: 7). 
" In practice, there had been a tendency for the Indonesian communist party to depart from communist 
class theory and secular values and to acconunodtatc other forms of social cleavages (cultural stream) and 
syncretic (religious) values of the poor peasantry (Mortimer 1969: 1-2). 
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transfomt itself into a native movement in its own right without too much regard for 
whether the nativ~s understood or even approved of the movement's communist goals. 
On the eve of the 1920s, the ISDV began to attract a huge number of native followers 
from both inside and outside the Sl. 
Based on the deepening influence of the leftist revolutionary section within the 
Sl and the growing power of the ISDV, a strategic alliance was made between 
communist cadres inside 'the bloc within' (the SI) and the outside (the ISDV) designed 
to create a cCJmmon front. As a result, in May 1920 proponents of the leftwing SI-
Semarang together with members of the ISDV began to establish a new communist 
organization, Pr.orserikatmt Komnumist di India (the Communist Association in the 
Indies, PKl)-the first such organization established in Asia outside of the former 
Russian empire-with Semaun as president, Darsono as vice president, Bergsma as 
secretary, and H. W. Dekker as treasure: (McVey 1965: 34-46; Kahin 1952: 74). With 
the establishment of the new Indies communist association, however, the communist 
cadres in the bloc within remained as members of the SI creating a problem for the 
Islamic oriented intelligentsia of the orgauization. 
In response to the id~ological attraction of communism both outside and inside 
the association, the Islamic oriented intellectuals of the SI came out with a counter-
ideology. The battle in the field of discursive practices between proponents of 
communism and Islamic modernism had its own constructive results. This in tum led to 
differences in 'social identities', 'social relations', and systems of knowledge and belief 
among members of the Sl. The bitter personal elite rivalries that had earlier caused 
cleavages within the association had now achieved ideological definition. Islamic 
identity that had been activated in the previous decade began to enter the phase of 
'politicized identity'. This term denotes a situation where an identity provides a more 
firm base for action and where individuals constantly think of themselves in terms of an 
identity (Bradley 1997: 26). In this phase, Islamic identityhecame not only the basis for 
political thinking and mobilization; it was the sole basis for politics. 
The making of an Islamic identity as the sole basis of politics was constructed by 
a system of signification based on the invention of a new form of Islamic ideology. 56 
The construct of Islamic ideology in this historical period was in fact produced within 
specific socio-historical contexts and discursive formations as a response to the 
56 As Louis Althusser holds, consciousness is constructed by ideologies; these nrc systems of meanings 
that construct the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence ( 1971: 152-~). 
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presence of significant others either as a defensive or affirmative mechanism. Although 
AI-Afghani's ideology of Pan•lslamism and 'Abduh-inspired Islamic reformism-
modernism became the main inspirations for formulating Islamic ideology in the 
Indonesian context, the h•fluencc of the leftist intellectuals and the relevance of socialist 
dochines for colonized people stimulated the Islamic-oriented intellectuals to combine a 
progressive view of Qur'anic doctrines with certain socialist ideals. This combination 
became known as 'Islamic socialism'.57 The new ideology was spearheaded by the 
Islamic modernist group including Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, Abdul Muis and 
Smjopranoto, with Salim acting as tlw prime fommlator of the ideology because his 
erudition in both Islamic and Western socialist literature was the most advanced in the 
SI. 
Inspired by the new politicized Islamic identity and ideology, Islamic 
intellectuals under the influence of Salim began to accuse communist cadres in the Sl of 
having dual loyalties, which created problems for the maintenance of a common 
platform and collective identity. This in tum led to the idea of party discipline/' and a 
policy to remove Communists from the organization. The furore this caused was only 
calmed by the efforts of peace-maker, Tjokroaminoto. However, when he was taken 
into custody in August 1921-accused of petjury in the secret Section B trials-Salim 
and Muis success fully took control of the organization. As a result, at the Sixth National 
Congress of the SI in Surabaya ( G-11 October 1921 ), the party discipline proposal was 
accepted by the Congress. As a consequence, the communist cadres had to leave the SI. 
Tan Malaka, in his capacity as a communist leader from late 1921, had tried to 
resolve tensions between Communist and Islamist leaders before his arrest in March 
1922. Then, from exile, he continued to struggle to reconcile the relationship between 
communism and Islamism through the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922. 
On this occasion, he outspokenly denounced the Comintern's hostility to Pan-Islamism 
as an untrustworthy, bourgeois force. He also stressed 'the revolutionary potential of 
Islam in the colonized territories and the need for communist parties to cooperate with 
radical Islamic groups' (Anderson 1972: 272; Malaka 1991: 92-3). This, however, was 
Sl For further discussion of the roots and formulations oflslamic socialism in Indonesian context, see J. S. 
M~.tz (1965). 
" Salim and Muis argued tl1:1t party discipline had in fact been applied by the DO, NIP and even Ute PKI 
itself. Nevertheless, the Sl had been excepted. As the most powerful organization in this period, the Sl 
tended to be viewed as a recruiting ground for other organizations notably the PKI (Pringgodigdo 1964: 
42). 
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not well-received by his communist comrades, and the conflicts between the PKI and SI 
continued. 
The removal of the communist cadre from the SI resulted in the formation of 
two intellectual political traditions in Indonesia: the reformist-modernist (Islamic) 
iradition and the communist (secular) tradition. The cultural base of the former was 
Islamic reformism-modernism, while its main socio-economic base was the (urbanised) 
Muslim petty bourgeoisie. The cultural base of the communists was a mixture of secular 
and syncretic abangan values, while its socio-economic base was the urban working 
class and rural peasantry. These differences were reflected in their views of nationalism. 
While the basis of nationalism of the reformist-modernist tradition was Islamic 
solidarity, that of the communist tradition was class solidarity. 
Each tradition contained within it the ideological touchstones for future 
generations of what were popularly called 'Muslim' and 'communist' intelligentsia 
movements. Henceforth, the word 'M•1slim' ir. Indonesian political discourse was no 
longer a 'culture code' referring to anyone ~.nbracing Islamic religion, but rather a 
'political code' signifying the adherents of Muslim politics (political Islam). 
During the 1920s, the SI gradually transformed itself into a political action 
group for reformist-modernist Islamic ideas. In February 1923 it changed its name to 
Partai Sarckat Islam (PSI, the Islamic Union Party) and then became Partai Sjarikat 
Islam Imlia-Timur (East-Indies Islam Union Party, PSII) in 1927 and finally was 
renamed Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam Union Party, PSII) in 1929 
(Amelz I 952b: I 5). 
Meanwhile, the Marxist revolutionary intelligentsia became more integrated into 
the communist international community. In I 924, members of the Pcrserikatan 
Komwzist di India supported by the splinter group of the SI (the so-called Sf Meralz 
[Red SI] or later 'Sarekat Rakjat' [Peoples' Union]) transformed the communist 
association of the Indies into the Partai Komzmis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist 
Party, PKI) (Ricklefs 1993: 174). 
While the SI was gradually being transformed itself into a reformist-modernist 
political party, reformist-modernist non-political organizations such as Mulzammadiyalz 
and Al-Irsyad began to expand from local to national levels. The tide of reformist-
modernist zeal provided a self-defining moment for the conservative-tradi :ionalist 
ulama to express their own collective identity. 
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B. The Birth of the Traditionalist Muslim Intellectual Political Tr:o;!it:on 
Until the early 1920s, despite the growing innucncc of 1hc reformist-modernist 
movements in the public sphere, the relationship of the traditionalist ulama with their 
rcfonnist-modernist counterparts in Java remained on relatively good terms. This is 
evident, for example, in the multiple affiliations of Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, who was 
a pioneer of the traditionalist (politico-cultural) movement. While he was studying in 
Mecca, he took the initiative to set up a local branch of the SI. Next, as we have seen, he 
collaborated with Mas Mansur (a reformist-modernist ulama, and a former student of 
Al-Azhar) to establish the Nalullatul Wathau in 1916. 
The deepening penetration of reformist-modernist propagation in the 1920s, 
however, brought a real threat for the traditionalist ulama.!n 1921, Mas Mansur left the 
Nahdlatul Wathau and his former traditionalist comrades to join the Muhammadiyah. 
Henceforward, connicts between the two Islamic streams became more severe, 
exacerbated by personal disputes between those who used to be close friends. This 
development pushed conservative-inclined ulama like Wahab to further identify 
themselves with traditional Islamic identity and traditional Islamic networks. 
The deepening connie! within the Islamic community in the f.1cc of the growing 
pressure of the communist and other political groups, stimulated the Muslim 
intelligentsia of the SI to try to unify Islamic groups. To this end the First All Islam 
Congress was held in Cirebon (31 October- 2 November 1922) with the dual aim of 
minimising internal disputes on matters of 'fum' (trivialities) and 'khilajiah' (matters of 
difference), and emphasising the unity of the entire Islamic community (ummah) under 
the leadership of the Caliphate. In fact, the Western educated intelligentsia of the SJ and 
leading figures of the urban-based reformist-modernist organizations dominated the 
leadership of the Congress leaving the rural-based traditional ulama in a mar gina! 
position. This became even more markc-' :i' .·n the second Congress was held in Garut 
(May 1924}, for only the reformist-modernist clements attended the Congress (Van Nicl 
1970: 209). 
The disenchantment of the traditionalist ulama became stronger in the aftermath 
of the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey by Mustafa Kcmal (Ataturk, 1881-1938) in 
February 1924. Shocked by this abolition, Al-Azhar ulama planned a so-called 
international 'Caliphate Congress' organized by Rashid Ridii scheduled originally for 
May 1925 (Landau 1994: 236-8). In response to this planned conference, the third 'All-
Islam Congress' was held in Surabaya (24-26 December 1924) to sdect the Indonesian 
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delegates for the Cairo congress. Those chosen were predominantly reformist-modernist 
leaders. 59 
Because of internal difficulties, the Cairo congress itself was delayed until May 
1926, and by this time there was no Indonesian 'official' {'All Islam Congress') 
delegation to the Congress. Nevertheless, the resentment of traditionalist 11/ama 
continued to grow, exacerbated by events following the capture of Mecca by 'Abd al-
'Aziz ibn Sa'ud (1880-1953) in October 1924. 'Abd al-'Aziz brought with him 
puritanical Wahhabi ideas of reform and the ambition to become a new Caliph. In 
countering the Cairo Congress plan, which smacked of the Egypt's King Fu'iid's (reign 
1923-36) ambition to become Caliph, Ibn Sa'ud also planned an international 
conference in Mecca on the issue of the Caliphate scheduled in .Tunc-July 1926. 
The Indonesian problem of choosing between the Cairo and Mecca congresses 
and of deciding an appropriate response to the new Sa'udi regime, led to the Fourth and 
Fifih 'All Islam Congress' respectively in Yogyakarta (21-27 August 1925) and 
Bandung (6 February 1926). In these Congresses Mulrammadiyalr, which was from the 
very beginning closer to the Egyptian Islamic reformism-modernism rather than to the 
radical puritan Wahhabism, favoured the Eg-.rrt congress. Meanwhile, Tjokroaminoto of 
the PSI and traditionalist ulama preferred the Mecca Congress. In the eyes of 
Tjokroaminoto, King Fu'ad's role in the E;typt congress represented a British plan to 
control the entire Islamic world. For the :::tdiiionalist ulama, the Hijaz position was 
perceived as much more important than that of the Caliphate for it was the home of 
traditional Islamic teachings. In their eyes attending the Mecca congress was important 
in order to ask for a guarantee from the Wahhabi regime that traditional Islamic 
practices would be respected. In fact, although the 'All Islam Congresses' decided to 
choose the Mecca Congress, none of the tradit•or.alist ulama were appointed as 
Indonesian representatives to the Congrcss60 (Van Bruinesscn 1994: 29-33). 
All these events marked the growing dominance of the Western educated 
intelligentsia and the reformist-modernist groups in the leadership of contemporary 
" The nominated delegates were Tjokroaminoto and Surjopronoto (PSI), Ahmad Soorkattic (AI-lrsyad), 
Fakhruddin (Muhammadiyah), and Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (a representative of traditionalist ulama). 
60 TI1e official representatives to the Mecca Congre5' "''re Tjokroaminoto (of the PSI) and Mas Mansur 
(of the Muhammmliyalr). Outside the Alllslamdele~odons, tl1ere were four non-official delegates to tl1e 
Mecca Congress, namely Muhammad al-Bagir (a troditional ulama of Yogyakarta), Djanan Thaib (a 
graduate of Al-Azhar who established an Indonesian school in Mecca, Madrassa Indonesia ai-Makklah in 
1926), Um:1r Nadji and Muhamnt~d bin TI~alib (both of Al-lrsyad). Meanwhile, the refonnist-modemist 
community of West Sumatra sent its own delegates to the Cniro Congress, namely Hadji Rasul and 
Abdullah Achm:~d (Van Bruinessen 1994: 33). 
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Islamic movements in the archipelago. With the development of a cohesive relationship 
between the Muslim intelligentsia and reformist-modernist ulama, the position of the 
traditionalulama came under iilreat both culturally and politically in the: homeland. The 
capture of Mecca by the Wahhabi regime threatened their position in the heartland of 
Islam. With the non-representation of the traditionalist ulama in the All Islam 
delegations to the Mecca Congress, Wahab Chasbullah (a spokesman for traditionalist 
ulama in the All Islam Congresses) urged traditionalist ulama to send their own 
delegates. They responded the so-called Komite liijaz (The Hijaz Committee) on 31 
December 1926. To add credibility to these traditionalist delegates, this committee then 
transformed itself into an organization that came to be known as Naltdlatul Ulama (the 
Rise of the Islamic Scholars, NU).6 t Henceforth, the NU, with Hasjim Asj'ari (the 
founding father of Pesautreu Tebuireug) as its venerable leader and Chasbullah as its 
main organizer, became the representative par excellent of Islamic traditionalism with 
its stronghold in East and Central Java. 
The emergence of the NU reflects the existence of another intellectual political 
tradition in Indonesia, namely the traditionalist (Irlamic) tradition. The cultural base of 
this political tradition was 'Islamic traditionalism'/2 while its main socio-economic 
base was the rural peasantry (land owning). For the next two decades, the leadership of 
this tradition relied heavily on the ulama and the traditionalist ulama-illtelek, as the 
traditionalist intelligentsia remained in the gestation stage 
While the leadership of the reformist-modernist political tradition was 
predominantly Muslim intelligentsia (illtelek-ulama) with the support of the reformist 
ulamu-illtelek, the lead~rship of the traditionalist tradition was predominantly ulama. 
Thus, conflicts between the two· traditions reflected not only the contestation of 
ideologies but also tlte contestation of social prestige between the old and the new 
Islamic clerisy. There had been recurring attempts to close the gap between the two 
traditions especially in response to the external ideological pressures. However, the 
cleavage between the two streams remained. 
61 This name seemed to follow the practice of earlier organizations set up by Chasbultah from 1916 up to 
early 1920s that had used the word 'nahd/ah ',such as Nalrd/alul Wathan (Ute Rise of the Fatlterland),and 
Nahdhatu/ Tuffar \fhe Rise oftltc Merchant). 
61 Islamic tradition111ism prefers to conserve •indigenous Islamic values' (Islam pribumQ. 
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C. The Bilth of the 'Nationalist' and 'Socialist' Intellectual Political Traditions 
In the midst of such growing tensions in the public sphere, abortive communist 
uprisings look place in West Java (November 1926) and on the West Coast of Sumatra 
(January 1927). The colonial government's crackdown of the uprisings was disastrous 
i:•'; only for the PKI but also for the rest of the nationalist movements. The PKI was 
banned, and thousands of its leaders and supporters were jailed or transported to the 
malarial upper reaches of the Digul River in New Guinea. The event was a prelude to a 
more general roundup oflndonesian nationalist leaders. 
As the colonial slate became more and more repressive, the radical intelligentsia 
concluded that Indonesians could not expect any meaningful assistance from the 
colonial master towards achieving their independence. Therefore, all cooperation with 
the colonial government should be terminated. In the eyes of PI members, 'Cooperation 
is only possible between two groups with equal rights and duties and with a common 
interest.' Otherwise, cooperation means merely 'the stronger riding roughshod over the 
weaker "!'.d the usc of one as an instrument by the other for its own interest' ('"gleson 
1979: 9). Thus, in following the PKI, which irom the very beginning refused to take part 
in the Volksraad, in late 1924 the PSI turned its political course towards the called 
'Jzidjralz · (migration) politics, which meant shifting from cooperative to non-cooperative 
politics. This stance was followed by other nationalist political movements and parties. 
The exile of many suspected l~aders and supporters of the PKI insurrections 
followed by the removal of the party from the political scene, encouraged young 
nationalist intellectuals to take over political leadership by implementing their 
conception of a new united nationalist party. Halla and his PI connections proposed the 
establishment of the Sarekat Rakjat National lndone.sia (SRNI, Indonesian National 
people's Association). After the rumouncement of the intended formation ofthe SRNI in 
early 1927, however, the PI lost the initiative to implement the plan to a group of 
nationalists in the Bandung-based Algemene Studieclub (ASC). Leaders of the ASC, 
notably Sukamo, argued that they had a better understanding of the Indonesian situation 
than the PI executive in the Netherlands. Abandoning the PI's proposed programme, the 
Bandung group then took it own initiatives. On 4 July 1927 they publicly launched a 
new nationalist association called the Perserikatan Nasio11al /11dallesia {Indonesian 
Nationalist Association, PNI) with a journal Persatoe11 Indonesia (Indonesian Unity). A 
year later, it metamorphosed into the first nationalist party led by intellectuals of higher 
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learning, the Parlai Natio11al 111do11esia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in which 
Sukarno assumed the position of chairman (Ingleson 1979: 2!k:3). 
The emergence of the PNI heralded the formation of another intellectual 
political tradition in Indonesia namely, the secular 'nationalist' traditicn. In fact, there 
was a crucial d:sagreement between the PI's ideals for the new party and the actual 
political direction taken by the PNI. In Halla's view, despite the need for the new party 
to be radical in nature, its first task was an educational one, and it could therefore 
proceed only slowly to prepare its members for independence. In Sukarno's view, 
however, Halla's plans were too moderate and the proposed party's educational role 
was tactically inappropriate for it would not lead soon enough to an independent 
Indonesia. In contrast to Halla's ideal, the PNI preferred to be a radical mass party. 
Beyond the controversy surrounding the new party's character, however, this seemed to 
prove that even in this historical phase the relationship between the university student 
activists was not always harmonious. There had bu,r, some disguised competition 
among students of different networks resulting from their respecti•,e c·!ltural origins and 
political inclinations. 
Halla's opportunity to implement his idealized party came after the arrest of 
Sukarno and three of his colleagues, and their subsequent trial and imprisonment in 
December 1929. After the imprisonment of Sukarno, Sartono, who took over the 
leadership, decided to dissolve the PNI and to form an ostensibly new organization in 
April 1931 named Portij 111do11esia (Parti11do, the Indonesian Party). Parti11do 
maintained the PNI journal, Persatoem1 llldo11esia, and published a new party 
newspaper Fikira11 Ra 'jal (People's Ideas). Not all former-supporters of the PNI joined 
the Parli11do. In many places those who disagreed with Sartono's action set up rival 
organizations in the form cf study clubs and catted themselves 'Golo11ga11 Merdeka' 
(Independent Groups). About the same time, the PI itself split when Moscow-oriented 
Communists gained .control over the organization, resulting in the expulsion of Halla 
and his younger comrade Sutan Sjahrir (b. 1909) who had arrived in Holland in 1929. It 
was through the emergence of the 'independent group' movements that Halla and 
Sjahrir found a way of implem~nting their political ideals. 
To the leading figures of this movement, such as Sujadi and Johan Sjahruzah, 
both Halla and Sjnhrir stressed the importance of publishing a journal and providing 
political educaiion for the masses. Late in August 1931, the 'independent groups' from 
several cities met and acting on Halla's and Sjahrir's advice estnblished a new political 
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mu•:··••. · . .vith its own journal. For the name of the movement they chose neither 
'pa;.· . .-~•!y) nor 'perserikata11' (association), but 'pe11didika11' (education), that is the 
Pe11didika11 Nasio11al l11do11esia (Indonesian National Education, PNI).63 The name ofits 
journal was Dau/ot Ra'jat (the People's Sovereignty, est. 1931), which was followed a 
year later with its own newspaper, Kedau/ata11 Ra 'jat (Mrazek 1994: 78-87). Aller 
Sjahrir and Hatta returned from the Netherlands respectively in 1931 and 1932, they 
assumed leadership of the Pendidika11 Nasio11allndonesia, which was popularly called 
the PNI Bant (the New PNI). 
The release of Sukarno from Sukamiskin prison did not succeed in reuniting the 
(secular) nationalist movements. He decided to throw in his lot with Par·tindo and thus 
perpetuated the cleavage between that party and PNI Baru. Both groups shared a 
common secubr-nntionalistic outlook, but both had different constituencies. Followers 
of both group differed in the degr~e of their exposure to {Western) liberal-secular values 
and socialist thinking. The main recruits of the Parti11do were followers of adat-
oriented ka11111 muda esp•:.~ially flam Central and East Java, who worked for the 
government bureaucracy and remained respectful to traditional aristocratic valu~s. In 
· contr.JSt, PNI Bant tended to be critical of any 'intellectual aristocratic spirit' .64 Its main 
constituency was the secular-oriented ka11111 muda who worked for the government 
bureaucracy and Western sector of the economy, typically people of higher learning 
who had been highly exposed to {Western) liberal-secular values.65 Compared to 
members of the Partindo in general, members of the PNI Bant were also stronger in 
their ap.,reciation of Marxist-socialist thir.king. 
Henceforth, the secular nationalist intelligentsia was split into two camps: the 
secul:l~-ttaditio.uilist nationalist political tradition (commonly called 'nationalist' by 
Indone>:i,ms ·, ~nd the secular-modernist nationalist political tradition (commonly called 
by Indonesian as 'socialist'). The cultural base of the former was a mixture of secular 
values, local customs and syncretism, while its main socio-economic base was a 
" InJ. D. Legge's view (1988: 21): 'TI1e name was probably chosen in order to preserve 01e initials, PNI, 
but it expressed also Balta's view Omt the principal task of01e nationalist movemcntatthis stage was not 
agitation or mobilization of mass action to challenge 01e colonial power, but the less spectacular task of 
educating 01e members of the movement and prep:uing for along term struggle against the more powerful 
imperial enemy.' -
64 As Mrozek observed (1994: 91): 'The Pendidikan carefully registered all of01e ningrat, 'aristocratic' 
characterCtics of its opponent. •Noble bearers of degrees' was a favorite term.' 
"Having said that the PNI Baru 's 1113in supporters wen ?"-"Ople of higher learning is by no m>ans to say 
that the educational qualifications of its leaders were superior to that of P11rtlndo. Conversely, the 
educational background of Partindo leaders was in fact superior to that of 01e former, since most of them 
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combination llf the government bareaucracy and land owners. The cultural base of the 
latter was Western secular values, while its main socio-economic base was a 
combination of the gover.;meni bureaucracy and Western sector of the economy. 
D. The Birtll ofChri•tian Intellectual Political Traditions 
Developments in the public sphere in tum encouraged the Indonesian Christian 
(Catholic and Protcstan:) community to develop its own political action groups. Already 
in 1923 Javanest: Catholics had successfuiJy established their own political ass<'::iation, 
namely Parkempaian Po/itik Djawi (the Association of Javanese Politics, PPKD) Jd by 
F. S. Harjadi and then I. J. Kasimo.66 In response to growing political tensions, the 
:i'PKD then transfom1ed itself in July 1938 from a socio-cultural movement into a 
political oue under the banner Persarrwn Po/ilik Kato/ik Indonesia (the ·politi~al unity of 
Indonesian Catholics, PPKI). An attempt to set up an Indonesian Protestant political 
party was made in December 1930 when U1e Partai Kaum Mase/zi Indonesia (PKMJ, 
Indonesian Christian Party} emerged in Jakarta.67 The party called for the autonomy of 
Indonesia and the need for the autonomous government to be b::sed on Christian 
Principles. Due to internal rivalries, hov.o<:ver, this party lasted for only a short time. A 
more serious effort was made in 1939 when the so-called Federasi Perkumpulan 
Kristen indonesia (Federation of the Indonesian Christian Associations) was establisher! 
in Yogyakarta,"8 as a prelude to tl:e establishment of a Christian political party 
(Pringgo<.li!;dO 1964: 126-8).69 
Being relatively small in membership the significance of the Christian (Catholic 
and Protestant) political parties, in Ricklefs' view, came from 'the substantial over-
representation of Christians in higher levels of the civil service and the military b'cause 
of their superior educatior ~~qualifications' lRicklefs 1993: 240). The emerge,.c,: of 
derived from the higher pr•)·ayi families who had earlier access to the higher cljur::alioh j•or further 
observations, see Ingleson, 1979: 193-5). 
66 For two years to come, however, PPKD remained affiliated to the Dutch-sponso:-<u /ndischc Kathollckc 
Partij (IPK). In 1925 it begon to assume an independent status separated from the lKP. and aficr 1930 its 
membership was extended to non-Javanese Catholics. 
•• Until 1930, the Indonesian protestint political community was affiliated to tl1e Dutch-sponsored 
Christclijkc Ethisclic Partij (v.hich was renamed the Christclijk Staatkundigc Parll] in late 1930). 
61 This federation consisted of the Pcrkwnpula11 Kaum Kristc11 (Association of the Christian Community), 
Pcrsatuan Guru Kristen (Association of the Christhm Teachers), Pcrsatucn Vcrplcgcr da11 Vcrplccgstcr 
(Associations of tl1e Christion Nurses), ami Pcrsall/an Pcnrocda Kristen (Associations of the Christian 
Youth}. 
69 Proponents of this fedemtion such ns Amir Sjarifuddin, at a Chri~tian missionary conference in 
Karangpandan (ncar Snrakarta) in 1941, rnised the issue of the Church's calling in tllc political field and 
the plan for establishing tl1e Christian political party. This pion could nr! ·.,.. implemented until 1945 
- becawc of the interruption of the Japanese occupation. 
Chapter 3 · Making lndonc.sla 
•99 
Christian political action groups represented the fonnation of yet another intellectual 
political tradition, that is :he Christian (both Protestant and Catholic} tradition. The 
~ultural base of this tradition ""OS Christi!·-• values, while its socio-tronomic. base was 
il1e government bureaucracy a!tl •,·.:, \I.' estern eector of the economy. In the discourse of 
nationalism and Indonesian State and nationalism in the future, the positicn of this 
tradition tended to follow the 'secular' nationalist position/tradition. 
E. Fragmentation within Intellectual Political Traditions 
Further consolidation of these political parties and traditions was still 
constrained by the increasingly repressive colonial state apparatus during the world 
economic depression of the 1930s. With the Dutch government's concern to maintain 
more finnly public 'peace and quiet' there was no scope for effective political activity 
on the part of non-cooperating parties. The choice of political parties was either 
cooperative politics (with the risk of internal conflicts between the realist and idealist 
members} or accepting a shadowy ~xistcnce (with the risk rJflosing contact with a larger 
audience}. 
In these circumstances, fragmentation within particular political traditions began 
to emerge. In May 1930, radical clements of the Sl-West Sumatra branch and Sumatra 
Thawa/ib groups converted the Swnutra Thawalib into a political association, Persatuan 
Muslimin Indonesia (PM!, lndoaesian Muslims' Union}. In 1932 it became a political 
party r..•cl its 'lame was abbreviated to Permi (Nocr 1973: SO}. Among promi<•t>•: 
pcrso .•. :;t •s of this party '.·.~re former activists of the Cairo-based Djama 'all a/-
Chairr·'''. ::~as Ja'kub and Muchtar Lutli. Disappointed with the value of Pan-Islamic 
ideas foil-· .i1ng the failure of the Caliphate conferences in Cairo and Mecca, Ja'l..-ub and 
Lutfi returned home respectively in 1929 and 1931. On their return they took charge of 
this ncwiy ··stablishcd party to make it attractive to many younger Minangkabau. Using 
the • .,gan of Islam dan Kebangsamz (Islam and [Indonesian] nationalism} the Permi 
established links with Partindo (Ricklefs 1993: 190} and distanced itself from the PSI 
ideological position. Af.er the Dutch arrested Lutfi and Ja''c•Jb in 1933, howe••er, this 
party soon disappeared from <he. public scene, thoug!1 :c c<Judnued to i;,, active 
educationally and culturally (Roff 1970a: 87). About the same time, internal disputes 
within the PSII, between proponents of the cooperation anrl those of the non-
cooperation, caused this party suffered a severe internal fragmentation. 
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In 1935, Sutomo's bulm•csische Sltldieclub, which had changed its name to 
Persatua11 Bangsa l11donesia (Union of the Indonesian Nation, PBI) in I 931, merged 
with the BU to form Partai lndollcsia Raja (Pari11dra, Greater Indonesia Party,). This 
party tended to be close to the Partimlo in its ideological position, but for the sake of its 
survival it remained or. tr:::ld terms witli the colonial government (Vander Veur 1984: 
26). Meanwhile, aficr the arrest and c>.ilc of leading nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, 
Halla and Sjahrir in 1933, Partindo was dis~,,; 1ed in November 1936. A year later, 
some of its former activists Jed by members of the radical intelligentsia such as 
MohP:nmad Yamin and the lefiist P.atak Christian Amir. Sjarifuddin, established 
Gcraka11 Rakjat flldo/lcsia (Gerindo, Indonesian People's Movement). With similar 
objectives to the Parti11do, the Geri11do accepted cooperation with the Dutch to appose 
the threat of.fascism, especially Japanese fascism (Ricklefs 1993: 192; Pringgodigdo 
1964: 108).70 
In short, on the eve of the Japanese occupation, there had already emerged six 
major 'intellect~al' political traditions in Indonesia: modernist-reformist (!~Iamie) 
tradition, traditionalist (Islamic) tradition, communist (secular) tradition, 'natir" tlist' 
(secular) tradition, 'socialist' (secular) tradition, and Christian (secular) tradition. One 
more political tradition would emerge ai\er the Japanese interregnum, namely the 
military (secular) tradition. Each tradition had its "" :1 culture and socio-economic base 
as well as political orientation, as depicted in Table 3. Features of each traditi~n in this 
diagram arc only an ideal t}T·~ and valid during the early fornmtion of intellectual 
political traditions (1920s-1940s). Over the. course of time, 'the cultural and ''lcio-
cconomic base as well as the political orientat,ion of each tradition could change. 
----------
70 In lhe meantime, efle! lho disastrous uprisings of t926-1927, the PKI wns ctonde•linely reconstituted' 
by Muso in 1935 and popularly called lhe Illegal PKI (Anderson 1972: 38). Meanwhile, aflerlhe arrest of 
Halla and Sjahrir, 01e PNI Baru ma11.1ged to preserve its shadowy existence until the arrival of 01e 
Japanese (Lcggo 1988: 21), 
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Table 3: Intellectual Political Traditions, their Cultural an::l Economic Basis and 
Political Orientations 
Tradition Culture Base Socio-Economic Dase Political Orientation 
Modernist Muslim Islamic Reformism- Petty Bourgeoisie Islamic-Modernism 
Modcn,ism (Indigenous Economy) 
Traditionalist Muslim Islamic Traditionalism Peasantrv/Land Owning Islamic-Traditionalism 
Nationalist Secular Values+ Local Bureaucracy and Land Secular-Trad ition:llism 
Custom+ :·~yncretism 01\ning 
Socialist Western Secular Values Bureaucracy & Western Secular-Modernism 
Sector of tlte Economy 
Christian Christian Values Bun:aucracy & Western Secular-Modernism 
Sector of the Economy 
Communist Secular Values+ Working Class and Poor Secular•Modcmism 
Svncrctism Peasantry 
Military• Secular-N a tiona I istic Bureaucracy and Public Secular-Modernism 
Values Sector of the Economy 
• 
. . .. . . Tite mthtary pohttcaltradtllon began to emerge m the second halfofthe 1940s . 
3.5 The Formation and Transmission of the Islamic 'Intellectual' Pl'litical 
Tradition 
Until the 1950s, the traditionalist community did not produce a significant 
tlumber of 'intel/ectueelen' (intelligentsia)-in the full sense of the term discussed 
above. ihe presence of madrasah within this community was an important step in 
producing traditionalist 'cleric~; ..... telligentsia' (ulama·intclek) represented by figures 
like Wachid Hasjim, Mohammad Iljas and Fathurrahman Kafrawi, forerunners of the 
future traditionalist intelligentsia. Yet, the participation of the traditionalist students in 
the mcdem 'sekolalr' (Western education) system at this juncture remained an 
anomalous· phenomenon. Thus, the intelligentsia of the NU before the 1950s were 
basically outsiders ('orang luar') who were recruited to join and help manage the 
organization (Van Bruinessen 1994: 39). 
Thus, Muslim 'intellectual' movements before 1950s were basically grounded in 
the reformist-modernist constituency. ihe reason wa;; that <:::1ce the Muslim 
intelligentsia had planted the flag of Islamic political ideology, it had to be placed in 
ground that had been well-prepared to accept a new ideology. Insofar as political 
ideology in its systematic formulation is a modem phenomenon, 'Islamic political 
--
ideology' can only be effectively absorbed if it is planted in a community that has been 
exposed to modernity. In this regard, as Shepard has argued (1987: 308), 'traditionalist 
positions could not be said to involve ideology in the strictest sense.' As the 
traditionalist position before the 1950s was not yet fertile soil for planting the seed of 
Islamic political ideology, it was sensible for the Muslim intelligentsia to focus their 
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attention on the rcfonnist-modcmist ~ommunity. When the SI became a rcfonnist-
modernist political action group, the fonnation of the modernist-political tradition 
began. 
This fonnation grew out of public intellectual debates. From the I 920s until 
1940s there had been a series of public debates in the press and at public meetings 
between organic intellectuals of the Muslim and secular intelligentsia especially 
concerning political ideology and the very foundation of nationalism and Indonesian 
independence. Throu&• these polemics in the public sphere the notion of Islamic 
ideology emerged. The decline of the political influence of the first generation of 
Muslim intelligentsia did not bring to end the Muslim intellectual-tradition and its 
ideology. This tradition and ideology was transmitted to and rcfonnulatcd by the 
following generations of the Muslim intelligentsia. This transmission was made possible 
by inter-generational intellectual networks, while the rcfonnulation was needed becaw.-
each generation had to face different critical issues and socio-historical challenges. 
3.5.1 The Making of a Muslim Collective Identity and Ideology 
Muslim political identity and ideology was not ready-made but developed out of 
clashes and discourses. At the outset, the clash of discourses between Muslim 
intellectuals of the first generation with the communist cadres (such as Scmaun and 
Darsono) in the SI resulted in the overt proclamation of Islam as the SI principle. With 
Tjokroaminoto (until 1921) working to maintain party unity rather than develop party 
principles, it was Agus Salim who began to move along the path of the party principle. 
Although the idea of Islam as the basis of the party had been fonnulated by 
Tjokroaminoto in 1917, A gus Salim asserted it more clearly and finnly so that it 
became the sole basis and identity of the SI in 1921. Writing in Neratja on 18 October 
1921, Salim publicly stated: 
There is no need to look for other 'isms' to cure th~ organizational disea:;c. The 
medicine is in the principle of the party itself, the principle that is longstanding 
and eternal, which cannot be eliminated by mankind, though the entire world 
may be hostile to it. This principle is Islam. 
The effort to mobilise support for the Islamic cause in a disputatious public 
environment necessitated the creation of a new framework of collective solidarity and 
ideology. At an international level, this led to efforts to draw the SI into the sphere of 
the 'Pan Islamic' movement. The SI and its related Islamic organizations became 
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engaged in international Islamic affairs at least until the abolition of the Caliphate in 
1924 and the failure of international congresses to audrcs~ this pro!Jlcm. In the media-
sphere this tendency was reflected by the emergence of the newspapers Doenia Islam 
(The Islamic World) published in Jakarta (1922-1923) and edited by Agus Salim. 
Domestically, since the ideological attack chiefly came from the proponents of Marxist-
socialism, the forntulation oflslamic principles and ideology in this early period tended 
to emphasise the socialistic dimension of Islam. Henceforward, the modernist Muslim 
intelligentsia of the SJ began to promote the so-called 'Socia/isme-lslam' (Islamic 
Socialism). 
Afier the removal of the communist cadres from the Sl, Tjokroaminoto joined 
Salim to champion the ideology of 'Islamic socialism'. Beginning in 1922, special 
courses on Islamic Socialism were given to the SJ young members in Yogyakarta with 
Tjokroaminoto teaching the doctrine of socialism, Surjopranoto teaching sociology in 
general and H. Fakhruddin (of the Muhammadiyah) teaching the Islamic theology of 
socialism. Among those who enthusiastically attended ihese courses was Hadji Abdul 
Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka), a son of Hadji Rasul of West Sumatra, who was to 
become one of Indonesia's most prominent ulama-intelek (Hamka 1952: 34-40). About 
the same time, articles such as 'Apakah Socialisme itu?' (What is Socialism?) or 
'Socialisme berdasar Islam' (Socialism based on Islam), written by Tjokroaminoto and 
Agus Salim, frequently appeared in the SI affiliated newspapers. Furthermore, at the 
First All-Islam Congress in Circbon (31 October - 2 November 1922), Islamic 
Socialism became one of the main issues discussed by the congress (Amclz, 1952a: 
137-8). All these contributP.d to the publication of Tjokroaminoto's influential book, 
Islam dan Socialisme (Islam and Socialism), in November 1924. The symbolic 
representation of this ideology was the establishment of an Islamic periodical, Bandera 
lslam (The Islamic Flag, 1924-7),71 which bec3me the main mouthpiece of Islamic 
socialism. 
Hal'ing agreed with a large portion of Marxist doctrine, Tjokroaminoto in his 
book and articles criticised the. Marxist-socialist theory of historical materialism for 
allowing no place for God and for its deification of the material object. He concluded: 
'Our socialism is not that kind of socialism, but Islamic Socialism which seeks human 
salvation in this world and in the hereafier' (Tjokroaminoto 1925; 1952: 141). Although 
they claimed the primacy of Islamic social principles, Tjokroaminoto and his modernist 
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comrades-as modem cduvated people who had been exposed to contemporary Western 
political thought- -also believed that democracy and democratic principles should 
providing the groundwork for Islamic struggles. 'If we, Muslims, truly understood and 
seriously performed Islamic injunctions', he said, 'we must be true democrats and 
socialists as well' (Tjokroaminoto 1952: 155). It was also said in the explication of the 
party's principles, Tafsir Program-Asas Purtai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (formulated in 
1931): 'In the independent nation of Indonesia, that the PSII is obliged to struggl~ for, 
its government must be democratic in nature, as asserted in the Qur 'mz (Asj-Sjzmi, 
XLII: 38).' It is rather ironic that in their efforts to find Islamic scriptural underpinning 
for their arguments, because most of these Western educated intellectuals had a poor 
command of Arabic language and Islamic theology, the supportive literature they 
quoted was taken from Dutch and English translations (or commentaries) on the sources 
oflslam (Amelz 1952b: 9). 
The making of a Muslim intellectual coliectivc identity and ideology found its 
galvanising moment because of growing tensions between the modernist Muslim 
intelligentsia and secular nationalist leaden;, such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Sutomo 
and Sukarno. Until late 1920s the relationship between the Muslim intelligentsia of the 
SI and nationalist leaders remained on good terms. Sukamo, for instance, was regarded 
initially as the SI's own flesh and blood.72 Not only because of his personal relationship 
to Tjokroaminoto as his bapak asulz (foster father), political mentor, and father-in-law 
(for a couple of years in the early 1920s), but also because Sukamo was actively 
engaged in SI's activities. It was Sukamo, together with l.,;,~; Salim and 
Tjokroaminoto, who edited Bandera Islam. ,Even after the establishment of his own 
political party (PNI) in 1927, Sukamo continued to attend SI national meetings. In the 
SI (now PSII) meeting in Pckalongan in 1927, Sukamo proposed the idea of converging 
all political organizations and leaders into a federation of political parties, which was 
supported by Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim. This idea materialized on 17 December 
1927 with the establishment of the Federation of Political Organizations (PPPKI), 
including the PSII, PNI, ASC, BU, Paswulan, Sarikat Sumatra, and ISC. 
Nevertheless it was the conflict of interests within this federation that created a 
series of disputes between the Muslim intelligentsia and the secular nationalist leaders. 
11 Published by prominent members oftlte Sland Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. 
"Tite Slalso supported the establishment ofthe lnclonesische Studicc/ub by Sutomo anticipating tltat Utis 
c1ub would empower the non-cooperative movement. Tilis was indicated by the involvement of some Sl 
members in this club (Noer 1980: 269-70). 
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A competitive struggle between Muslim and nationalist lc-Jders. to win the leadership of 
political movements in general and the federation in particular, resulted in unbridgeable 
internal conflicts. In March 1928 Tjipto Mangunkusumo sent a letter to Sukamo 
warning him of the dangers of (the infectious residue of) Pan-Islamism and of probable 
attempts by Tjokroaminoto and Salim to gain control of the PPPKI. Tjipto blamed such 
alleged attempts on the 'traitorous game' of Tjokroaminoto and the PSII (Ingleson 
1979: 131).73 
The unwillingness of the secular nationalist im.:lligentsia to be led by their 
Muslim counterparts coincided with the growing resentment of the PSII leaders in the 
face of the rising popularity of new nationalist leaders in the public sphere. The major 
cause of this resentment was the steadily increasing internal fragmentation and decline 
of the party's dcvclopmcnt.74 The fact that this internal paralysis coincided with the 
growing influence of new nationalist leaders made the Sl leaders sensitive to the 
perceived external threats. Thus, they could not accept the federation's ruli: .f equal 
representation among political parties ('one party-one vote')-rcgardless of the size of 
the party's constituency. They perceived this ruling as weakening the PSII position as 
the biggest political party and the only Muslim representative in the federation (Noer 
1980: 272). 
This internal conflict of interest within the PPPKI was worsened by public 
disagreements. At the outset, a series of hostile debates occurred between the Sl leaders, 
particularly Salim, with Sutomo. These debates had their origin in Sutomo's interview 
with the bzdisc/ze Courant (18 December 1926) in which he requested the government 
to give more official positions to Indonesian-educated people. This strategy wa:; 
opposed by some SI leaders afraid it might give the impression that the main motive of 
the Indonesian political movement war to gain official positions. This led to a public 
debate between Sutomo and Sl leaders ~\'!ondosudirdjo, Sangadji and Salim) in January 
1927. It resulted in a bitter conflict, as Su( .. ;J·o accused the PSI of inflaming dissension 
among the various clements of the nationalist movement and argued that Salim was a 
foreigner (non-Javancse) who was fond of creating dissension wherever there was unity. 
73 This Jetter was publicly uncovered when at Sukamo's trial in August 1930 tl1e prosecution produced a 
Jetter from Tjipto to S•1kamn, which was soon published in several newspapers including Sutomo's 
Socara Ocmocm and PSII's P•n:bcla Islam (lngleson 1979: 131; Noer 1980: 279). 
"In 1923 one oftl1e Sl's prominent leaders, Abdul Muis, withdrew from the party because of the Jack of 
moral support from the party's leaders, particularly Tjokroaminoto, for his activities as tl1e vice president 
ofthc party. This was followed by the departure of all Mulwmmadiyah members from the party in 1927 in 
response to the persistent criticism by Muhammadiyah leaders of the pcrsonallaxity ofthe SJ's leaders. 
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In response to this accusation, in January 1927 the PSI ordered its members to withdraw 
from Sutomo's club. This in tum stimulated counter-reactions from Sutomo and 
proponents of secular nationalism.75 Sutomo in his writing, published by Balai Pus taka 
in 1928, condemned leaders of the PSI as being tightly tied to Islam rather than to 
nationalism, ignoring the fact that even in Turkey the sentiment of Pan lslamism had 
;,~,·n replaced by nationalism. 
In the midst of growing conflicts between Islamic and nationalist leaders, 
Sukamo made an effort to restore national unity. In his ap1>eal for national unity, 
Sukamo drew on pre-Islamic elements from the archipelago's past, such as the strong 
figure of Gadjah Mada from the lS'h century of Madjapahit Kingdom, to claim a 
common united position for all Indonesians. He also called upon the Indonesian people 
to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation. Unexpectedly, this provided fuel for the 
PSII leaders to criticise the secular nationalist conception of nationalism. Debates 
between Salim and Sukamo then followed in Fadjar Asia contesting the very Jcfinition 
of nationalism. Salim criticised Sukamo's speeches by 'vaming that excessive emphasis 
on nationality could endanger both the Indies people and those of foreign countries. He 
called Sukamo's conception of naticnalism a form t>ridolatry. 'Our loving devotion to 
the country', he said, 'must go beyond a devotion to th~ material and territorial entity; it 
must be a devotion to almighty God' (Fadjar Asia, 26 July 1928). Sukamo countered 
such a criticism by saying that the nationalism he struggled for was not identical with 
that developed in Western society. 'It is not a jingoistic nationalism or chauvinism, and 
not a copy or imitation of Western nationalism. Our nationalism is a wide nationalism 
which gives a ~pace for loving other nations, as basic as oxygen that gives life to every 
living thing' (Fadjar Asia, 18 & 20 August 1928). 
The polemics continued without compromise for each argument had its own 
political basis. Salim then came to the conclusion that despite the similarity of the PSI 
and the PNI in their objective for achieving Indonesian independence, they differed 
from each other in basic principles. Even so, he said, the PSI respected Sukamo's own 
outlook and political stand, but at the same time would choose its own political 
trajectory (Noer 1980: 277). The Muslim intellectuals of the PSII came to the 
conclusion that in future seeking cooperation with other Islamic organizations, even if 
"In February and Mardt 1927, Timboc/ (a magazine edited by Wcdiodiningrnt of the DU and Singgih of 
Sutomo's club) ran articles accusing the PSI as having fallen under the innuencc of opportunist leaders 
such A gus Salim who had transformed the party into a party of the clergy and innamcd dissension among 
nationalist leaders (Noer 1980: 270). 
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they were in some ways contrary to the PSII, was far preferable to working with the 
anti-Islam secular nationalists (lnglcson 1979: 131 ). 
All these heated discursive clashes in the public sphere compelled adherents of 
each position to engage in the debate. Fired by the secular nationalist's negative 
definition oflslam, Ahmad Hassan of the Persis, a man who had involv ... :! himself more 
in religious teaching rather than in political affairs, began to side with the PSII leaders 
in resisting the ideology of secular nationalism. In 1929 he established a monthly 
journal, Pcmbela Islam (The Defender of Islam, 1929-1935), with the mission to defend 
Islam from the secular ideological onslaught. In the sixth edition of the journal, for 
instance (March 1930), he linked the spirit of nationalism to 'ashabiyah' (tribalism) 
which was forbidden in Islam. This journal soon became the bastion of Muslim 
ideological defence, where Muslim intellectuals launched tli~ir counter-ideological 
positions. Its role in defending Islam became more conspicuous in the events following 
Sutomo's controversial statement in a public meeting in May 1930 and the appearance 
of a series of articles (June-July 1930) in Sutomo's Soeara Oemocm (June-July 1930) 
written by Homo Sum (pscudonym).76 Fired by the negative perception of'lslam' by its 
opponents, Pcmbcla Islam ran many articles calling for Islamic solidarity.71 
Ironically, while the public debates of the 1930s were becoming hostile and the 
Muslim intelligentsia more obsessed with their proclaimed role as the defenders of 
Islam, the PSII itself had reached its nadir. At the very time new parties of the higher 
intelligentsia began to bloom, the PSII split into factions. The leadership competition 
between Tjokroaminoto (a leader of the younger generation) alld Sukiman 
Wiljosandjojo (a leader of the new generation) combined with criticism of 
Tjokroaminoto's financial t,.; :.,. magement led to the suspension of Sukiman and 
Smjopranoto from party t:;~.1 1 · ,··'.ip in 1933. Some branl'hes of the party protested 
against this decision b) ' · .utg a special committee that came to be known as 
Pcrsatua11 Islam I11do11csia (Union of Indonesian Islam). The committee merged with 
another splinter group of the Yogyakarta chapter, the PSII Mcrdcka (the Independent 
PSII), to establish Partai Islam I11do11csia (Indonesian Islamic Party, PH) in late 1933. 
This became the first Islamic party to be led by a Western university graduate, Sukiman. 
76 Among other things, Sutomo's statement nnd these articles criticised the practice of the had). He argued 
that the money spent on tl1e had} could belter be used for the interest of the nation. He also suggested 
\',olitical prisoners from Digul deserved more respect tlmn had} is (Vander Veur 1984: 28). 
Sukiman Wiljosandjojo of the PSll, for instance, wrote an article in this journal (no. 13, October 1930), 
'Tcntangan Tcrhadap Kcpada W£1 Agama Islam' (111e Clmllenge to Islamic Religion), in which he 
concluded that such views represented nnti-lslamic voices. 
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However, it was inactive until it was revived under the same name in 1938 with strong 
support from leaders of the Muhammacliyah (Noer 1980: 175; Alamsjah 1952: 68-9). 
Meanwhile, A gus Salim who had considered the hicljrah policy of nob-cooperation as 
unrealistic under the repressive regime of ntsl e11 orcle, in November 1934 establis!1ed a 
cooperative faction called Barisa11 Pe11jaclar PS/1 (Awareness Front of the PSII). In 
1937, the PSII expelled any of its meml-.o:,; who gave support to the Barisa11 Pcmjaclar. 
The decline of the PSII and the growing internal disputes between activist 
Muslims proved that action was urgently needed to promote a sense of unity. Under the 
initiative of NU, Muhammacliyah and PSII leaders an All-Islam Congress was 
conducted in Surabaya on 18-21 September 1937.1t resulted in the establishment of the 
Macljlis Islam A 'faa fllciollesia (MIA!, Supreme Islam Council of Indonesia}, a 
federation which continued to exist until the first two years of the Japanese occupation. 
The paralysis of the PSII did not lead to the death of its ideals. Vehicles for the 
transmission of Islamic collective memory and ideology from the first to the second 
generation of Muslim intelligentsia were now available, especially in the form of 
Muslim student associations. 
3.5.2 The Transmission of Muslim Intellectual Political Traditions 
The most import;,nt catalyst for the transmission of Muslim 'intellectual' 
political traditions from the first to the second generation of :.:·,,r.'im intelligentsia was 
the establishment in January 1925 of Jo11g Jslamieten Bo11cl (JIB, Young Muslims' 
League) in Jakarta. 
Bam out of disappointment with Jong Java (Young Java}, the establishment of 
this league reflected a severe competitive struggle in the public sphere and the 
marginality of Islamic oriented intelligentsia. It is said that a Christian missionary, 
Hendrik Kraemer (1888-1965), gave a series of lectures on Christianity (as well as on 
theosophy and Catholicism) for the Jo11g Java members and successfully put himself 
forth as an adviser to this student association (Steenbrink 1993: 111). The more 
orthodox Muslim students in the association believed that Islam could provide a 
common denominator for fragmented youth leagues and that Jo11g Java members as 
prospective leaders of the nation, regardless of their religious beliefs, were supposed to 
·know about Islam, the religion of the majority of the people because of its important 
role as the main social world view. 
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In response to the Christian lectures in Jong Java, the more orthodox Muslim 
students also requested a series of lectures on lslar as well. Among supporters of this 
proposal was Raden Samruridjal, the sixth chairman of Jong Java. He put forward the 
proposal at the society's seventh annual meeting held in Yogyakarta towards the end of 
1924. The fact that the proposal was not supported by the majority vote,78 forced him 
and his supporters to find their own way. Agus Salim, who attended the meeting and 
had long realized the importance of forming cadres of the Islamic oriented intelligentsia, 
suggested that they establish a nr.w student organization which came to be known as 
Jong Islamictcn Bond, JIB (Noer 1978: 242-3). 
JIB's historical project was to 'Islamize educated people' (mcngislamkan kaum 
tcrpclajar). The major concern of this league was how to bring Western-educated 
Indonesians closer to the Islamic community or at least to persuade some of them not to 
become full-fledged members of secular oriented organizations. The a!ms of the league 
were stated in its statutes: 
The study and promotion of the practice of Islan1; the cultivation and promotion 
of sympathy for Islam and its followers, while giving positive tolerance to those 
who think otherwise; the cultivation and promotion of contacts among the 
intcl/cctucc/cn and with the people through Islam; and the promotion of physical 
and spiritual development of its members through self-training (education) and 
self-activity. 79 
Thus, the understanding of Islam was now different irom that of Jong Java. 
While the idea of providing !~Iamie teaching within the Jong .lam context was based on 
pragmatic reasons (for the sake of unity and leadership of the nation), the same idea was 
now situated within a particular collective identity and with a particular ideology. 
Islamic solidarity was now regarded as the only solution to social problems. As the 
statute stated: 'No one can work wholeheartedly to improve general social welfare 
·without having respect and sympat' for this religion of the majority people. '80 
Moreover, following its first congress il. > ogyakarta in late 1925, the league obliged its. 
members to learn and observe Islamic tenets. Islam was· now perceived as providing 
more than a language of social solidarity; it was to provide the groundwork for socio-
political action. In their exposure to the clash of discourses between Muslim and secular 
intellectuals of the older generation, these students found a model for the formulation of 
their own ideology. 
71 For a further explanation of this vote taking, sec Pan ilia Pcrlngatan 7S Tahun Kasman (1982: 27). 
"See Hct Licht, no. 1/1925, p. 7. 
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It has to b~ borne in mind, however, that the notion of Islamic solidarity for JIB 
members did not contradict the idea of national solidarity and did not Jessen their 
attachment to the aim of a national (historical) bloc. 'In becoming a Muslim', argued 
Moham•d Rocm (one of its leading activists), 'one has to love the fatherland, as this is 
an essential part of the Islamic faith' (Roem 1989: 131). This was reflected in name it 
cl,0sc for its scout group established in 1926, namely Natioual Judo11esische Padviuderij 
(The Indonesian National Scouting Movement), the first ever organization in Indonesia 
referred to the 'Indonesian nation'. It is also reflected in its active involvement in the 
Second All-lndcnesian Youth Congress (Octob~r 192.8). Thus, Islamic solidarity in this 
context was invoked as a way of supporting the idea of collective identity in the face of 
the competing ideo-political struggles of diverse intellectual streams. 
JIB's emphasis on the importance of Islamic collective solidarity was reinforced 
by arguments to defend Islam from external misrepresentation. Early editions of JIB's 
journal, Het Licht (The Light}, were overwhelmed by complaints about the false-
depiction of Islam in Western schools, textbooks, m ·~. and the view of the Ethici 
and missionaries who had successfully downgraded the high standing of Islam. Agus 
Salim in his article in the first edition of the journal published in March 1925, 
emphasised that the Western world should thank Islam for its great contribution to 
modern civilization. In fact, he said, many Western scholars and Christian missionaries 
had relentlessly produced a negative image of Islam. 'Sadly, the Muslim community of 
this day, because of the lack of intellectualism and lack of understanding of Islam, tends 
to take for granted such a negative definition oflslam.' 
To attract ct!ucatcd people to Islam in this historical context required the 
modernization of Islamic expression. The prime test of modernity among students at 
that time was the use of Dutch language and the application of modern approaches and 
rationalism in teaching. Thus, the JIB journal was named in Dutch, Hct Lir.ht (the 
Light),81 and most of its articles were written in Dutch. In its first tive years, many of 
its articles argued for I he compatibility of Islam with modern science and rationalism, 
described the glory of medieval Islam, the relevance of Islam to modem social 
problems, and the importance of religious teaching to the younger generation, with the 
quotation of views of Western scholars being frequently used to support the arguments. 
In the view ofMohamad Roem, this information helped to rescue Muslim students from 
10 Sec Het Llcllt, no. 10/1925, pp. 3-10. 
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the prison of an inferiority complex and endangered a sense of pride in being Muslim 
(Roem 1989: 132). 
To make Islamic teaching attractive for students of secular schools, most Islamic 
mentors of JIB were drawn from the reformist ulama-intclek and the modernist intelek-
u/ama. In contrast to the traditionalist method of teaching that tended to be dogmatic 
with little opportunity for questions, these intclck-ulama and ulama-inte/ek were more 
open for discussion and more able to connect Islamic themes with contemporary 
realities. This together with the fact that JIB mainly op~rated in big cities82 made this 
league closer to reformist-modernist intellectual tradition rather than the traditionalist 
one. In addition to Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto (of the PSI) Ahmad Hassan (of the 
Persis), Achmad Dachlan and H. Fakhruddin were among the prominent Islamic 
mentors of this league. 
By and large, JIB members were students or f::.l"'<er students of secondary 
schools, although graduates of the primary school could join the league and some of its 
members, especially in the 1930s, were university students. The fact that there was no 
university-based Islamic student association in the country up to the 1920s indicates the 
backwardness of the Muslim intellectual community compared to secular, Chinese and 
Christian counterparts. 83 Moreover, JIB could only attract a small percentage of the 
secondary sct0ol students. From about 5,692 Indonesians with Western secondary 
education in 1927 (Kahin 1970: 31 ), it was claimed that the total membership of JIB 
Wl!S 1,700-not all of them from secondary schools (Aifian 1989: 124). 
Among senior members of JIB in the 1920s who would become tb~ future 
leaders of Muslim political movements, were Samsuridjal (the first president, 1925-
1926, a graduate of the Rechtsshool), Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo (the second president, 
1926-1930, a graduate of the HBS), Kasrrnm Singodimedjo (the third p!'I::J~dent, 1930-
1935, a student of the STOVIA-preparation section), Mohamad Roem (a student oftlte 
STOVIA-preparntion section), . Mohammad Natsir, Jusuf Wibisono, and Prawoto 
11 Although it also had an Arabic n>.<llt, ,ftJ-Noer, it. Otiich name was more popular and widely cited in 
the works of its followers. 
11 In addition to big citiea in J•va such F:< Jakarlll, Yogyakar1a, Dandung and Surabaya, Jin braches were 
found in S•matra (Kota Raja/A"'h, Medan,Padang, Dukittinggi and Palcmbang), Sulawesi (Makassar, 
Goronllllo and Mcnado), and even in Maluku (Ambon). 
13 By this decade a secular intelligentsia with university backgrounds, as we have seen, had established 
socio-political clubs in tlteir own right. Eorly in the 1920s an association of Chinese university students 
was f9rmed, Ta Hsion. Christian university students began to establish Ute Christc/ijkc Studcntcn 
Vcrccn;gu•g (Association of the Christian Univernity Students) in 1926 (officially proclaimed in 1932), 
while Catholic university students established the Katho/ieke Studenten Vcreenlging St. Bellarminus 
(Association of the Catholic University students, St. Dellarminus) in 1928. 
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Mangkusasmito (all were students of f•.:· AMS). It is worth noting, however, that the 
level of Islamic mindedness of JIB members even among these promiloc11t figures was 
by no means homogenous.84 Despite their heterogeneity, however, the shared 
experience of being incorporated into the same network of Islamic intelligentsia 
provided JIB's members with a sense of affinity and attachment to an Islamic political 
tradition. 
From 1927 JIB's concern about strengthening Islamic knowledge and practice 
among its members led to the establishment of the so-called Kcm Lichaam (Core 
Body). This was a sort of brains-trust, comprised of those who had a good 
understanding ofislam. Iniemally, it was oriented to the promotion and improvement of 
religious teac:ting within the league. Externally, it functioned ru; a connecting chain 
between JIB a'ld other Islamic organizations. Members of this body were typically those 
who had mu::Jple o:~•oizational affiliations. The ll!ost prominent was Muhammad 
Natsir who was also a rising star of the Persis. Having a madrasah background (Di11iah 
School, Solok-West Sumatra) combined with the HIS at the primary level, Natsir had 
been well exposed to the reformist-modernist iJeology. His encounter with Persis 
founder A. Hassan during his study in the Bandung AMS reconnected his link to the 
reforntist intellectual networks and quenched his ambition to take a d~gree from the 
college of law. Similar to Natsir was Kasman Singodimedjo who had beer-. exposed to 
the reformist dalmah (Islamic outreach) in his childhot'd and then had a strong 
connection to Djami 'at Chair and Muhammadiyah during his study in Jakarta. Through 
this kind of cadre, JIB connected itself to a wider web of Islamic socio-political 
movements, and became integrated into l~lamic ideological formation in the public 
sphere. It would become a vehicle for the transmis~ion ofislamic ideology from the old 
to the new generotion oflslamic intelligentsia. 
At the be3inning of the 1930s some lead;ng activists of JIB had become 
university students. Realising that JIB was nC> longer a suitable place for the intellectual 
. development of the university students, Jus~fWibisono ami Mohamad Roem (both were 
now students of the RHS) proposed the founding of an fslamie society for universit) 
students-as tlie continuation of JIB in a tertiary ~nilieu. This was achieved in 
"Tili Morsuti in her ,.,icle in /let Licllt (Vol. VIU1931) identified some c•ter,ories or JIB membership 
including those oftn. ,,, "icvt:1s of Islam, tbosr who had gained both secular and religious education and 
then joined the league !u Jalisry tl1eir religious spiri~ tl>o•e who had ~>ceo widely influeoced by Western 
thoughts but who were inh.::estcd in knowing lsl.e~i~ tcachin&s, and \hose who were intcrr.stcd in po1idcal 
Islam. JIB uctivilies rnngcd rrorn Islamic ,.ltd; •.••urses, P"blishing, .stablishinr. librories nnd schools, 
scouting, excursions, and sportS. 
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December 1934 with the establishment of the Studente11 Islam Studicclub (SIS, Muslim 
Students' Study Club) in Jakarta. 
The emergence of this Islamic club actually lagged behind that of the secular 
(university) student activists, for the latter by this time had already transformed their 
student clubs of the 1920s into political parties. It was exactly because oi' this 
backwardness that S1S initiators were motivated to continue JIB's historical project, 
namely the Jslamisation of the intelligentsia. Jusuf Wibisono's remarks at the opening 
ceremony of this society capture the mood surronnding of its csub!ishment: 
The intellig. ntsia (intcl/cctucclcn) of our ~ocicty mostly have a poor 
understanding of Islam ... Notwithstandinr the fact that they lack an 
understanding of Islam and although they may realize the meaningfulness of 
Islam for the •••ajority of people, they have no i11ierest in Islamic study ... They 
often associate Islam with the negative image of its followers ... Sadly, the 
literature on Islam accessible to these educated people is mOstly written by non-
Muslim scholars who are not free from negative intentions. 
After describing the Islamic deprivation of the intelligentsia, Wibisono came to the 
conclusion: 'Our objective is to stimulate interest in Islamic studies among the 
intelligentsia (illtcl/cctucc/cn) in panicular and Islamic society in general' (Wibisono 
1980: 394-5). This objective was again emphasised by A. Karim's remark (former 
chairman of SIS, 1937-1938) in his speech on October 8, 1938: 'Our great desire is to 
convert the intelligentsia (imcllectuee/en), especially those increasingly alienated ;'.om 
their own religion' (k..~dm 1990: 89). 
To attract student interest in Islamic irlcas, SIS adopted a scientific approach to 
articulate Islam. For this purpose, in March 1935 SIS established its own journal, 
Orgaa11 van de Studente11 Islam Swdiec/ub (The mouthpiece of SIS), which after the 
fifth edition of the second year was renamed Moslimsc Rcvcil (The Muslim Revival). 
Most articles were written in Dutch and, more importantly, z scientific analysis was 
applied to the interpreiatim, of Islam. An article like 'Da11te e11 Islam' (Dante and 
" Islam) appeared in this journal. To give a rational interpretation of the scriptures, this 
journal often used li1e Qur'anic com.nentary of the Ahmadiyah, wl;\r.h was w;:a-known 
for its rational-scientific reasoning. 
In actual fact university students with strong Islamic backgrounds and 
commitment to Islam were limited. To deal with this problem SIS telaxcd its 
recruitment criteria to accommodatr. a wider constituency. In Article 5 of its statutes it is 
. said that 'all university students, regardless of their natimtal and ideological orientation, 
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can be accepted as members of the association'. In reality, the membership of this 
association was limited in uumbcr. ·From about 1,246 students of thc .. univcrsity in 1940 
(Tho11·ms 1973: 12), the number of students engaged in various SIS activities, based on 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito's estimates, was no more than 100 people (Saidi 1990: 39). 
Moreover, to encourage the involvement of nominal Muslim students in this 
association, the early leadership of SIS was given to those who had no background in 
Islamic activism.85 
Thus, the majority of SIS mr"lbcrs were unlikely to be committed to Islamic 
political ideology. Nevertheless, whatever their level of commitment to Islamic political 
ideology, their engo;;··ment in Islamic ititellectual networks linked them into the Islamic 
community. With its pioneering effort to create a nucleus of.Jslam-fricndly intelligentsia 
among university students, the foundation of the SIS \yas a watershed for the future 
development of a university-based Muslim intelligentsia. 
The formation of JIB and SIS represents a central theme in the development of 
Muslim intellectual movements throughout the 2o•h century, namely the Isl.amisation of 
the intelligentsia. During the Japanese occupation in 1942 both organizations 
disappeared from the public scene. Their ideology and networks, however, were 
sustained in the memory of their former members and maintained through 
commemorative ceremonies and informal. contacts among former activists or were 
transposed to new forms of collective actions. 
The main overseas counterpart of the JIB and SIS was the Cairo-based Djami ;,:: 
al-Chairinh (Persatuan Kemerdekaan Indonesia). The most important contribution of 
this Cairo utganization I') the intellectual and political development of the Indonesian 
Muslim community was its function as a catalyst in linking the religious and political 
thought of the Indonesian Mush .. 1 intellectuals to that developed in centres of Islamic 
learning ;~nd movements in the Middle East. Al-Azhar graduates played a decisive role 
in the translation and interpretation of Arabic literature into Indonesian. In so doing they 
contributed to the provision of Islamic arguments used in the clash cl' discourse in the 
public sphere and to the formulation of Islamic ideology in response to the ongoing 
15 The SIS's chairmen were respectively: Sudiman Knrtohadiprodjo (December 1934-1935), Suwaltio 
Sumodilogo (Des. 1934-December 1936), Mohammad Roem (December 1936-March 1937), Abdullah 
Sidik (March 1937-0ctober 1938), Abdul Karim (October 1938-July 1939), Widagdo (July 1939-
o,cember 1940), Prawoto Mangkusasmito (December 1940-M•rch 1942). The li,;t two ch.1irmen as 
jr.;Hcated by their naml!s were descendants of higher priyayi fau~!ics who had never before been involved 
in Islamic Bl :_~·,ism. 
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debates on nationalism and the foundation of the independent state (Boland 1971: 161-
4, 212). 
3.5.3 Leadership of the Second Generation of Muslim Intelligentsia 
(Former) leaders of JIB, SIS and Djama 'ail ai-Chairiah became leading 
intellectuals of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia and 'clerical-
'· 
intelligentsia'. Leaders of this generation began to play a significant role in the political 
and intellectual leadership of the Muslim community in the I 930s. One of the most 
influential intellectuals of the second generation was Muhammad Natsir. His 
identification with the reformist-modernist idcolog~· was a consequence of his 
deepening incorporation into the reformist-modernist intellectual networks (Persis and 
JIB). His erudition in both secular and religious knowledge made him an organi.; 
intellectual of the Muslim community which was recognized when he was made co-
editor (with A. Hassan) of Pembela Islam in 1929. 
At the time when Natsir began to co-edit this publication, the public sphere was 
dominated by discourses on nationalism. He began to take part in the polemic on Islam 
and nationalism in 1931. His article, 'Indonesisch Nationa/isme' tlndonesian 
Nationalism) in Pembela Islam no. 36 (October, 1931), introduced the term 
'Kebangsaan Mus/imin' (Mu~lim Nationalism) as an alternative to secular nationalbm 
and outlined the pioneering efforts of Muslim intellectuals in the national awakening 
movements, as well as stressing the primacy of Islamic principles and solidarity over 
secular-territorial idcntitics.86 Furthermore, his commitment to defendi:.g ; •Iamie ideals 
was miculatcd through the establishment of an Islamic educational institute, 
Pendidiknn Islam (Islamic education), of which he was director from 1932 to 1942. 
About the same time, he became an editor of a Medan-bascd Islamic magazine, Pandji 
Islam (The Islamic Banner, p. 1934-1941}, a magazine that reflected a Westemised 
approach to the study of Islam. As well, he translated some Arabic religious books into 
Dutch as well ns writing pocket books in Dutch to communicate Islam to the educated 
community and also to promote Islam as the foundation of Indonesian independence. 87 
86 In developing his own appreciation of Islam, Natsir admitted he was influenced by two non-Indonesian 
Islamic thinkers whose writings he studied in the t920s and t930s, namely Mohammad 'Abduh and his 
disciple RashTd Rida (Knhin 1993: t60). 
17 Among the books written in this period were Hct lslamitiscltc ldcaal (Islamic Ideals) and De 
lslamitischc Vrouw en ltaar rccllt (Women's '!lights in Islam) published by Pcrsaluan Islam in 1934 
followed by Cultrmr Islam (Islamic Culture) in 1936 and Dcngan Islam kc Indonesia Moclia (Witltlslam 
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Natsir's engagement in political activity began in 1940 when he became a 
chainnan of the Bandung Chapter of the Sukiman-lcd Islamic Party (PII). This time was 
also a decisive moment for his inauguration as the leading ideologist of the second 
generation of the Muslim intelligentsia. He gained a reputation as a leading spokesmen 
for modernist-reformist Islam through his widely circulated exchange with Sukamo · 
(then interned by the Dutch in Bcncoolen) in April-June 1940 (Kahin 1993: 161). This 
exchange was expanded to debates on the Islamic versus the secular state which were 
published in Pamlji Islam from May 1940 until July 1941. In this polemic, Sukamo 
highlighted Turkey's experience of detaching Islam from the state as the possible 
solution to the challenge of the modern world. In contrast, Natsir denied that the 
Ottoman Sultanate, commonly perceived as the exemplary centre oflslamic polity, was 
truly Islamic because of its departures from Islamic tenets. In that case, he said, Islam 
had never united with the siatc For the polity to be really Islamic, he argued, 'it has to 
apply the whole of Islamic principles, whether in relation to individual behaviour or 
social life' (Pandji Islam, no. 28, 15 July 1940). Natsir rejected the idea that a Western 
secu'.ll' polity was the only model to be followed. He argued that according to Islam 'the 
state is not an end in itself, but it has to realise Islamic injunctions.' 
In a much more thorough f.1Shion than had been argued by Salim's generation, 
Natsir's arguments brought a new benchmark for the future formulation of Islamic 
ideology. The main political challenge of Salim's generation was the pressure of 
Marxism-communism. The formulation of Islamic ideology by Salim's generation was 
presented under the rubric of 'Islamic socialism'. The main political challenge of the 
Natsir's generation was the pressure of secular nationalism and the formulation of 
Islamic ideology by Natsir's generation was represented under the rubric of 'Islamic 
nationalism and state'. 
The rise of Natsir as a new champion of Islamic ideology was followed hy the 
elevation of the intellectual and political roles of former activists of JIB and SIS, such as 
Mohammad Roem, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo and Kasman Singodimedjo88 and also that 
towards Ute glory of Indonesia) in 1939, which reflected his deepening inclination towards the 
idealization oflsl~m as the foundation of Indonesian independence. 
11 When the Salim·lcd Barisan Pcnyadar PSI/ (Awarene" rront of the PSII) Lccame an Independent 
political group afler 1937, Mohamad Roem joined this party, becoming the chairman of the executive 
committee (Lajnah Tanjldziyah). Next, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo (fonncr president of JIB) collaborated 
wiUt Sukiman Wirjosandjojo to uctivate the Pll in 1938. Meanwhile, Kasman Singodimedjo (n fonner 
president of Jill) began to emerge as n young leader cfthe Muhammadiyah.ln 1936 he became n tcacll'~ 
in some Muhammadiyah schools (Mu 'alimicn, Mu 'alimmat, MULO, HIK, and AMS). His first promotion 
as a new leader of this association began in ti'C aftermath of his ancst in 1940 just after giving a public 
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of fonner activists of the Djami'ah ai-Chairiah. In addition to Iljas Ja'kub and Muehtar 
Lutfi whose important role in the leadership of the Permi has been discussed, it is worth 
including some other figures. Mahmud Junus, on his return in 1930 was made principal 
of the Nonnal School, founded by the PGAI in Padang in 193 I. He himself soon ran the 
Djami'ah Jslamiah School in Sungajang, and later in the early 1940s, in collaboration 
with Muchtar Jahja, established an Islamic university. In the same period, Fathurrahman 
Kafrawi and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir af\cr their return to Java became prominent leaden; 
of the NU and Muhammadiyah respectively. Tim~. by the time of the Japanese 
occupation, these Muslim intellectuals of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia 
had become the new leaders of the Islamic community. 
3.6 Po\Ver Games: Consolidation and Contestation 
By the early 1940s intellectuals of the first generation of the intelligentsia, such 
as Agus Salim, were referred to as 'the grand old men' and their political influence had 
begun to decline. At the same time, the second generation of the intelligentsia were 
considere,d.as the 'kaoem dewasa' (mature generation). Intellectuals of this generation, 
mcr.t of whom had university educations, had successfully created new parties in their 
own right and detached themselves from the older parties of the first generation. The 
main political public of these new parties, beyond fellow intelligentsia of the same 
generation, were junior student-youths who were bm~l generally in the late 1910s and 
1920s. On entering the public sphere of the second generation of the intelligentsia, the 
activists among these junior students had been brought up in the discourse of 
nationalism and Indonesian independence. By the time of the Japanese occupation 
(1942-45) and the revolution for independence (1945-1949), these young student-youths 
found a common 'language' and experience leading to the fonn·ation of the third 
generation of the Indonesian intelligentsia. 
The Japanese occupation which began on January 1942 provided a galvanising 
moment for the strengthening of Indonesian nationalism. An easy victory for Japan over 
the Dutch made a tremendous impression on the Indonesians. The Dutch lost prestige in 
the eyes of many Indonesians and there was a belief that if given arms, they could have 
done as well as the Japanese. Coming io the land below the winds with the image of the 
speech to tl1e Muhammadiyah conference of the West-Java chapter in which he called for Indonesian 
independence. His first major role in Muslim leadership was as one of tl1e chairmen of the MIAI during 
the Japanese period (Panitia Pcr!J•gatan 7S Ta!Jun Ka.rman 1982: 41-6).ln addition, Rnden Syamsurizol 
(a founder of JIB) would become H Ma.rjumi figure. 
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Asian elder brother, the Japanese initially raised popular feelings that they came as 
liberators and as such they were generally received enthusiastically. This was reinforced 
when the Japanese immediately allowed the display of the red and white Indonesian 
national flag and the singing of buloncsia Raya, the national anthem, both of which had 
been forbidden by the Dutch. They also elevated the status of Bahasa Indonesia 
(Indonesian language) so that it replaced Dutch in all its functions (Kahin 1952: 101-2). 
The Japanese soon interned in concentration camps practically the whole Dutch 
population of the Indies plus a substantial proportion of the Eurasians, as well as a 
number of Christian Indonesians whom they suspected of harbouring pro-Dutch 
sympathies. To fulfil the middle and upper-bracket administrative and technical 
positions lcfi empty by the Dutch and Eurasians, the Japanese relied heavily on the 
Indonesian functional intelligentsia. Suddenly almost all such Indonesian personnel 
were given promotions, advanced to at least one and frequently two or three ranks in the 
hierarchy in which they had been employed. As a result, the Indonesian functional elite 
experienced a tremendous upward rise in socio-economic status (Kahin 1952, I 02-3).89 
This shocking 'Unnvertrmg al/er Werle' (radical change) of events in 1942 was a 
prelude to a great break in the history of modem Indonesia. In this regard, there is every 
reason to consider 1942 rather than 1945 as the starting point oflndoncsian Revolution. 
As A. Teeuw argued (1986: 106): ' ... the events of 1945 were a logical and also 
irrevocable consequence of the events of preceding years; politically as well as 
spiritually there is continuity rather than a break in 1945.' 
3.6.1 From the Japanese-Sponsored Associations to Popular Nationalism 
For the politicised intelligentsia, the transfer of power from the old to the new 
colonial master might be summed up by an Indonesian saying as an 'exit from the 
mouth of the crocodile, to enter into the mouth of the tiger'. Even so, the Japanese war 
effort provided an unintended catalyst for the consolidation of Indonesian nationalism 
as an historica! 'J'.nc. 
89 From the vantage point of the Dutch, the shifting loyalty of this native functional elite to the new 
coloniallll3sters seems to be ironic. As a former professor of the RHS in Batavia, W. F. \Vertheim, noted: 
'Remarkable was the conduct of lll3ny ["nati·; :"] civil servants, always loyal to the Government, the 
pillars of Dutch rule. How easily, now, they bwed to the new masters. They had been yes-men before-
they were yes.men now, these antique prijajis [aristocratic civil servants], the jewels of feudal society. 
Their tradition of obedience carried tl1cm over towards a new authority' (Mclzck 1994: 221). TI•c 
Japanese relied heavily for their administrative tasks on the traditional administrative corps, Pangrelr 
Praja, who largely. continued as they had under the Dutch colonial bureaucratic state (bcambtenstaat)-
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At the very beginning, the Japanese administration attempted to impress the 
Indonesian political community by releasing all former political prisoners imprisoned 
by the Dutch. Shortly afterwards, however, all Indonesian political activities were 
prohibited by a decree of the first Japanese Commander-in-Chief on Java, Lt.-Gcneral 
Imamura, which forbade 'any discussion or organization ... concerned with the political 
administration of the country.' This did not have the automatic effect of abolishing the 
existing political parties, but it condemned them to a process of gradually 'withering 
away' because any political activity in the public sphere was tightly controlled by the 
military police, Kcmpcitai (Benda 1958: Ill). 
On the basis of the initial welcome they received from the population in general 
and the functional intelligentsia in particular, the Japanese Gwrscika11 (head of the 
military administration) initially felt their ambition to exploit Indonesian resources 
could be achieved without having to make concessions to Indonesian nationalism. Thus, 
the Grmseika11 side-stepped pre-invasion political associations and on 29 April 1942 
launched a new all-embracing political umbrella called Pergeraka11 Tiga A (Triple-A 
Movement), without involving the first rank nationalist leaders of the time such as 
Sukarno and Hatta.90 
Wanting to attract all major anti-Dutch forces to their cause, the Japanese, as 
depicted by Harry J. Benda, 'appeared to have felt that to ensure Muslim goodwill was a 
matter of greater urgency than to satisfy the demands of the nationalist elite.' In the eyes 
of the new colonial masters, neither the corps of priyayi nor other functional elite 
'could, by comparison, easily escape the stigma of their previous loyalty to the colonial 
government.' In contrast to the nationalist leaders-whose political influence remained 
confined to the few major urban centres-the political advantage of the Muslim leaders 
from the point of view of the Japanese was simply incommensurable, as !he latter 
'counted hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of adherents'. In addition, 'the Japanese 
might have singled out Muslim lcadecs as perhaps the most reliable and Eastern-
oriented element' of the Indonesian political communities (Benda 1958: 108-10). 
except in the symbolic field that the Indonesian language now became the official language of 
administration. 
90 The three A's stood for the well-lmown Japanese propagandas slogan: 'Japan the Leader of Asia, Japan 
the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Light of Asia'. By appealing for Asian solidarity, the movement 
manipulated Indonesian support for Ute Japan"s w:tr effort and the so-called Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere. This movement was headed by Mr. Raden Samsudin, a member of the governing 
board of Ute Parindra (Knhin 1952: 103). 
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Some preliminary efforts to establish a good relationship with Indonesian 
Muslims had been taken even before the Japanese troops landed in the archipelago. On 
October 1939, the Japanese invited the MIA! to attend the Japanese-sponsored first 
Islamic World Congress in Tokyo. Also, just before the arrival of Japanese troops to the 
area, the PUSA's ulama of Acch had contacted the Japanese and laid plans to conduct 
sabotage against the Dutch and to remove the ulei!balang (feudal aristocracy) from their 
administrative posts. This Jed to a general revolt in Acch in March 1942 (Benda 1958: 
103-4; Ricklefs, 1993: 200). In Java, the Japanese effort to mobilize Muslim supporters 
began soon after the surrender of the Dutch with the establishment of the Religious 
Affairs Office (Siuimubu in Japanese, Kantor Uruso11 Agama in Indonesian) at the end 
of March 1942. The Office was headed by a Japanese officer, Colonel ChOse Horic, but 
from October 1943 Dr. Husein Djajadiningrat (the first result of Snouck's 'association' 
policy) was elevated to be the firstlndoncsian Head of the office. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that when Muslim politics became an issue, 
the Japanese adopted a carrot and stick policy. In a similar pattern to Snouck's blue print 
of divorcing Islam from politics, the Japanese made it clear that they would not tolerate 
the marriage of Islam and politics. Thus, of all political groups, Islamic political parties 
were singled out for :xplicit prohibition. On May 1942 the PSII announced the closing 
of its Jakarta head-office and ordered all branches to follow suit immediately. About the 
same time, the new modernist Partai Islam l11donesia (PII) also published a similar 
announcement. On the other hand, the new rulers not only tended to provide greater 
representation for Muslim leaders in the new government-sponsored quasi-political 
organs, but also attempted to forge a close link between the Islamic elite and its rural 
following (Benda 1958: 111-13). 
In this context, the Japanese sponsored the creation of an all-embracing Muslim 
body that was to become part of the Triple-A Movement. The motive for this policy 
ap!Jearcd to be to supplant the pre-invasion Islamic federation, MIAI-for its overtly 
anti-coloniL! rccord-wiU1 a new more cooperative one. Thus, the Japanese soon 
created the Preparatory [committee] for the Unification of the Islamic Community, 
headed by PSII chairman Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Tjokroaminoto's younger brother), 
and called a U1rec-day meeting of all Muslim leaders to be held in Jakarta bct\veen 
August 21-23, 1942. Although the conference resulted in a certain degree of cooperation 
with the Japanese, it was surprising that no new organization came into existence. 
Instead of creating a monolithic persatuan (union), the conference decided to retain the 
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MIAI federation headed by a Western-educated leader of the PSII, Woitdoamiscno. By 
the end of 1942, when the new version of the MIAI had been set up, the authorities had 
abandoned the Triple-A Movement. This meant that the MIAI continued to be an 
'independent' organization. 
In a further development, however, as the MIAI leadership sought to build an 
independent network of Islamic cells through the islands, to unite the people in the 
name of Allah, rather than that of Tcmw Hcika, the Japanese could no longer tolerate 
the existence of the federation. In an attempt to alienate the leadership of the MIAI from 
its major constituency, the Japanese granted legal status to Muhammadiyah and NU 
with all their branche~. In the face of this challenge, chairman Wondoamiseno could do 
nothing but to close down the MIA I in October 1943. Aflcr the disappearance of the 
MIAI, the government sponsored the creation of a new federation in November 1943, 
the Majlis Sjuro Mus/imin Indonesia (Masjumi, Consultative Council of Indonesian 
Muslims). This federation was initially based on legal associations91 and headed 
nominally by the venerable tr.•ditionalist leader, Hasjim Asj'ari. It would play a critical 
role in championing the aspiration of political Islam in the lead up to the proclamation 
oflndonesian Independence (Benda 1958: 114-151). 
The creation of Masjumi represented a victory for Japanese Islamic policy. At 
the same time, it provided a catalyst for a powerful alliance of the •wo most important 
Muslim associations, NU and Mulwmmadiyah. This elevated the political bargaining 
power for the Muslim group at the expense initially of the secular nationalist camp. 
Thus, under the Japanese policy of wooing the Islamic community, the Muslim 
intelligentsia and 'clerical intelligentsia' made more conspicuous gains than they had 
duting the pre-war period. More importantly, traditional Isla.'llic leaders with their 
unique influence at the grass-root level gained a higher political advantage than other 
groups and during previous periods. The main beneficiaries of this situation were the 
traditionalist uluma-intelek. Because the Japanese government forbade formal 
communication except in the Latin and Japanese script, the ulama-illtclck who were 
literate in Latin alphabet had a symbolic capital which strengthened their public role. 
This was signalled by the appointment of Wachid Hasjim as the Vice (and Acting) 
President ofth~ .Wasjumi. 
91 At the time of Masjunrl's establishment, legal stotus had been grated only to Mu!Janrnradiya!J and NU 
and the new federation derived its main membership from both associations. In further developments, 
however, individual kjai (religious teacher) and ulama could likewise become members of the Masjunri 
with the approval of the Shlimubu, which assumed control overthe new federation (Benda 1958: 151). 
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Nevertheless, the occupation was too short in duration to affect in any vital way 
the body of Indonesian political and functional elite. As the Japanese began to lose the 
Pacific War and the economic condition of Java deteriorated, the Japanese became more 
aware of the importance of curtailing radical nationalist movements by giving more 
concessions to the secular nationalist leaders. Thus, the political scene during the last 
months of the occupation was increasingly dominated by the rise to ultimate pre-
eminence of the Indonesian nationalist elite (Benda 1958: 172-4). 
The Japanese came to realize the importance of involving inftuentialuationalist 
leaders following the failure of the Triple-A movement to gain expected support from 
the secular nationalist politicians. With the promise that self-government would be 
granted in the ncar future, a new all-inclusive nationalist organization was set up on 9 
March 1943, called the Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (Putera, Centre of People's Power). This 
movemr~t brought together all of the former Indonesian political and non-political 
nationaL.! associations domiciled in Java and Madura, led by a board of four. Sukamo 
was chairman, Halla vice-chairman, with Suwardi Smjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantara) 
and a prominent Muslim reformist-modernist leader, Mas Mansur, as the other 
mcmbers.92 
Under the aegis of Putera, the Japanese set up a number of military 
organizations. The most important was the Sr:karela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air (Pcta, 
Volunteer Arn1y of Defenders of the Fatherland).93 Established in September 1943, the 
Peta was as a decentralized auxiliary guerrilla forcc,94 in which those chosen for training 
as battalion commanders (daidanclzo/5 were mostly older men believed by the Japanese 
to have influence among the youth. They were recJUitcd often from among local 
schoolteachers, officials, Islamic notables and intellectuals who had some Western 
cducation.96 On 29 April 1943 the military government also initiated paramilitary 
91 Bcc:1use it was widely believed that Pulera was n genuinely nationalist organization oriented to\vard 
seJf.govemment, this organization initially gained wide support, even from many students nnd 
underground accivists (Kahin 1952: t06). 
91 Prior co Pcla, the Japanese military adminislrlllion had set up che HelM (Auxiliary Forces), a unit of 
conscripted Indonesian labourers, romuslras, incorporated into the Japanese nnny us labour b:~.ttalions. 
9-1 The Peta was set up as local defence for the administrative district of the islands, knbupaten, and 
organized only up lo lhe baUalion {tlaidan) level. In dte case of very large kabupalen, like Jakarta and 
Bandung, there might be two or even three b:~.ttalions. · 
95 The daidanchos were not given intensive military training and were not confined to bameks. TI1eir 
essential function was to conduct moral leadership and exercise political supervision over tl1eir 
subordinates. Schooling and effective military training was only given to junior officers who assumed the 
rank of company commanders (ch:tdanc/w) and pia loon conunanders (slrodancl:o) (Anderson 1972; 20-
22). 
96 To give on insight of the Daidanc!Jos' background, several examples are given. Kasman Singodimedjo, 
u daidanclro of Jakarta, was a graduate of lhe RHS as well as former leader of lhe JIB and MIA!. Mas 
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training for youth, intended to provide youth forces for the more irnmedi2t<: goi'.ls of 
internal security and political mobilization. These included Seinendmz (Youth Corps),97 
the Keibodan (Vigilance Corps),98 the Gakutotai (Student Paramilitary Corps). 
For the Japanese, these organizations were primarily a means of rallying 
Indonesian support behind their war effort. To the nationalist leaders, however, they 
provided a vehicle for extending their contact to the masses which the repressive 
apparatus of the Dutch regime had so severely limited (Kahin 1952: 108).99 Japanese 
lack of political commitment up till 1943 provided the opportunity for the nationalist 
political leaders to exploit these organizations for their nationalist interests. This factor 
along with internal leadership rivalries doomed the Put era project to failure. too 
As the economic condition of Java and popular morale deteriorated, the 
Gzmsekcn felt it urgent to create a new organization that they could control effectively. 
Established on I March 1944 the name of this organization was the Pcrlzimpur:an 
Kebaktian Rakjat (People's Loyalty Organization) generally was known by its Japanese 
name, Djawa Htiktikai (Java Service Association). Designed for the purposes of 
massive mobilization, the Htiktikai was directly under the authority of the Gzmseikan. 
Sukamo was only a nominal chairman ofthis organization (Kahin 1952: 110).tot 
Arudji Kartawinata, a tlaiclal!c/10 of Cimahi, was a graduate of the MULO a• well as the former PSII 
executive in charge of youth. Mustopo, a daidmrclto of Sumbaya, was a for .... .. udent of the STOVIA 
and a graduate of the STOVIT as well os a dentist by profession. Sudirman, a.-. .. fa11cho ofY.roja, was a 
graduate of the Mubammadiyah's Teachers' Training School as well a< n Muha•mnadiyah schoolteacher. 
Mohammed Saleh, a daidanclro ofYogyakarta, was a grnduate of the HighcrTeachcr~Trnining School as 
well as teacher o~ the Muhammadiyah MULO. AIUtough Utcrc also appeared exceptions such os K. H. 
Sjam'un, a daio!ancho ofDanten, who had a conservative rural kjai background (Anderson 1972: 2t). 
9 Seinendan was designed as a sort of militant, politicized scout organization primarily for the urban 
f:>Pulation to cany out various tasks such as tr.tnsmitting government propaganOa Ia the young. 
Keibodan was an auxiliary police force designed to help mainlain order and security and to detect spies 
and saboteurs. 
"As Kahin noted (1952: 108): ' ... Ute most important long·term result of the activities of the Putcra was 
the tremendous increase in political consciousness of the Indonesian masses, and in particular their will to 
independence. For the Putera not only allownl but even encouraged the contact between nationz.lisl 
leaders and the masses which the repressive apparatus of the Dutch regime bad so severely limited.' 
100 In Benedict Anderson's view, the re~on for P111era 's failure was in part because of covert obstruction 
by tt.e traditional civil service after finding that tho leadership of Ute movement was in the hands of their 
old adversaries, the prewar nationalist politicians, 'and in part because of internal divisions among the 
politicians lhemselves'. 'Essentially, howeve_r, the movement failed because in 1942 and 1943 the war 
was not yet going badly enough for Ute Japanese to feel any urgent commitment to· politienl 
development.' This lack of political conunitment provided a space for nationalist political manoeuvres to 
exp1oit the Putem for their own interests. As a result, those who engaged in Putera activities, especially 
the educated youth, appeared to be more anti-Japanese tban anti nllies (Anderson 1972: 27-8). 
101 This made Suknmo in Ute eyes of many Indonesians nothing but a captive of Ute Japanese. In contrast 
to the Putera that confined its constituency to indigenous people, the HOkOkal reached out to incorporate 
Ute Eurasian, Otinese, and Arab minorities (Anderson 1972: 28; Kahin 1952: 110). 
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Under the aegis of the li6k6kai, in September 1944 the Japanese set up a youth 
vanguard organization, Suislti11tai or Barisa11 Pclopor (Pioneer Corps). 102 This corps 
was originally designed as a political organization whose principal aim was to be the 
driving activist vanguard of the liokokai. For this purpose, members were given 
paramilitary drilling with bambu nmci11g (sharpened bamboo spears) and taught the 
techniques of mass mobilization, such as bringing the people to hear the speeches of the 
nationalist leaders. The li6k6kai recruited young people from all social strata but 
primarily those from nominal Muslim backgrounds (aba11ga11). The Corps drew its 
strength especially from the increasingly politicised youth of the larger urban centres 
(Anderson 1972: 29-30). 
Shortly after the appearance of the Barisa11 Pelopor, the Japanese concern about 
the increased strength of the nationalists prompted the Gu11seikan to grant a long 
neglected Muslim request for l similar Corps on 8 December 1944. A few weeks later 
this Muslims youth corps was named liizbu'llalt (The Anny of God}, followed in 
January 1945 by the first field training of live hundred Muslim fighters somewhere in 
West Java.103 This corps was incorporated into Masjumi and was intended as a reserve 
corps for the Peta. Its chairman was Zainul Arifin (one of the NU delegates in the 
Masjumi executive}, with Mohammad Roem (modernist Muslim intelligentsia) as vice-
chairman plus ten other members. Ul.o 
Through the structure of vanguard corps such as Barisa11 Pelopor and 
/iizbu '1/alt, the links between the educated people of the central offices and the non-
educated people of the city slums, shantytowns and countryside were created. In this 
process the rigid educational stratification and the boundaries between the elite and 
others created by long term colonial policies began to break down. The Japanese-
sponsored propaganda of nationalism by nationalist leaders might have contributed to 
the crumbling of the social boundaries. But the main reason was the encounter of the 
educated and uneducated youth as fellow members of particular vanguard corps, which 
enabled the nationalist ideology to attain its concrete meaning. This experience, in the 
view of Anderson 'generated that sense of mass power, of fraternal solidarity, of 
"' Nominally, this Corps was under lhe leadership of Sukamo, but operationally directed by the r•dical 
nationalist, Dr. Muwardi. 
1
" In addition, to conlllin the influence oftl1e Bari.ran Pclopor in lhe countryside, on 28-30 January 194~ 
tl1c Masjumi decided to set up local Islamic work brigades (Bari.ratl Pckcrdja) directed to obtain l s.cu.·e 
Islamic foolhold in the village neighborhood association, Tonari G11ml (Benda 1958: 178-80). 
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immense possibilities, that lies at the heart of popular nationalism' (Anderson 1972: 
30).105 
3.6.2 From Underground Movements to Popular Nationalis1n 
The growing tide of popular nationalism was also swelled by underground 
movements. Soon after the arrival of lhe Japanese troops, some of the polilieised 
intelligentsia who did not want to collaborate with the new colonial masters went 
underground. Thus, there emerged underground groups in the large urban centres, 
notably Jakarta. These developed informal communication networks in which a few 
senior (political) mentors recruited followers from the nucleus of student-youths. 
AI the outset, the so-called 'Sjarifuddin's Pcmocda' acted this way under the 
sponsorship ofP.J.A. ldenburg.106 Amir Sjarifuddin, chairman of the Gerindo, the most 
left-wing of the legal parties of the late thirties, rcr.ruited to his underground networks 
former members of Gcrindo and members of the so-called Illegal PKI, which had been 
clandestinely reconstituted by Muso in 1935 (Anderson 1972: 37-8).107 After the 
collapse of Sjafruddin's underground networks in early !!l<:3, 'Sutan Sjahrir's 
Pemo;Jda' came into existence and became the most important. Drawing its principal 
support from amongst educated youth, Sjahrir's Pemoeda also established a wide 
I0-4 The ten people were S. Surowijono, Sudjono, Anwar Tjokroamirioto, K. H. Zarkasji, Masjhudi, Mrs. 
Sunarjo MangUI1J!U·;pito, Jusuf Wibisono, Muh~rtun.Jd and R. H. 0. Djunaedi, and Pr.~woto 
Mangkusasmila wh,• mostly had a Western cducalcd oackground (Benda 1958: 280). 
10s The growing tide of this popular nationalism m·cntually rebounded on the colonial masters when its 
. enthusiasm was r•:.-·;:-rted into political insurrt.~tion. Greeted as tiberntors from the Dutch oppres"ii~n 
when they first ar . . .,\- ;11 the archipelago, Japanese popularity in the eyes of Indonesian populace was not 
long-lived. In the ,;.urttcnn this 'Asian elder brolhcr' had proved himself to oo u most oppressive and 
devastating colonial regime. In the face of a bloody repressive apparatus, racial ignorance, the riimuslta 
program, :md crop failures, native resentment turned into the despair and tmt.·ed that finally led (o 
century-old tradition of hopeless agrari:m protest) to sporadic iP.~t:mces of llf.i!n resistance. On 25 
February 1944, OIC first instance of a popular uprising occurred in Singapam• (West Java) led by an 
elderly tradilionalist kjai, K. H. Zainal Mus1afa, with the full support from 01e members of his pe.santren 
and the surrounding populace. TI1is was followed by sporadic mutinies within rural Pela units in early 
1945. The first and the most serious was 01c mutiny in Blitar on 14-5 February 1945 led by Suprijadi 
!Ande,.on 1972: 35-6). 
06 Shortly before 01e collapse of theUutch colonial government, PJA Idcnburg had con\actcd Amir 
Sjarifuddin asking him whether he would be willing to organize an underground intelligence network in 
tltc event ofo Japanese occupation. Amir acccp .. ,t the proposal, renlizing thnt for the conunitted ICfl-wing 
Asian nntionnli:.ts at the tjmc, cooperating witl1 bourgeois-democrntic colonial stntcs wa5 preferable to 
collaborAting wi01 the rising powers of fasCism and mili!arism, as confinned by the alliance of those 
slates wit~ 111" ,'oviet Union 3fter June 1941. After accepting tbe offer Sjarifuddin received,um of25,000 
f.uilders r o Jinar:e the projected underground nerworks (Anderson 1972: 37-8). 
01 Eariy ·'·' !~<.:J Sjarifuddin and •eve:-al o01er leaders of this underground organization were arrested and 
sent•nccd to dca01 on 29 February 1944. Sukamo's intervention was able to change the sentence of 
Sjarifuddin to be life imprisonmen4 but four of the other "'""'sted leaders were executed (Kubin 1952: 
112). 
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networl:. with mral ynuth tl:rough peasant coopemtives.108 In addition, there also 
emerged 'Tan Malaka's Pcmocda' (followers of the legendary communist leader, Tan 
Malaka}, as well as an Islamic circle of 'Mohammad Natsir's Pcmocda •. Each of these 
groups developed a particular student-yot · wing, comprised of radical students of the 
t~rtiary and secondary schools whose nun.·· . : increased unprecedentedly as a result of 
.:hanges in educational regime and schor.>l conditions. 
For the Western-educated minority, the initial effect of the occupation was 
extremely shocking. The military govemmcnt closed down all schools, and when the 
schools were gradually, reopened Dutch was no longer permitted as the language of 
instruction in any type of school. As Dutch was outlawed and Japanese took some time 
to learn, Indonesian became the language of instruction. 
For IndoneJian students, the promotion of Indonesian language and the teachers 
provided a perplexing new experience. On the one hand, there were difficulties as the 
'alien' Indonesinn language had to be mastered and textbooh provided in Indonesian 
and Japanese. On the other hand, the exposure to Indonesian language and the encounter 
with Indonesian teachers, the fusion of various types of schools (particularly at the 
secondary level) into a single united system, the introduction of school uniforms, 
morning rituals, marching and other paramilitary practices brought about a new 
collective solidarity (cspirit de corps) which empowered Indonesian nationalism 
(Redaksi SMT 1998: 1 5-32). 
As well as re-organizing public schools, the Japanese kept close control over the 
whole field of I~lamic education. In their eyes, Islamic education deserved special 
attention for its significant impact on grass-root political behaviour. For this reason, 
Arabic teaching was initially forbidden. Nevertheless, when active Islamic support for 
the defence of Java was felt to be more urgent, Arabic teaching was allowed and Islamic 
schools were gradually reopened. Yet, Islamic students and teachers suffered a serious 
humiliation. The Japanese insistence on the practice of Saikeirci, bowing towards 
Tokyo (rather than Mecca) which resembles the prayer bow performed by Muslims, 
clashed head-on with the Islamic faith. This gave rise to anti-Japanese overtones and 
increased the desire for independence (Benda 1958: 122-3). 
The most detrimental effect· of this new educational regime occurred at the 
higher level of education. Students of the higher schools who were the most 
Westemised segment of society and for whom Dutch was the language of conversation 
101 For a good description oftl1e Sjahrir's group, see J. D.Lcgge (1988) and Mr.lzek (t994). 
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had to face the reality that the Dutch was outlawed and that Japanese, or at best 
Indonesian, was tile general medium of instruction. Since virtually all upper-level 
textbooks were in Dutch, students were suddenly alienated from the existing acauemic 
literature. Beyond the language problem, the students were also humiliated by Japanese 
lecturers who could slap the stlldents' faces and order them to hav~ :heir heads shaved 
in the Japanese fashion (Mrazek 1994: 229). 
Lacking exposure to Western scicl!tific knowledge, all students of this 
generation were exposed to milit'IIJ' and paramilitary trainings in which they were 
encouraged to absorb a ~piritual strength a Ia Bushidii. The residual effect of the 
student-youth engagement i:1 this paramilitary education was a the cultivation of violent 
mentalities. 10, At the same time, this kind of education helped strengthen the spirit of 
egalitarian nationalism and student-youths of diverse backgrounds came to unite in a 
common historical calling: to serve the nation. 
Being deprived of or frustrated by the school conditions many students went in 
various directions with radical students tending to be drawn slowly into the underground 
movement. 110 Some student-youths began to set up underground groups centred in some 
student donnitories (asrama) in Jakarta. These included the group of 'Persatuan 
Mahasiswa' (Student Union) centred in th~ asrama of the lka Daigaku (medical 
--
college) at Prapatan 10,111 the 'Sendenbu group' centred in the Asrama Angkata11 Bam 
Indonesia (Ashram of the New Generation of htdonesia) at Menteng 31,112 the • Kaigwz 
109 
'During the Japanese occupation', said General T.D. Simatupang, 'military skills were widely acquired 
by the population, aud a radical change took place in our minds, especially among the militant pemoeda 
[youth]. Subsequently, there emerged a tendency among us to reach our goals by employing force, against 
the enemy as well as against ourselves' (Quoted in Said, 1991: 5). 110 As Anderson observed (1972; 19): 'Some [students], indeed, returned to tl1eir hom'-S. Otl1ers wert Ia 
wo((. in various capacities far the military government, most notably in the Sendetrbu (Departme Jt of 
Propaganda), wh~re they-were given significant roles to play. Still others, thanks to their financial r ,cans, 
were able to withdraw into private life,· meeting with friends, holding infort113l discussionc;, ~ !ading 
intensively on all manner of subj~clS that seemed relevant to their condition, some of these yuu'llS were 
drawn slowly into the underground groups that grew up on the base of such intim:~tc daily intcll' ·.tions.' 111 The 'P"rsatuan Mahasiswa' (Student Union) had a close relationship witlt Sjahrir. It was mado up of 
university students in Jakarta, principally those from U1e medical college (lka Daigaku), and was fo.mted 
following the stu<Jent demonstration in the middle of 1942 to protest against the Japanese order that all 
students had to crop their hair (Kahin 1952: 112). 
112 Tite so-cal!cd 'Scndenb11 group' associated wit11 the Asrama Angkatcm Baru Indonesia (Ashram of the 
New Generation oflndonesia), which was set up early in the occupation under the auspices ofthc army's 
Department of Prop•ganda (Sendenbn). TI1is was intended to give political training to the recruited 
student youths in order to be potential cadres in the provinces. The lectures given in this asrnma were 
strongly naticnalist in content given by such prominent older nationalist politicians ns Suk4mo, Hatta, 
Yamin, SunaJjo, and Amir SjarifudJin (until his arrest). Older Pemoeda of this group such as B. M. Diah, 
Adam Malik and the Tjokroaminoto broL~ers (Anwar and Harsono) worked for tl1e Domei (Japanese 
News Agency) or tl1c Japanese-sponsored newspaper Asia Raja. This group was headed by Sukami nnd 
included among its leaders Adam Malik, Chaerul Saleh, Pandu Wiguna, and Mnruto Nitimihardjo. Most 
leading members of this group were former students ofthe RF.S (tl1e Law College) and bad been involved 
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group' centred in '.he As ram a Indonesia Mertlcka (Frc~ Indonesian Ashram) at Kcbon 
Sirih 80,113 and the group of Sekolah Tinggi Islam (Advanced Islamic School) centred 
around Ba/ai Mus/imin Indonesia (the House of the Indonce'·.;,-. Muslims) at Kramat 
31.114 
These groups were not 'underground' in the sense of being secret agents who 
orchestrated sc:rct violent resistance. In fa~t. not only were many of the asrama 
activists closely related by family or other lies to the most prominent collaborators but it 
was· also the case that the military government knew what was going on in pemoetla 
circles. The tcnn 'underground' in this case, to borrow Anderson's view, could best be 
seen as a frame of mind: 'a growing willingness on the part of metropolitan pem11dt1 to 
think of themselves as "thinking dangerous thoughts"' (Anderson 1972: 49). Even so, 
this was sufficient to stimulate a political climate conducive to mobilizing popular 
patriotism. 
with the pre· invasion anti·Dutch nationalist activists. Some of them were also identified ns T.m Malaka's 
Pemoecla (Mrazek 1994: 242; Anderson 1972: 42-3). 
113 Tile So·co.\h:d 'Kaigun group' associated with the Asrnma Indonesia Merdcka (Free Indonesian 
Ashram). TI1is asranra was set up as a political school for scmi·educated youths between eighteen to 
twenty under the sponsorship of Rear. AdnL Tadashi Maeda. Its purpose remained a Il1.1ttcr of 
controversy. It was sometimes charged that the usmma was set up to materialize the Kaigun (Japanese 
navy) ambition to train infiltrators to penetrate the communist or near·communist underground. On other 
occasions it was said that asrama was set up by Maeda and his aides in :mticipation of a Japanese defeat 
which would finally lead to the Japanese a!liance with the conuuunist axis (Soviet Union) in opposition to 
the Anglo·Saxon powers. It was also believed that the asrama was sc:t up as reflection of the sincerity of 
Maeda and his assistants with regards to Indonesian Independence, consistent with the Koiso Declaration 
(Anderson, 1972: 45). 1l1c Indonesian chosen to head the school was Wikona, a man who L.' a close 
connection with the 'Illegal PKI' but then became fairly closer to Sjahrir. And the Indonesian behdld·the· 
scenes organizer of this project was Achmad Subardjo (fanner PI's member), an older-generation 
politician who had a close connections with Tan Malaka. 1l1e lecturers of this school were virtually 
identical with those at the crmy's spoilsored Asrama Angkatan Bam lntloncsia (minus Sjarifuddin) with 
SJahrir as an addition (Kahin 1952: 115; Anderson 1972: 46). 1 4 1l1e Sckolah Tinggi Islam (Advanced Islamic School) group came I ale and had close connections with 
Masjumi leaders. The existence of this group has been almost unrecognized by Indonesian historical 
accounts possibly due lo the late emergence oflhe school (est. on 8 July 1945). In foe~ the school played 
a significant role particularly as an alternative for students whose colleges were close down or suspended 
by the Japanese or for those who had been expelled from other schools due to their political resistance. 
Moreover, in the early revolution after the J1ror:lamation of Indonesian independence, the ashram of Balai 
Muslimin Indonesia WilS also important as an alternative sanctuary when the Asrama Angkatan Bam 
Indonesia (Ashram of the New Generation of Indonesia) al Mentcng 31 was captured by ohe Japanese (on 
19 September 1945), and the asrama oflko Daiga~11 al Prar·•••n 10 was under the sli1Ct survcittancc of 
the NICA (NeUoerlands Indies Civil Administralion)-lhc postwar Dutch adminbtra;ive system in 
occupied territories. The leading figures of this asrama were Subianto Djojohadikusumo, Suroto Kunto, 
Bagja Nilidiwirja (aU were former sludcn~ of Ute lka Daiga~11), Dahrum Ranglruli (fo•mor student of Ute 
College of Literature). M. Sj:mvani (fom1er student of the THS), Sili Rahmah Djajadiningral, Anwar 
Harjono, Karim Hatim, Djanamar Ajam and some others (Harjuno & Hakicm t 997: 3-59). 
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3.6.3 From Literary Activism and the Media-Sphere to Popular Nationalism 
1:1 the literary field, the immediate inipact of the Japanese occupation was the 
volun:ary cessation of the publication of Pudjangga Baroe (PB) by its editors. In the 
face of the new colonial environment, the PB journal and the literati of the PB 
generation found themselves unfit to cope creatively with the new zeitgeist. Politically, 
although the PB journal was a manifestation of pre-war nationalism that opposed 
colonialism, its tendency to favour some Western values such as modem rationalism 
and individualism had a certain degree of affinity with the symbolic universe of the 
Dutch colonial masters. This affinity may well have worked to gain Dutch support for 
its survival. But now, under th~ fascistic Japanese occupation, the mental frame of 
r~fercnce of the PB literati underwent a sudden breakdown. Spiritually, the approach of 
the PB was c;sentially romantic, semimental and provincial. In an age of war and 
revolution that demanded deeds rather than drrams, PB literature became totally 
inadequate. Under the heightening spirit of popular nationalism and revolution, a new 
generation of literati emerged frol\> 1942-3 up to the end of the Indonesian revolution in 
1949 (Tc-.aw 1986: lOS-18). 
The literature of this generatbn reflected the spirit of revnlution both in content 
and fom1. In content, the literature tended to be dominated by nationalistic political 
propaganda. In form, there was a radical departure from rigid traditional literary 
structure, especially in the poetry. By adopting Western literary styles the works of the 
'rebel' poet Chairil Anwar became the representative par excellence of such a 
revolutionary change. In prose, most writings produced in this period were short stories 
reflecting the revolutionary mood, time and space with ldrus' works being the best 
example of this genre. At this juncture, 'there was still little specifically Islamic writing, 
except for Bahrum Rangkuti (I 919-77), who was much inspired by the Pakistani writer 
Muhammad Iqbal' (Ricklefs 1993: 215). 
Apart from literature, a specific characteristic of the public sph"e of the time 
also contributed to the growing vibrancy of popular patriotism. Under the Japanese all 
types of publication without legal permit from the military government were forbidden. 
All Dutch and Chinese-owned media were forbidden. All pre-invasion native presses 
were closed down, although shortly afierwards a few of those reappeared under a new 
structure with new names given or agreed to by the Japanese.115 Increased opportunities 
115 The secular nationalist organizations had bctn C:eprived of any publication of their own since early in 
the occupation. Neither the 'Triple-A Movement' nor lhc P11tera were allowed to print tltcir own 
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to spread the seeds of popular nationalism occurred when the Japanese installed a 
considerable radio network throughout the archipelago. They also made sure that the 
villagers and city dwellers had receiver sets.ttG 
Since most of the Indonesian population of the time were illiterate, the 
introduction of the radio was a breakthrough in overcoming the communication barriers 
between the politicised intelligentsia and the masses. To borrow the words of Marshall 
McLuhan in his seminal work, Utulcrstmuling Media (1964: 299), the advantage of this 
new media can be described thus: 
Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of 
unspoken communications between writer-speaker and the listener. That is' the 
immediate aspect of radio. A private experience. The subliminal depths of radio 
arc charged with the resonating echoes of tribal horns and antique drums. This is 
inherent in the very nature of this medium, with its power to tum the psyche and 
society into a single echo chamber. 
In contrast to the limited and elitist circulation of the press, the radio provided 
the first massive simultaneous experience of exposure to the 'alien' political world of 
periodicals. Despite repeated requests, the nationalist's cry to have their own press WolS only gr.mted some 
three months before the collapse of Japanese rule (Benda 1958: t 18) By contrast, the Japanese priority of 
winning of Muslim supports gave the opportunity for Islamic socio-political organizations to run their 
own ptcss. TI1is is especially true when the MIA! was allowed to publish its journal, Socora MIA/ (the 
Voice of MIAI), which would mctam'lrphose into the Masjumi's journal Soeara Moeslimin /t;doncsia 
(Benda, 1958: 118, 262). Few other publications appeared during the Japanese occupation run as 
individual enterprises-a contrast to the situation before the pre-Javanese invasion. Examples of this 
publication were the Jakarta based Asia Raja (Greater Asia), 7Jaja Timocr (Light of the East), Kung l'ung 
Pao-lncfoellcsia, Kana-Afonji Shimbrm, P.mc/ji Poestaka (Banner of the Good Reading), and Djawa Baroc 
(New Djawa), and Pcmamlangan (The View) or its substitute Pcmbangocn (The Developer); the 
Bandung based 1]ahaja (The Light); the Yogyakarta-bascd Sinar Matahari (Sun Light); t•~e Semarang-
bascd Sinor Baroc (New Light); the Surabaya-based Socara Asia (The Voice of Asia); the Medon-based 
Kita Soematra S/Jimbrm and Semangal Islam (The Istam:c Spirit); the Padang-bilsed Pm/ang /Iippa and 
Soem.~tra Slu"mbun; the Palembilng-bilsed Pa/emba11g Shimbrm and Sinar Matahari (Sun Light); the 
Tilnjung Karang-based Lampoeng Shimbwr; the Danjilnnasin·based Soeara Kalimo11tan tor whilt later 
became Borneo Shimbun); the Makassar-based Seiches Shimbrm; and tlte Ambon-based Sinar Matahari; 
and probably some others (Said 1987: 52-5; Benda 1958: 238). The names of publications in this period 
overwhelmingly used the word 'slrimb11n ', 'sinar' or 'ljaja '/'tjalraja' (light), Asia, nnd tl1e like, reflecting 
the radiance of the Triple-A's credo nnd the spirit of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. 
Under this regime there was no such thing as an independent press, as the mili~ary government stricti:! 
controlled nil existing publications. 
116 The significance of these radio networks is depicted by Kahin (1952: 108) as follow: 'Large public 
Qddress systems linked to the radio network, "singing towers," were set up at importilnt points throughout 
the cities. At prescribed hours the population was required to listen to their official broadcasts, including 
the frequent speeches of Soekarno. In these, according to his instruction from the Japilnese, he attacked 
the Allies, extolled the Japanese and called upon the population to support their war effort. An 
examination of these speeches, however, will support Sockarno's contention that '75 per cent of their 
content was pure nationalism.' Moreover, they were full of subtleties and double talk which generally 
pilssed over the heads of Japanese monitors but were meaningful to the population, especiillty those of 
Javanese culture. Such talk made it easy for the peasant to equate "anti-imperialism" with anti-Japanese.' 
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the intelligentsia in an intimate way. In this, the radio mediated the construction of 
common ideas and solidarity leading to the empowerment of popular nationalism. 
3.6.4 Towards the Proclamation oflndoncsian Independence 
The en:ounter of pemoeda from all social strata through various military and 
vanguard organizations, the existence of underground movements and the powerful 
effect of radio in breaking socio-spatial boundaries brought about an unprecedented 
collective experience of horizontal comradeship. This in tum helped empower the spirit 
of Indonesian nationalism as a common historical bloc. In the growing spirit of 
egalitarian nationalism, the third generation of intelligentsia was born without a specific 
signifier in its own right. The only powerful signifier of the time was 'pemoeda' which 
included both the educated and uneducated people. 
The egalitarian nationalism of the revolutionary pemoeda was channelled into 
the push for independence following the so-called Koiso Declaration. As the Japanese 
military situation worsened, the Japanese Prime Minister, Kuniaki Koiso, made his 
historic promise on 7 September 1944 that Indonesia would definitely be given its 
independence 'in the future'. This declaration stimulated civil disobedience among the 
educated youths. Underground groups changed their character, 'and moved out of the 
shadowy limbo between legality and illegality', as 'the Japanese authorities were no 
longer in a position openly to oppose pemuda objectives' (Anderson 1912: 49). Above 
ground, this promise led to the formation of several Japanese-sponsored institutions in 
line with the preparation oflndonesian Independence. 
Towards the realization of this promise, on I March 1945 the Japanese 
Commander-in-chief announced the establishment of the Study Committe' for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badal! U11tuk Me11yelidiki Usaha-Usaha 
Kemerdekaa11)111 chaired by Radjiman Wediodiningrat. The composition of the Study 
Committee was made public on 29April. Of the sixty-two members of this Committee at 
its first series of meetings (29 May- 1 June), there were only ten representatives of the 
Tslamic community.118 The dominance of secular politicians in the Committee reflected 
the Japanese preference for transferring state power to Indonesians capable of 
117 In Japanese it was called Dokuritsu ZJ•mbi Tyoosako. . 
111 Titese were Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Mas Mansur, Ki Dagus 
Hadikusumo, Abdul Halim, Abdul Knhar MliZ:Ikkir, Ahmnd Sanusi,Wachid Hnsjim nnd Mnsjkur (Ynmin 
I 959-60 !: 60). 
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administering a modem state. In this context, as Benda argued, the secular nationalist 
elite was to benefit from its superiority in Western education and political schooling that 
'it could rightfully claim as a monopoly among its competitors' (Benda 1958: 173-4). 
In this first session of the Study Committee, the mood of the meetings, which 
were dominated by secular figures, had tended to reject the idea of an Islamic state. On 
the closing day (I June) Sul:amo as a prominent nationalist leader gave an address in 
which he outlined for the first time his ideas on the live principles of the independent 
Indonesian state, ideas that came to be known as Patrcasila (Five Principlesj} 19 When 
the address described the third principle, that of democracy, he rejected the idea that 
Islam should become the basis of the Indonesian State. He confronted the Islamic 
leaders with the fact that although about eighty to ninety per cent of the total Indonesian 
population were Muslims, a considerable proportion was fairly lax in practicing Islamic 
injunctions and was in favour of a 'secular' over an Islamic state (Dijk 1981: 45-6). 
Sukamo's exposition on this fundamental issue with subsequent debates on its 
ramifications gave rise to a conflict iletween proponents of a 'secular' and those of an 
Islamic state. These debates provided a new basis for mobilizing Islamic collective 
solidarity and identity. After their experience of unity under the all-inclusive Islamic 
federation, MIAI!Masjumi, and in confronting a common enemy, both traditionalist and 
reformist-modernist Muslim leaders now had a common language with which to 
articulate the interests of the lslan1ic political community. This can be seen in their 
cohesiveness in defending Islamic ideals in the following session of the Study 
Committee. 
Following the first session, Sukamo took the initiative to gather some thirty-
eight members of the committee in the headquarters of Djawa Hokokai on 22 June to 
discuss the issues to be settled at the. Committee's next session. At this meeting a special 
sub-committee of nine chaired by Sukamo was appointed to study the position oflslam. 
The other eight were Mohammad Halla, Muhammad Yamin, Subardjo, and Maramis (as 
representatives of the secular camp), Agus Salim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Wachid 
Hasjim, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (as representatives of the Islamic camp). This sub-
committee reached a compromise that later came to be known as the formula of the 
'Piagam Jakarta' (The J~karta Charter), which was intended to be included in the 
preamble of the constitution. In this compromise formula, Islam was not regarded as the 
119 TI1c five principles (Pancasi/a) b.lSed on Sukamo's speech wci·e 'nationalism', 'internationalism', 
'democracy', 'social justice', and 'belief in God'. 
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sole basis of the State, but with a modification of the Pancasila principles outlined by 
Sukarno early in June would have a proper place in the independence Stale. In the first 
place, the order of five principles was changr.d. The principle of the 'belief in one God', 
put at the end in the earlier Sukarno's formulation, became the first principle. Next, 
under pressure from the Islamic camp for a special provision for the Muslim 
community, the phrase of the Belief in God was expanded with the following clause 
'with the obligation for the adherents oflslam to practise Islamic law'. This clause came 
to be known as 'the seven words'{Dijk 1981: 47-8; Boland 1971: 27). 
During the second series of the Study Commillee meeting; {I 0 -17 July), the 
formula of the Jakarta Charter was discussed in the constitution sub-commillee headed 
by Sukarno. The formula came immediately under auack from J. Latuharhary 
{representing the Christian community of the Moluccas), Wongsonegoro {a Javanese 
aristocrat) and several other representatives of non-Muslim and secular groups. 
Basically, they raised objections to 'the seven words' for 'the consequences the clause 
might have for adherents of other religions, and because of difficulties it might give rise 
to in the relation between Islam and customary law'. The aUacks gave rise to severe and 
extensive debates that could only be reined in by the charismatic appeals of influential 
personalities such as Sukamo. Sukarno relentlessly reminded members of the sub-
commillee that the Jakarta Charter was the optimal compromise in which both 
proponents of the secular and Islamic State could gain a common denominator. Thus, at 
the end of the second session, the status of the Jakarta Charter remained in the drafi of 
the constitution {Dijk 1981: 48-58). 
By the beginning of August 1945, the Japanese position in the Pacific war was 
desperate. When Hiroshima was devastated by the atomic bomb on 6 August, 
Indonesian political developments accelerated. On 7 August the Japanese High 
command in Saigon announced the creation of the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia {PPKI, Commille~ for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence), as the 
successor to the Study Committee. The new commillee was intended 'to hasten all 
efforts in relation to final preparations for lbrming a government of an independent 
Indonesia' {Anderson 1972: 62). While the membership of the Study Commillee had 
been composed along the lines of ideological diversity, the major criterion for Ute 
composition of the PPKI members was the regional diversity of Indonesia. 
Consequenlly, some key former members persons ofthe Study Commillee such as Agus 
Salim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Masjkur, Ahmad Sanusi, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as well 
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as Wongsonegoro and Mohammad Yamin disappeared from the list of PPKI 
membership (Dijk 1981: 60). 
The disappearance of leading Muslim figures from the PPKI was a bad omen for 
the struggle of Muslim politics. The political history of the nation afterwards continued 
to reflect the inferiority of political Islam. Originally, the PPKI was composed of 
twenty-one members chaired by Sukarno with Mohammad Halla and Radjiman 
Wcdiodiningrat as .. :ce-chairmcn.120 Of the twenty-one members twelve can be 
classified as older & . · ·.ion, non-Islamic nationalist leaders. The other nine contained 
two representatives of the 'pangreh praja' (indigenous administrative corps), three from 
the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, two from Islamic organizations, one as 
Peta representative, and one from the Chinese minority (Anderson 1972: 64). The new 
committee was once again dominated by secular politicians with the Islamic camp 
represented only by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo of the Muhammadiyah and Wachid Hasjim 
of the NU. 
After discussions between the chairman of the PPKI with Japanese authorities it 
was agreed that the Committee's first meeting would be held on 18 August. When the 
t.itL · r.amc, the Indonesian political mood and situation had changed dramatically. 
When the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces in August 1945 there was an 
opportunity for the political intelligentsia to declare the independence of Indonesia. In 
this moment, a combination of the growing culture of violence and the spirit of 
egalitarian nationalism among the youth played a very decisive role. He:;ring rumors 
about a possible Japanese surrender as early as I 0 August 1945, radical pemoeda urged 
nationalist leaders, Sukamo and Halla, to declare immediately the proclamation of 
independence outside the framework of the Japanese-sponsored PPKJ. 121 Sukarni and 
some other pemoeda kidnapped Sukamo and Halla at 4 a.m. on I 6 August and brought 
them to the Pet a garrison at Rengasdcngklok (West Java). Although the act itself failed 
to move both leaders, that experience was a strong case for them to convince the 
Japanese military government that the Proclamation of Independence was a condition 
120 The original members of the PPKI were Sukamo, Mohammad Halla, Rndjiman Wediodiningrat, Oto 
lskandardinata, Ki Dagus Hadik'Usumo, Wachid Hasjim, B.K.P.A. Surjohamidjojo, B.P.H. Puruboyo, M. 
Sutarjo Kartohadikusumo, R.P. Suroso, R. Supomo, and R. Abdul Kadir for lava; Mohammad Amir, 
Teuku Mohammad Hassan, and Abdul Abas for Sumatra; G.S.S.J. Rntulangi and Andi Pangeran for 
Celebes; A.A. Hamidh:m for Borneo; I. Gusti Kctut Pudja for the Lesser Sunda Islands; l. Latuharhary for 
the Moluccas; and Yap Tjwan lling representing tlte Chinese community (Kahin 1952: 127; Yamin 
1959-601: 399). 
121 Sukamo and Halla, hoping to avoid bloodshed, preferred to wait for an official statement from the 
Gunselkan. This was perceived by the rudic01l pemoeda as wasting time and they decided to intervene. 
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si11e qua 11011 to avoid a state of anarchy. This dramatic moment finally led to the 
proclamation oflndonesian Independence by Sukamo on 17 August 1945. 
In the jubilation of Indonesian independence, certain adjustments were made to 
the composition of the PPKI. On an informal basis some individuals, included Kasman 
Singcdimedjo (Peta commander in Jakarta), were asked to attend. 122 Thus, with the 
addition of Kasman there were only three people who could be expected to represent 
Islamic voices in the Committee. With this minority representation, the Islamic camp 
had to confront a vital 'battle' in deciding the constitution of the Indonesian Republic. 
On 18 August the PPKI elected Sukamo and Mohammad Hatta respectively President 
and Vice-Preside~! of the Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, the Committee 
approved the draft constitution drawn up earlier by the Study Committee. The 'seven 
words' of the Jakarta Charter-the provision that had frequently been described by 
Sukamo as an optimum compromise and that had aroused the greatest controversy in 
the last session of the Study Committee-were omittcd.123 
The impotence of the Islamic camp in the PPKI was also proven by the early 
rejection of the idea of creating a Ministry of Religion. At first, Latuharhary opposed 
the idea on the ground that it would become a bone of contention between the Islamic 
and Christian communities. He won the support of the nineteen members of the 
Committee (Anderson 1972: 87-90) with the result that from Sukamo's first presidential 
cabinet (August 31-Novembcr, 14, 1945) until Sjahrir's first parliamentary cabinet 
(November 14, 1945-March 12, 1946) this department did not exist.12' The 
disappointment of Muslim leaders grew when they were under-represented both on the 
122 Other names were R. A. A. Wiranatnkusumah, Iwa Kusumasumantri, Ki Hadjo.r Dewantara, and 
Sajuli Mclik (Yamin 1959-60 1: 399). 
"' Sukamo and Halla approached Teuku Mohammad Hassan (tl1e Acehnesc reprcscnlalive) and Wachid 
Hasjim to persuade to the strongest supporter of the Islamic position on the Committee, Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo. Although from an aristocratic family, Hassan's association with the Acelmesc conununity, 
which was well-known as a slrong defender of Islam, was expecled to effeclively persuade Hadiknsumo. 
In fact botl1 Hasjim and Hassan could not convince him. The last effort was made by Kosman 
Singodimedjo who presented the argument that in the very critical situation when Indonesian unity was so 
important for saving the Indonesian independence threalened by tl1e arrival of Allied forees, the Islamic 
stand should be sacrificed. More importanlly, Kosman convinced him that based on an article of the dmfi 
of constitution it was said that in six montbs time a special session could be conducted to set up a more 
comprehensive constitution. Believing that the Islamic P"Sition could be reinlroduced by that time, Ki 
Bagus Hadikusumo finally accepted tbc elinUnation of 'the seven words'. Tite special session Dever 
occurred cancelled l·y the great tremor of tl1e revolution (Panitia Pcrlngatan 75 1'altun Kasman 1982: 
I28-30). . 
124 In both cabinets religious affairs were mano.ged under tbc Minister or State without portfolio. Luter, 
however, tbc Department of Religious Affairs appeared in Sjnhrir's second parliamentary cabinet 
(Oclober 2, 1946-June 27, 1947) and has continued to exist up to the pr:csent (Djamily 1986). 
Chaprer J • MaA:ing Indonesia 236 
newly established legislative body Komite National Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, Central 
Indonesian National Committce)125 and on the Indonesia's first republican cabinet. 126 
Thus, although they were freed from the iron cage of the colonial occupation and 
moving towards the frc~ public sphere of the independent nation, pt>litical Islam 
remained in gloom. The political marginalisation of Muslims was sustained, in part, by 
persisting colonial hierarchies of knowledge and values which reinforced what Edward 
Said calls the 'dreadful sccondarincss' of some segments of society and cultures. 
Colonisation, as Said argued, is a 'fate with lasting, indeed grotesquely unfair results' 
(Said, 1989: 207). 
3. 7 Conclusion 
With the proclamation of Indonesian independence, a radical departure in the 
history of the nation began. The cry of 'merdeka' (independent) now became the rite de 
passage of people in the street. It was in the fantasy of popular hope that Indonesian 
independence became a reality, while in fact post-colonial nightmares entered the 
political arena through the back door of the new Republic. For the political actors of the 
new Republic there was no time to rest. New 'enemies' had arisen and the Allied forces 
were about to land on the islands. At least, there was a brief moment to share jubilation 
with the millenarian hope of the ordinary people through the recognition of the heroic 
Indonesian struggle of the late colonial period. 
The period of the 1920s-1940s had seen the culmination of a whole series of both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects in the relationship between the superior-
'" On 22 August the l'PKl disappeared inlo the newly established Komite National lndonrsla Pusot 
(KNlP, Central Indonesian National Conunittec) which acted ns an advisory body ofd1e new govenunent 
tho~ in a later development, would become the legislative body for the new Republic. Sukamo as 
Indonesian president was given the aud1ority to select the membership ofd1e KNIP. He was assisted by 
Hatta, appointing 137 members including those from the PPKl (Kahin 1952: 140). Although Knsman 
Singodimedjo was appointed d1e chairman of the KNll' (perhaps because of his strategic position as 
PETA conunander in Jakarta), the Islamic representation on this Conunittee was once again very small. 
As Anderson observed (1972: 91): 'A great majority of the 137 members (at least 85) were abanga11 
Javanese. At d1e highest estimate, Islamic leadern numbered less d1an twenty. 11JC pcmuda fared little 
better, with no more than twenty or twenty-five positions. An even larger majority consisted of nationalist 
politicians, of pangreiJ pradja, and of profe,;sional men who had been appointed to the various top-level 
~scudo-legislative and pseudo-party organizations of the Japanese period.' 
26 Indonesi•'s first republican cabinet was formed on 31 August under President Sukamo's leadership. 
The greater part oftt.e ministers were selected from the PNI (State Party) and the Jawa Hokokai or from 
those men of 'prlyayi' origin who bad occupied the top posts of tlJC departmental hierarchies as bucho 
(chiefs) or sanyo (advisors) in tl1e Japanese administration. Of the fourteen ministerial level posts ofdlis 
cabinet, tbe Islamic camp received only two positions: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as tlte Minister of 
Communications, and Wachid HllSjim ns tlte Minister of State without portfolio, namely as an advisor for 
religious affairn (Anderson 1972: 110-13; Knhin 1952: 139). 
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colonizers and the inferior-colonized people in the East Indies. In the end, 'Dewi 
Fortuna' (the goddess of fortune) sided with the oppressed. 
It seems to be true that the historical trajectory of humans is not a straight path that 
can be easily manipulated by the superiority of knowledge and power. Both the myth of 
Dutch zakelijkheid and Nippon's inner strength failed to control Indonesian history. 
Despite the colonial practice of domination, there remained some resources of counter-
hegemonic power. No matter what domination wus applied it failed to quell the 
resistance. 
The dominant power was always equipped with its own mask. The Dutch 'Ethical' 
and 'Association' policies were intended to cover colonial interests with the image of 
benevolence. The cost of maintaining the mask was indeed expensive. In a time of 
social-economic malaise when economic resources were scarce, the rising expectations 
of the privileged segment of the dominated society were too expensive to be satisfied by 
the presentation of so-called benign policies. Faced with this, the dominant power 
preferred to remove its mask. Thus, in the deterioration of the Indies economy after 
Word War I, and especially during the great depression of the 1930s, the ethical spirit 
became an outworn creed, to be replar~d by the regime of n1st en ore/e. 
The deployment of the repressive state apparatus at a time of newly emerging 
national consciousness brought about a radical change in Indies political development. 
Politicised intelligentsia began to tum away from the politics of cooperation with the 
apparatus of the colonial state. In their eyes, cooperation under repression meant merely 
'the stronger riding roughshod over the weaker and the usc of one as an instrument by 
the other for its own interest'. The point of departure was the invention of 'Indonesia' as 
a counter-construction to the Dutch construction of the 'Netherlands East Indies'. The 
invention of Indonesia signalled the invention oflndoncsian politics. A new 'imagined 
community' emerged that could unite the plurality of subject positions into a common 
historical bloc. 
The stmgg!e to achieve this historical project found its decisive moment during 
the Japanese interregnum. Through the structure of the Japanese-sponsored military and 
paramilitary organizations tile links between the educated and the non-educated people 
were forged. In this process the rigid educational stratification and the boundary 
between the elite and the masses, created by long term colonial policies, began to break 
down. This situation generated a sense of mass power and of fraternal solidarity leading 
to the growth of popular nationalism. 
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The making of Indonesia as a new imagined community and historical bloc was 
in fact cotenninous with the ongoing political disputes among the intelligentsia of 
different collectivities and identities. The clash of ideologies which began as social 
movements in the previous decades transfonncd themselves into political parties. In the 
very beginning, idcolcgical discovery was needed not only iO give a solid theoretical 
foundation for responding to the repressive colonial state, but also to give plausibility 
and a sense of collective identity to particular collective actions. Neverthelc.~s. in 
grounding the ideology in the body of a the structured political party-requiring specific 
rules, code of conducts, chains of command and party discipline-mental, linguistic and 
spatial boundaries had been automatically created which separated us and them, in-
group and out-group (collective) identities. In this stage, collective identities that had 
been created in the awaking of the proto-national movements in the 1910s began to be 
converted into politicised identities. 
There soon emerged diverse political traditions centred arJu,ld imclei of the 
intelligentsia and 'clerical intelligentsia'. The basic principle for the constimiio:i of 
these traditions was a coming together of differences in intellectual networks, the degree 
of exposure to modern (Western) civilization, cultural and socio-economic base, und 
political orientation. In broad tenns, six political traditions had emerged in the pre-war 
period: the refonnist-modernist (Islamic) tradition, the traditionalist (Islamic) tradition, 
the communist (secular) tradition, the nationali$t (secular) tradition, the socialist 
'secular) tradition, and the Christian-Protestant & Catholic-{secular) tradition. One 
more tradition would emerge in the second half of the 1940s, namnly the military 
(secular) tradition. 
Here, both the Marxian prcm; · of polarization bctwe~n two major can1ps of 
society and the Weberian theory of social fragmentation within each social camp are of 
relevance. As the socio-political groupings were mainly defined on the basis of 'alira11' 
(cultural stream) solidarity rather the,l 'class' solidarity, political Jiolatization mostly 
emerged between the Muslim and secular camp. At the same iime, there had been a 
fragmentation within both the Muslim and the secular ca:nps. Each tradition had its own 
sectoral solidarity and identity. In certain moments, however, the logic of competitive 
political struggle, especially in facing ext.:rnal threats to 111e perceived common cultural 
identity, forced smaller sectors of each cultural stream 10 unite in a broader coalition of 
the a/ira/! entity. 
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Thus, the making of Indonesia as a new political community expressed not only 
a tension in thr. state-society interaction but also in the interaction of diverse politic•! 
traditions within society. Under the 'alien' colonial administration, the conflict within 
society was ttcutralizcd by conflict in the state-society interaction. As the colonial state 
disappeared, conflicts within the societ!' made it difficult to arrive ;o.t a common cause. 
In the competition between the secular and Muslim intelligentsia over the 
political leadership of the new state, the secular intelligentsia became the winner. The 
Dutch Association policy with its disguised ambition to detach the new elite from Islam 
now began to bear fruit in the emergence of the (moderate) secular intelligentsia. The 
handicap of the Muslim intelligentsia in terms of modem educational qualifications and 
political schooling was made worse by the Dutch and Japanese policy of marginalizing 
p•;litical Islam. As a result the Islamic camp was defeated in a series of competitive 
politic:.! struggles. 
The Muslim intelligentsia began to realize their minority position within the 
iniellectual community in the 1920s. To deal with this problem they developed the 
historical project of Islamizing the intelligentsia that would become the main theme of 
Muslim intellectual movements for the rest of the 201h century. This was embedded in 
the /ormation of, among others, JIB, SIS, and the Islamic University. These projects 
successfully contributed to the emergence of a new breed of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
By the time of the proclamation oflndependcncc, however, their competitive advantage 
remained far less than that of their secular counterparts. This resulted in under-
representation of political Islam in the political community of the new Republic. 
With the impotence of the Islamic camp in the polity of the new Republic, the 
faith continued to be an outsider on the Indonesian political scene. This gave rise to the 
emergence of what W. F. Wertheim called (1980) 'the majority with minority mentality' 
syndrome. It was this kind of collective mem0ry and mentality that would shape the 
construction of Muslims' politics of meaning in the following decades. Under the 
shadow of this cognitive structure, a new generation of the Muslim Intelligentsia was 
bam with the burden of a painful remembering. 
-- ----- -- _____ j 
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Chaptcr4 
INTELLIGENTSIA AS THE POLITICAL ELITE OF THE NEW NATION 
The postcolonialtlream cf discontinuity is ultimately vulnerable 
to tlte infectious residue of its own rmconsideretl and unresolved past. 
Lee Ia Gandhi (1998)1 
lilthougiJ the imellectuals of the wulerdcveloped countries ha~·e created the idea of nation 
wit/tin their own countries, they have not been able to create a nation. 
They are tlwnseh•cs the l'ictims oft/tat condition, 
since nationalism tines not necessarily become citizenthip. 
Edward Shit• ( 1972)1 
The Indonesian intelligemsia (inteligcnsia) has t.'lC intcl/cclllczl responsibility 
to dcje11d till! ideas and moral values of the nation ... 
Those wlto gil'C up litis responsibility to political passio11 
betray their function and the nation. 
Moh:nmad Halla (1957)1 
For more than four years after the proclamation of Independence, Indonesians had to 
defend their self-proclaimed freedom through revolutionary SVJgle as the Dutch 
attempted to reassume the control over the territory. In this critical historical phase, the 
national euphoria of independence provided the impetus for all political traditions to 
strive to actualise their own political dream. 
This resulted in internal power struggles and clashes of ideologies which were 
reflected in the short life-spans of the early cabinets. From \9 August 1945 until 20 
December 1949, the new nation experienced the rise and fall of nine cabinets each of 
which lasted less than two years.4 Despite this internal fragmentation, however, an 
historical bloc survived temporarily ba£ed on a common will to resist the aggression 
from the outside. 
Through revolutionary warfare and negotiations, Indonesia at last achieved its 
formal and legal sovereignty. The Rnund Table Conference held at The Hague from 23 
August to 2 November 1949 resulted in iln agreement to the unconditional and complete 
1 Gandhi (1998: 7). 
1 Shils (t972: 409) 
'Halla (1957: 29-30). 
' TI1c nine cabinets were Sukamo's (Presidential) Cabinet (19 August-14 November 1945), the First 
(Parliamentary) Cabinet of Sjahrir (14 November 1945-12 March 1946), the Second (Parliamentary) 
Cabinet of Sjahrir (12 March 1945-2 October 1946), the Third (Parliamentary) Cabbet of Sjahrir (2 
October 1946-27 June 1947), the First (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin (3 July 1947-11 
November 1947), the Second (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin (II November 1947-29 
January 1948), tl1c First (Presidential) Cabinet ofMohanunad Halla (29 January 1948), the Emergency 
Clbinet of Sjafruddin Prnwirancgara (19 December 1948-13 July 1949), the Second (Presidential) 
Cabinet of Mohammad Halla (4 August-20 December 1949). 
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transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands no later than 30 December 1949, of the entire 
territory of the former Netherlands East Indies, except for West New Guinea, to the 
Republic of the United States oflndoncsia (RUSJ). 
The RUSI was to have the sovereign of the Netherlands as a sympolic head, 
Sukarno as President, Mohammad Halla as Vice-President and als() Prime Minister 
(1949-50). It consisted of the original Republic of Indonesia and 15 Dutch-created 
political units (statcs).5 Dutch investments were to be .protected, and the new 
government was to be responsible for the billion-dollar Netherlands Indies government 
debt.~ 
This federal state of Indonesia, however, did not last long. Although the id.:: · '~: 
federalism had long been idealised hy a large segment of the po!iticised intelligentsia, 
the fact that the f01mation ot RUSI was perceived as Dutch-imposed and a relic of 
colonialism gave rise to a climate of opinion that favoured a unitary $late. In all the 
fil\ccn states there soon emerged popular dc;nands for the liquidation ofthcse states and 
their merger with the Republic. On 3 April 1950 Mohammad Na!sir, the chairtnan of the 
Masjumi fraction in the RUSl House of Representatives, proposed the so-called 'Mosi 
Integral Natsir' (Natsir's 'Integral' Motion) to the House, calling on all the states to 
unite and to establish together a unitary state. The motion gained positive responses. On 
the occasion of the fil\h anniversary of the declar;;,ion of independence, on 17 August 
1950, the RUSI was replaced by a new Republic of Indone5ia with a unitary (but 
provisional) constitution. 
Natsir was mamlatcd by President Sukarno to form a new cabinet, which was 
announced on September 6 and s~mbolized the beginning of the new 'unitarian' 
government. The l?ng cherished dream of political independence had been achieved but 
the dream had to be transformed into actuality. The 'enemies' were now no longer 
foreign imperialists but domestic problems of poverty, educational bacLI~ardncss, social 
inequality, corruption, political disputes and the challenge of territorial disintegration. 
In the polity of the independent state, the Indonesian intelligentsia and 'clerical-
. ' 
intelligentsia' (ulama-illlefekhvho served as the instiga:ors, leaders and executors of 
. . 
national politics constituted the dominant ruling elite. Harry J. Benda has tended to 
5 TI1e fifteen smtcs consisted of Great Dayak. East Indol'l.csia, Southeast Borneo, East Borneo, West 
Bor. ~ . ~hncoolcn, Billiton, Riouw, East Sumatm, Ban jar, Madura, Pasundan, South Sumatra, East J.-va, 
and C :,; lhl Java. The original territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which was fanned during the 
revolut;• :·- :. 'llprised parts of Jnva, Madura nnd Sumaira (Panitla Peringatan, 1978b: 95). 
6 Tit. ,,... amount of this debt w"" f. 4.l.billion; 'much of this in fact represented the costs oftlle Dutch 
attempt <O crush the Revolution' (Ricklefs 1993: 232). 
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exaggerate the situation by describing the structural position of this intelligentsia in 
ternts of forming a cla$S in its own right. In his view, this group of intelligentsia wielded 
political power in their own right, as intelligentsia, rather than as spokesmen for 
entre:Jchcd social forces. 'In other words, these intelligentsias arc a ruling class, or 
rather the ruling class par excellence' (Benda 1962: 237, emphasis adde.i). This is an 
exaggeration since the economic conditions for the transformation of the intelligentsia 
into a class were absent in Indonesia. 
As G. Konnid & I. Szelcnyi argue (I 979), the intelligentsia in a market economy 
and state capitalism system do not constitute a class in the wey they did in the (former) 
socialist societies of the Eastern Europe. In the latter countries, the inlelligcr:tsia with its 
monopolistic authority to control both the state-ideology and !he redistribution of the 
products of economic s•trplus had been the focal po;,,, for a merging of economic and 
political power. In this way it could emerge as a class. In a system of market economy 
and state capitalism, however, economic redistribution is subordinated to the logic of 
the market and cannot be controlled in th~ same way. 
The Indonesian situation was also different from that of Eastern Europe. 
Members ofthe Indonesian intelligentsia who led Cabinets in the early years of the new 
Republic, while fonnally advocating ideologies of a socialist and nation~l:st character,7 
had no intention of immediately nationalising the economy and of comrolling the 
redisllibution of economic surplus products. They believed that 'any rapid move from a 
colonial to a national economy would create disruption on a scale that they could not 
manage <nd thus were unwilling to confront' (Robison 1978: 19; 1981: 20). This 
situation wru: reinforced by the Financial-Eccnomic Agreement of the Round Table 
Conference in 1949. Based on this agreement, 'Dutch firms could enjoy business as 
usual. ;.1:/udi•l!'; !he J•.miitrs;ce of profit'. The Indonesian go•vemment was obliged to 
consult with the Netherlands en any monetary and financial measures likely to have an 
impact on Dutch interests, which was a definite limitation of Indonesian sovereignty' 
(Dick 2002: 170-1 ). 
The ruling intelligentsia's attempt to eontrcl economic distribution in the early 
1950s through the so-called Bemr.11g (bastion) programme was doomed to failure as it 
7 As Robison noted (1978: 23): '11te early economk policy makers of the PSI, PNI, and dte Masjumi 
were all to some extent influenced by social:~~ ideals ... Muny of these ideal!: were dilutt..'<l ·t\-·hen these 
leaders were faced with the pmctical difficul,. -.s of di!Juuntling n colonial econom.>····' 
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was never their serious objective.8 When the nationalization of Dutch corporate 
holdings took place in 1957-8, what appeared afterwards was state capitalism (Robison 
1978: 23-24). In this system of the economy, the intelligentsia could not fully control 
the redistribution of the economic surplus products, as economic redistribution in this 
system was still subordinated to the logic of the market. 
Nor can the Indonesian intelligentsia's road to power be described in terms of 
the rise of the 'new class' m Gouldnerian terms. Alvin Goulder argues that the 
possessor of cultural capital could emerge as a class in its own right for it has 
'consid~rablc de facto control over the mode of production and hence considerable 
leverage wit!'. which to pursue its interests' (Gouldncr 1979: 12). In fact, the political 
dominance of the Indonesian intelligentsia did not originate from their (powerful) 
control over the mode of production. In actual fact, members of the intelligentsia were 
predominantly government employees and socio-humanitics intellectuals who had no 
strong connections with the productive sector ofthc economy. 
Under these conditions, th~ !ndonesian intelligentsia could only constitute a 
social stratum, which typically occupied an intermediate position between capitalists 
and workcrs.9 As a social stratum, the intelligentsia underwent a noticeable structural 
differentiation. The great bulk of them belonged to the middle income level. Some few 
others emerged with their wealth substantially enhanced, in many respects coming to 
share economic power with the owners of capital, while the rest were distinctly 
prolctarianiscd. These factors along with the diversity of their cultural and political 
affiliations meant that the Indonesian intelligentsia could not emerge as a distinct 
established class. 
1 Titcrc had been a common expectation among the intelligentsia as political elite that their economic 
dep:ivation coL•Id be compensated for through the empo1,:;ennent of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Hence 
various measure:; had been made to generate an indigenous domestic capitalist class. 11te most concerted 
was the so.called Benteng (bastion) programme. 11tis programme was intended to secure indigenous 
dominance in the import sector, through controls over the nllocaSon of import licences, as a base for 
capital accumulation which would sustain the ~xpansion of indigenous capital into other sectors. 11tc 
idea of the programme arose during Ote Halla (RIJSI) cabinet but was implemented first in Ote period of 
the Natsir cabinet and was most entltusiastically prosecuted by the First Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet In 
fact, the abuse of power and Ote spirit of communalism again caused Otc failure of this programme atod 
accentuated corruption and cronyism. Richard Robison noted (1986: 4S): 'As the programme progressed 
it became apparent that few recipients of i:1tp01t licenses wert established iltdigenous importers but 
tended instead to be individuals associated with powerful figures in the bureaucracy or the parties who 
contrc11ed allocation of licences and credit. More disturbing, it also became apparent that the majority of 
Benteng finns were not using the licences for importing but were simply selling them to genuine 
importers, mostly Chine<e, and often failing to repay DNI credit. What wns being consolidated was not an 
indigenous merchant bo~rgcoisie but a group of licence brokers and political fixers.' 
9 For ::m elaborate discussion of the intelligentsia as social estate, social stratum, or c1ass, sec G. Konnid 
& I. Szc1cnyi (1979: 63-184). 
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Despite the diversity of their structural positions and political affiliations, 
intelligentsia and ulama-intelek played a dominant role in all political groups. As a 
corollary of this they played a dominant role in the leadership of the state. There were 
some explanations for the elevation of intelligentsia and ulama-intelek to the dominant 
ruling elite. By the time of Indonesian Independence, the princely dynasties were in 
decay. Their powers and their capacities had declined even before the consolidation of 
the colonial state: they 'organized no political movements and they espoused no 
ideology' (Shils 1972: 387). The historic clerisy, such as the (old) scholastic ulama and 
other custodians of the sacred texts, usually-with a few great exceptions-lacked the 
capacity to deal with the administration of the modem state. During the same !)cried, 
merchants and industrialists (the 'moneyed' bourgeoisie) had no significant ir.l iuence on 
politics. The passing of colonialism did not change the economic structure and capital 
formation of the nation. As Robison argues, capital control continued to be dominated 
by Dutch (or other foreign) bourgeoisie and their Chinese counterparts, who were 
unable to constitute themselves as a ruling class in the full sense of the term because 
both were excluded from formal parti,·ipation in public political activity. Although the 
'pengusaha pribumi' (indigenous bourgeoisie) were included in political participation, 
their socill and economic base was too weak to enable them either to capture the state 
apparatus or to exert a decisive influence on the formation of state policy (Robison 
1981: 19-20). It was th~ restricted translation of economic force into a politic:!l power 
that gave politics a substan!ial degree of autonomy. 
In !he vacuum of power following the end of World War II and th~ relative 
incapacity oi ;;!her ~gtnci~s to administer the country, the (politicised) indigenous 
intelligentsia of diverse political streams eventually achieved a position of political 
dominance. This was a position achieved not simply through the possession of cult urn! 
capital, but more importantly through their special affinity with anti-colonial 
movements as well as with the leadership of political organizations. Thus, to borrow (). 
Konrad & I. S:..cl~.tyi's ar::.!:onent (!9"i9: 28), the essence of the intelligentsia's political 
dominance did not lie in the fact that their cultural capital guarnnteed power and reward 
in certain positions; rather, the intelligentsia sought to obtain power and reward for 
themselves by exploiting their relative monopoly of cultural capital as a means of 
achieving those goals. The heart of the matter, then, was not to be found in a knowledge 
that was functionally necessary, but rnther in the desire to legitimise aspirations to 
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power, which based its justification on the intelligentsia's leadership position in the 
struggle for independence. 
Under the leadership of intellectuals of the second generation, from September 
195(l to March 1957 Indonesia experimented with the development of parliamer.tary 
(constitutional) dcmocracy. 10 The experiment did not run smoothly. Along with the 
deterioration of the post-revolutionary economy, Cabinets continued to change, with 
none lasting more than two years. This was a serious prc.licament for both the 
hnplementation of the state's programs and for the consolidation of democracy. To 
make matters worse, with political parties tending to be preoccupied with their own 
short-term interests, the abuse of power in the form of corruption and cronyism was a 
common feature. Overall, all cabinets failed to meet the high expectations of the general 
population. 
The fragility of parliamentary democracy provided a rationale for President 
Sukamo to play a more active role in political life by shining the country's political 
system towards authoritarian lines. Thus, from March 1957 until the collapse of the 
Sukamo regime in 1966 the democratic experiment was d~stroyed leading to severe 
political unrest, which provided the momentum for the construction of nr.w collective 
identities oflndoncsian Intelligentsia as well as for a regime change. 
'fhis chapter will describe the political role of the intelligentsia and ulama-
illlelek as the political elite of the newly born Indonesian Republic, stretching from the 
early months of Indonesian independence in 1945 until the fall of the Sukamo regime in 
1965. During this period, contestations between various intellectual traditions were 
translated into contestations between various political parties in the struggle for control 
of the state lcadernhip. The chapter will then discuss the obstacles to the democratic 
experiment and the failure of civilian intelligentsia in exercising parliamentary 
democracy in the 1950s. At thti same time, this chapter will also pay attention to the 
acceleration in educational development thut gave rise to the quantitative explosion of 
the Indonesian intelligentsia. A more elaborated discussion will focus on the rise and 
falf of Muslim intelligentsia as political leaders of the nation and the rising tide of a new 
generation of Muslim intelligentsia. The structure of presentation is similar to the 
10 Herbert Feitlt depiclcd !hose years as follows: 'Civilian< played a dominanl role. Parties were of very 
great importance. The contenders for power showed respect for •rules of the game' which were closely 
related to lhe c:dsting·constitution. Most members of the political elite had some sort of commitment to 
svmbols connecled wilh conslilulional democracy. Civil liberties were rarely infringed. Finally, 
iovcmments used coercion sparingly 0'cith 1962: xi).' 
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previous chapters, and the chronology is based the sub-topics of the chapter. Each sub-
topic returns in time to earlier phases in the development of that sub-topic. 
4.1 Equal Access tr; (Secular) Public Education 
Indonesian independence was celebrated in a spirit of liberty, equality, and 
fraternity. With the passing of colonialism there had been a vibrant popular hope that 
the colonial-imposed social boundaries and discriminations would crumble. The 
Indonesian word 'merdeka' (independence), which became a popular cry everyv•here in 
the pnblic sphere, implied a call for the elevation of social status. Deriving from a 
Sanskrit word 'maharddhika' (meaning 'sacred', 'wise' or 'pundit'), the word in the old 
Javanese language (Kawi) was often used to refer to a 'pundit or 'Buddhist monk'; that 
is, a person who had a privileged social status (Stecnbrink 1984: 169).11 Thus, with 
independence, people from different classes and status groups shared the dream of being 
tftatc<l as first-class citizens. This spirit was reinforced by the popular usc, from the 
time of the revolution, of the word 'bung' before the name of particubr persons, such as 
Bung Kama (Sukamo) or Bung Halla. The word is best translated as 'brother' 
resembling the usc of the temt 'citizen' of the French Revolution or that of 'comrade' of 
the Russian. 
The popular desire for greater social recognition for all btought new 
opportunities for the expansion of the intelligentsia. Realising that educational 
qualification,: Wl>;; a powerful means for the elevation of social status in the colonial 
period, there was a strong political consciousness among people of different status 
groups to break down restrictive regulations and enlarge people's choices in the 
educational field. The politiqai commitment to fulfil such a desire was enshrined in 
clause 31 of the 1945 Constitution: 'Every citizen is entitled to education.' 
The realisation of this educational ideal, however, was temporarily interrupted 
by the revoluti;maty struggle. In mid-September 1945, the first British troops (on behalf 
of the Allied forces) began to land in Jakarta, their mission being to establish and 
maintain law and order in Indonesia until the Netherlands administration could be re-
established. They were soon followed by the landing, under British cover, of Dutch 
troops whc L-.teuded to overthrow the Republic and return Indonesia to colonial status 
(Kahin 1952: 141-3). 
11 The word might also derive from the tenn 'mardijkcr', a free social class in VOC times. 
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Under these circumstances little could be done in educational development as 
priority was given to more urgent military and political tasks. On 29 September 1945, 
the first education minister, Ki Hadjar Dcwantara, issued an interim educational 
guideline intended more to galvanise the spirit of nationalism than to launch educational 
programs. 'Schools were urged to instil the spirit of nationalism especially through daily 
singing of the national anthem and raising of the Republican flag' (Lee 1995: 32). The 
Nationalization Dc~reP. and the Higher Education Decree of 1946 mandated that 
instruction be delivered in Indonesian with English and German being included at the 
scconuary and tertiary levels. 
Thus, the educational opportunities for the third gcncraticn of intelligentsia 
continued to be overtaken hy history. As Lee Kam Bing rightly stated (1995: 32-3): 
'Large numbers of students had already dropped out of school during the Japanese 
occupation. When the revolution broke out, m.my more young men left school to join 
the fighting. Young university and high school students formed student army 
organizations referred to as tentara pelajar or SOh1ctimcs pel ajar pejuang.' 
Even so, efforts to maintain educational life continued. Two days after the 
proclamation of independence, Indoncsi:m nationalists established in Jakarta an 
educational association, the Republic of Indonesia Higher Education Centie (Balw 
Pergunwn Tinggi Republik Indonesia). 'It drew most its staff and students from 
Indonesians of the Jakarta medical school during the Japanese times and of the Dutch 
!Jw and literature colleges from before tll~ war' (Thomas 1973: 43). 
Following the first Dutch 'police· (military) action in July 1947, the Dutch 
forces controlled most of the islands, while the Indonesian Republican government 
could only hold a densely populated portion of Java around Yogyakarta, the city that 
became the capital for the revolutionary government. With some existing cot. •gcs 
inherited from the past dc~.lt:cs located i!1 the Dutch occupied territories, the 
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) regained the momentum to realise tlJC 
unfinished business of the early 1940s of amalgamating all pre-war colleges plus several 
new faculties into a single university. This university was called Universiteif van 
lndonesie (the University of indonesia) with its branches being scattered in some ci:ics. 
Many nationalist lecturers and students who did not want to stay in the Dutch 
occupied territories fled together with the revolutionary government to Yogyakarta. In 
the city and its surrounding areas (Klatcn, Surakarta, etc.) they established faculties 
(colleges) of medicine, dentistry, Jlilit.mtdcy, veterinary medicine, agriculture, Jaw, and 
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(limited) the arts. On 19 December 1949, these faculties were officially combined to 
form the Univcrsiteit Negeri Gacljah Mada (UGM, Gadjah Mada Stale University). 
When Indonesia finally achieved its legal sovereignly in December 1949, the 
long cherished dream of eqnal rights to education began to find strong ground. The 
Education Law no. 4 of 1950, which was ratifiecl as Law no. 12 of 1954 when the 
federal system was replaced by the unitary stale, staled unequivocally that 'education 
was the right of every citizen'. Henceforth, despite the nation's serious economic and 
political problems, the educational sector enjoyed unprecedented growth. 
The greatest expansion in the number of schools and pupils look place initiall:1 
in the areas of elementary and secondary education. Between 1950 and 1958 the number 
of(secular) elementary schools increased from 24,775 to 33,845, while the total number 
of their pupils grew from 4,977,304to 7,317,307. In the same period, the number of 
(secular) lower and upper secondary schools increased from about 954 to 4,608, while 
the total number of their students jumped from about 138,668 to 754,089 (Ministry of 
Education 1956, 1958). This dramatic expansion at elementary and secondary levels 
soon flowed through to higher education. A great number of upper secondary school 
graduates were ready in the later 1950s and early 1960s for admission to universities. 
In the first half the 1950s government efforts at the tertiary level were 
concentrated on improving the two existing public universities: Gadjah Mada University 
(UGM) and the (former Dutch) University of Indonesia (UI).12 With large numbers of 
upper secondary school graduates in the late 1950s, Indonesia began to experience its 
most rapid expansion in higher education. As Thomas noted (1973: 87): 'The four 
universities of 1950 had increased to well over 135 higher-education institutions by 
1960, 53 of them public and more than 80 private. The total enrolment grew from about 
6,000 in 1950 to 60,000 or 70,000 in 1960.' 
This quantitative explosion, ho\vevcr, was not matched by qualitative 
improvement, especially at the higher education level. By precipitating an exodus of 
Dutch academics and the removal of Dutch as the language of instructiot1, 13 Indonesia 
experienced a degree of intellectual impoverishment. As Professor I. Broersma, a 
former Dutch scientist in the Bandung Branch of the University of Indonesia, said: 
12 Gradually each branch of l1te fanner Dutch University of Indonesia beca-me an independent uni\'crsity: 
UJ•i"<rsicy oflndonesia (UI) in Jakarta in 1950, Airlangga Universily (in Surabaya) in 1954, Hasanuddin 
Un •• "rsily (in Makassar) in 1956, Bandung lnslitute ofTeclmology (ITB, in Bandung) in 1959, Bogor 
lnstilute of Agriculture (IPB, in Bogor) in 1963, and tl1e Jakarta Institute of Teaching and Education 
(!KIP, in Jakarta) in 1964. 
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'The greatest lo::ss Indont~ia sustained aficr independence was not wealth but 
brains ... The intellectual cap;t~l of the country, represented by a generation of Dutch 
scientists with research experience in Indonesia, was lost' (Messer 1994: 57-8). 
Furthermore, aficr Indonesian plus English were mandated a~ replacements for Dutch as 
languages of instruction, there were a number of practical problems. Because of the 
scarcity of technical literature in Indonesian, lecturers were forced to provide notes as a 
replacement for books. V cry few students understood sufficient English to usc English 
text~. Thus, nationalism, which was signalled by the removal of Dutch from the 
academic world, made a massive scientific literature suddenly unavailable, and 
Indonesia became largely cut off from current scientific developments because of a 
language barricr. 14 
Thanks to the 'cold war' and growing tensions in international relations, some 
Indonesian scholars were able to improve their academic qualifications through foreign 
aid (and) scholarships. During the 1950s and 1960s a substantial amount of aid to 
Indonesian higher education came from both communist and capitalist countrics.15 By 
far, however, the greatest amount or help was given by the United States Agency for 
International Development (US-AID) and by the Ford Foundation (Thomas 1973: 213-
4). While the communist and nationalist scholars tended to be critical of the capitalist 
countries, those who benefited most from scholarships from these capitalist institutions 
were 'socialist' and Christian scholars, and to a lesser degree also Muslim scholars. 
Among those who pursued overseas swdics through these scholarships were several 
economists from the University of Indonesia such as Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali 
Wardhana, who would play an important role in the rise of the New Order. About the 
same time, with scholarships from the Canadian government, several Muslim 
intellectuals of the Islamic institutional background such as Mukti Ali, Anton Timur 
Djaclani and Harun Nasution began to enter a Western centre of Islamic Studies at 
13 The Nulionalization Decree and the Higher Education Decree (1946) mandated that lectures he 
delivered in Indonesian. 
14 For a detailed discussion of effects of the transfer of power on the Indonesian scientific establishment, 
sec A. Messer (1994). · 
13 As TI10mas noted (1973: 2134): 'TI1e Soviet Union furnished over 600 scholarships and provided tl1e 
financing and expertise for establishing an occanogmp1,;~ institute on the island of Ambon. Doth E:lst and 
West Germany offered scholarships, and a West GL'· m city gave Padjadjaran University a printing 
press. The China Medical Board of New York gave books for medical-school libraries. The British 
Council provided greater libraries ond lent films for uS': in schools of Bandung ond Djakarta. Chr;•ti., 
missionary societies in the US and Australia sent faculty members to Satya Watjana Christian University 
in Central Java. Catholic organizations in Europe and America sent funds and staff members for severn! 
Catholic colleges on Java. And more than a dozen oUter tDI:ntries, both conununist and non-communist, 
provided scholarship, books, and supplies for various lnL'onesian colleges, public and private.' 
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McGill University. These Muslim scholars would have a significant impact on the 
future development of Muslim intellectuals and of the religious administration of the 
country. 
In addition to the general qualitative degradation, the rapid educational 
expansion was not matched by the economic performance of the country. In the late 
1950s, a Dutch economist, A. van den Ende, had already predirt · 1 .:,at the result of this 
discrepancy would lead to an inevitable disillusionment. For an agrarian economy, he 
believed that too much education is dangerous. Education was not in keeping with the 
needs of people and it was producing extremists. He appraised the situation and 
predicted violent upheavals as a result of too much education in Indonesia (Mauldin 
1981: 361-5). It was against this backdrop that the formation of the fourth generation of 
intelligentsia took place. This generation was made up largely o!" those who were born 
in the 1930s and 1940s. 
In the rapid expansion of an educated population, the term 'i11te/ige11sia' 
(intelligentsia), which was often used interchangeably with the term 'illlelekt:lil' 
(intellectual), became relatively popular for the first time. Entering the Indonesian 
public sphere perhaps through a detour via Western European intellectual influence, 
rather than being imported directly from Russia or Poland,l 6 the term intelligentsia 
began to app~ar in Indonesian intellectual writings as early as the late J930s.t7 During 
the Japanese occupation and revolution of the 1940s, however, the tern! was 
overshadowed by the popularity of the term 'pemoeda' (youth) as the latter better 
represented a sense of mass power wd of fraternal solidarity. By the end of the 
revolution, the rise of new (university) student organizations, provided the momentum 
for the term 'i11te/ige11sia' to be reintroduced to the public sphere signalling the growing 
expectations of the educated community.t 8 
16 The Indonesian tendency to use the word 'intelligentsia' interchangeably with the word 'intellectual' 
reflectcc! a similar tendency among the Western Europea.IS (sec, chapter t). 
17 Sukamo, for instance, in his leiter from the prison (in Endch, Flores) to the Persis leader, A. Hassan, on 
18 Augustl936 wrote the following sentence: 'Rakjatlndo11esla, teroetamu kaoem intelligcntzia. soedah 
moclai banjakjang senang mcmbatja_ bockoe·boekoe balmsa sendirijang "matang" dan "thorough"' 
(Indonesians, especially th~ intelligentsia, began to enjoy reading 'mature' and 'thorough' books in their 
own langu>ge, emphasis added). See Soekamo (1964: 325-43). Mohammad Natsir, in his article 
'Sckolah 1inggi Islam', P"blishcd by Pancljlls/am (June 1938), identified the existence of what he called 
'doca golongan inte/ligensia' (two groups· of intcl!igcntsia; emphasis addecl), namely: intelekt11il and 
ulama·intc/ck(Natsir t954: 71). 
11 TI1e so-called 'Ko11gres Muslimin Indonesia' (AII1ndoncsian Muslims' Congress), held in Yogyakarta 
(20·25 December 1949), for instance, included tl1e following in its closing statement: 'Sctc/alr beronding 
sckian harl, maka ISS organisasl, Alim U/ama dan lntcligcnsiasclunth Indonesia mcmutuskan ... '(After 
several days of discussion, 185 organizations, ulan\3. and intelligentsia all over Indonesia came to the 
decision .... '; emphasis added). For a complete statement, sec Sitompul (t987: t t). Nex~ the word 
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Until the end of revolution in 1949, the community of those with higher 
education continued to be dominated by secular-oriented students. Only a small number 
of Muslim students was able to enrol at the new Republican collcges.19 Due to their 
involvement in the revolutionary struggle, however, these Muslim students of the third 
generation could not finish their tertiary education or postponed eorr:pletion until after 
the revolution. 
During the 1950s, taking advantage of better access to education and rapid 
expansion of higher education, however, children from smttri families gradually entered 
stale (secular) universities. As a result, by the emergence of the fourth generation of 
intelligentsia around the 1960s, Muslim students began to play a major role in the 
Indonesian student movement. 
4.2. Religious Education and the Expansion of Islamic Universities 
Disappointed by the omission of the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Chr.rter from 
the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Muslim leaders attempted to seck compensation 
in the realm of religious education. They started their strategy during discussions on the 
Educational Bill in the Working Committee of the KNIP in October 1949.~0 In these 
discussions, Muslim leaders, included Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Muhammad Daud 
Bcurcu'eh, Zaenal Abidin Achmad, and Kjai Zarakasji, raised three contentious issues: 
the future of religious schools, co-education (l.;ctwcen males an~! females) and the 
position of religious instruction in secular schools. 
Regarding the first issue, Muslim members of the KNIP accepted that religious 
schools sho!!ld be administered separately from the state secular schools, but on 
gained further popularity following the historic speech of Moharnrnod IIotta before the civitas acadcmica 
· of the University of Indonesia (II June 1957), entitled 'Tanggung Djawab Moril Kaum Intcligcnsia ', the 
Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia (Halla, 1957). Afterwards, a critical litcratus, Wiratmo Soekito, 
ivrotc his views in Siasat Baru (No. 655, 30 December 1959), 'Posisi Kaum Intc/igensia Indonesia 
Dewasa Ini' (Tite Contemporary Position of the Indonesian Intelligentsia). A member of Ute communist 
intelligentsia, Jusuf Adjitorop used Ute term in his article published by the leftist journal Madju Terus, I 
(1963, pp. 169-70), 'Kembangkan Terus Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan Inteligensia' (To Continue 
Developing the Party's work in the Intelligentsia Community). The term could also be found in the name 
of the association of the Indonesian Christian intelligentsia, Penrotuan Inteligensia Kristen Indonesta 
(PIKI, est. 1963). Finally, the term was widely used in a heated polemic around the issue ofthe so-called 
'bctmyal of the intelligentsia' that began to cr.lf!rge in final years ofthe Suknmo•s regime. 
19 Examples of these Muslim students were ~1. S. Mintarcdja (b. 1921) and Achmad Tirtosudiro (b. 
1922) at the UGM. 
20 In late 1947, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Ute Utcn Education Minister, set up a committee to droft the 
Education:tl Bill headed by Dewantara. Tite drafting of the bill was completed by early 1948 and 
submitted to the Working Committee ofKNJP. 'But the debate was interrupted when the Dutch captured 
Yogyakarta in the second military action on 14 December 1948. It was not until October 1949 that the 
KNIP could reconvene, and discussion on the Educational Bill resumed' (Lee 1995: 35). 
Cl10ptcr 4 ~ Intelligentsia as the r,/itica/ Elite 252 
condition that the government treat Islamic schools as equal to secular schools. This was 
agreed and it was decided that there would be two major educational streams in the 
country: a secular system under the Education Ministry, and a religious one under the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. The latter ministry was established in the second Sjabrir 
Cabinet (March 1946-0c:cbcr 1946) with M. Rasjidi (b. 1915, a graduate of Cairo 
University) being its iir~t minister. Intended initially to assuage Muslims' political 
disappointments and t<l win their political support in the age of revolution, this ministry 
offered a middle way between a secular state and Islamic state. 
Concerning the scconrl issue, Muslim members of the KNIP were unhappy with 
the concept of co-education. Placing boys and girls together in the same schools was 
regarded as improper and even offensive. This provi~iiln, however, 5eemed to be 
tolerated, and the government propo~al was passed without serious objection. 
The third issue was th~ most contentious. Almost all political groups in the 
KNIP agreed that religious education was an important foundation in shaping 
Indonesian education to distinguish post-colonial s~hools from tl:osc of the Dutch 
period. However, there was no consensus about whether religious instruction ought to 
be a compulsory subject or not, and whether e<.impulsory religious education obliged 
attendance only or that examination marf:s from religious classes should determine 
promotion. As expected, Muslim leaders insisted on the implementation of compulsory 
religious education with all its ramificatiorts. This proposal was tot~lly rejected by 
secular and Christian leaders. When this matter of disagreement was covered in Clause 
20 of the bill, the details of the text went even farther than Muslims' expectations. The 
clause stated: 'In all state schools, religious instruction will be provided. Parents arc to 
decide whether their children should attend those classes.' 
The Bill was finally passed by the KNIP. Acknowledging Muslims' 
dissatisfaction, President Sukamo decided not to sign it as a law. The bill was signed 
finally by Assaat as President of the Yogyakarta-bascd Republic of Indonesia, which 
was a member of the RUSI, and became Law 4 of 1950. When the federal system was 
replaced by the unitary state, ·it was ratified, during the Prime Ministcrship of Ali 
Sastroamidjojo of the PNI, as Law 12 of 1954.21 
Despite Muslims' dissatisfaction with some aspects ofthc Law, the fact that two 
early cabinets of the new 'unitarian' government were Masjumi Cabinets (Natsir's and 
Sukirnan's Cabinet) secured Muslims' interests. At the time when Law 4 of 1950 had 
11 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Lee (t995: 47-61). 
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not yet been ratified, the Minister of Education and the Minister of Religious Affairs in 
the Natsir cabinet, respectively Bahdcr Johan (a devout Muslim from West Sumatra) 
and Wnchid Hasjim (of the NU) took early initiatives to pass a regulation that made 
religious instruction compulsory for secular schools and conversely the teaching of 
secular subjects was made compulsory for religious schools.22 With Hasjim being 
reappointed the Minister of Religion in the Sukiman cabinet, this arrangement was then 
fixed in the Education Regulation of 16 July 1951. When Law 4 of 1950 was ratified in 
1954, the Education Regulation of 1951 had been widely implemented and was not easy 
to remove (sec Table 4). This scheme bridged the gap between the Muslim intelligentsia 
who were erudite in secular subjects but generally lacking in religious ones and the 
ulama who were erudite in religious subjects but generally lacking in secular ones. 
Table 4: Rcli!:ious Education in State (Secular) Schools 1955/1956 
Primary Lower Secondary Upper Secondary 
(SMP) (SMA) 
TC'Ial number of school 27,910 1,299 494 
Schools where religious 15,584 881 93 
Education was given 
Sourcc:LccKamHmg{l995: 121) 
Legislation aside, Islamic educational institutions continued to catch up with the 
development of secular schools. At the tertiary level, the backbone of the Indonesian 
Islamic university was the Japanese-sponsored Sekolah Tinggi Islam (STl, Advanced 
Islamic School) with its governing board and lecturers representing the best available 
Muslim intellectuals of the fir.;t and second generation. Established in the las\ few 
w~eks of the Japanese occupation, educational activities of this university were .;oon 
intcrrJptcd by the demands of the revolutionary struggle. When most of the Republican 
intelligentsia fled with the revolutionary government to Yogyakarta, the STI was also 
relocated tc · this city. On I 0 April 1946, its reopening took place in Yogyakarta, in the 
presence of President Sukamo, with a speech by Halla as president of the board of 
governors. Later on I 0 March 1948, this institution began to transform itself into 
Universiteit Islam Indonesia and then Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII, Islamic 
21 The religious schools that were run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs included tlte maclrasah 
ibtida'iya (print:lry school), madrasah t.:;Jnawiya (lower secondary school), madrusah 'a/iya (t~per 
secondary school). Tite statistics for 1954 revealed that at that time the government subsidiled more than 
13,000 primary, 7761ower secondary and 16 upper secondary ma<lrasahs (Boland 19'11: 117). 
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University of Indonesia) offering degree progmms in its four constituent faculties-
those of religion, law, economics, and education. 
The emergence of the STYUII was very important. It not only represented the 
first Indonesian private university offering both religious and secular faculties but it was 
also an ancestor for a widespread network of State Islamic Institutes and a diversity of 
p:-ivate Muslim universities and colleges that would evolve in later years. More 
importantly, it was an early breeding ground for the upcoming leaders of the Muslim 
intelligentsia. Some of its early students such as Lafr.m Pane (b. I 922), M. Jusdi 
Ghazali (b. 1923), Anwar H:ujono (b. 1923), and Mukti Ali (b. 1923) would play 
decisive roles in creating new Islamic epistemic communities and intellectual networks 
as new vehicles for Islamic ideals. 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs was keen to mise the; educational levels of its 
staft; a desire which was in accord with the government policy of providing more public 
higher education. The Ministry therefore took over the faculty of religion at the Ull. In 
c.rder to tmin Islamic judges, teachers of religion, and directors of district religious 
offices, the faculty of religion was ·tmnsformed in 1951 into the so-called Pergur··a11 
Ti11ggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN, The State College of Religion). 
Meanwhile, a new type of,, '11'1.ic college was created in 1957 in Jakarta, known 
as Akademi Di11as Ilmu Agama (ADIA, Government Academy<>· ;{cligious Studies). It 
was designed to be a training college for oflicials of religion in government service and 
for teachers of religious instruction at state schools. Subsequently, the PTAIN and 
ADJA were united in 1960 to form ~:1 I11stit11t Agama Islam Negeri (lAIN, State Islamic 
Institute), set up initially in Yogyakarta (JAIN Sunan Kalidjaga) with other JAIN being 
established later in some other cities.23 In this educational institution religious and 
geneml oubjects were taught side by side, a policy that would have a signifi~ant impact 
on the future development of Islamic i.1telligentsia. It was grarh~: ;:;s of these Islamic 
universities who would become a strategic counterpart of Muslim students of secular 
universities in the struggle for intellectual hegemony in the 1960;;. 
"Otltcr IAINs that emerged in tltc !~60s were JAIN SjarifHidajatuttah, Jakarta (est. 1963), JAIN Ar-
Rnniry, Aceh (est. 1963), JAIN Rnde-a Fatah, Palcmbang (est. 1964), lAIN Antasari, Banjarmasin (est. 
1964), JAIN Alauddin, Makasar (c.o:t. 1965), lAIN Sunnn Ampct, Surabaya (est. 1965), JAIN lll'.am 
Bondjol, Padang (est. 1966), lAIN Sultan Tllllha Saifuddin, Jambi (est. 1967), lAIN Sunan Gunung Ojati, 
Bandung (est. 1968), and JAIN Radel\ lntan, Tanjung Karang (cot. 1968). By 1995 tltcre were some 14 
I 
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4.3 Discursive Practices aud the Public Sphere of the Newly Independent Nation 
Besides leading to a sharp nse in the number of the intelligentsia, the egalitarian 
spirit of the new independent nation also had a significant impact on intellectual 
discourses and on the construction of the Indonesian political system in the early years 
of the post-colonial Republic. Alongside the theme of revolution, issues of 'democracy' 
became a dominant discourse in the public sphere. Already in Sukamo's historic speech 
on the birth of Pa11casila (I June 1945), democracy had been ide:<' ·.-1 as one of the 
future national principles. In the constitution and platforms of th• >:·. ~rtccn parties 
included in the book Kepartaim! di l11dol!esia (The Party System of Indonesia), which 
was published by the Information Ministry in 1950, the word was used frequently and 
almost always with unqualified approval (Feith 1962: 38). At the level of discursive 
consciousness-which was not necessarily manifest in practical consciousness-a 
general agreement prevailed fo• the need for democracy in the social, economic and 
political fields including support for the equality of all citizens, denunciations of 
dictator.:;hip, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and dcmonsllation, and 
freedom to strike. 
Intelligentsia of higher !taming and ulama-i11telek continued to become organic 
intellectuals of various political streams and it was they who articulated political ideals 
of particular groups. Their public role had now been extended from being the 
champions of civil society (as they were during the colonial period) to becoming 
champions of political society in the newly independent nation. 
As the political elite, the intelligentsia and ulama-illte/ek had a critical role in 
shaping the future of the nation. The euphoria of political freedom in the <'arly birth of 
the new Rc:mblic encouraged each group of the intelligentsia to lead the nation along a 
particular ideological line. The imm~diate consequence of this attempt was the failure of 
the monolithic state-party arr.mgement. In an effort to maintain an historical bloc for the 
sake of the unfinished revolution, IlK PPKI which metamorphosed into the KNIP o;. ·;:•. 
August 1945, on th~ very same day oJStablished a sh1gle state party, 'PNI Staats-Partij', 
with the strong suppiln of President Sukamo. Thi; single state party was oriented to 
unite all groups ancl to become the 'motor of the people's struggle in every sphere and 
every field' (Anderson 1972: 91). Ten days later, however, this monolithic state party 
was dissolved as a result of pressure especially from radical pemoeda under the 
IA!Ns throughout Indonesia with their total students being 86,198. On the history and future development 
ofthc JAIN. Sec C<o~sis nr.d Dibiopcrta (1996). 
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influence of Sjahrir.24 With the dissolution of the monolithic state party arrangement, 
the era of the multi-party system began bringing with it the return of the Indonesian 
public sphere with its diverse nature. 
4.3.1 The Formation of Post-Colonial Political Parties 
Just a few months aflcr th~ proclamation of independence, diverse political 
traditions were reconstructed according to th~ socio-political networks which had been 
set up both before and during the Japan~sc occupation. As a result, the public sphere 
soon became a contested spJCe of a diverse intellectual political traditions. The 
Communist Party (PK.I) was reconstituted in October 1945 representing the communist 
intellectual political tradition, and soon atlcr came under the "antral of m1hodox 
internationally oriented leaders. '\olany of these leaders were former activists from L'le 
1920s who had been released from detention, surh as Alimin and Sardjono (Ricklefs 
1993: 221).25 
ln November 1945, the .Masjwni v1as four.dcd as the main representative of the 
Muslim intellectual politicaltraditin!l. l.iiiii:<c the earlier Japancse-sponsorw Ma.<jumi, 
it now brought together both noii-politi. .I lslllmic organizations subsumccl under the 
Masjrmri of the Japauese period, including the Mulrammadiyalr and NU, and pre-war 
Islamic political organizations such as the PSII. 
In December 1945, Amir Sjarifuddin's followers merged with those ofSjahrir to 
form a political partly along socialist lines called Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party). In 
early 1947 they split aP.ain. In Febn;.~ry 1948 Sjahrir's followers established the Partai 
Sosialis brdonesia (PSI, indonesian Socialist Party), while Sjarifuddin's group made an 
alliance with the PKI to fonn the so-called Fro/11 Demokrasi RaAyat (People's 
Dem"cratic Alliance). The PSI's main constituency was still found among the 
'westmnizrd' segment of Indonesinn society and it was particularly influential among 
higher civil servants aild the central army command. D~:i;'lg the last months of 1945 
there also emerged the Partai Kristen I11donesia (Parkindo, Indonesian 
Christian/Protestant), the Partai Katlro/ik (Cathclic Party) and some other ~mall parties. 
Both partie~ represented the Christian intellectual tradition. 
21 The formal re.uon for the pemoeda's opposition to this state party wa~ that it would be redundant and 
rompctitive with the KNIP. The actual reason, however, was the:r fear of it• potenti>l fascistic influence 
.,,nee ihc party was headed by Achmad Subardjo, •.vho used to be in close collaborution with lhe JapJnesc 
(Kubin 1952: 147-S). · 
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In January 1946, the Partai Nasioual ludouesia (PNI, Indonesia~; Nationalist 
Party) was revived outside the framework of •.t" aborted PNl state party. Although 
Sukamo was not made its chairman, because as President he was theoretically above 
politics, this party was led by Sukamo's followers, especially those former a~livists of 
the pre-war PNI and Par/ill(/o. Its main supporters came from the adat-oriented 
bureaucrats, especially those from Central and East Java (Kahin 1952: 155-9). 
These parties, with many others that would emerge in the following days, 
vigorously recruited mass support especially amongst young men whose militancy 
could prove lo be an enom10us asset. Along with the political parties there emerged 
their paramilitary offspring. So the Hizbullalt became the offshoot of the Masjumi; the 
Pesiudo (Pemuda Sosialis ludouesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth, est. 1945), became 
thai of the socialist group; the Japanese-sponsored Barisau Pelopor metamorphosed into 
the so-called Barisau Bauteug (Buffalo Corps) and became the vanguard of the PNI, but 
slowly drifted into the camp ..r radical nationalists; and the Laskar Rakjat (People's 
Militias) and l.askar Meralt (Red Militias) were affiliated to the PKI (Sundhaussen 
1982: 4). 
The emergence of this plethora of political parties and the resulting political 
conflicts coincided with Du:ch attempts to reoccupy the country. The wor~t 
consequence of these conflicts was the rise of political insurrections against the civilian 
auth0rity of the Indonesian R-l'--:blic. Among these were the Dam/ Islam (Ar. the !:'>use 
oflslam) rebellion by a West Java-based militant islamic guerrilla unit in May 1~48 and 
the 'Madiun Affair', the PKI rebellion in September-October 1948. The challenge of 
maintaining the new c!vilian government's authority and of struggling for independence 
provided the impetus for the formation of an Indonesian military force.26 
____________ ,__ .. _., __ _ 
25 It is worth noting that 'a large number of the Indonesian St:J.linists, including some of the most 
important of them, did not enter the PKI. Instead they entered 'Joe or the other of the three chief non-
communist Marxist parties, the Socialist party, Labor Party, nrd l'csindo' (Knhin 1952: 159). 
26 
'11tc road to the establishment ufan L:d...,ta\!.::ian military force b:;s:1n witu the PPKI onhourtcement on :22 
August 1945 a Bat/an Peno!ong Kcluarga Karban Pcrang (A~ency for Aid to the Families of War 
Victims), which organizlltionally includr.d a Bat/an Keanuman R.-ik)•at (DKR, f.'eople's Security Agency). 
In further developments, the BKR-aflcr a series of steps in its fronsfonnation to tl1c Tentara Kcamanan 
Rakyat (People's Security Anny, TKR) on S October, tl1e T ·il/am Kcsclamatan Rakyat ('fKR, P•ople's 
Safety Anny) on I January )946, and tl1e Ten tara Rcpub/ik Indonesia (TRI, Anny of the Republic of 
Indonesia) on 24 January-finally bora"'' tl1e Tcntara NasionallnJune>ia ('i.Nl, iuuar.os1an Notional 
Anny) on 5 May t947 (Sundhaussen i982; ·:·18; Anderson 1972: 2:12-1). 
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4.3.2 The Fmnmtion of the Indonesian Military Political Tradition 
The early backbone of the National Army was drawn from LIJe former Pete 
corps. With the need to improve its military organization, some former KNIL (Royal 
Netherlands Indies Army) officers became involved. Because there was civilian 
political interest in the military force, some laskar (militia) forces and segments of 
youth paramilitary groups were also integrated into the Republic army. 
The formation of the Indonesian National Army was accompanied by a series of 
internal and external conflicts. Internally, conflicts occurred because of differences in 
the background of military training and affiliation (ex-KNIL vs. ex-Peta, and ex-Peta 
Votsus ex-/askar!pemoeda clements in the army), in religious artiliation (Muslim vs. 
non-Muslim and satllri vs. abangan), in ethnic origin (Java [Central and East Java] vs. 
non-Java), and in age group (senior vs. junior military officers). Externally, the milita1y 
field became an extension of the competitive civilian political struggle with the socialist 
politicians (Amir Sjarifuddin and Sutan Sjahrir) being the most interventionist civilians 
in the formative phase of the National Army. 
At the very beginning, the conspicuous role of Muslim officers was evident in 
the appointment of Sudirman (former da!ldanclw of Kroja, and a local Muhammadiyah 
schoolteacher) as the first Indonesian military commander-in-chief.27 As most Muslim 
officers were e-:-PETA officers, however, their role gradually declined following the 
urgent need to create standards of military efficiency. In an effort to create a 
professional military corps, former KNIL officers btcame more influential in carrying 
out staff duties.28 Although only a very small group of about thirty, these ex-KNIL 
officers were far superior to the ex-Peta officers.29 
The standing of Muslims in the new ·army brcame even worse following the 
involvement of particular !>.Iamie irregular guerrilla unit" in rebellious against the 
Indonesian Republic Govcmment.30 This caused difficulties for the integration of the 
17 For other Muslim daidancllos (battalion commanders oftlu.· p,•tfl). fCC chapter 4. 
21 The reason has to be found in the nature of the Japanese military training. Unlike rtrore junior officers, 
:he claiclancllos were not given intensive military training and were not confined to the asrt.ma (bamcks). 
11teir essential 'lhtction was to conduct moral leadership and exercise political supervision over t~1eir 
subordinates (And,.son, 1972: 20-22). Lacking professional mili:•ry capability, former daida11clws 
suffered a m:tjor drawback in the leadership cnmpetitivh. Meanwhile, tiJose who came from the socialist 
paramilitary background had also their own competitive advantage due to their greater exposure to 
Western knowledge ~nd training in political manoeuvring. 
" Some cf these cx-KNIL officer.; ltacl graduated from tlte Royal Military Academy in Breda 
wethcrlands), but most of whom had been trained in tlte Milii.l')' CodetSchool in Bnndung. 
0 In late 1940s and early 1950s them were severni rcbcilion.S tl~ruHghoutthe country under the bonner of 
Danlllslam (The Housr.rrerritory ol' Islam) in nn efforts td e;tablish the Islamic State of Indonesia, as 
compensation for tl1oit ~~isappointmtnts witlt the central gcrJcmmcnt. D.:ginning in West Java in May 
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Islamic military/paramilitary corps into the National Army (TNJ). Given this fact, it was 
hardly surprising that the military tradition of independent Indonesia grad11•1lly lost its 
original close· links wtth Muslim political communities. 
In the meantime, the growing civilian-military conflict in the face of Dutch 
military actions and the impotence of the civilian politics of diplomacy provided the 
grounds for the military officers to consolidate their own corps and to increase their 
political leverage over civilians. The detemtining moment in the construction of the 
army collective identity Wl'S the so-called second Dutch 'police action', an attack on the 
temporary capital of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyal:arta, tround 19 December 1948. 
The top civilian government leaders dec.ided to stay in the capital, as if intending to 
surrender authority to the Dutch, but the Army mobilised a guerrilla war that finally 
forcect the Netherlands into negotiation with the Indonesian leaders. The sudden 
willingness of the Netherlands to grant independence to Indonesia in 1949 was regarded 
by the Army not as the result of either diplomacy or international support, but of their 
military achievements which must have convinced the Dutch that the application of 
force to prevent Indone;;ian Independence would no longer work. This perception 
boosted espirit de corps and created internal ~olidarity and a sense of collective identity 
in thP. arrny.31 
The emergence of the TNI's sense of common identity and political ideology 
brought about the formation of another intellectual political tradition, namely that of the 
military leaders. It makes sense to depict the Indonesian military officers as an 
intelligentsia in their own right. They shared common characteri>tics with the civilian 
intelligentsia in terms of higher social origin a.1d exposure to modem education. From 
the very inception of military training for the Indies, the recruitment patterns for officers 
had r .~d the opportunity of people of lower social origins io become KNIL 
or· rhe Military Academy was prestigious, with fluency in Dutch language being a 
r .. 1isitc for admission, and this alone was an entry barrier for people of lower social 
.1gin {::undhaussen 1982: 17). A strict recruitment pattern was also applied to the Peta 
officers. As Sundbausscn noted (1982: 17-8): 
!948 d1e mow:menl then spread to parts of Central Java, Ia South Kalimanllln (Bomeo), Ia South 
Sulawesi (Celebes) and to Acch. For furd1er discussion of the cause of rebellions sec, among others, C. 
van Dijk (1981). . 
31 Ulf Suodhaussen puts this as follows (1982: 46): 'Ccrl:!inly, the officer corps of 1949 \WS still largely 
heterogeneous bu4 compared with 1945/6, somcd1ing of a common political platform had emerged. The 
officers were much more self~nssurcd nnd proud of their achievement, rtistrustful of politicians, 
politicking, and party ideologies, and more aware oflhc corpo.-.lc interests ofL>< ormy. But they still had 
rio clear perceptions of what, in their opinion, its position in society should be.' 
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Battalion commanders were recruited among well-known politicians, 
outstanding religious leaders, or influential opinion leaders. The rank of 
company commanders was filled in many cases with school-teachers who 
commaudcd a comparatively high social prestige in a largely illiterate society. 
Platoon commanders were recruited from students, or sons of the lower pamong 
praja, or young officials. All these groups had some sort of secondary education. 
They included a large percentage of youths with noble backgrounds; but by and 
large the Japanese die! not deliberately promote an aristocracy which they had 
reason to believe to be rather Dutch-oriented, especially the older generation. 
Moreover, with their modem educational background and experience of study in a 
relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere, these military officers had been in close contact 
with the civilian intelligentsia (Anderson 1972: 235). 
The systematic effort to create the military political tradition was 
institutionalised as early as February 1946 when Amir Sjarifuddin established the so-
called Pendidikan Politik Ten•ara (Am1y Political Education, PEPOLIT). Two years 
later, Halla's first cabincL (29 January 1948- 4 August 1949) launched the policy of 
rationalization and reconstruction of the National Army, so that the military 
intelligentsia wielded a more decisive role in the leadership of the army. A more serious 
effort to prepare military intelligentsia for the lcadcrshir of the nation began in 1957, 
when the Indonesian military academy was reopened in Magclang. This academy 
provided the Indonesian army with professional and politically conscious ofti~crs.32 
Thus, by the end of the revolution, the euphoria of independence had not only 
led to the establishment of multifarious political parties but also the highly politicised 
Indonesian anned forces. This explosive political participation gained momentum 
following the achievement of lndonzsian legal sovereignty and the installati.m of the 
unitary Indonesian st~te. 
" The Indonesian Natiot.al Military Academy (AMN) was reopened by President Sukamo on II 
November 1957, as a continuation of-tht: fanner military academy in Yogyak&lrta, one of the military 
institutes to provi':!e the arrr.y with young officers, which was established soon after the proclamation of 
independence in 194:: BeC~llSC of lack of infrastructures anci instructors, this first academy had to clcsc 
its doors in 1950. Abo:•~ the same time with the appearance of the Yogyakaru military academy, there 
also emerged an neat::,;~·, fur military engin~eriug in Bandung. Uater, thi:~ Bandung military institute 
became the technical de11artment of the Ma,;etang-based AMN after its onmlgamalion in t 959 (/.MN, 
1969). The appearance of the Magebr,r·based AMN was soon followed by the establishment of similar 
institutes for the navy and air force cadets and also other institutions for socio--political education of the 
military officers such as Staff Colleges of the Armed Forces (Sc.rko), the Joint StaffCotkge of the Armed 
Foree.• (Sc.rlwbab), the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas) and so forth. 
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4.4 Power Games: Consolidblion and Contestation 
The Indonesian allcmpt to tr;ms!ate their demucratic ideals mto political practice 
was manifested in the adoption of Westem·type parliamentary democracy. Indonesia's 
commitment to this Western democratic i<lstitution reflected both a genuine belief in 
democracy bnd a pragmatic interest. For some of the politicised intelligentsia who had 
been deeply exposed to the traditions of European liberalism and socialism or similar 
values of modernist Islam, the adoption of parliamentary institutions wrs believed to be 
a necessary condition to safeguard the country against c, possible development of 
authoritarianism. Such a ge10uine commitment to constituti<.:nal democracy was allied 
with " pragmalir. interest to gain wid~r international acceptance for the new Republic 
an-I to show the Dutch that Indonesians were Eble to govern themselves democratically 
(Fch .. 1962: 43-5). 
4.4.1 Impediments to the Democratic Experiment 
In the open public sphere of a newly sovereign Indonesia, the euphoria of 
parliamentary c•mocracy among the plurality of Indonesian political traditions 
encouraged proliferation of parties and increased the trend to a wide rage of parties 
which had been an early characteristic of Indonesian politics. In the lead up to the first 
Indonesian General Election in 1955 there had been some 172 parties and quasi-political 
groups reflecting the ongoing external polarization and internal fragmentation of 
Indonesian political traditions, Along with this development, freedom of the press 
became an issue. Afier experiencing survival difficulties during the revolution, the 
number of Indonesian daily newspaper.; jumped quickly from 67 in 1950 to 120 in 
1957. Daily circulation tripled from just 338,300 in 1950 to 1,049,500 in 1957. In the 
period when professional {non-partisan) media remained in an embryonic stage, 
newspapers that gained a large circulation were those affiliated to political parties. 
These were, among others, Hnrian Rakjat of the PKI {55,000/day), Pedoman of the PSI 
{48,000/day), Soe/oeh Indonesia of the PNI {40,000/day), and Abadi of the Masjumi 
with 34,000/day {Said 1987: 95-6). 
During the 1950s, only a few political parties had significant influence in terms 
of followers or political representation. Among these were the Masjumi, the NU, the 
PNl, the PKI, the PSI, the Christian parties (Parkindo and the Parlai Katholik). The 
PSI and Christian parties were small parties in terms of followers but influential parties 
in terms political representation. Their powerful polilical representation derived from 
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their influence among higher civil servants and the central anny command (because of 
their sup~rior educational qualifications). 
Throughout the 1950-57 period these major parties, c~cluding the PKI, were the 
principal stakeholders in governmental affairs, with the PNI and Masjumi being the 
prime-movers. The failure to sustain Cabinets for more than a year or two, a 
characteristic of the revolutionary period, continued into th~ 1950s. From September 
1950 until the 1955 Elections, Indonesia experienced the rise and fall of five different 
governments based on a fragile series of coalitions between several parties. The five 
cabinets were respectively the Mohammad Nal!lir cabinet of the Masjumi (September 
1950-April 1951),33 the Sukiman Wiljosandjojo cabinet of the Masjumi (April 1951-
Fcbruary 1952),34 the Wilopo cabinet of the PNI (April 1952-June 1953),35 the First 
Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI (July 1953-July 1955),36 and the Burhanuddin 
Harahap cabinet of the Masjumi (August 1955-March 1956).37 Such fragility was hardly 
surprising for there were fe,v foundations upon which constitutional democracy could 
be consolidated. In a country stitttypificd by a high rate of itlitcracy, a lower level of 
education, poor cconomir. conditions, huge social discrepancies and authoritarian 
mentalities, the political terrain remained the property of a tiny layer of elite politicians 
(Ricklefs 1993: 237). 
The political behaviour of these elites has been identified by Feith as the main 
problem leading to the failure of the democratic experiment in this period. In his eyes, 
the most crucial factor that caused the breakdown of Indonesian constitutional 
democracy was an ~uduring tension between what he called the 'solidarity makers' 
(such as Sukarno) and the 'administrutors' (such::; Halla); that is between leaders with 
33 Natsir failed to convince the PNI to join his cabinet. As a result, this cabinet was based on the Masjumi, 
supported by the smaller parties (PIR, PSI, Parindra, Partai Katholik, Parkindo, PSII and Democratic 
Fraction) and five prominent non·porty persons. 11te deputy prime minister himsctr, Sullan Hamengku 
Buwono IX, was a non·party person (Feith 1962: 149: 150). 
34 Sukiman was able to convince the PNl to join his cabinet. Thw, this cabinet was based on the Afasjumi 
and PNI, supported by lhe smaller porties (PIR, Catltolic, Labour, Parkindo, Parindra and Democrnlic 
'raction) and two non-party persons (Mohammad Yamin and Djuanda). Tite deputy prime minister was 
Suwirjo ortlte PNI (Feitlt 1962: t80). 
"Tite Wilopo Cabinet was based on tltc PNI and Masjumi, supported by lhe small porties (PSI, Catltolic, 
J.:,bour, PSII, Parkindo. Parlndra) and three no-party persons. TI1e deputy prime minister was Prawoto 
Mangkusasmita or the Masjumi (Feitlt 1962: 228·9). 
36 The first Ali cabinet was based on tlte PNI, PIR and NU, supported by tltc smaller parties (Progressive 
Fraction, PRN, SKI, BTl, PSII, Labour, Parlndl'a) and one non-p:trty person. 11tis cabinet included two 
deputy prime ministers. Tite first deputy was Wongsonegoro or tlte PIR; the second deputy was Zninul 
Arifin orlhc NU (Feith 1962: 338-9). 
31 The Burh,nuddin ca~inet was based on the Masjumi, suppo~.ed by other parties (PIR-Hazairin, PSII, 
NU, PSI, Democratic Fraction, PIR, Catholic, PRN, Labour, Pari11dra, Parki11do, and Indonesian 
People's Party). Tite cnbh.ot included two deputy prime ministers. Titc first deputy was Djanu lsnudi or 
tlte PIR-Hnzairin; the second deputy was I:arsono Tjokroaminoto orthe PSU (Feith 1962: 418-9). 
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integrative skills and skills in symbolic manipulation as well as mass mobilization and 
leaders with administrative, legal, technical, and foreign language skills. The tensions 
were never effectively ;-o.:solved. Both groups were little concerned about middle-range 
goals. Virtually none of the leaders were attempting to link long-term ends with short-
term administrative programs, ideological appeals with lhe solution of practical 
problems (Feith 1962: 34). 
In contrast to Feith's view, H.J. Benda attributed the failure to the alien nature of 
democracy in the Indonesian historical context. In his eyes, Indon~sian political history 
from pre-colonial times until the end of colonialism had not experienced styles of 
governing other than patrimonialism and authoritarianism. Thus, the democratic 
experiment was doomed to failure 'once Indonesian (especially Javanese) history found 
a way back to its own moorings' (Benda 1964: 453-4). Beyond the surface of both 
perspectives, however, the cause Jay much deeper in the complexities of Inclonesian 
politics as a reflection of the diversity of the Indonesian political elite, the plurality of 
Indonesian society, and the polyvalence oflndonesian collective memories and cultural 
conditionings. 
The Indonesian intelligentsia and 'clerical-intelligentsia' as the dominant ruling 
elite underwent structural and cultural differentiation. Economically, they were not a 
unitary class that could form a unitary technocracy. Culturally, they were affiliated with 
diverse cultural solidarity groupings. By the end of revolution, a common historical 
bloc, which created a common · :II during lhe colonial period, suddenly became an 
anachronism and lost its efficacy to maintain national unity in facing new domestic 
problems of the new Republic. With the breakdown of the historical bloc, Indonesia 
found its away back to its original nature: a plural society. 
J. S. Furnivall (1980) characterised a plural society as comprising two or more 
elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling in une political 
unit. In such a society, he said, 'there is no common will except, possibly, in matters of 
supreme importance, such as resistance to aggression from outside'. This Jack of 
common will makes nation building in such societies an uphill task.38 
The uphill task of grounding democracy in a plural society docs not necessarily 
mean that this kind of society is inimical to democracy. Arend Lijphart argued (1977) 
31 Inn plural society, said Fumivall, there is a general dis· 
demand and economic motives arc not coordirutcd by .~ 
opportunity, social mobility and an equitable distribu~ .... ~ 
plural society than in any other type' (Fumivall 198r -6.-
... , of social demand as the structure of 
:tunll values. 'Achieving equality of 
·~ 1' ...:refore, a greater problem in 
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that it is possible to maintain a stable democratic government in a plural society as long 
as the elites arc willing to cooperate. That such cooperation will occur, however, cannot 
be taken for granted. This requires a new common solidarity framework that relics, inter 
alia, on the presence of civic nationalism. In fact, this kind of nationalism which bases 
its appeal on inclusive citizenship and the virtue of civility (Snyder 2000: 24) had not 
yet become the major feature of the Indonesian political community. 
This lack of civility might reflect the lack of a common will amongst 
Indonesians as a plural society, but more importantly this was rooted in the post· 
colonial traumatic remembrance. Post-colonial Indonesia was sensitive to the imprint of 
traumatic experiences and the persistence of the source of hatred inherited from the 
clash of identities in the ct • · tial period. One of the most crucial problems in creating 
national integration in the · ·mcsian polity was the problem of collective memory. To 
borrow Homi Bhabha's dep.~tion ( 1994): the past in the collective memory of most 
Indonesians was not just a reservoir of a raw material of political practice and 
experience that could be theoriscd distantly, but rather the root of historical self-
invention, the main source for discovering gtoup identities. Remembering, as such, is a 
necessary bridge but also a dangerous one between past experience and the question of 
cultural identities. 
What seemed to weigh or. many Indonesian minds, especially among the 
marginalized groups, was the colonial policy of social segregation and favouritism. This 
collective recollection did not die with the coming of new gcnt:l'l :ions. In the absence of 
a genuine civil society in Indonesia, the medium for collective social learning and the 
production of political symbols was predominantly supplied by communal groups. It 
was through the commemorative rituals of these communal groups that recollections 
were sustained. Thus, traumatic remcmbrmtcc was sustained by the failure of collective 
social leaming.39 Generally speaking, Indonesia at this juncture was still a communal 
not an associational society. Associations as a catalyst for transforming people from the 
spirit of communalism towards the spirit of citizenship did not exist to any great extent. 
39 It has been argued by Klaus Eder (1993: 20-7) that the key to explaining the pOih of development 
leading to modernity in the Western experience lies in the learning process and symbolic practicr.s in the 
sphere of culture. As a society moves from traditional to modern life, the arena for collective learning 
shifts from closed-communal to open-associatiOnal bonds, frort1 estates and castes to class society. The 
changing arena of social learning will in tum change the symbolic universe. In association the symbolic 
universe is produced by discursive communication which involves a high degree of rationality and equal 
rights to free thinking and speech. Tite more this rationality nnd equality can be institutionalised, tho more 
tl1e idea of a democratic organization of civil society can be achieved. Tilis culmil13tcs in the idea of 
democratic realization ofthe good life by civil society. 
Chapter 4 ·fntclligc.~lsla as lhc Political Ellie 265 
The politicised intelligentsia, who were expected to lead the political 
communities into the virtue of political civility, had in fact fostered the attractions of 
comm;malism. Having no strong economic foundation, groups of the politiciscd 
intelligentsia competed with each other to control the state bureaucracy and economy. 
The will to control resources needed social justification. In this context, communal 
interests became a powerful reason. Cultural and communal solidarity became 
politicised in conflict situations where the real issues were frequently the political and 
economic interests of the political elite. 
The first General Election of 1955 was expected to become a springboard for 
elite settlements, political stability, and the pursuit of national goals. In fact, the dream 
did not come true. The results of the election established the pre-eminence of four 
parties but none of them obtained a majority. The four parties were PNI, Masjumi, NU, 
and PKI that each gained 22.3, 20.9, I 8.4, and I 6.4 percent respectively of the total 
valid votes (Feith 1957: 58-9).'0 While nime of the parties could win a majority ·-;ote in 
the parliament and most of the parties wanted to be included in the Cabinet, the 
government was once again formed through a broad coalition. The cabinet that emerged 
following the election was formed through a coalition of the PNI with two major 
partners, Masjumi and NU, plus other small parties (Parkinclo, Partai Katlwlik, PSII, 
IPKI and Pcrti) and even a non-party representative (H. Djuanda). This so-called 
Second Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo was led by Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI as 
prime minister assisted by Mohanmd Roem of the Masjumi and ldham Chalid of the NU 
respectively as the first and second deputy prime ministers. This broad government 
coalition without a solid democmtic foundation was once again destined to fhil. 
In December 1955, the Election for the Constituent Assembly, a special body 
responsibl: for drafting and approving the definitive constitution for the Republic of 
Indonesia, produced similar overall results. This brought no victory to any political 
party or even to any one of the mainstreams in Indonesian society. The two parties 
considered to represent the Islamic stream and those representing the secular one could 
not win the two-thirds vote required a~ a legal basis for deciding the dralting and 
approval of the new constitution. This created a fragile base for the Assembly sessions, 
which in tum would undermine the whole parliamentary system. 
Beginning its sessions on I 0 November 1956 in Bandung, the Assembly could 
reach agreement on many fundamental principles including issues concerning human 
"Surprisingly enough the PSI could only gain 2.0 percent of the total valid vote. 
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rights, the unitary form of the state, governmental bodies (legislative, executive, and 
judicative), the power of the head of the state, and so on (Nasution, 1995).41 One 
question, however, developed into the most crucial issue that polarized Oi;inions of 
Assembly members into two blocs that could not arrive at any compromise. This was 
the formula concerning the basis of the state, more precisely the label of the statP,, . .,.hich 
led to a verbal battle between thc.proponcnts of a so-called Pancasila state and those 
seeking some form of Islamic state. All parties considered to represent the secular 
stream were united in support of the former, while all parties representing the Islamic 
stream were united in support of the latter. As none of the streams controlled two-thirds 
of the total vote, no one became the winner nor could they reach any compromise.42 
In a situation of enduring political disputes, the economy of the country 
continued to deteriorate. The end of the revolution created great damage to economic 
infrastructure: transportation and communications, irrigation and power supplies. The 
macroeconomic environment was also unstable. Because of budget deficits, 
governments borrowed money from the Bank of Indonesia. The over-supply of money 
fuelled inflation which in tum weakened the balance of payments. At the· same time, 
foreign investment wa~ discouraged, domestic savings remained low, and public 
expenditures were weighted heavily towards current consumption. Furthermore, there 
were no economic foundations on which national integration could be grounded. Apart 
from the continuous presence of duah>tic economic tendencies (between tl)(i modem 
and traditional sector), tl~ economics of the Outer Islands were oriented more. to the 
outside world rather than to Java (Dick 2002: ·170-82). This immense economic problem 
was exacerbated by an arrogant aloofness in the ranks of the elite, immoral 
exhibitionism among the new rich, and corruption among state offici~ls and government 
servants (Feith 1962: 463). 
All these factors, together with efforts of the central government to extend its 
power, especially through the taxation of the tndc of the Outer islands, provided the 
grounds for regional disappointment and rebcilion. At first, the provincial spokesmen 
criticised the centrai government for not giving them enough autonomy. Then, as 
'Jakarta' did not respond to their demands satisfactorily, regional disappointments in 
some provinces metamorphosed into rebc.llions led by regional army commanclcrs and 
" The debates in tloe Assembly did not proceed from a drafi Constitution, but from fundamental 
principles which later on could be incorporated into tloc constitution (Boland t971: 90). 
Chapter 4 ·Intelligentsia as the l'oltttcal Elite 267 
political leaders.43 Between 1956 and 1960 the country was plagued by increasing 
tensions and regional rebellions. 
4.4.2 Repression and Resistance 
The failure of parliamentary governments to overcome the political and 
economic turmoil of the country provided a rationale for three latent political forces to 
play a decisive role in politics: Sukamo, the TN! (particularly the armyt4 and the PKI. 
Throu~hout the 1950-57 period, these three forces had been excluded from playing 
active roles inside the govemment.45 The three forces were now united by a common 
will to power. 
Both the Anny and PKI found in Sukamo great political prestig~ that could be 
used to achieve their political interests. Conversely, political turmoil and regional 
ret,.;:,ons gave Sukamo no choice but to cooperate with the Am1y. At the same time he 
also needed the PKI as a powerful source of popular support to counterbalance the 
power of the Army. Thus, the Arn1y and PKI became the most enthusiastic partners of 
Sukarno. At the same time, they also competed with each other and would face one 
another in a struggle for political power. 
In the latter half of 1956 Sukarno began explicitly to criticise the detrimental 
cffc:t of Western-style parliamentary democracy on the revolutionary struggle of the 
nation which was perceived as far from complete. In a rousing speech on 28 October 
1956, he described political parties as a 'disease' and called for them to be 'buried'. His 
ambition to bury parliamentary democracy became more uncontrollable following 
Halla's resignation from the vice-presidency in December 1956.<6 Thus, in Sukarno's 
,.
2 In the view of Adnan Buyung Nasutiori (1995: 409), it was not impossible that tue compromis~ would 
have finally been achieved if President · Sukamo had not taken an extrn·parlinmcntary decision to 
forcefully dissolve the Constituent Assembly on 5 July 1959. 
" As Ricklefs noted (1993: 252): 'In tl1e years since 1952 many regional commanders had forged 
unorthodox links with ontcr island interests as a means of financing their units and their personal 
incomes.• 
" 111e most influential branch of the lndunesian armed furces was the army. 111e army witl1 its 330,000 
members in the early 1960s was in a dominating position over the navy (30,000) and air lorce (40,000) 
ISundhausscn 1982: 162-207). . 
5 President Sukamo, despite his ~reat prestige nnd considerable popularity, continued to play n purely 
formal role as head of the state. According to tl1e 1950's (provisional) Constitution, the Pre•ident and 
vicc-r: ·sident were formally inviolable and above the political nrcna. The nm1y, despite claiming to be 
the bulwark of the nation following its decisive role during the revolutionary struggle was not included 
either in the parliament or the government. The PK1, despite its great achievement in the 1955 Election, 
was excluded from parliamentary cabinets because of tl1e stigma of its treachery to tl1e nr.w Rcpublknn 
~ovcmmcnt in 1948. . 
Disagreeing with Sukamo in many fundatllcntal issues and frustrated by his limited power ns Vice 
Prcsiden~ Halla submitted his resignation on 20 July 19S6to take effect on I December. 
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next speech on 21 February 1957 he attacked 'liberal democracy' and advocated, for the 
first time, wha;· he called 'guided democracy', that is dc:r.ocracy with 'lcadership'.47 
Aflcr a series of speeches attacking the i~oco:npa'i~llioy 01 #estern-style democracy 
With !ndOI!CSian COnditions, he CaJnC OUt With the SO-called 'kOIISCpsi" (conception) 
sp~.:~!i, on 21 Fcbnw.ry 1957, in which he revc-1lcd his alternative proposals. The 
President called for the 'establishment of a new form of government based upon a 
'mutual· cooperation' (Goto11g Royo11g) cabinet, which would accommodate all major 
parties, including the PKI. He also proposed the formation of an ~ntirely new Dcwa11 
Natio11al (National Council) as an advisory body for the gc·:ernment, which would 
represent functional groups (workers, peasants, youth, women, religions, tcgions, etc.) 
· rather than political parties. 
Sukarno's chance to introduce his long-waited 'b11sepsi' was provided by the 
prr ~:~mation of military-supported martial law, following cxplostve regional rebellions 
in Sulawesi and Sumatra."8 These rchcllions provided the grounds for the army chief of 
staff, Major General Nasution, to cr,d parliamentary democracy by asking Sukamo to 
proclaim martial law· over the entire nation. Racked by internal dissension and the 
spreading of regional resistance Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo dissolved his cabinet 
on March 14, 1957. On the same day, Sukarno declared martial law, which paved the 
road for both Sukarno and the Army's active involvement in politics and civilian affairs. 
With the announcement of martial law the experiment with constitutional 
democracy began to crumble. Major General Nasution was SO<!n appointed as Central 
War Administrator signalling military involvement in non-military affairs:• Snkutno, 
appointing himself formatezz,-1° as 'citizen Sukarno', established a new cabinet which 
marked the early implementation of his ccnception of 'guided democracy'. This cabinet 
was called the 'Working' Cabinet (Kabi11et Karya) with H. Djuanda, a r'spected 
engineer who was not aligned with any political party, becomittg the p:ime minister. 
As the Djuanda cabinet evolved, the PKI and the army took steps to strengthen 
their position. By now PKI members had begun infiltrating the armed ibrcc~ thmugh 
"An English translation orthcse speeches by Sul:omo can be found h I'eilh ond Castic• (19i0: 81-9). 
"On 2 March 1957, the territorial conunanJtC' ofE.lst Indonesia in Makasar (Sul>wesi), Lt. Col. H.N.V. 
Sumual, declared autonomy under MartiJl Law, the origins of the so--called Pcrc!J·u;m!::an Semesta 
(Permesta, Universal Struggle) rebellions. On 8 March the South Sumatra regio~al ·•sscmbly vcted no 
confidence in the governor nnd the local6!.1my took ovr.r ~su~honty in that Tl'bion 
"'
9 After the implementation of martial law, tlte nrmy as the most powerful oftl-: Indoneshm 3rmt:d forces 
emerged us the most powerful politi,at, economic nnd ndministrativ;: fri~r. in lhe nation ~Sundhausscn 
1982: 162-207). 
50 Fonnatcur is person or conunittce appointed by a particular legal authorfty \o fonn the executive 
leadership, cabi!l-:t, etc. 
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contacts with intelligence officers who were themselves seeking to infiltrate the PKJ. In 
the meanti•••- ~. the army chief of staff, Major General Nasution, began to formulate the 
so-called 'Middle Way' concept, as a basis for what would become known as the 
military's dual function (dwi-fimgsi), !he legitim~tion of the military's role in non-
military's affairs. Speaking before the National Military Academy on II November 
1958, Nasution insisted that the army would neither seck to take over the government 
by imitating the Latin American military junta nor rem~" ,_., ';, .nlly in:1ctive as a d~a~ 
tool of the government. Instead, the atiT•Y leadership wo.u!d share political power with 
civilians in the cabinet, parliament, and other state organs {Crouch 1988: 24-5). In line 
with this concept, the am1y began to establish army-civilian coopcrLon bodies 
{BKS).51 The establishment of these cooperative bodies, which would metamorphose 
into the so-called Sckretariat Bcrsama Golongm1 Karya (Sck:·,·r-<)o/kar, Joint 
Secretariat of the Functional Group) in 1964, was intended to empower the anny as a 
functional group in order to ensure its position both in the cabinet and in the National 
Council. 
The Army's path to power was facilitated by the strengthening of its economic 
base and its decisive role in cmd ong down on regional movements. The military control 
over eco!tomic resources began through the expropriation of Dutch enterprises in 1957-
58. Ir. December 1957 Nasution ordered &!I Dutch property to be placed under military 
supervision and most Dutch citizens to be rcp1triatcd to Holland (Robison 1986: 72-3). 
In the meantime, the role of the armed forces in main:aining political stability became 
more obvious as regiona1 rebellions reached their climax in the f&ce of the establishment 
on 15 February 1958 of the so-called Pemerintah Revolusioner Rcpublik Indonesia 
(PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Padang {West 
Sumatra), which involved prominent figures of the Masjumi and the PSI. 52 
" 1l1cre were al leas! IInce BKS founded hctwccn 1957-1958: lhe Youlh-Mililary Coopcralivc Body 
(BKS Pcmuda-Militcr), tl1c l.abor-Mililary Coopcrati-,e Body (BKS Burull-Militcr), and the Pcasant-
Mililllry Cooperative Body (BKS Tani-Mi/itcr). Subsequently, !here also appeared the U/ama-Military 
Coo;n.rative Body (BKS U/ama-Militcr),the Women's-Mililllry Cooperative Body (BKS Wanita-Militcr) 
and so forth (lmawan 1989: 158, DPP Golkar 1994: 95). 
52 Hatt.1•s resign:~.tion from the vice·presidency in December 1956 had exacerbated regional 
dissatisfactions in Sumatra. Born in Minangkabnu, West Sumatra, 1-latta was very popular in the Outer 
islands and had done much to ~Wintain the regional trust in 'Jakarta'. His resignation was seen as 
signalling the complete scveraoce ofrcgiona1 voices from the central government (Kahin 1999: 178).0n 
1G February 1958, dissident leaders ofSumotra, Ll. Col. Achmad Husein, Lt. Col. Zulkini Lubis, and Col. 
M. Simbolon, sent a five-day ullimatura t., ·.:'t cenllal government: 'the cabinet must be dissolved, Hatlll 
and S&Ib~P lt~:~..,,~ngkubuwana IX m~! 1(' - .o.·r ... ·Jinted to fonn ·a new business cabinet until eko;tions were 
held,n an 110 must return to his v. ::·~utirnal position as n figurehead president' \(u.cklefs 1993: 
262). Afie,. _,,timatum was rejected, the dissident leaders declared on 15 February the establishment of 
Pcmcrintall Rcvu:'r.::"''lcr Rcpub/ik Indonesia (PRRI, ~' -volutionary Govcrnmenl of C:c Republic of 
- --------- --------- --------------
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This political crisis w~s exacerbated by the deadlock of the Constituent 
Ass. ·nbly session. After two years, th~ Assembly sessions could not arrive at any 
compromise concerning the basis of the state. 10>.; provided the excuse for Sukarno to 
move against the Assembly. On 22 April 1959, he gave a speech before the Assembly 
proposing the idea of a return to the 1945 Constitution which he believed could revive 
the spirit of revolution. Based on the President's proposal, the Assembly discussed the 
idea and decided to take a vote on 30 May 1959. The majority agreed with the idea but 
could not win two-thirds of the total votes. The taking of a vote was repeated on 1-2 
June but the result was the same. '.'n \he following day (3 June}, Nasution as the Central 
War Administrator, took a decision to furbid political activities. On 5 July 1959 
Sukarno with the full backing of the anned forces issued a Presidential Decree 
dissolving the Constituent Assembly and restoring the 1945 Constitution. 
The proclamation of this decree signalled a complete breakdown oi the whole 
stn1cture of constitutional democracy and a full implementation of the totalitarian 
'guided democracy'. Institutionally, from 9 July onwards Sukarno appointed himsJlf as 
Prime Minister •.· fa succession of guided democracy cabinets that lasted until 1966. In 
these cabinets military and c~mmunist intellectuals would assume a dominant position 
supported by intellectuals of the PNI, NU and other parties, excluding those of the 
Masjumi and PSI. In June 1960 Sukamo dissolved the elected parliament and appointed 
the so-called Dewall Perwakila11 Rakyat Goto11g Royo11g (DPR-GR, the Mutual 
Cooperation People's Representative Council) along with the so-called Majelis 
Permusyawaratall Rakyat Seme11tara (MPRS, Provisional People's Cor.sultative 
Assembly). ln both new institutions the anned forces and the PKI were again well-
represented, while the Masjrmri and PSI were excluded. 
The implementation of 'guided democracy' brought a new political structure 
into being. Ideologically, on 17 August 1959 Sukamo began to set out a political 
Indonel.ia) in Padang (West Sumatra). This revolutionary government was led by the then Governor of 
the Central Bank, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (of the Masjumr), as Prime Minister. In addition to 
Sjafruddin, other Mnsjumi leaders, Burhanuddin Hnrahap nnd Mohammad Natsir, were respectively 
appointed the Minisrer ofSer.urity and Justice and the spokesman of the PRRI. The duee Masjumi leaders 
were coincidenta1ly in Sumatra when the dissident lenders were preparing the proclamation of the PRRI, 
and they were being presented with a fait noeompli to lead the PRRI (Noer 1987: 376·7). In addition to 
Mosjumi leaders, the PRRI Cabinet included former finance minister Sumitro Djojohadil:usumo (of the 
PSI) as the Minister of Trade and Conununieations and several dissident colonels such as Col. M. 
Simbolon, Col. Dachlnn Djambek, Col. Warouw, nnd Col. Saleh Lahade, le>pectively ns d1e Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, oflntemal Affairs and Defence, ofDevelopmen~ nnd of information (Knhin 1999: 211). 
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manifesto called Manipol-USDEK.53 Politically, in order to unite all political powers for 
the sake of the 'unfinished revolution' he proposed the re-establishment of a sort of 
'national bloc'. The option was either to revive the idea of a monolithic state pany or 
simply to weaken the parties and then link them in a broad coalition faithful to guided 
democracy. In 1960 he decided in UlVOUi' of the latter option. This led to the 
establishment of so-called Nasakom (from Nasiona/isme [nationalism], Agama 
[religion). ·;ud Komunis [communism)).54 
The doctrine of Manip>J/-USDEK and Nasakom became the official definition of 
the state's ideological orthodoxy. It soon became the hegemonic discourse in the public 
sphere. It was indoctrinated at all levels of education and government, and even was 
adopted as a scientific par.>digm that influenced the theoretical thinking and textbook 
writing of academic intellectuals. The press became the state's ideological apparatus 
and was obliged to support it. Mass media that refused to do so, such as the pro-
Masjrmri and pro-PSI newspapers and periodicals, were banned. As a result, during the 
years 1959-1961, newspaper circulation was cut by about one-third, from 1039 000 
copies for ninety dailies to 710 000 copies for sixty-five dailies (Ricklefs 1993: 267). 
With the introduction of Nasakom, parties were severely restricted in their 
activities and subjected to a great variety of army-implemented controls. There were 
only ten parties included in the new political system: PNI, PKI, Murba, NU, PSII, Pcrti, 
Parkindo, Partai Katlro/ik,IPKI, and Partimlo. The last had split froin the PNI in 1958. 
These ten parties would form the core of a National Front. During the period 1959-65 
the coalition of ten parties pius the armed forces-which were not included in the 
Nasakom slogan, but were stilt a poWcl ful ally of Sukarno-was always in danger of 
fracturing, due to major ditrerences in ideology, political interests and degree of belief 
in the Nasakom doctrine.55 
" 'Manipol' was tltc acronym of Ai,rnifcs/o Politik (Political Manifesto). This political m:mifc•;to was 
intended to revive the spirit of revolution nnd social justice. Titis would be achieved tllll'llgh the 
implcmcnt:ltion of what later in 1960 became known as USDEK, st:lnding for Undang-Undu11g Dasar 
1945 (the 1945 Constitution), Sosia/ismc Indonesia (Indonesian socialism), Dcmokrasi tcrpimpin (guided 
democracy), Ekonomilcrpimpin (guided economy), nnd Kcpribt1dian Indonesia (Indonesian identity). 
5-4 Titis option had its antecedents in his old idea, espoused as early ns 1926, of uniting tlte thrc. main 
component parts of Indonesian society: the nationalists, the religious groups, nnd the communis1:,;, · 11e 
main supportive clements of Otis doctrine were the PNI (nasionalis), NU (agama), and l'Kl eli;,.;•,;., :,., 
along with nn array of smalkr parties representing Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, nnd other secular iJ,,, ;·.:·~t 
groups. Crackdowns were carried out on parties th:tt refused to support the doctrine such as Masjullil nnd 
PSI. 
"The army considered the increasingly powerful Communist Party (PKI) to be n direct tltreat lo its own 
power. Tite PNI itself suffered internal differences, with a loft wing under the leader>hip of Ali 
Sastroamidjojo nnd Surachman (PNI ASU) working in cooperation witlt the Communists, while n right-
centre wing under the leadcr>hip of Osa Mnliki (PNI Osa Maliki) viewed the Communist Party with 
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The clash between the pro- and anti-Nasakom groups helped galvanize a 
collective solidarity among v""ous subject positions from which the structure of 
opposition was constructed. The oppositional parties were basically made up of the 
Masjumi and PSI. On 24 March 1960 some leaders of these parties supported by the 
hardliners of Partai Katho/ik, Parki11do, JPKI and NU established a common 
oppositional front, Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League).56 A few months later, 
however, Sukamo banned this league and then banned both the Masjumi and PSI. A 
loug distrust of Sukamo by both parties' leaders, the involvement of some leaders of 
these parties in the PRRI rebellions, and the parties' opposition h' ;~uidcd democracy 
provided Sukamo with sufficient grounds to outlaw the parties and imprison their 
leaders. Yet the parties' followers continued to engage in movements of opposition. 
Beyond the party line, oppcsition came from the intellectual circles of society 
and more importantly from student organizations, especially those ideologically close to 
Masjumi and PSI. Contesting arguments on the very definition and role of the 
'intellectual' (which was often confused with the term 'intelligentsia') took place in the 
public sphere (the media and public meetings). 
Soon after martial law came into effect, Mohammad Hatta warned educated 
people about the derailment of political direction and called for intellectuals to take 
responsibility for r~tuming it to the right track. Speaking before the civitas academica 
of the University oflndonesia on II June 1957, in a speech entitled 'Ta11ggrmg Djawab 
Moril Kaum btte/ige11sia' (The Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia), Halla 
reminded •:.' ··Cated people that they had a double responsibility: to become 'devotees of 
knowledge (illtelektuil) and 'devotees of moral values' (mori/). In his view, the 
Indonesian Revolution had been successful in establishing a new state and national 
identity but had failed to implement its social ideals, since political independence was 
bdng used merely for the sake of communal and personal advantage. Politics was not 
assuming responsibility for the common good but was abused as simply a means for 
distributing wealth and position among a limited group. He strongly condemned the 
intelligentsia for neglecting their social responsibility and for their subjection to 
material and political passions. Quoting Julien Benda's words in his seminal work La 
suspicion. The Plutestant and CaU1olic parties accepted inclusion ;:, 11e NASAKOM alliance but were 
never happy about their lefl·wing bed-fellows. 
,. /katan Pcndukung Kcmerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI, League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence) 
was established in May 1954 under the initiative of General Nasution and such prominent pro-t7 October 
officers as Gatot S1•broto, Aziz Saleh, and Sutoko. In the case or IPKI'> support for U1e Democratic 
League, Nasution t('l.•': ... neutral position. 
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1'rahiso11 des C/ercs (The Betrayal of the Intcllcctuals},57 he criticised those intellectuals 
who had exalted particular political passions at the expense of the universal and moral 
values and for having betrayed their responsibilities and their nation (Hatta 1957). 
Furthermore, Hatta came to envisage the danger of intellectual alienation by 
what Raymond Aron called (1957) 'the opium of the intellectuals'; a situation when 
the intellectual attachment to public conscience, democracy and moral responsibility is 
undermined by the myth of an unfinished revolution, cynicism, and a taste for 
aristocratic values. With regard to this menace, he published an article in Pandji 
Masjarakat (l May 1960), entitled 'Demokrasi Kita' (Our Democracy), in ,;·hich he 
fiercely attacked the violation of democratic values by the President and his intellectual 
supporters who had turned the independence dream for democracy into a nightmare. 58 
Conversely, Sukamo, and the partisan intellectuals who rallied behind him, 
promoted a large scale anti-intellectual campaign. Indonesian intellectuals who did not 
support guided democracy and its ramifications were depicted as the 'residues' of the 
old world that had to be wiped out from the earth. Those who were committed to the 
enrichment of erudite knowledge and critical thinking and distanced themselves from 
political partisanship were accused of being 'textbook thinkers' (Sockito 1966).59 
In the cultural-literary field Indonesian literati were divided, by and large, 
between proponents of 'social-realism' and 'universal humanism'. The former was the 
cultural ideology of leflist and other pro-Sukamo literary activists, who idealised the 
contextualisation and subordination of cultural/artistic expression to particular social 
realities and necessities as defined by political ideology. 'Universal humanism' was the 
cultural ideology of the rightist opposition that idealized the freedom of cultural/artistic 
expression from the burden of a particular political ideology and dedicated itself to U1e 
universal values of mankind. 
"The word c/crc (clerk) both in French and English implied originally a man of learning. For a more 
elaborate discussion of this term and this book, see Herbert Read (1959: xiii-xxxii). 
" In a similar tone, a critical Indonesian literary figure, Wirntmo Soekito, wrote articles in Siasat Baru 
(No. 655, 30 December 1959), 'Posi.<i Kau:n lnteligeruia Indonesia Dcwasa lni' (The Contemporary 
Position of the Indonesian Intelligentsia) and in Indonesia (No. 4, October-December 1960), 'Kesctian 
lntelcktual kcpada Masjarakat' (The Intellectual's Loyalty to Society), complaining of Ute fading of 
intellectunl criticism and reminding intellectuals of their heroic calling as defenders of a collective 
conscience. Titis critique of intellectual alienation culminated in the emergence of polemics around the 
issue of the so-called 'betrayal ofthe intellectuals' in Ute early months ofthe New Order. 
" This campaign of anti-intellectualism was supported by lefi-wing intellectual organizations such as 
Organi.<asi 7jendekiawan Indonesia (OTI, Indonesian Intellectual Organization), Himpunan Sardjona 
Indonesia (HIS, Association of Indonesian Scholars), an~ Himpunon Pengarang Indonesia (HIPMI, 
Association of Indonesian Authors). 
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The main organizational organ of 'social realism' was the PKI artists' and 
writers' association, Lembaga Kebmlajaa11 Rakjat (Lekra, People's Cultural Institute, 
est. 1950)/,o supported also by the PNI literati's front LKN (Lembaga Kebudajaa11 
Nasio11al, National Cultural lnstitutc).61 Both institutes accused many poets and authors 
of displaying too little interest in the reality surrounding them because of their intense 
preoccupation with their own inner life. Based on this judgment both organizations 
began to launch a severe attack on 'bourgeois' artistic expression. In supporting 
Manipol-USDEK both ·tJrovided a basis of legitimacy for Sukamo's official 
orthodoxy.62 
As a reaction to the bitter attacks of pro-Sukamo intellectuals, in August 1963 
proponents of'universal humanism' and other oppositional intellectuals proclaimed the 
Ma11ijes Kebudajawr (Ma11ikebu: Cultural Manifesto). Among other things, the text of 
the manifesto stated: 
We, Indonesian artists and intellectuals, hereby present a cultural Manifesto 
declaring our principles and ideals and our policy with respect to National 
Culture. For us culture is the constant effort to bring the conditions of human 
existence to perfection. We do not regard any one sector of culture as superior to 
any others. All sectors act in correspondence to achieve this culture to the best of 
their ability. 63 · 
This obviously implied unequivocal criticism of the monolithic cultural ideals of Lckra, 
where politics was asserted to be the leader (pa11glimu) and everything else was made 
subservient to ultimate political goals (Teeuw 1979: 35). A fierce counter attack was 
launched by Lekra and LKN which heatedly denounced the Manikebu's creed of 
'universal humanism' as counter-revolutionary for its imperialistic and capitalistic 
bias.64 
60 The leading figure oflckm was the famous writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 
61
'1be leading figure ofLKN was a well· known poet, Sitar Situmorong. 
62 For the repressive actions ofthe Lekra and LKN toward their intellectual opponents, see T. Ismail and 
D. S. Moeljanto (1995). For a more sympathetic view oflhe L<kra's literory activity, see Foulcher(l986). 
63 The original drofi of the Manifesto was composed by Wirotmo Soekito on 17 August 1963. It was then 
discussed by a group of 13 artists on August 23 leading to the appointment of a droning commiuee of six 
artists. The committee completed tlte final version of the Manifesto on 24 August. On t11e same day, it 
was approved and signed by a group 12 literati: II. B. Jassin, Trisno Sumardjo, Wirntmo Soekito, Zaini, 
Bokor Hutasahu~ Gunawan Mohamad, Bur Rasuanto, Soe Hok Djin (Aticf Budiman), D. S. Muljanto, 
Ras Siregar, Djufri Tanissan and A. B•stari Asnin (Tceuw 1979: 35) . 
.. Sukamo agreed with the accusation tltat tlte Ma11lkcbu displayed a hesitant altitude with respect to tlte 
revolution. Claiming that there was room for onJy one manifesto in Indonesi3 and that was Manipol-
USDEK, Sukamo banned Manlkcb11 on May 8, 1964 (Teeuw 1979: 35-7). 
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This political and cuitural turmoil during the period of guided democracy ran 
parallel with the economic deterioration of the country,6S As the economic deterioration 
..:ontinued the level of educated unemployment increased dramatically.66 This 
intellectual 'proletarianization' provided a driving force for the radicalisation of student 
politics. As a result, the academic world and university students during the early 1960s 
were intensely politicised, more than they had been at any time in the past. 
In the growing political and economic turmoil, a fierce hostility between the PKI 
and the Army was inflamed by foreign intervention in domestic politics as an extension 
of the 'cold war',67 Under such circumstances, Sukamo' strategy of maintaining the 
balance of power between the two competing forces produced a reverse impact. This 
hostility finally led to the turbulent and bloody last months of 1965.68 
65 Already in August 1959 the government's effort to restrain inflation led to the decision to devalue the 
Rupiah by 75 per cent. A monetary purge was ordered by which all Rp. 500 and 1000 notes were reduced 
in value to one-tenth, which in tum reduced the money supply from Rp. 34 billion to Rp. 21 billion. The 
real sector of the economy was very badly affected by this decision which obliged the government 10 
allow an expansion of credit. As a result, within six months the money ~upply was back to its former level 
and inflation again crept upwards. From late 1961 to 1964 the count•;;, experienced continuing hyper-
inflation (around 100 per cent pet annum). At the beginning of 1965 tltis inflation became extreme, with 
prices rising by something like 500 per cent. To make matters worse, economic planning for an eight-ye:~.r 
development progrnm, which was promulgated at the end of 1960, was given a tragic--comic flavour. 'It 
was a tragic ritual nonsense for the plan to be divided into 17 parts, 8 volumes and 1945 clauses 
!r":bolising the date of the Independence declaration', (Ricklofs 1993: 267, 280). 
As job openings decreased yearly with a large number of graduates, the problem of how selective 
universities ought to be in admitting and passing students arose. This problem of intellectual 
'proletarianization' was exacerbated by a general attitude of Indonesian educated people of the time: the 
love of clean hands. L. W. Mauldin, for instance, noticed that of the 1,200 students at Bogor Agricultural 
School ('If tlte University oflndonesia in 1957 only one student wanted to be a farmer. Tite ambition of 
tlte rest was to sen•e as government officials, employment in a government office being regarded as the 
closest d.ing to leisure in the priyayi tradition. 
67 The heightening competition between the Chinese and the Americans to exercise some control over the 
Southeast Asian region penetrated Indonesian political affairs. lh November 1964 Chinese leaders 
advised Sukamo to set up a 'Fiflh Force', a new service consisting of armed workers and pea'iants to be 
recruited from the PKI's mass organizations. Titis was in line with Sukamo's idea of the 
'Nasakomisatio11' of the Army. About the same time, American hopes of stopping the leftward swing in 
Indonesia gave rise to their allomptto collaborate with the at my (Sundhaussen 1982: 193). An indication 
of the Americans cum British attempt to build cooperation with the Army was revealed by the discovery 
of the so-called Gilchrist letter, allegedly found in the villa of an American film distributor and suspected 
CIA agent at Puncak when it wao attacked on I April 1965 by a communist youth group. The document, 
purportedly a secret telegram from the British ambJssador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, to his 
superiors, mentioned possible future cooperation between tlte British and the Army (Elson 2001: 97). 
61 By late September, with tens of thousands of troops gathering in J:~.karta in preparation for Anned 
Forces Day on 5 October, a rumour about a coup planned by a so-called 'Dewan Jcndcral' (Council of 
Generals) was spread by the I'Kl. Titis a rumour transformed quickly into tl1e so-called '30 September 
Movement'. In the course of this event six senior army generals- were killed and General Nasution only 
narrowly escaped tlte same fate. Tite generals targeted by the 30 September Movement included Let.-Gen. 
Jani (minister/commander of the Army), Gen. Nasution (minister/coordinator of defence and security), 
and key members of the Gener•l Staff (SUAD): Maj.-Gen. Suprapto (deputy II, administration), Maj.-
Gen. Harjono (deputy III, finance and public relations), Maj.-Gen. S. Parman (assistant I, intelligence), 
Btig.-C:en. D. I. Pandjaitan (assistant IV, logistics), and tlte prosecutor general of the Army, Brig.-Gen. 
Sutojo Siswomihardjo (Elson 200 I: I 0 I). 
---------- -------------------
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Following this so-called '30 September movement' (Gestapu), Major General 
Suharto (b. 1921 ), the commander of Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command), 
took control of the Army. Supported by 'right-wing' organizations, the Army quickly 
launched a devastating attack upon its most powerful political contender. At least 
several hundred thousands of PIG leaders, members and even alleged sympathiscrs of 
this party were killed or imprisoned. With the Army gained control over the political 
activities of the nation, Sukamo's era came to an end. 
As late as early 1966, the idea of Indonesia without Sukarno remained almost 
unthinkable. The mystification of his charismatic power meant almost no single political 
group could imagine the nation without him. In late 1966, some Newspapers were still 
running a series of articles on the so-called 'Acljaran Pemimpi11 Besar Revo/usi Bung 
Kamo' (The Teachings of the Grand Revolutionary Leader Bung Karno). The 
breakthrough in demystifying Sukarno's charisma was again taken by the youth, that is, 
a new generation of politically conscious university students. From late 1965, student 
organizations, especially those ideologically closed to oppositional political groups, 
were united in several common fronts to mobilize demonstrations with army backing 
demanding the disbandment of the PKI and the di5solution ofSukarno's regime. 
As the student movement strengthened, some publications which had been 
banned or had closed during the guided democracy period, suddenly re-emerged seizing 
the moment to take revenge on Sukarno's 'old order' regime. As well, critical literati 
who had begun writing and publishing their works some years before 1966 and shared a 
common spirit in resisting the political repression and tyranny of the 'old order' now 
wrote with renewed vigour. The main characteristic of the works of Utcse literati, who 
carne to be known as the '1966 Generation', was rcsislru!ce literature, especially poems 
like those published in 1966 hy authors such as Taufiq Ismail, Mansur Sarnin, Abdul 
Wahid Situmeang, and Bur Rasuanto.69 Their works expressed the spirit of hope of the 
'New Order' which they believed would restore democracy and stability lost in 
Sukamo's 'Old Order'. 
4. 5 The Rise and Fall or Political Islam 
When 'the seven words' of the Jakarta Chruter were dropped from the 1945 
Constitution, the pmtagonists of political Islam failed in their struggle for their Islamic 
cl~ims. For some Islamic leader5 this failure left a painful memory._ A collection of 
"For a more detailed discussion ofthe formation ofthis generation, sec A. Tceuw (1979: 41-153). 
-- ----------- --------- --------
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Muslim recollections of this shocking experience can be found in Endang Saifudidin 
Anshari's work (1981, 1997). Just to give an example, Prawoto Mangkusasmita wrote 
as follows: 'Why was the formulation of the 'Jakarta Charter', which was achieved with 
a great difficulty and by racking our national leaders' brains and energies, changed in 
just a few minutes in the meeting of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory 
Committee on 18 August 1945? Why, why, why?' (Quoted in Anshari 1997: 48). With 
the removal of the 'seven words', the remaining phrase expressing the 'belief in One, 
Supreme Divinity' has no specific Islamic content. It is a general and neutral concept of 
God appropriate for everyone who worships God, as emphasized in an early Sukarno 
speech before the Study Committee. Henceforth, Indonesia established (to a greater or 
lesser extent) both the separation of polity from religion and the expansion of polity to 
perform regulatory functions in areas of social life previously under the ju:"sdiction of 
religion.70 
These processes of secularisation, however, need not be understood as 
extinguishing religious expression and identity in politics. Since the greater bulk of the 
population remained predominantly religious in orientation, so long as the civic politics 
of the Indonesian modernising society remained weak, communal religious parties 
would continue to be a major political force. As Geertz argued (1973: 44): 
In modernizing societies, where the tradition of civic politics is weak and where 
the technical requirements for an effective welfare government arc poorly 
understood, primordial attachments tend, as Nehru discovered, to be repeatedly, 
in some cases almost continually, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred 
bases for the demarcation of autonomous political units. 
Moreover, in a society characterised by religious pluralism, religion is frequently used 
as a symbol of group identity and self-esteem. Communal-religious parties arise in 
response to the actual or latent conflict in a religiously pluralist society for the sake of 
protecting communal interests. Religious communities become politiciscd in conflict 
situations where the real issues arc frequently social, political, and economic (Smith 
1970: 137). 
Reiigious ideas and identities in Indonesian politics remained strong as the 
process of secularisation of Indonesian political culture was still far from being 
achicwd. The secularisation of political culture is a complex matter, because it involves 
broadly based changes in values and cannot be effectively directed by the ruling elite 
within a short span of time. The masses' approval for the secularisation of political 
70 For further discussions ofthis issue, sec D. E. Smith (1970) andY. Latif(l999a). 
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culture is also much more difficult in Muslim societies. For many Muslims, to perceive 
religion as a purely private matter of faith and thus to be intensely devout personally 
while functioning politically in a completely secular manner is almost unthinkable, 
albeit possible historically. 
Partly due to the efficacy Gf religious values as a social frame of reference and 
the enduring challenge of the religiously oriented political parties and movements, 
secularisation manifestation in Indonesia differs significantly from that in the Western 
world. Radical secularism in Indonesia was stili an anomalous phenomenon, as the 
highly secularised individuals were still a small minority. Indonesian regimes have both 
supported and controlled religious teaching and institutions to a considerable degree. 
The governments had also played a significant role in the process of Islamic 
development. A special portfolio had been provided since 1946 to deal with religious 
affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs.71 What characterises all of this as secular is 
the subordination oflslam to national ideas and interests. 
When Muslims' post-colonial traumatic remembrance flared up because of the 
marginalisation of Islamic aspirations at the birth of the new Republic, some Muslim 
political leaders continued to struggle to give Islam a proper place in the independent 
state. 'The Muslim community', said C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuijzc (1958: 65), 'has 
come to hold the explicit belief that during the whole colonial period the colonial 
government has kept it in an undcrrrivileged position, that it has been the victim ot 
discriminatory attitudes and measures, and that this situation has forthwith to be 
remedied.' Expectations and strengths were now exerted through the Masjumi party. As 
a federation of Islamic political groups, this party was expected to serve as a new 
vehicle for Islamic ideology and a melting pot for forging Islamic solidarity and 
identity.72 
In fact, the seed for its schism had been present from the very beginning. The 
composition of the party leadership was biased towards the modern!st intelligentsia and 
71 TI1crc nrc only a few countries in the world which haven specittl :-·-·~;.;trt of Religious Aff:1~:0. The 
Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs was created for thr first tim: oy ii1e second Sjahrir Cabinet 
(March 1946.Qetober 1946) witl1 M. Rasjidi as its first minister. II w-;.; ["tended to assuage Muslims' 
political disappointments following the omission of!he 'seven words' from the 1945 Constitution and the 
repudiatiml oftl1e establishment oflhc Religious Af1air Ministry in the early birth oflhc new Republic. 
72 In n meeting of the Masjumi in Circbon, some -.vccks before l1tc first 'police nction', Sukirnan 
complained· tb't under !he 1cfl·wing government in Yogyakarta, Masjumi was having a very difficult 
time and was not being offered any chance for activity and development. He then said, 'We should 
however wait patiently for our chance to come.' Being aware that tl1c Masjumi embraced all Muslims he 
carne to believe that it cannot but be victorious in the end, ns it will comm:md an absolute rnajority 
(Nieuwenhuijze 1958: 55). 
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refonnist ulama-illlclck. Overwhelmingly urban and modernist in character, the party 
leadership offered little to the locally powerful traditionalist ulama. This was obvious in 
the composition of the first Party Executive (Pcngums Bcsar). Such well-known 
modernist figures as Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Wali Alfatah 
respectively became the chainnan, first vice-chainnan and second vice-chainnan. 
Harsono Tjokroaminoto became the first secretary assisted by Prawoto Mangkusasmito 
as the second secretary. Among memkrs of the Party Executive there were prominent 
modernist intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir and Mohamad Rum.73 The 
traditionalist ulama only held a dominant position in the Party's Consultative Council 
(Madjlis Sjuro), u which had no major influence on the party's decision making. 
From the very beginning of its establishment, the West Sumatra-based 
traditionalist organization, Perri, refused to join the party because of its long rivalries 
with the local modemist-refonnist leaders. It then established a party in its own tight in 
December 1945. The pre-war PSII, which had been outlawed by the Japanese, 
amalgamated with the Masjumi. The cooperation, however, did not last long. Leaders of 
the PSII, who were mostly composed of the older-generation of Muslim intelligentsia, 
felt that the positions they held within the Masjumi were not as high as they merited on 
the basis of the position they had held in the pre-war Islamic movement. The grounds 
for the PSII's breakaway from the new party emerged following the Masjumi refusal in 
1947 to join the Sjarifuddin cabinet. Sjarifuddin, who needed Islamic political backing 
for his cabinet, approached PSII leaders offering them several ministerial posts. The 
PSII leaders responded to this by withdrawing PSII from the Masjrmti to becor.1e a 
separate political organization in July 1947 (Noer 1987: 76-7). Since Perti and PSII 
were only small parties, their seraration from the Masjumi did not constitute a serious 
blow to the bargaining power of political Islam. The situation would certainly have been 
different had the NU, as the biggest Islamic organization in the country, followed this 
track. 
73 In addition, these were also some other intelle\!tuals such 115 Abu Hanifah, Kartosuwirjo, Anwar 
Tjokroaminoto, and Sjamsuddin and also a small number of ulama·lnte/ek such us Fotlmrrahman Kafmwi 
and Mohammad Dachlan (of the NU), and Fokih Usman (ofthc Mu!Jammadiya!J). 
" The Chairman of the fi"t Party's Consultative Council (Macljlis Sjuro), was Hasjim Asj'ori (of tlte 
NU). He was nssisted by Ki Dagus Hadikusurno (oftlte Mu!Jammadiyalc), Wochid Hasjim (of the NU), 
and Knsman Singodimcjo (of the Mulwmmadiyah) respectively nsthe fi"t, the second, and the third vice-
ch:tirman. They were supported by some other membe" including M. Adnan (President of the Court for 
Islamic Affai"), Agus Salim (individual), Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (of the NU), A. Sanusi (of the AI 
lllihadijatullslamijah), and M. Djamil Djambek (of tlte Sumatran reformers) and dozens of other kjais 
and Islamic leaders. 
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The NU leaders also resented not only the dominance of the modcrnist-refonnist 
leaders in Masjumi but also the fact that most of the Masjumi's cabinet posts during th~ 
revolution went to intellectuals with backgrounds of Western education whose 
connections were principally with the Muhammadiyah. Nevertheless, for some years to 
come, the NU retained its attachment to the party. This was especially because of the 
key positions of important roles that the NU leaders were offered. From October 1946 
up till February i 952, the NU always received one or more ministerial post/s whenever 
the Masjumi joined or led the cabinets. The NU leaders also played important roles in 
the leaderJhip of Islamic guerrilla organizations, Iiizbullah and Sabilil/ah, and in the 
Madjlis Sjura. These factors were enhanced by the ability of Sukiman, as th~ first 
chainnan of the Masjumi (1945-49), to stay close to NU leaders.75 Nevertheless, with 
the irrelevance of the guerrilla organizations aficr the revolution, the demotion of the 
Madjlis Sjuro from a legislative council to a religious adyisory council h, 1 94~, and the 
rise of Natsir as the new chainnan of the Masjumi in the same year,76 the NU leaders 
became more and more dissatisfied culminating in the NU secession from the party in 
April 1952. 
During the revolution, the threat of an external enemy neutralized ideological 
tension between the Masjwni and secular political parties. According to Feith, members 
of the Sukiman group, mostly composed of older persons in the party council, had 
closer political and personol relations with Sukarno and with the PNI leaders than did 
members of the Natsir group. The Natsir group, composed mainly of intellectuals of the 
second generation who had risen to prominence in the revolution, had closer political 
and personal relations with Sjahrir and with the PSI leaders than did the Sukiman group 
(Feith 1962: 137). 77 In fact, even Natsir and Sukarno remained on good tenns during 
this period. As Natsir admitted: 
In Yogyakarta during 1!1~ revolution, I was one among Ute ministers who had the 
closest relations with Sukarno. Sukarno quite ofien invited me to have breakfast 
in the presidential palace. During tlmt time I wrote almost all Sukarno's 
" A Javanese by origin and having been deeply exposed to secular political ideas during his study in tl1e 
Netlterlands, Sukim:m had a close relationship with the Javanese NU leaders and was less obsessed with 
the modernist-reformist ideology. 
76 Being a non-Javanese (Minangkabau) by origin and having tong been exposed to t11e modernist-
reformist tet'things, especially after his deep engagement in the Persis org:mization, Natsir was a true 
believer in tlte modernist-reformist ideology and drew support main!) from non-Javanese. This made the 
r"' t. --,]crs tend to mistrust him. 
· ·~·i ·1 ·.r, lhc revo1ution, Natsir joined Sjahrir's second and third cr.bincts (iAarch 12, 1946·June 27, 
1 '• h rep:-esentative of the Masjumi with the portfolio of Minister of lnfom~:~tion. And with tlte 
:: . oiiion of Halla's cabinet (January 29, 1948-Decembet 19, 1948) he served again in tltat poo. (Knhin 
1993: 162). 
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speeches for the commemoration of the Indonesian independence day ... Our 
relationship was so close that whenever he had to leave the country I was the 
first man he had to invite as his companion. Our biller polemics of the 1930s on 
the principles orthe Indonesian independence had been forgollen.78 
With Natsir on good terms with Sukamo, strengthened by his initiative of 
proposing the so-called 'Natsir's Integral Motion', he won Sukamo's support to become 
the first prime minister of the fully sovereign unitary state of Indonesia, after the 
breakdown of the RUSI government in August 1950.79 By the same token, the 
breakdown of his relationship with Sukamo led to the fall of his cabinet in March 195 1. 
The friendship between Natsir and Sukamo deteriorated as a result of their different 
altitudes to the issue of West Irian (West New Guinea).80 Although Natsir was as 
critical as Sukamo of the Netherlands' refusal to negotiate a satisfactory solution to that 
issue, he viewed Sukamo's confrontational approach as being counter-productive and 
out of place. In his view, Sukamo's constitutional jJ(lsition as a figurei!?.~d president did 
not permit his involvement in mailers of foreign policy (Panilia Peringnt" , !978b: 
117-20).8t The relationship between the two leaders became sever~ly damaged :u,d was 
never n-.-iorcd. The strained relations betv.~~·t both leaders )lrovidcd the PNI, which was 
not inclt...!cd in the Natsir cabinet, with the opportunity to oppose Ute cabinet. Following 
the inability of the Natsir cabinet to respond to the motion headed by S. Hadikusumo of 
the PNI, which asked the govemmr.m 1: r e~•0f··· Regulation 39 and 'freeze' th~ :.:~ional 
councils, Natsir retum:d his me mbtc •.· the l'rcsi.!•:nt on March 21, 195 I. 82 
71 Quoted in··' .arir(l996: 70). 
79 1n addition to 1'' ,_~._ · :Is Prime Minister, some th. '<' a!i.cr .\t.:sjmni :enders, MDhanmd Roem. Sjafruddi:t 
Prawiranegaro, ri.·: ·;.:·~hid Hasjim respectively~.::;·. •!·, r · .~.'i of Mint.:tcr of Foreign Affairs, Minis~c1 of 
Finance, and Mi~.h.~·;.a of Religious Affairs. Anoth~r }:jlamic party. FSSI, had ~'':0 its tepresentative in !he 
cabinet, namely, Harsono Tjokroaminoto as the Minister of State without portfolio, though he resigned 
rrom the eabinet as or December 31, 1950. 
10 Based on the Round TabJe Conference, West New Guinea was excluded from Indonesian territory. TI1e 
integration of this region into the Republic of Inllonesia became an incu:asingly prominent object of 
coneem in the middle months or 1950. President Sukamo had for some time been setting his own tone for 
pronouncements on this issue and acting independently or the cabinet. In his Independence Day address 
on 17 August 1950, and in several other t;peeches he repeatedly promised his audiences that Irian would 
be in Indonesian hands befcre the sun rose on the year 1951 (Panitia Peringataiii9'/Bb: 117-20). 
11 In Natsir's \'iew, the Irian issue was legally determined by international agreement and any decision on 
Ibis issue should be made through the parliamentary mechanism. Natsir brought this issue into tl1r. cabinet 
meeting. Twelve ministers supported his positiOn, while the remaining five ministers supported Sukarno's 
view (Maarir 1996: 71-2). · 
" Herbert Feith depicted the Natsir cahinet as a eabinet or adminis1IIllors. 'In the very short time it had 
been in the office the Natsir cabinet pursued its policy goals intently and with some success. It moved the 
country several steps along the road to civil security, administrative 1.:mtinization. increased production, 
planned economic !I' ,,;1b. 111at it railed wos clear rrom the fact or the v:ry short time it had in office: it 
had railed to build its<ifa ba3is ~rpolilical suppon' (1962: 176, :<20). 
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The fall of the Natsir cabinet did not automatically end Masjumi's political 
significance. Sukimun succeeded him as prime ministe;.83 This was made possible by 
his favourable relationship with Sukamo, and by his ability to convince the PNI to join 
the coalition government. The strained relations between the government and the Anny, 
however, became a serious impedimen! to the survival of his cabinet. 84 Following the 
controversy surrounding the Foreign Minister's acceptance of U.S. aid vn the terms of 
the Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951, the Sukiman cabinet was accused of being pro-
Western in its foreign policy and the cabinet was obliged to step down. To make 
matters worse, the Masjumi executive, following its chairman Natsir, did not \''Jill to 
support and take responsibility for the signing of the MSA agrecme .. :. On 23 February 
1952 Sukiman returned his mandate to the President.85 
The next two cabinets were led by the PNI (Wilopo cabinet anrl the first cabinet 
of Ali Saslroamidjojo ). This posed a crucial problem for Masjrmri in particular and for 
political Islam in general. Intemal connicts within Masjumi came to a head in the cl'urse 
of the cabinet crisis which follo\vcd Sukiman's resignation. At first (on Macch I), 
President Sukamo appointed Sidik Djojosukarto of the PNI and Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito of the Masjumi as format curs to form a new cabinet. In the process of 
negotiating the composition of th~ cabinet, Prawoto faced a serious challenge in the 
fomt of a fierce connict withi;. ,iis own party. The Sukiman group, which was 
disappointed by the party's decision on the matter ;:~'the MSA agreement, once again 
proposed Sukiman as the new Prime Minister. At the same time, K. H. Abdul Wahab 
Chasbullah (of the NU) openly declared that NU would review its affiliation with 
Masjumi unless the party saw to it that Sukiman returned to the post of prime minister 
., In addition to Sukim:m ns Prime Minister, some four other Masjwui representat.'. !S, Achlll3d Subardjo, 
Jusuf Wibisono, Samsudin, and Wachid Hasjim, respeclively held the posls of Minister of Foo-eign 
Affairs, Mini~tcr of Finance, Minister of Social Affairs, and Minister of Religious Affairs. No one, 
however, could be said to be a true believer in Islamic reformism-modernism associated with the Natsir 
firi~rc were some political events that ~ontribttted to the stmined relationship between the Sukiman 
cabinet and the nnny. On June 7, 1951, the Justice Minister Yamin released 950 political prisoners 
withn~! the anny leader's ipprovat. ht revenge, the Army leaders refUsed lo assist the Prime Ministe~ 
when he sought to in"voke the State of.Wnr and Si~&e regulations ns a legal cover for the :nass arrests 
following the anti..c:onununist raid in August 1951. In the case of these arrests, the cnbima again had not 
consulted the army lenders, nod the same pattern repented itself over the matter of the agreement on 
Mutual Security Act witl1 tl1e U.S.A (Feith 1962: 185-207). · 
as TI1e Su1dlll3n cabinet was mainly made up of men who were solidarity makers. nus cabinet was able 
to register some important nchiever . .cnts, especially in the field uf labour and education. The internal 
frictkn witlun the cnbint:t and tbc cabinet's persistent difficult relatiora.Ship witl1 the Am1y, however, 
presen .. ~ serious challenges for its achievement in a Lroaderser•e (Feith 1962: 218-24). 
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an•! Wachid 11asjim was reappointed the Minister of the Religious Affairs.86 This 
internal conflict weakened Prawoto's bargaining power with Sidik. Negotiations about 
filling the prime ministerial and ministerial positions could not reach agreement and this 
led to the failure oflheformatcurs to form a new cabinet (Feith 1962: 225-37). 
On Marcli 19 Sukarno · appc:-inted Wilopo of the PNI as a new format cur. 
Masjumi reappointed Prawoto as the party's representative in the negotiations with 
Wilopo to form a lle·v ,:abinet. Prawoto offered Wilopo some nominees for each 
portfolio desired by the '-::.,sjnmi. On ~~e other hand, Wahab Chasbullah again asked 
Prawoto to nominate only Waci•"1 HdSjim for the Religious Affairs p••rtfolio. He argued 
that the main supporters of th~ Ha:;_i"'''·' came from the NU and Muhammadiyah. 
During the previous cabinets, ho\,. ·. · ., Muhammadiyah had always been given at 
least two porttblios, but the NU al .lc'. only secure one ministerial position. To 
maintain the unity of the party, he said, it wru: important to uphoid justice by giving NU 
the Religious Affairs portfolio. Prawoto actually did not object to the reappointment of 
Wachid Hasjim as the Minister of Religious Affairs, but left the final decision to 
Wilopo. This did not satisfy Chasbullah for there was no guarantee that Hasjim would 
definitely be elected. The uncertainty became even stronger when a modernist leader, 
Hamka, argucd'that a :i·esh man was needed for this ministry, since Wachid Hasjim had 
held this portfolio three terms in a row (Noer 1987: 221-2).87 
Prawoto brought back this issue for the party's decision. While the deliberative 
mechanism to respond to th ;-.U's complaint was in process, Chasbullah took his own 
way. Bypassing the part',. procedure he went to meet Wilopo to express the NU's 
demand and disclosing his le!!ers of complaint to M,1Sjumi. The Masjumi executive 
raised an objection to Chasbullnh's political manoeuvres and then took its own dccisior. 
concerning the Minister of Religious Affairs based on its own decision making 
procedures, According to the Masjumi's idea of the rules of the game, the basis for the 
appointment of the nominee should not represent political elements in the party, bm 
should be whoever was elected by the party's democratic mechm:i ''~•. Rased on a 
majority vote, Fakih Usman of the Muhammadiyah was elected as the party's nominee 
16 In addition, Chasbullah nlso nominated Abu Hanifah as Minister of Foreign AITairs aud Zainul Arifin 
for the Minister of Defence (Noer 1987: 222). 
17 According to an NU observer, Greg Fcaly, Hasjim himself actually no longer wanted the job. Fealy, 
personal communicalio~ (3 July 2003), 
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for the Religious Affairs portfolio, and Wilopo agreed to appoint him as the n~w 
Minister (Nocr 1987: 86).88 
The cost of this decision, however, was indeed very great. On 5 April 1952, the 
NU meeting in Surabaya took a decision to scccd~ from Masjumi, and to establish a 
political party in its own right. Apart from its theological and ideological differences 
with the modernist-reformist clements in the Masjumi, this event was a culmination of a 
series of the NU's dissatisfactions with its marginal political position. This marginality, 
which resembled the marginal position of political Islam at the birth of the new 
Republic, was not necessarily caused by the hostile attitude of other political groups. It 
is more likely that it was caused by the persisting colonial hierarchies of knowledge 
which placed the mastery of modem scicnti:ic Knowledge as the benchmark of human 
achievement. 
Apart from the issues of patronage and the NU's desire to gain a position in the 
government, at the root of this conflict lay a residue of the uneasy relationship between 
illtelektuil and ulama. There remained a sort of hegemonic consciousness that people 
with a Dutch (modcrn·sccular) school background were considered superior to those 
with a traditional religious one. tdham Chalid (b. i 921) ofthc NU admitted this: 
Actually, the NU secession from the Mr~_:umi was not only because of that 
political position ... but rather h<c.;.usc of a more principled mal!er ... Someone 
with a MULO background considered a graduate from the HIS as being superior 
to that of the tsa11awiyalz (lower secondar, religious school) ... At this period of 
time, one could not imagine that a graduate from the sceulr.: university was 
willing to bow towards the ulama, as a signal of respect. Even a graduate from 
the AMS at that time talked to K. H. Wahab Chasbullah with arms akimbo, 
reflecting a superior attitudc.89 
The NU secession from the MasJumi helped free NU leaders from the 
domination of the modernist intellectuals and gave them more r i portunity to gain 
political positions. This began to bear fruit in the formation of the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet. Not only did the NU regain its traditional portfolio, the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, with Masjkur as its minister, but also succeeded in elevating 
11 In addition to Fakih Usm:m as the Minister of Religious Affairs, some other ftfasjumi representatives in 
the Wilopo cabinet were: Prawoto 1\!nnglrusasmita as tl1e D:puty Prime Minister, Mohamad Roem ns the 
Minister of Interior, and Muhammad Sardjan as the Minister of Agriculture. Another Islamic party, the 
PSII, hnd also its representative in the cabinet namely, Anwar Tjokroaminoto as the Minister of Social 
Affairs. 
19 Quoted in A. Fadhali (1969: 25·6). 
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Zainul Arifin to the privileged position of th~ second Deputy Prime Minister.90 On the 
other hand, for the first iime in the period of constitutional democrar.y, there was no 
single Masjumi representative in the cabinet. Against the backgrc-und of growing 
regional and ethnic protests and also the develcpment of internal conflict Within the 
army during and afier the Wilopo cabinet, the Masjumi aiong with the PSI put forward 
the idea of returning to a presidential cabinet with Halla as Prime Minister. The P!lll, 
however, could not accept a presidential cabinet, seeing it as unconstitutional unless 
Halla were to resign from the vice-presidency. Mohamad Roem of Masjumi and 
San nidi Mangunsarkoro were then initially named asformateurs.91 There soon emerged 
a charge that the Masjumi had put forward the controversial Roem in an attempt to 
make the formateur fail so that it could then draw in Hatta. Such a charge resulted not 
vnly in the failure ofRoem aud Sarmidi to form a new cabinet but also in the absence of 
the Masjumi in the Ali cabinet later on. 
The resignation of the first Ali cabinet on 24 July 1955, because of its 
unresolvect dispute with the Anny, gave Masjumi the opportunity to resume the prime 
ministership. Afier PNI rejected the idea of returning lhtta as Prime Minister, as 
proposed by the three formateurs (Sukiman of the Masjumi, Wilopo of the PNI, and 
Assaat, an independent), Burhanuddin 1-!arahap of the Masjumi was appointed a new 
formateur and successfully fom1ed a new cabinet.92 This cabinet continued the work of 
the first Ali Cabinet by implementing the long-awaited first Indonesian general election. 
It is also worth noting that this cabinet was the last parliamentary cabinet led by a 
Muslim politician in the twentieth century Indonesia. 
During the five years of Muslim dominance in the political leadership of the 
nation, Islamic parties displayed a positive commitment towards democratic principles. 
Having been in the centre oflndonesian politics, Islamic leaders were also able to forget 
their painful memories as the basis of identity politics.93 As such, they were less-
90 Besides the NU, the PSII also hod its representative in the cabinet namely, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso ns 
U1e Minister of Communications. 
91 Aflcr Roem and Mangunsarkoro failed to fonn the cabinet there were still two other formatcurs 
(Mukarto and Burlmnuddin) who also failed to do so. Wongsonegoro of the PIR was the last appointed 
formateur who successfully put forward Ali Sastro•midjojn ns the new Prime Minister nnd he himself as 
the first Deputy Prime Minister(though he resigned from this post on 17 November 1954). 
92 In addition to Durhanuddin the Masjumi representatives in the cabinet were Mohammad Sardjan as the 
Minister of Agriculture and Abdul Hakim as the Minister of State without portfolio. The NU party also 
had its representatives nnmely, Sunarjo as dte Minister of Interior nnd K.H. lljas as dte Minister of 
Religious Affairs. Another Islamic party, PSII, had two representatives namely, Horsono Tjokroaminoto 
as the second Deputy Prime Minister and Sudibjo as the Minister of Social Affairs. 
" According to Judy Rebick, o prominent Canadian feminist political octivis~ i<ientity politics is dte 
politics of marginaliscd groups in search of a language to articulate their soci:ll discontent. 'Identity 
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'lbscsscd with their Islamic claims for a form of Islamic statc.94 This was proven not 
only by their rejection of the Dan;/ Islam movement ofthc 1950s-an armed movement 
aimed at the iorccful establishment of an Islamic state-but a!sn by their respect for 
democratic procedures and mechanisms. 
The strong commitment to democratic principles was expressed by Natsir, as a 
representative par excellence of political Islam. In his capacity as Prime Minister he 
strongly opposed the Dam/ Islam rebellion in West Java (1948-1962). He believed the 
concept of an Islamic state conld not be achieved by force and must be regarded as an 
ideal-something yet to be achieved and still very far removed from the reality of that 
period. In the meantime, he insisted that Muslims should strive for a democratic 
political order. 'As far as the Moslems arc concerned, democracy comes first, because 
Islam can prosper only in a democratic system' (Kahin 1993: 161).95 His dispute with 
Sukamo over the West New Guinea (Irian) issue rcflcct~d his strong adherence to the 
rule oflaw and democratic procedures, even though such a strict observance of the rules 
of the game might make him rather inflexible, as happened in the case of the Nll's 
request for the Religious Affairs portfolio.96 When the Masjmni was in power, he did 
not hesitate to acknowledge Pmzcasiln as th~ principle of the Indonesian nation. In his 
speech before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952 he defended Pa11casila as 
consonant with Islamic principles. By putting forward the belief in 'One Supreme 
Divinity' as the first principle of the Pal!casila, he said, the five principles that became 
the ethical, moral, and spiritual basis of the Indonesian nation were in accordance with 
monotheistic b~Iief(Natsir 1954). He repeated this view in his speech on the celebration 
of 'Nuwlul Qur'a11' (The first revelation of the Qur'an) in 1954: 
The formulation of Pal!casila was a result of deliberation' among national 
leaders during the peak of the Indonesian Independence struggle in 1945. I 
believe that in such a decisive moment, the national leaders who mostly 
embraced Islamic religion would not approve any formulation that in their eyes 
contradicted Islamic principle and doctrine (Ptmitya B11~11 Peri11gatmz 1978a: 
244). 
politics is born when that identity becomes the basis for political thinking, sometimes the basis for 
~olitics' (Rebick 1996: 31). .. 
This situation wilt of course be different in Muslim countries where Islam is treated as the fonnal state-
ideology, rather than just an icon of identity politics. 
" Like Sukamo's 'Pancasila speech' (June I, 1945) he held that through democracy Muslims could 
ultimately have the opportunity for putting through legislation consistent with Islamic precepts. 
Moreover, he believed that if 'Utcre was enough time and freedom to educate Indonesians as to the 
character of Islam, more and moze of them would come to love it'. But he acknowledged tltatthis would 
be a long-tezmprocess that would take generations (Kaltin 1993: 161). 
96 The refonnists' strict observance of rules of the game seems to be a positive reflection oftlteir strong 
adherence to religious laws. 
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The question of Islamic claims over the Indonesian polity was reignited by the 
Islamic political parties during and aficr the election campaign of 1955. In an effort to 
mobilize Muslim support at the grass-roots level, Islamic political parties called for a 
form of 'Islamic State' and the adoption of the Jakarta Charter. In the struggle for 
power, idcntily politics wc•.·c reproduced by reviving the collective memory of 
subordination. 
In fact, the election of 1955 did not bring victory to any political group or any 
one of the mainstreams in Indonesian society. The Islamic strcan1 only obtained 43.9% 
of the total valid votes or 45.1% of total scats in the parliament. Of the total 257 scats in 
the parliament, Islamic parties obtained 116 scats; Masjumi, NU, PSII, Perti and other 
Islamic partics97 obtained 57, 45, 8, 4, and 2 scats respectively (Feith 1962: 434-5). The 
composition of the Islamic stream in the Constituent Assembly showed a similar overall 
result. 
Since the PNI obtained the largest percentage of the total votes (22.3%),Y8 on 8 
March. i956, Pr~sidcnt Sukamo appointed the PN1's leader, Ali Sastroamidjojo, as 
fimuateur. In this second Ali cabinet, all major Islamic parties had their representatives 
in the cabinet. 99 Unfortunately, this cabinet was doomed to fail due to a fierce 
ideological and personal rivalry "•ithin the cabinet in conjunction with internal disputes 
within the Anny that led to regional rebellions. 
The real contestation between the Islamic and non-Islamic political parties took 
place within the Constituent Assembly. Despite the r.pparent internal fragmentation 
within the Islamic stream, the Islamic parties presented a united front when faced with 
the non-Islan!i•; and anti-Islamic parties on matters of principle. Islamic parties now 
tried to continue their fight for Islam in the Assembly. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Assembly had re;lched agreement on many fundamental issues, it failed to arrive at any 
compromise in the dispute concerning the basis of the state (more precisely, the 
91 These other Islamic panics were the Tllarikah Unity Party (PPTI) and the Islamic Victory Force 
\AKUI); each won one scat. -
1 In tcnns of the total scats in tlte p:!!liament, the PNI obtained a result similar to that of Mosjumi (57 
seats). 
99 The Masjumi representativ~s were Mohamad Roem as the first Deputy Prime Minister, Muljanto as the 
Minister of Justice, Jusuf Wibisono as the Minister of Finance, Sultiar Tedjasukmana as the Minister of 
Communications, ar..•<. Pangeran Noor as Ute Minister of Public Works and Power. ·inc NU 
representatives were Idham Chalid as the second Deputy Prime Minister, Sunarjo as the Minister of 
Interior, Burhanuddin as the Minister of the Economic Affairs, Fatnh Jasin as the Minister of Social 
Affairs, and K.H. lljas as the Minister of Religious Affairs. 11tc PSII representatives were Sudibjo as the 
- ------------ ------ ---- - --- ------
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designation of the state). While the Islamic camp struggled for a state based on Islam, 
the abangan, Christian, and secular camps which had combined into a Pancasila bloc 
defended a state based on Pancasila (Boland 1971: 85). 
To refer to both camps as Pa~tcasila and non/anti Pancasila is actually 
misleading. As Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the Masjumi argued, the Islamic camp 
actually agreed with all principles of the Pancasi/a. In his eyes, what made it different 
from the non-Islamic camp was its demand for maintaining the 'seven words' of the 
Jakarta Charter in the first principle of the Pancasila. Thus, the phrase 'Belief in One 
God', as the first principle of Pancasila, should, it was argued, be expanded by the 
. following clause 'with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law'. 
For the Islamic camp, he said, the seven words were important as a signal that Islam had 
now found a proper place in independealt Indonesia (Ghazali 1998b: 19-33). This 
became even more important when facing a real threat from th~ !'KI which had an 
intention to change the first principle to become the principle ~ r ·eligious freedom 
(Maarif 1985: 155}. Because of differences over wording and the constructive effect of 
labelling by public discourse, however, the two camps were seen as representing the 
Islamic bloc and Pancasi/a bloc. Henceforth, as Feith noticed, the Pancasila, 
'previously accepted by Moslem political leaders as a symbol to which they could give 
at least tentative assent, now be~ame an:i-Moslem property' (Feith 1963: 317). 
With the Assembly unable 10 arrive at any compromise, from 1957 Sukamo was 
busily working towards his 'guided democracy'. Realising that the 1945 Constitution 
gave the President more power than the later constitutions and could thus support his 
plans for 'guided democracy', Sukamo decided to enforce the return to that 
Constitution. From 5 December 1958 an 'exchange of ideas' took place between the 
President and the cabinet. On 19 February 1959, the cabinet unanimously passed a 
resolution for the realization of guided democracy within the framework of a return to. 
the Constitution of 1945. In the 24 points covered by this resolution, one of them (point 
9) runs as follows: 'In order to meet the desire of the Islamic groups, in connection with 
the restoration and assurance ofpublic·safety, the existence of the Jakarta Charter of22 
June 1945 is recognized.' In supporting this resolution, Sukarno made a S:Jeech before 
the Assembly on 22 April 1959 again appealing for a return to the 1945 Constitution. 
Minister of Infonnation and Sjeikh Marhaban as tlac Deputy Minister of Agriculture. The Pert/ had one 
representative namely, H. Rusli Abdul Wahid :as the Minister of State for Parliamentary Relations. 
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Fierce debates soon emerged both in the parliament and in the Assembly about 
what the status of the Jakarta Charter should be within the 1945 Constitution. For the 
non-Islamic camp the Charter was only one of the historical documents produced in the 
course of the history of the Indonesian people moving toward the proclamation of their 
independence. Therefore it might not and could not be a source of law. Conversely, for 
the Islamic camp the Charter had not only influenced the Preamble of the 1945 
Constitution but the whole Constitution so that it had continuing legal significance and 
could be used as a source of law for the realization oflslamic legislation for Muslims. 
With the dispute over the status of the Jakarta Charter unresolved, Sukamo 
finally issued a Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 proclaiming a return to the 1945 
Constitution and dissolving the Constituent Assembly. ln the Preamble of this decree, it 
was said that 'the Jakarta Charter inspires (mendjiwai) the 1945 Constitution and is an 
integral part of this Constitl!tion.' Nevertheless, the status of the 'seven words' was left 
unclear and continued to be a controversial matter. This matter was finally 
overshadowed by the furore caused by Manipo/-USDEK and Nasakom. 
During the period of guided democracy, Masjumi was demoralised, discredited 
and divided. Already in February 1958, the involvement the Masjumi leaders in the 
PRRI rebellions led to the banning of this party in the regions where the rebellions took 
place. The involvement of some leaders of the Natsir group in the rebellion provided an 
excuse for Sukiman to take over the party leadership. Such an action was, however, 
reined in by his supporters. Natsir remained chainnan of the Masjumi until April 1959. 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the Natsir group, as the new chaimmn of the party (1959-
60), was asked by both the rival groups within Masjumi, as well as external opponents 
of the party to condemn the Masjumi leaders who had been involved in the rebellion. He 
refused to do so arguing that the Masjumi as an organization had nothing to do with the 
rebellion. Yet, the fact that some of the party's leaders wcr~. : . .,;vcd in the rebellion 
had a long-tcnn psychological and political impact. The link between Masjumi figures 
and the rebellion, together with the distrust the party's h:aders had long felt for Sukamo 
and the party's rejection of Manipol-USDEK and the Nasakom, provided Sukamo with 
sufficient grounds to ban the party in August 1960. Between 1960 and the end of 1966 
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the leading figures of Masjumi, who had been involved in the PRRJ rebellion and who 
had opposed Sukamo's doctrines, were held in prison for varying periods of time. too 
Other Islamic parties loosely united in the Liga Mus/imin (the Indonesian 
Muslims' League)10t had no choice but to accept 'guided democracy'. The NU moved 
even further to become a strategic partner of Sukamo by agreeing to be a major pillar of 
the Nasakom. But this was by no means a united decision. For the hard-liners of the 
party, such as Mohammad Dachlan and Imron Rosjadi, opposition to guided democracy 
was a moral imperative for it 'breached the principles of democracy and arbitrarily 
reduced the influence of Islam whilst bolstering that of communism' (Fealy 1996: 33). 
Yet, the majority ofNU's leaders, tended, as they ofien did, to support the pragmatists' 
accommodatory approach.t02 The pragmatists of the NU empha,;ized the importance of 
risk minimisation and retention of political influence as a means of protecting the 
ummah, especially the NU constituency. To justify this a:td other political choices, they 
returned to the flexible precepts of the traditional political community.toJ Above all else, 
the NU's venerable leader, Wahab Chasbullah, who had always been very influential in 
100 Titcy were, among others, Mohammad Natsir, Sjafru•hiin Prawirancgai~. Durh:muddin Harahap, 
Asaat, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Rocm, , Knsman Singodimedjo, Isa .\nshary, E. Z. Muttaqin, 
Junan Nasution, and Hamka (Ghazali 1998b: 8·9). 
101 Afler lhe NU eSiablished a political party in its own right, its leaders propos•:d tlte idea of eSiablishing 
a sort of federation of Islamic parties. Receiving n\l response from the Afasjrtmi, the NU then turned to 
other small parties, l,SII and Perti. Doth responded this idea warmly. TI1h. i..:Jeration was called Liga 
1 :·uslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslims' League). In addition to 1'::- th1ee parties, the South 
Sulawesi-based Dar ai-Da'walr wal-lr.sjad and the Chinese Muslims' association, Persjarikatan 
Tio11glroa Islam Indonesia, also joined tlte federation. This federation, however, did not operate 
effectively and as such had no significant advantage for the empowerment of political Islam (Noer 1987: 
94-5). 
102 Politically, the NU tended to be consen'ativc reflected by its preference for four core values of 
conservatism: 'authority' (tlte primacy of traditional religious authority), 'hierarchy' (based on heredity 
with grand ulama and their related-families and descendants being at the top), 'property' (a finn 
commitment to individual rights to private property), and 'community' (ad\'ocating the maintenance of 
solidaristic unitary traditional religious communities). The conservative nature oflhe Nil frequently led it 
to usc political expediency for the sake of tltc elite and communal interests. For a 1norc elaborate 
discussion of tlte four core values of conservatism see, among olhers, K. Mcl..cish ( 1993: l 59-61 ). 
101 The pragmatists of tlte NU emphasized the importance of risk minimisation and retention of political 
influence as a means of protecting the ununah, especially the NU constituency. To justify this and other 
political choices, they returned to 'clastic' precepts of the traditional political community. Among the 
most commonly used precepts were 'mas/ahah' and 'mafsadah' (respectively, lhe pursuit of benefit and 
avoidance of hann), 'aklraffud-dararain' (in essence, choosing the lesser of two risks), and 'ma Ia 
yudraku kullulm Ia yutraku ba 'dlmlm' (in essence, if a complete whole cannot be obtained, the portion 
that ean be achieved should not be disposed ot). In the case of the NU's acceptance of 'guided 
democracy', Chasbullah encapsulated this principle in the catchphrase: 'ma.ruk dulu; kcluar gampaug' 
(getting in is essential, getting out is easy). Wilh the Masjuml's demise as ~ ;_;olitical force, lhe NU 
support for Na.ralwm was said to be important to open Ute way for Islamic representation within the 
government as well as to promote l moderating influence on Sukamo and a counter to the activities of the 
PKI. Titis accordingly would bring lhe greatest benefit for lhe ummalr or at the very least could minimise 
harm. On the NU and the role of Wahab Chasbullah during the guided democracy period, see G. Fealy 
(1996). 
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the decision making of this organization, tended to get closer and closer to Sukamo 
because of his resentment of the Masjumi. 
With the banning of the Masjumi in 1960, ihe public role of political Islam in 
general became more and more curtailed. With an increasing unease with Sukamo and 
the communists during the rest of the guided democracy period, some Islamic groups 
(particularly former adherents of Masjumi) had no choice but to build a strategic 
alliance with the Anny and place their hopes especially in General Nasution. This 
rapprochement of the Army and Muslim leaders was signified by the co-establishment 
in 1963 of Pendidikan Tinggi Dakwah Islam (PTDl, Higher Education of Islamic 
Propagation),1IJ.I and the involvement of Islamic groups in the army-sponsored Sekber 
Golkar(Joint Secretariat ofthe Functional Group, est. 1964). 
Thereafter, in the aftermath of the '30 September PKI Movement', many in 
these Islamic action groups became the Army's enthusiastic partners in destroying the 
PKI and ousting Sukamo. Interestingly, the NU as a major pillar of Nasakom quickly 
changed its political alignment to the Amty. Apart from its capacity to accommodate 
prevailing political 'winds', the growing communist strength in the rural areas had long 
threatened the material basis and spiritual values ·of the traditionalist kjai and 
community, most particularly as a result of the PKI's efforts to press for land reform. 
Tht,s, as the communist political legitimacy began to crumble, Ailsor (NU's youth wing) 
became the Army's most assiduous assistant in the slaughtering of thousands of PKJ's 
members and sympathisers (Hindley 1970: 39). 
Politically speaking, the pedod between 1960 and 1965 was a frustrating time 
for political Islam. On thl' other hand, this period was a turning point for the positive 
development of Islamic cultural movements. To a certain extent Muslim interest began 
to switch from the political scene to the realms of education, Islamic teaching and 
propagation, the production of reading-matter, and leadership training. Thus, in facing 
political dislocation, Islamic dakwah (outreach) began to concentrate on socio-cultural 
developments within the Muslim community, just as had occasionally happened in the 
colonial period, as a result of political frustration. 
104 The PTDI was a kind of 'extramlll111 instruction for Islamic dakwah (propagation), founded under 
sponsor of senior officers of the military (General Sarbini and General Sudirmnn of the Army, General 
Sutjipto Judodihardjo of tlte Police, and Commodore Sukmadi of the Navy). These military officers were 
aware oft he danger of communism and wanted to fight it by means of dakwalr (Boland 1971: 194-5). 
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4.6 The 'fransmlsslon of Muslim Intellectual Political Traditions 
The decline of the political role of the second generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia, did not obliterate its memories and ideologies. V chicles for the 
transmission of these memories and ideologies had been available especially in the fonn 
of Islamic studcnt-you:ll associations. 
1' ionecrs in the establishment of such associations in the ~arty years of the new 
Republic came chiefly !rom students of the STI/Uil. Already on 2 November 1945, 
Anwar Hrujono and other students of the STI with the support of Masjumi lcadcrs105 had 
made an attempt to unite Muslim students and young people from various Islamic 
streams and educational backgrounds in the Gcraka11 Pcmuda Islam illclollcsia (GPII, 
The Movement of Indonesian Islamic Youth). Led initially by a pemoccla leader of the 
Japanese period, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, this association was intended to achieve three 
objectives: first, to organise Muslim student-youths for the revolutionary struggle; 
second, to become a recruiting ground for future Islamic leaders; and third, to become a 
meeting BfOund between you(hs of the pcsmllrc11 and those of secular schools (Hrujono 
& Hakiem 2002: 50). It soon became the youth wing of Masjumi and involved itself in 
the revolutionary struggle (pcrcljuangan). Thus, for most its career, the GPII represented 
itself as an Islamic student-youth vanguard organization. 
As the number of Muslim students in both the secondary and tertiary education 
increased, the distinct interests of students could not be satisfactory met by the existing 
youth organization, for the latter included under-educated pcmocda. To accommodate 
the distinct interests of university students, the Himpu11a11 Maltasiswa Islam (HMI, 
Islamic University Students' Association) was fanned early in 1947. To meet the 
distinct interests of secondary school students, the Pcladjar Islam illdollcsia (Pil, Union 
of Indonesian Islamic High School Students) was fanned later in 1947. In the 
beginning, the emergence of these student organizations was opposed by the GPII on 
the basis that they could jeopardise the unity of!slamic youth(Sitompul2002: 2). As it 
is eventuated, however, the three organizations were able to live side by side. 
At the All-Islam Congress held in Solo (20-25 October 1945), Muslim leaders of 
diverse streams recognised the GPII, HMI and Pll respectively as the only legitimate 
Islamic youth association, Islamic university student association, and Islamic secondary 
student association (Sitompul 1976: 39). Nevertheless, a combination of internal 
101 Among Masjumlleaders who inspired tloe establishment of the GPII were Mohanun:~d Natsir, Wachid 
llasjim, AnwarTjukroaminoto, Wondoamiscno and Mas Mansjur (llaojono & Hakim 1997: 48-50). 
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(Islamic) disputes and the increasing number of Islamic students led to the 
multiplication of Islamic student organizations in the following years. To give n dear 
picture of the development oflslamic student organizations as a breeding ground for the 
future leadership of Islamic political communities it is worthwhile looking at some of 
the most importm\1 of these organi:r.rtions including the HMI, PI!, PM II, and IMM. In 
addition to student associations, attention will also be given to the first Muslim 
association of degree holders (Persami) which would accommodate former members of 
Muslim student associations 
4.6.1 The Rise of HMI 
The HMI .was established by students of the STI under the initiative of Lafran 
Pane (b. 1922) 011 5 February 1947.!06 He was a younger brother of two prominent 
Indonesian literary figures, Sanusi Pane and Armijn Paue. Lafran Pane was a man with 
a strong Islamic background but also with multiple affiliations. Before cntcrit:t~thc STI, 
Pane's main educational background was in a pesantren, HIS, MULO and AMS of th~ 
Muhammadiyah. Nevertheless, he was enrolled also at the nationalist primary schools, 
Taman Antara of Siporok and Taman Siswa of Mcdan. After leaving the 
Multammadiyah AMS in Jakarta he entered a nationalist school, Taman Dcwasa Raya. 
Shortly before the Japanese occupation, he joined a leftist organization, Geritrdo, where 
he socialised with the future communist i~ader, D.N. Aidit. Du;ing the Japanese 
occupation he joined an underground movement of the Kaigwr group. His return to the 
Islamic e.-istemic community occurred during the revolution, when he enrolled in 1946 
at the STIIUII in Yogyakarta. 107 
Through Pane's encounter with STI lecturers such as Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, M. 
Rasjidi, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, Ka.;man Singodhncjo and Prawoto Mangkusasmita, he 
was inspired to revive his Islamic identity and commitment (Sitompul 2002: 45-47). 
This internal conversion provided him with the psychological driving force to form a 
new network of young Islamic intelligentsia. He was stimulated by the desire of the 
older generation of the Muslim intellectuals to establish an Islamic student organization 
like the former JIB and SIS, which would serve as n recruiting ground for future Islamic 
106 In addition lo Lafran Pane, lhe otloer fourteen sludcnls of lhe STI who jointly esl:lblished lhc HMl 
were Kamoto Zarkasji, Dahlan Husein, Suwali, M. Jusdi Ghazali, Mansjur, M. Anwar, Hasan Basri, 
Mnnvan, Zulkamaen, Tajeb Rozak, Toha Mashudi, Didron Hndi, Maisaroh Hila! and Sili Zainah (lhe las! 
two were females). See Silompul (1976: 23). 
107 Next in 1948 Lafran Pane lefi doe STI and entered Uoe polilical college (AlP) Uoat would become lhe 
Arts Facully of doc UGM. He graduated from lhc UGM in January 1953. 
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leaders. 108 An additir.o::•, · . , . 1n was the failure of the existing local student 
organizations, Persjarii..··. · ;,,l~asiswa Yogyakarla (PMY, Union of Yogyakarta's 
University Students, est. 1946) and Solo-based Sarikat Mahasiswa Indonesia (SMI, 
Union of Indonesian University Siudents, est. 1946) to meet the aspirations of Islamic 
oriented students.t09 In its competition with secular student organizations to attract 
followers, HMI resembled JIB and SIS in terms of its project to Islamise the educated 
community through the modernization of Islamic institutions. 
Differing somewhat from the previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia, 
however, the Pane generation (the third generation of the intelligentsia) as children of 
the revolution tended to be more 'nationalisiic' and inclusive in its political orientation. 
This tendency can be seen in the objective of the HMI which reflected both the spirit of 
Islam and nationalism. When it was first established, the HMI objective was: (!) 'To 
defend the State of the Indonesian Republic and rai>e the prestige of the Indonesian 
people;' (2) 'To maintain and develop the Islamic religion.' After its first congre5s in 
November 1947, there had been e small changr in the ordering of its objectives with the 
second clause becoming the first. Judging by Ieday's perspective, the nationalistic 
outlook of such a fo:mula!ion is probably not so remarkable. Compared to the standard 
objective of Islamic organizations of that time, however, it signalled an 
acknowledgment that the Islam-ness (keislaman) and the Indonesia-ness 
(keindonesiaan) were not dichotomous but overlapping. 
In this spirit, early leaders of the HMI tended to be more willing to accept 
Pmzcasi/a. Even a man like A. Dahlan Ranuwihardjo (b. 1925, a student of the UI and 
the HMI chairman of the 1951-53 period) enjoyed a very close relationship with 
Sukamo and enthusiastically suppor:ed Pancasila.tto The HMI had never been formally 
affiliated with any poliiic~.! prrty, . though it obviously had strong links with the 
Masjzmzi-for the HMI leaders and the modernist intelligentsia within this political 
party shared a common outlook. With such a relatively neutral political position, the 
HMI could also recruit students both from the modernist and traditionalist backgrounds. 
101 In an article published by a bulletin of the Eastern Indonesian chapter of the HMl (1971: 19), 'Warga 
Hija11 Hitam Mcmbina HMI,' it is said that the HMI establisl~'llent had been inspired by some modernist 
leaders and idea> put forward by Jill and was oriented to achieve a long term goal of tlte Jill in creating 
Muslim intelligentsia who had a balance between erudition in general knowledge and respect for Islamic 
values (Tnnja 1982: 51-2). 
"' :;,.,. PMY and SMI were dominated by left-wing students (interview with Achmad Tirtosudiro, 
11/1,,,;•)99). 
110 Interview with A. Dahlan Rnnuwihardo (29/1211999). 
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Until the mid-1950s HMI did not atlract a large membership. In the first month 
of its establishment its membership was only 18 with all students coming from the STI. 
The HMI's ambition to become a member of Kcngres Mahasiswa Indonesia (KMI, 
Congmss of!ndonesian Students) obliged it to have at least 150 members as a minimum 
requirement. This challeiozle ca:~sed it to extend its recruitment to students of other 
higher institutions in Yogyakarta and its SUiTOundings, especially those from colleges of 
the embryo Gadjah Mada University (UGM)111 and Sckolah Tinggi Tcknis {STT, 
College of Engineering). By the time of the KMI congress in Malang on 8 March 1947 
the HMI was able to meet the memb~rship requirement (Sitompul 2002: 218). 
Subsequently, in order to attmct a larger membership of non-S'fl students, La fran Pane 
as the chairman of the HMI was replaced on 22 August 194 7 by M. S. Mintaredja (b. 
1921) of the (embryo) UGM with Achmad Tir:usudiro (b. 1922) of the same university 
being the vice-chairman. 11: Y ct, the organization continued to remain small compared 
to the major secular student organizations and was of relatively little political 
significance Ulltil the mid-1950s. During the revolution, most of its leaders joined 
pammi!itary groups leaving little opportunity to consolidate the organization. 
It was not until the late 1950s when there was an increase in upper secondary 
school gmduatcs, together with a rapid expansion of (secular and religious) higher 
education that membership of the HMI increased. A prelude to this mpid development 
had actually begun in the early 1950s when students from prestigiou:; secular 
universities such as M.lmaduddin Abdulrahim (b. 1931) of the Bandung btanch of the 
UI (ITB}, Ismail Hasan Mctareum (b. 1929) and Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (b. 1931) of 
the Jakarta bmnch of the UI (Ul) began to join this orgrutization. In the late 1950s, 
among new members of the HMI were such well-known names as Sulastomo (b. 1938) 
of the UI and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (b. ,938) o!' Padjadjaran University. In 
response to the increase in its membership, HMI began to set up a systematic basic 
!mining (pcndidikan dasar) in 1959. Because of the scarcity of litemture on Islamic 
ideology in lr.donesian, the training program used Tjokroarninoto's book of the 1920s, 
Islam dan Socia/ismc (Islam and Socialism) as its main reference. 113 By the early 1960s 
a huge number of students of sa/1/ri backgrmmd began to flood universities, including 
such famous HMI figures as Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939) of the lAIN-Jakarta, Djohan 
111 The UGM was officially established on 19 December 1949. 
112 Later in dte 1990s Achmad Tirtosudiro would play a very decisive role in the fonn:ttion and 
developmcr.t of /kntan Ccndckiawan Muslim Sc-lmlonesia (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
lntelli~rntsia). 
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Effendi (b. 1939) of the lAIN-Yogyakmta, M. Da" am Rahardjo (b. 1942), Ahmad 
Wahib (b. 1942), an~. M. Amien Rais (b. 1944) of the UuM, Fahmi ldris (b. 1940) and 
Ridwan Saidi (1;. 1942) of the UI, Adi Sasono (b. 1943) "f the ITB, Ahmad M. 
Saefuddin (b. 1940) of the IPB, and Sugez,~ ~;. .,.;, \o. 1942) of the Padjadjaran 
University. Tims, when guided democracy reached its zenith in the mid-1960s,the HMI 
had become the largest student organization in the country. Its membership in the late 
1960s was reported to be well in excess of I 00,000.114 
As the membership of the HMI began to increase significantly, Indonesian 
politics was adversely affected by growing ideological conflicts over the basis of the 
s~ ''·'l leading up to the 'guided democracy' period. As most student organizations were 
affiliated to political parties, disputes in national politics inevitably affected the 
activities of student movements. Facing vitriolic attacks from the nationalist and 
communist oriented student organizations, a new generation of the HMI experienced an 
idnlogical rndicalisation. In a depmture from its original goal of maintaining 
harmonious relations between islam and nationalism, the HMI congress in Medan on 
24-31 December 1957 decided to support ;>e!itical Islam in its strug~;le to claim blam as 
the basis of the state. According to Dahl an Ranuwihardjc, this decision was a deviation 
from the basic principle of the HMI (Sitompul 2002: 159). Tensions between 
proponents oi Patzcasila and Islamic principles wJnld sec HMI positioned as a 
moderate organization. 
4.6.2 The Rise of PII 
The junior pmtner o\' \ lvii was the PII. Like the JIB in the pre-war period, the 
Pll's membership was most! .omprised of Gunior and senior) secondary school 
students, though its leadership at the national and provincial 1e·,cls was dominated by 
university students. 115 Establisl>.:~ on 4 May 1947, its initiator was again a student of the 
STJ who hat\ been invo\ ·.J in the establishment of HMI, namely M. Jusdi Ghazali (b. 
1923), supported by other STI students and those ofthe Klaten-based medical college of 
the (embryo) UGM. 116 According to Ghazali, its establishmetlt was inspired '>' the 
previous existence of the JIB ar.d was designed 10 ;mite Muslim students in sec.ukr antl 
religious schools to create intelek-ulama and ulama-imd;:k. This was considered 
113 For the contents oi the book, see chapter 4. 
114 For n description oftlzc dcvelopmcnt ofHMI membership, see Sitoinpul (2002: 217-40). 
1
" The Pll mcmbership wos open to students under 40 years. 
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necessary for strengthening Islam in the national struggle. The actual trigger for its 
emergence, however, was again the disapp:>intment of Muslim students with the 
existing Ikata11 Pe/adjar Indonesia (IPI, Union of Indonesian Students), which was 
dominate•.' by left-wing activists (Ghazali 1998a: 19-33).111 
C;•·,, Jling among high school students, the PII tended to emph~ize a 
pedogogical approach aimed at implanting Islamic values in adolescents during their 
impressionable period of emotional development. Thus, compar,.• to the HMI the 
lslamic-mindedncss of the PI! was much stronger. This was reflected in its objective: 
'To perfect education, ins:ruction and culture in accordance with T>lam for the entire 
people of lndortesia.' It was DOL surprising that the PII tended to be more susceptible 
than the HMI to the ideological influence of the Masjumi leaders. According to Utomo 
Dananjaya, chairman of the Pll during the 1967-69 period, the lack of erudition of most 
Pll member~ made them more susceptible to the influence of their intellectual 
· ,!rons.118 However, the emphasis on Islamic teaching was combined with the teaching 
of modr;m rationalism and vocational skills. Members were introduced to leadership 
!mining, scol•:;.ng and ati English conversation club. One of the most important 
contributions of the I'll to the development of the Indonesian Muslim intellectual was 
its pioneering effort from 1955 onwards to follow a program of international student 
exchi!llge, through AFSIS (American Field Service for International ~cholarship). 
Among the PH members who joined this program and would become well-known 
Islamic intellectuals were Mohammad Diponcgoro, Taufik Ismail, Z. A. Maulani, 
Dawarr/ Rahardjo, and Sugeng Smjadi. 
/ 
.At the time of its first Congress on 14-16 hlv 1947, the PH membership was 
only 300 students with the m3jority coming from tne STI. Nevertheless, with the 
amalgamation of some local lslamis student unions throughout Indonesia into the PII 
from 1948 onwards the membership ex ,.~rienced .; rapid increase. The continuing 
growth of its membership made it a major recruiting ground for the HMI. The strategic 
alliance between the two. organizations was signalled by a tradition that the HMI 
,,,airman wruid be invited to give a speech at the National Congress of the HMI and 
vice versa. 
116 Other pioneers of the Pll were Anton Timur Dj;t~:l:~ti, ibrahim Zarkasji, Kamoto, Halim Tuasik.al, nnd 
Mukti Ali of the STI, Tedjaningsih (fem:~le) and Nursjafoftl1e (embryo) UGM. 
m On tl1e history nod development of the PII seeM. H. Timmrin and Ma'roov (1998). 
111 Inteni~c· with Utomo Dananjaya (711212000). 
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The increase in the number of secondary school graduates in the late 1950s 
comributed not only to the influx of the PII activists into the HMI but also to the 
unprecedented growth of the university student segment of the PII. By the early 1960s 
such famous figures of the PII as Utomo Dananjaya (b. 1936), Hartono MaJjono (b. 
1937), Usep Fathuddin, A.M. Fatwa (b. 1939), and ~'\oh. Husnie Thamrin had entered 
universities and continued to retain their association with the PII. In this way, the 
relationship between the HMI and PII began to transcend the traditioml form of senior-
junior partnership, as the increasing university segment of the PII helped create a 
foundation for a more equal relationship. 
Like the HMI, during guided democracy, the PII underwent a considerable 
ideological radicalisation with the ter.den •: · :o be more Islamic-minded than the HMI. 
During 1960-1965, in an effort to remain on good terms with Sukarno, the HMI as a 
whole was willing to accept the Manipo/-USDEK ideology. The PII, however, refused 
to do so, wiiich made it stronger than the HMI in its identification with the Masjunri and 
Masjumi leaders. Thio situation caused the relationship between the two organizations 
during the period to be strained. This was indicated by dropping the tradition of inviting 
the HMI chairman to give a speech in the PII Nv . nal Congress and vice versa 
throughout !;,e period 1960-1966. 119 
4.6.3 The Rise ofiPNU and PMII 
The 1950s were also a formative period for the NU intelligentsia. At the moment 
when members of the modernist-reformist Muslim intelligentsia had become part of the 
ruling political elite, a significant number of the traditionalist-oriented intelligentsia had 
just begun ent·.::ing universities. Rudolf Mrazek provides a good illustration of the 
scarcity of traditionalist higher intelligentsia before the late 1950s. As the general 
election of the 1955 apprilached, the great leader of the PSI, St. Sjahrir, told a Dutch 
Socialist, Salomon Tas, that a leader ofthc NU had come to him to ask help in placing a 
few intellectuals from his group at the disposal of the NU, which had practically no 
cadres. 'But I couldn't help him; my people find it much too boring to deal with people 
ofthat level,' Sjahrir said (Mrazek 1994: 432). 
For some years after the revolution, students of traditionalist families had no 
choice b~t to join the PII and HMI. The reason was not only because of the NU's 
affiliation with the Masjumi until 1952 and Ute decision of the All-Islam Congress of the 
11
'"tnterview wi•h Utomo Dananjaya (Chairman ofthe Pll-t967-1969, 07/1212000). 
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1949 recommending that the PI! and the HMI to b.; the sole Muslim student 
organizations respectively for students from the high school and from the university, but 
more importantly because of the fact that students from traditionalist families in the 
modem school system remained relatively few. Thus, students of traditionalist families 
such as Toha Mashudi (b. 1923) and Mukti Ali of the STI had taken part in the 
establishment of the HMI and PI! respectively. 120 Traditionalist students who entered 
universities in the 1950s such as Tolhah • 'ansur of the UGM, Ismail Makky of the 
Yogyakarta's lAIN, and Mahbub Djunacdi of the UI also had joined the HMI before 
establishing their own traditionalist student organizations. Even the secession of the NU 
from Masjrmri did not suddenly dissociate the NU students from both the HMI and PII 
(Wahid 2000: 32). 
At the same time, the fact that both the HMI and PII were dominated by the 
modernist-reformist students made traditionalist students feel out of place. This became 
worse following the secession of the NU from the Masjrmri. As a ;esult, on 2 Fehruary 
1954 traditionalist students from various levels and types of school began to establish 
lknta11 Peladjar Nalrdlatul Ulama (IPNU, Union of the NU Students). Founders of this 
organization were mostly those who had been involved in the HMI, such as Tolhah 
Mansur, Ismail Makky and Nuril Huda. Following the emergence of this new 
organization they held a dua! membership, since they did not automatically resign from 
the HMI. A year afier th'' establishment of IJ>NU, the Jkata11 Pe/~;cljar Puteri NV 
(IPPNU, Union of the NU Women Students) was founded. Both new organizations were 
intended to strengthen cooperation between the NU students in the modem and 
traditional religious school system in order to provide a recruiting ground for the 
constitution of the traditionalist intelligentsia (Wahid 2000: 30-1). 
Furthermore, as the number of traditionalist university students increased in the 
second half of the l950s, efforts were made to set up a separute student organization for 
the traditionalist university students. In December 1955, traditionalist students in Jakarta 
undtt' the leadership of Wail Baris Sugiarto established Jkata11 Malrasiswa Nalrdlatul 
Vlama (!MANU, Union of the NU University Studcr,ts). In the same year, traditionalist 
students in Surakarta under the leadership of MuJUiml Ahmad of the Tjokroamir~·J1 ·1 
University (est. I 955) founded Kelrwrga Malrasiswa NV (KMNU, The Community of 
the NU University Students), a name which resembled that of the existing NU student 
12° For tl1c religious background ofToha Masduki, sec Sitompul (1976: 23). For the religious backg•ound 
ofMukti Ali, see Munhanif(1998: 278-9). 
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organization in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the IPNU leaders consider-~:.! these early 
experiments to be premature, for the number of traditionalist_ university students 
remained limited and the existence of such organizations was localised and fragmented 
(Wahid 2000: 33-4). 
The number of traditionalist university students rose substantially at the end of 
the 1950s, especially al\er the establishment of several religious colleges. Apart from 
the State's Islamic colleges, in 1958 the NU had established an Islamic college in its 
own right, Pergunta/1 Ti11ggi Nalul/atul Ulama, in Solo, though it only had a faculty of 
Islamic Law. In their exposure to modem rationalism, technology and education these 
NU students were as modem as those of the Muhammadiyah, so that at this juncture, the 
NU had already had a group of intelligentsia in its own right. It differed from the 
Muhammadiyah intelligentsia in its distinct theological orientation. While 
Muhammadiyah intellectuals were committed to refonnist teachings that idealised 
religious purification, NU intellectuals retained a conservative outlook. The tenn 
'conservative' in this context means a preference for conserving the local established 
traditions of Islam. Thus, it was actually more appropriate to think of these NU 
intellectuals as fonning a 'conservative-modernist' intelligentsia rather than a 
'traditionalist intelligentsia'.121 
This growing number of traditionalist students, which coincided with the 
deepening affinity of the HMI with the Masjumi as a result of a severe conflict within 
student politics, motivated the IPNU leaders to create a long-awaited special body for 
the traditionalist university students. The IPNU national c:;nfcrence in Kaliurang (ncar 
Yogyakarta) on 14-16 March 1960 appointed thirieen members of the IPNU to fonn the 
desired organization.122 This finally resulted in the establishment on 17 April of the 
Indonesian Jslami~ University Student Movement, Pergeraka11 Mahasiswa Islam 
l11donesia (PMII) with Mahbub Djunaedi (b. 1933) as the first chainnan, Chalid 
Mawardi (b. 1936) as the deputy chainnan, and Said Budairy as Secretary General.m 
Its membership in the late 1960s was only a few thousands, consisting largely of JAIN 
students. 
121 Even so, because of the common use of the term •traditionalist intelligentsia'. Ibis term will be used 
hereafter to mean 'lhe traditionalist-oriented intelligentsia'. 
112 The tltirtccn members of the commillcc were A. Cha!id Mawordi, M. Said lludairy, and M. Sobich 
Ubaid (Jakarta), M. Makmun SJukri and Hilman (llandung), Ismail Makky and Munsif Nachrowi 
(Yogyokarta), Nuril Huda Suaidi and Lnili Mansur (Surakarta), Abdul Wahab Djaclani (Scmorang), 
Hizbu!lah Huda (Surakarta), M. Cha!id Marbuko (Malang), and Alunad Husain (Makassar). 
123 On the history and development oftlte PMII seeN. Wahid (2000). 
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The emergence of the PMII invited scepticism and cynici•m from both the 
conservative ulama and the HMI. The ~onservative ulama of the NU were concerned 
about the violation of the syari'ah for there was no separation between male and female 
students in its membership. For the HMI, the establishment of the PMII was a betrayal 
of the Islamic community which had agreed in 1949 to permit only the PII and HMI as 
the Muslim student bodies.124 Henceforth, traditionalist segments of the HM1 were 
isolated. Traditionalist figures in the HMI such as Mahbub Djunaedi (a vice chairman of 
the HMI when the PMII emerged), Fahrur Rozi, and Darto Wahhab were accused of 
masterminding a 'separatist' movement and were then suspended from the HMI (Wahid 
2000: 42-3). Afterwards, traditionalist students gave their allegiance to the PMII, though 
some of them continued to join the HMI or to hold a dual membership. Typically, 
descendants of the traditionalist ulama and religious functionaries tended to join the 
PMII, while descendants of the 'laymen' from the traditionalist community tended to 
join U1e HMI. 125 
4.6.4 The Rise ofiMM 
While NU students considered that the HMI was dominated by the modernist-
reformist students, the followers of the Mulrammadiyalr considered the HMI as being 
less committed to the reformist ideology. They came to realise the importance of 
creating a training ground for the future leadership of the Mulwmmadiyalr. This was 
driven by the fact that the Mulrammacliyalr university students were numerous. Apart 
from those who studied in the public universities, from 1958 the Muhammadiyalr had 
successfully e~•ublished universities that offered both religious and general faculties. 
Soon after the establizhment of the Mulrammadiyalr University in Surakarta and Jakarta 
in I 958, a similar university emerged in Yogyakarta and in several other places in the 
following years. The actual trigger for the establishment of the Mulrammadiyah student 
organization, however, was the desire to counter the real threat to the Mulrammadiyalr 
dakwalr at the grass-roots level, especially from the ideological manoeuvring of the 
"'Aclually, some years before lhe emergence oflhe PMll Muslim sludenls who affilialed will11he PSll 
had left lhe HMI and founded on 2 April 1956 a separale organizalior, Scrikat Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia (SEMMI, Union of Indonesian Muslim Sludent.j. Nevertheless, lhis did nol botl1er lhe HMI 
because tlte influence of the SEMMI was never great. 
'" The leadership and vertical mobilily in lhe HMI is based on a meril syslem, while in tl1e PMll il is 
based on a combinalion of merit and heredity. Tims, for descendants of 'laymen' it is safer to join the 
HMI. 
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communist student front which was quite strong in Yogyakarta and Solo,l 26 the centres 
of the Muhammadiyah movement (IMM 1998: 3). 
The Union of the Muhammadiyah University Students, Ikata11 Mahasiswa 
Muhammadiyah (IMM) came into existence on 14 March 1964. Founders of this 
organization were Djazman Al-Kindi, M. Amico Rais, A. Sulamo, Sudibjo Markus, 
Kastolani, Slamet Sukirnanto and Dzulkabir (all of the UGM), Rosjad S.H. and A. Muis 
of lAIN Yogyakarta. Most of these students came from the medical school and socio-
political faculty of the UGM (IMM, 1998: 4). Students from these faculties represented 
those who were concerned to support social services, especially health services, for 
people at the grass-roots level and also those who could provide ideological criticism of 
their political opponents. Already in the mid-1960s Amien Rais, for example, as the 
head of the politics department of the IMM launched a strong criticism of the scale of 
foreign debt and the corruption of the Sukarno regime. The IMM commitment to social 
advocacy was symbolised by the wearing of a red jacket, instead of green, as a uniform 
of the organization. It was a sort of proclamation to the people at the grass roots that the 
concern aboi.l their social pHght was not a monopoly of left-wing organizations.t27 
Within a year of its establishment the IMM membership was 7,000 and it rose to 
around 30,000 by the end of the 1960s (IMM, 1998: 5). With such an enthusiastic 
response, leaders of the IMM who had been involved in the HMI became more 
concentrated in the IMM, though they did not secede from the HMI. For the 
Muhammadiyah students it was quite normal to hold a dual membership of the HMI and 
!MM. Typically, students of the Muhammadiyah universities tended to join the IMM, 
while students of the Muhammadiyah families in state universities tended to join the 
HMI. 
4.6.5 The Rise of Persami 
Many students who entered higher education in the 195;>·; i1ad graduated by the 
early 1960s. Like their junior counterparts, these senior intellectuals could not escape 
political partisanship. In response -to the establishment of Christian and secular 
intellectual associations, 128 some 100 Muslim sardja11a (degree holders) from various 
126 For Solo and its surroundings as a stronghold uflePht students, see McVey (1990: 20). 
127 Interview wilh Piet Haidir Hizbullah, Chairman of the IMM oflhe period 2001-2003 (10 January 
2003). . 
121 TI1ese Christian and secular intellectual associations included lkatan Sardjana Katholik Indonesia 
(!SKI, Union of Indonesian Catholic Sardjana, est. 1958), tl1e Pcrsat11an llllcligcnsia Kristen Indonesia 
(PIKI, Union oflndoncsian Christian Intelligentsia, est. 1963), tl1c PNJ's Union of Indonesian Republic 
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organizational backgrounds (more than a half of them were former HMI activists) 
decided to form a united Islamic intellectual front. Established in I 964, this front was 
called Persat11an Sardjana Mr.slim Indonesia (Persami, Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Sardjana). In its attempt to bridge the g::iJ between the traditionalist and 
modernist intelligentsia, the initial leadership of this organization went to Subchan Z. E. 
(b. 1931) of the NU ,,, the chairman and H. M. Sanusi (b. 1924, a graduate of the SIT) 
ofthcM11hammadiyah as the vice chairman (Anwar 1995: 251-2). 
In the last years of Sukarno regime, Persami would play a significant role in an 
anti-establishment movement by the Indonesian sardjana front, Kesat11an Aksi Sardjana 
Indonesia (KASI). Some of the Persami ligures such as Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo would 
pioneer the project of lslamising the government bureaucracy in the New Order period. 
4.6.6 The Making of Muslim Students' Collective Identity 
Despite internal fragmentation within the community of Muslim students, the 
most decisive factor in the construction of their collective identity and idcorogy in this 
periocl was the external threats from communist and nationalist student fronts. The 
competitive political struggle in national politics penetrated the studcr-t world and 
brought about a rapid politicisation of university campuses and univcr . .,ty student 
forums throughout the country. In an effort to recruit potential cadres, most political 
parties developed student affiliates that attempted to establish chapters on university and 
college campuses. These party-affiliated student fronts were ofrclative!y minor political 
significance until the late fifties. By the early 1960s, however, :·.~ the number of 
university students increased dramatically, they had grown in size and activity and soon 
became influential political clements. 
Apart from student organizations based around the Muslim intellectual traditions 
there also emerged student organizations of the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) and 
secular intellectual traditions. Representatives of the Christian intellectual tradition were 
GMKI129 and PMKRI.130 Representatives of the nationalist tradition were the 
Sartljana (lkatan Sardjmra Rcpnblik Indonesia, ISRI), and the communist's intellectual fronts, the 
Association of Indonesian Sardjana (Himpnnan Sordjana Indonesia, HSI), and Organization of 
Indonesian InteJiectuals (Organisasi 1]cndckiawan Indonesia, OTI). The latter three were estab1ished in 
the first part of the 1960s. 
"'In February 1950 Christelijke Stndenten Vereenlging opJal'tl (cst.1926, officially proclaimed in 1932) 
of the 'federal' territory merged with Perhimpunan Malrasiswa Kristen Indonesia (est. 1947) of the 
•Republican' territory to establish the Indonesian Christian University Student Movement. Gerakan 
Malrasiswa Kristenlnclonesla (GMKI). GMKI was affiliated to the Parkindo. Sec GMKI (of the Malang 
chapter) website www.gcocitics.com!Cnpitolllill/8766 [20/0212002]. 
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Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement, Gerakan Malwsiswa Nasiona/ 
Indonesia (GMNI) 131 and the Indonesian University Students Movement, Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia (Gennindo). 132 The socialist intellectual tradition was represented 
by the Socialist University Students' Movement, Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosia/is 
(Gcmsos). 133 PSI-type students might also associate with relatively indepencient local 
student organizations, including the federation of local university student associations, 
Serikat Organisasi Mahasiswa Loka/ (SOMAL). The communist intellectual tradition 
was represented by the Unified Movement of Indonesian University St;.~dents, 
Conse/1/rasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (CGMJ). 134 In addition to CGMI, there also 
appeared another radical lefiwing student organization namely the Indonesian 
University Student Association, Perhimpwwn Mahasiswa Indonesia (Perhimi). Fonned 
in the late 1950s out of an earlier Dutch-oriented and exclusively Chinese organization 
by a small group of radical Sino-Indonesian students Perhimi's membership consisted 
130 In June 1950 a federation of Catholic student assodations, Kalho/iekc Sudenlen Vercniging (KSV), of 
the federal lerrilol)' merged witlt Pcrscrikatan Mahasiswa Katalik Indonesia (esl. 1947) of tlte 
'Rcpublic:m' territory to es\.'blish the Union of Indonesian Catholic University Students, Pcrlrimpunan 
Mahasiswa Katolik lnclonesi• (""'-t.:lU). PMKRI was affiliated 10 lhe Portal Katlwlik. liS n:tlioll31 
membership in the 1960s was around 10,000 students. See PMKRincl: 
www.gcocitics.com/pmkri web/nrofil-~ejarnh.htm [20/0212002]. 
Ill Founded in 1954 GMNI was a fusion of the three rutionalist student organizations emerged during the 
revolution: Gcrakan Mahasiswa Marhacnis, Gcrakan Mahasiswa Mcrtlcka, and Gcrakan AfalwsUwa 
Dcmokrat. Sec GMNI website: www. geocilies.com'gmnijklfprofile.hlm [20/02/2002]. II was fo11113lly 
affiliated wilh the PNI wilh ils national membership in early 1960s being around 77,000 (Maxwell, 1997: 
118). Most of i~ members were protagonists of the ru.tionalist ideology, but most students with leflwing 
inclinations also preferred to join GMNI, since it offered useful connections for getting political or 
bureaucratic positions taler (McVey 1990: 20). 
m Gcm1indo was established in the late 1950s as a student affiliate of Parlimlo: a political party which 
was re-csl:lblished in 1956 and claimed lobe tlte embodiment of Sukamo's lefiwing, radieal-n:tlionalist, 
non-communist ideology. Titis sludenl organization never allracled more than a few hundred members 
(Maxwelll997: 119). 
m TI1e socialist university students who had been part of :Jrt· -;~~:~ -~ian Socialist Youth, Pcmrula Sosia/is 
Indonesia (Pc.si111lo, esl 1945) during early years oflhe '• • ;,.;,.. ..~gan to c:!·••hlish Gemsos in !955. II 
attracted those in student circles who were supporters "r~h· 1' :. i. ; had never Jttc:n1pted to attr..::..t large 
numbers of students to its membership. Even so, it ww .~ ·· : :.;. · ·-.;.ial in elite universities such as the Ul 
and tm. 
m Fanned in 1956 as an amalgamation of three locai student org.mizations in Bandung, Bogar and 
Yogyakarta, CGMI claimed to have around 35,000 members by 1964-5. Bul only a few (3000 members) 
of tltcsc were in Jakarta and fewer still al elilc institutions such as the Ul (Maxwell 1997: I II). It 
accordingly tended to draw its greatest support from peripheral private Ulliversitics, especially from 
places like Yogy;tkarta and Solo, many of whose students were socially insecure. A good portion of tlte 
Jakarta membership came from lhe Baperki·sponsored Res Publica University (McVey 1990: 20). Badon 
Pern1usyawara1an Kewargaan lnclo11esia (Baperki, Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizenship) was a 
lenist-incline political movement oflhc 1950s and 1960s intended origill3lty lo inleyple elhnic Chinese 
into Indonesian society, In addition to Res Publica University it is also worth noting that from 1958 
onwards tlte PKI esl:lblished its own university, the People's University, U11i>•crsitas Rakjat (Unra) 
operating in eight cilies (Jakart:t, Bandung, Solo, Sem:trang, Surabay;t, Malang, Palembang, and Medon). 
Its enrolment in 1959 was claimed to reach 2,816. For a fuller discussion of the communist educationnl 
institutions seeR. McVey (1990). 
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of approximately 2000 students, mostly from Res Publica University (Maxwell 1997: 
119). 
These organizations, because of their operations beyond the boundary of any one 
particular university and their links to external organizations (political parties or 
religious bodies),· either fonnally or indirectly, were commonly referred to by 
Indonesians as 'extra' university organizations. Despite th:t. rivalries, these 'extra' 
university organizations were loosely united under the Federation of Indonesian 
University Student Organizations, Pcrscrikatan Perhimpzman Mahasiswa Indonesia 
(PPMI, est. 1947). All the extra university organizations competed with each other for 
the leadership of the PPM I. 
Meanwhile, within each university there was also an internal student body that 
confined its operation to a particular university. It was referred to as an 'intra' university 
organization. The university-wide student government of the intra-university 
organization was called Dewan Mahasiswa (Student Council), while at the faculty level 
there was also a student-elected faculty senate. The 'extra' university student 
organizations competed with other to place their members within each Dewan 
Mahasiswa and faculty senate. Moreover, beginning in 1957 a national forum for intra 
student organizations had been set up under the auspices of the Department of Higher 
Education and Science and was intended to !1\lkc the universities more accessible to 
government influence. This national fomm of the Dewan Mahasiswa was called t: .~ 
Indonesian University Student Assembly, Majclis Malzasiswa Indonesia (MMI). This 
also became an arena for competitive political struggles among the parties' student 
fronts. In the battle for supremacy, a degree of competition also emerged between MMI 
and PPMI as to which body spoke on behalf of all Indonesian students. 
In the early 1960s, tensions within student politics became extremely fierce 
causing 'extra' and 'intra' student organizations as well as other student forums to 
become greatly politiciscd. Despite their variety, two major blocs emerged reflecting a 
polarization between the pro- and anti-regime clements. The main protagonist of pro-
regime groups was GMNI supported by CGMI, Germindo and Pcrhimi. The main 
protagonist of anti-regime forces was the HMI. It gained support from Gcmsos, PMKRI, 
PMII, IMM and to a Jesser degree from GMKI. 
Interestingly enough, although the NU, Partai Katholik and Parkindo had been 
included in the National Front of the political establishment, their student affiliates 
tended to align themselves with anti-establishment students. In the case of PMII, soon 
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a!;~r the '30 September PKI movement' (Gestapu) of the 1965, it departed from the 
NU's political position and joined the anti-establishment student movcm·-.:. 
Most of the PMII leaders in the mid-1960s had been under the patronage of 
Subchan Z.E (vice chairman of the NU}, rather than ldham Chalid (the Chairman). 
Unlike ldham who strongly supported Sukarno, Subchan, as a prominent 'modernist' 
intellectual of the NU, tended to be more critical. He had been educated at a modernist 
school as a student of the HIS Multammadiyalt and obtained religious instruction from a 
prominent leader of the Multammadiyalt, Mas Mansur. He had spent some time sitting 
in on lectures at the UGM before attending a non-degree program in economic 
development at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA, 1961-2). Raised in a 
traditionalist lhmily but having been exposed to the modernist intellectual network, 
Subchan served as a bridge between two intellectual traditions. As such it was not 
surprising that he had a close relationship with the HMI leaders.135 Under his influence, 
the PMII moved closer to the HMI. 
The toughest competitive political struggle occurred between the GMNI and 
HMI. Both organizations made every effort to dominate student forums, councils and 
senates with the most acrimonious quarrels taking place in elite universities. Following 
the ban on the Masjumi after 1960, however, the HMI with its alleged connection to this 
party was increasingly thrown on the defensive. 
GMNI and its allies set out to dominate guided democracy forums both on and 
off the campus. Student forums and a large number of student councils and faculty 
senates rapidly came under the control of the GMNI supporters at the expense of other 
student organizations, especially the HMI and groups of students organized in intra-
campus bodie;. At the fourth national congress of the MMI held in April 1964 at Maline 
(South Sulawesi}, GMNI gained control over the newly-elected executive by winning 
18 out of the 24 positions. In the wake of this event the st nt councils of the UI and 
ITB, which were led by Baldr Hasan of the HMI ana .. ~slimin Nasution of the 
Independent group respectively, failed to gain a place on the new body. Because of this, 
the representatives of both universities rejected the election results on the ground that 
this was an insult to two of the oldest and most prestigious universities in the country. 
"' Subchan's house firstly in Jalan Wahid Hasjim and later in Jl. Banyumos was the meeting ground of 
the HMI. He was regarded by the HMI activists as a senior because of his sl113rtncss and financial 
support. His young sister, Aniswali, also became a member of the HMI. On tl1e biography of Subehan, 
see A.M. Mandan (ed. 2001). 
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Consequently, both student councils w.·:e suspended from MMI membership (Maxwell 
1997: 119-20). 
The anti-HMI campaign became e1•en more aggressive in the aftermath of the 
MMI incident. The HMI was frequently accused as being anti-Manipol and counter-
revolutionary and was denigrated as an afiiliute (onderbouw) of Masjumi. GMNI and its 
allies began to demand that it be banned. Sparked 'lff by the decision of the acting 
secretary of the Law Faculty at the Jembcr campus of Bmwicljaja University, Professor 
Ernst Utrecht, to suspend the HMI in May 1964 Ji·om all activities within that 
institution, a fierce public· campaign against it soon spread to other cities. In October, 
the PPM! executive which had been controlled by GMNI and its allies suspended HMI 
from membership of the federation. Early in 1965 leftwing student fronts attempted to 
'retool' the newly-fom1ed senate of its allegedly 'counter-re1·olutionary' elements. On 
29 September, the PKI leader D. N. Aidit spoke at a CGMI mass rally in Jakarta 
challenging the CGMI students with the following statement: 'if you all cannot get rid 
ofHMI you may as well put on sarongs' (Maxwelll997: 20, 25).136 
In the face ofsueh threats, the HMI survived because of its strategy of remaining 
on good terms with Sukamo, particularly because of its acceptance of the Manipo/-
USDEK and because of the close rehitionship between Sukamo and leading HMI figures 
such as Dahlan Ranuwihardjo and Achmad Tirtosudiro. Its survival was also made 
possible by the support it gained from an influential NU leader, Saifuddin Zuhri. As the 
then Minister of Religious Affairs, Zuhri persuaded Sukamo not to dissolve the HMI. 
Eventually, HMI's strategic alliances with the Army and also with other groups of anti-
establishment provided it additional support for its survival. 
Thr. mid-1960s was a confusing and a self defining moment for the HMI's 
collective identity. Internally, as a reaction to the ideological onslaught of the leftist 
student movements, the HMI's mindset became more Islamised. Externally, because of 
its urgent need to develop strategic alliances with non-Islamic political actors and 
groups, and especially to ensure Sukamo's guarantee for its survival, it was forced to 
develop a sort of'inclusive' (nationalistic) political language. Tensions between the two 
currents meant that the Islamic mindedness of the HMI was moderated by its inclusive 
relationship. Beyond this general tendency, however, HMI members began to split into 
two relational and ideational inclinations: 'exclusive' (Islamist) and 'inclusive' (liberal). 
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This latent disputation between the two groups would become evident in early years of 
the New Order. 
The '30 September PKI movem~nt' brought about a turning point for HMI's 
resurgence. The lailure of the PKI's political manoeuvre and the anny's quick counter-
attack ga..-c rise to a political climate that favoured the w1ti-establishment student 
movement. With the PPMI being irrelevant in the new political circumstances, in late 
October anti-establishment students formed a loose coalition of externally-based student 
organizations with Army encouragement and protection. This loosely united front came 
to be knvwn as the Indonesian University Students' Action Front, Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI). 131 Considering that Sukarno remained in power and that 
the NU's relationship with him remained strong, Zamroni (b. 1933, a student of the 
JAIN) of the PMII was appointed the initial chairman of the KAMI presidium.138 
On 4 November 1965 KAMI began to organise student demo·1strations 
demanding the disscttrtion of the PKI. Although Sukarno's charismatic power had been 
severely damaged, he was still in power. As if to prove this he passed a proposal for the 
establishment of the so-called Kabinet Dwikora jang Disempunrakan (the Revised 
Dwikora cabinet) which was comprised of I 00 ministers.139 When KAMI came under 
strong attack from Sukamo forces, a similar high school students' front emerged e>.rly 
in 1966 under the banner of the Indonesian Student Ym:ths' Front, Kesatuan Aksi 
Pemuda Pe/adjar Indonesia (KAPPI ) with Moh. Husnic Thamrin of the Pll being the 
initial chairman. At the same time, there also came into existence the Indonesian 
University Graduates' Front, Kesatuan Aksi Sardjana Indonesia (KASI) with a 
Masjumi-PSI intellectual core. On 12 January 1966 KAMI began to organize a massive 
student demonstration under the slogan of the People's Three Demands, Tri Tzmtutan 
Rakjat (Tritura): 'ban the PKI, purge communist elements from the Dwikora C~binet, 
and lower prices of basic commodities!' 
'"Sarong' (sarong) was a !radiliom! dress of the !radilional Muslim conununily. The tel!n 'kaum 
sanmgan' (!he sorong community) wrc ofien used a deroga•·.· '"" assoeialed with the (lradilio:>alist) 
Muslim conununity. 
137 In Indonesiar. the word 'KAMI' means 'we'. 1llis was use~ us an opposih: to the word 'KAMU' (yo·J) 
lht was used to idenlify sludenls affilialed lo tl1e PKJ. 
"'On the formation ofKAMl, see Sulastomo (2000). 
"' Dwikamando Rakyat (Dwikora) sl:mds for the pcoplcf• two mandales: cnc.h Malaysia and defend tl1c 
revolution. It was Sukarno's slogan to tum public auentiort nway from internal domestic problems to 
a11eged external threats. There were tluee difTc1ent Dwikora cnbincts. Tite first Dm'kora cabinet was · 
launched in August 1964 and lo be in effect until February 1966. II was followed by tl1e Kabinet 
Dwikora yang Disempurnakan (the First Revised Dwikora Cabinet, February l966·March 1966), and 
finally !here emerged the Kabi"el Dwikora yang Discmpurnakan Lag/ (111e Second Revised Dwikora 
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When the Revised Dwikora cabinet was inauguo:c:d on 24 February, a 
disastrous clash occurred between student demonstrators and the regiment of the 
presidential guard, Cakrabirm.-a. One of the KAMI's demonstrators, Arief Rahman 
Hakim, was killed}40 He became a martyr and ignited the students' anger. After 
Jakarta's streets were taken over by sluder.: demonstrators, the Army took the 
opportunity to seize political power. Slowly but surely, Sukamo's charismatic and real 
power faded, leading to his eventual expulsion from the presidency in March 1967. 
The anti-communist student demonstrations around the mid- I 960s helped 
galvanize a collective solidarity among young intellectuals. In sharing a common 
experience, historical project and the language of anti-establishment, the fourth 
generation of Indonesian intelligerlsia emerged in the public sphere. With the coming 
of this generation the young Muslim intelligentsia began for the first time in Indonesian 
history to show its dominant P<> ·• .on. B)' far the largest and most active member 
organization oflhe KAMI was HMI, while :;,JI of the KAPPI was Pll. In celebrating the 
monumental achievement of a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia in this period, 
Nurcholish Majid, chairman of the HMI (1966-68, 1968-71 ), wrote: 
If the year I 966 is mentioned, Indonesians will at first associate it with the birth 
of a generation closely related to the fall of the 'Old Order' and the rise of the 
New Order. If we concentrate our allention merely on KAMI, the dominant role 
of HMI within it will be very conspicuous. II is not an exaggeration of many 
observers that KAMI was actually parallel with, if not identical to, HMI. This 
could arouse the envy and jealousy of many other groups (Madjid 1990: 2 !). 
4.4 Conclusion 
In contrast to the expectations of Marxist theory, the dominant (economic) class 
did not necessarily become the dominant political elite in I:.donesia. Due to the relative 
ittcapacity of other social forces, the intelligentsia and clerical inUclgenisia (ulama-
intelek) as instigators, leaders and executors of national politics became th~ duminant 
political elite of the fully independent Indonesia. 
As bearers of the traditional intellectual obligations to •J;cir people, th~ task of 
Indonesian intelligentsia and ulama-illlelek in political leadership was to acti.vat~ what 
Sukam.:; called the 'national spirit', 'national will', and 'national deed'. Insp'red by the 
Cabine4 March 1966-July 1966. Tice last Suknmo CJbincl wus Kabiuc/ Ampcra (the Ampcra r.abine!, July 
1966-0ctober 1967). 
140 Other Muslim students who were mui<\~. -c.:. in the student dem.lnstrntions in other cities were 
Hasanuddin Noor (Banjannasin), and Sjarif Alkad:i (Mnkassar). 
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post-colonial dream of liberty, members of the intelligentsia attempted to translate this 
vision into a democratic political system. 
The implementation of democracy in a plural society-with a mulliple structures 
of knowledge, collective-memories, modes of production as well as a variety of social 
identities and subject positions-was an uphill task. With the diversity of iratellcctual 
political traditions there was an intense ideologicr.l struggle to impose upon the state a 
particular conception and institutional structure. 11tis ideological struggle could not 
simply be addressed through the invention and imposition of :1 civil religion such as 
Pancasi/a to blunt the variety of .;ocial ideologies. Rather, there was " need tu :otablish 
political institutions and mechanisms within which opposing groups co"ld safely and 
fairly contend. 
Tht democratic experiment of the constitutional democracy period (1950-57) 
was an attempt to establish political institutions for safe political competition. This 
experiment, however, ~.amcd no solid democratic foundation. In a country still typified 
by a high rate of illiteracy, a lower level of education, poor economic conditions, huge 
social inequalities and authoritarian mentalities, the political terrain remained the 
property a tiny layer of elite politicians. Ai the same time, elite settlement failed to be 
achieved because of the lack of common will and civility among the elites in general 
and more importantly because of the failure of collective social learnine. In the failure 
of collective social learning, 'the post-colonial dream ,of discr.mtinulty', to borrow 
Gandhi's words (1998: 7), was 'ullimaletj· vulnerable to the infectious residue of its 
own unconsidered and unresolved past'. 
Leaders of political Islam were able to forget their traumatic political 
experiences when they were in power. Between 1950 and 1954 Islamic leaders showed 
their rejection of the idea of c~tablishing an Islamic state through antled struggle ancl 
their willir.gcJess to accept Pancasi/a as the principJe·ofthe state. Their claim for some 
kind of Islamic state was revived during anti aflcr the election campaign as a reflection 
oftheir pr,>.::nous political position and their disenchantment with the communist effort 
to deconfessionalise Pancasi/a. 
In the struggle of identity politics, symbols were considered as important as 
substance. Thus, allhough the Constituent Assembly produced agreements on all other 
parts of the constitutional drafl, it was unable to arrive at any compromise concerning 
the designation of the state. On the issue of whether the ideological basis of the s.tatc 
should be Pancasila or Islam, Indonesian politics wa& soon divided into two major 
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blo~s: the so-called Pmrcasi/a camp versus the Islamic camp. In fact the Islamic camp 
i;self agreed with all principles ui Pancasi/a as long as the phrase of the 'Belief in One 
God', as the first princip:e of Pancasila, was followed immediately by the clause 'with 
the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law'. For the Islamic camp, 
. maintaining 'Islam' as the symbol of the state was important as an indication that the 
state had now put the Islamic community in its rightful place. For the Pwrcasila camp, 
on the other hand, accepting Islam as the designation of the state was too much, for this 
could open the way to further Islamic claims. 
All these political disputes and problems indica•cd that the implementation of 
democracy required time for structural adjustment anti !:c•:ial learning. For political 
actors who had been marginalized under the democratic political system, however, such 
disputes and problems were considered as proof of the incompatibility of Western-style-
democracy and Indonesi:.n conditions. The failure of the Constituent Assembly to end 
the dispute over the designation of the state, while national politics was overshadowed 
by economic crisis and regional movements, provided a rationale for these political 
actors to imp!'se an authoritarian political system. With Amty and PKI backing, 
Sukamo came out with his 'guided democracy' project by claiming himself as the 
meeting ground of the nation. 'I have made myself the meeting place of ail trends and 
ideologies. I have blended, blended, ;.nd blended them until finally they became the 
pre~ent Sukamo.' 141 
Under the framework of the state's official orthodoxy expressed as Manipoi-
USDEK and Nasakom, the df,-.·rsity of the nation had been denied as a story fabricated 
by colonialism. In this way the political CS<' .olishment managed to create what Geertz 
called 'a near anarchic politics of meaning' (1972: 324) with its arbitrary imposition of 
political and cultural homngeneity. This engendered a cynical spirit of anti-
intellectualism and various forms of intellectual 'prostitution' that came to be called 'the 
betrayal of the intellectual'. This :spirit of anti-intellectualism and intellectual 
partisanship provided a legitimisation f6r the repression and imprisonment of dissenting 
intellectuals. Oppositional parties such as Masjumi and PSI experienced political 
devastation. Henceforth, the public role of the Muslim intelligentsia of the second 
generation, mostly affiliated with· the Masjumi, withered and was not restored by regime 
change. 
_____ .. __ 
141 Quoled in Gecr.<(t•72: 322) and Fischer (1959: 154). 
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The decline of their political role, however, was compensated for by their return 
to the field of education and Islamic dakwah. Meanwhile, the crumbling of social 
borders and cliscrimination in the educational field of post-colonial .Indonesia had 
resulted in the influx of the children of santri families into the public and private 
schools/universities. This led to the unpre~cdcntcd growth of Muslim student 
organizations. By mid-1960s the HMI and Pll had become the largest student 
organizations in the coun~-y. Both played a very decisive role in the student 
demonstrations of the mid-1960s leading up to the f.11l of Sukamo regime. 
The dominant position of HMI and Pll in the student politics signalled the first 
significant influence of the Muslim intelligentsia. II would, however, take some time for 
these young intellectuals to prepare for a decisive role in the political leadership of the 
nation. As power was transferred from the Old to the New Order, th~ secular 
modernizing elite under the leadership of the military intelligentsia continuecl to 
dominate the Indonesian polity and bureaucracy. 
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Chapter 5 
THE NEW ORDER'S REPRESSIVE-DEVELOPMENTALISM 
AND THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE 
They have treated us like cats with ringwonn. 
Mohammad Natsir (1972)1 
The impetus for change in/slam has more often tome from tire bottom rather than from the top, 
fmm tloe edge than from the center. 
Richard W. Dulliet (1994)2 
When the Sukarno regime crumbled in 1966, the rising new power began to designate 
the period of 'guided democracy' as the 'old order' (artie lama) and celebrate the new 
era as the 'new order' (artie bam). Although Sukamo was still granted official status as 
the President of indonesia until October 17, 1967, his real power declined after the '30 
September movement' (Gestapu} of 1965. the groundwork for the 'new order' regime 
was signalled by the issuing of Sukamo's controversial 'mandate' on II March 1966 
entrusting Lieutenant-General Suharto, the Army commander since October 1965, with 
the task of coordinating the power of the govemment.3 This 'mandate' came to be 
known as Sural Perintah Se?elas Maret (Supersemar, II March Letter of Instruction). 
Suharto took over the command of national politics following massive Army-backed 
anti-Sukamo and anti-communist student demonstrations in the national capital and 
other cities. On 12 March 1967 the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ra/..yat Semetztara, MPRS) appointed Suharto as the acting 
President oflndoncsia. 
To emphasise that this would be a new era, the new regime reopened the public 
sphere but with some controls. All kinds of groups, individuals and publications who 
had been virtually silenced during guided democracy began to make themselves heard 
again. Conversely, those who had been so vocal during the 'old order' period were 
silenced. 
The rise of the New Order marked the ascendancy of the third generation of 
Indonesian intelligentsia. Members of this generation, who grew up during the Japanese 
occupation and revolution, generally lacked exposure to Western academic training but 
1 Quoted in Hassan (1980: 125). 
2 Dullicl (1994: 195). 
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were highly imbued with militaristic and nationalistic mentalities. The new regime was 
dominated by the military intelligentsia who had a long-standing aversion to the 
'unpatriotic' and disputatious politics of civilians. 
Intellectuals of the PSI and Christian communities became the military's main 
partners in the formation of the New Order. Their decisive role owed much to their 
superior educational qualifications and the powerful innuence of the PSI and Christian 
lobbies among the central army command. Moreover, !he fact that political followers of 
the PSI a~d Christian communities were relatively insignificant, freed intellectuals from 
these groups from being perceived as menacing threats to the military's ambition to 
dominate Indonesian politics. 
With the state dominated by the military intelligentsia, there would be no quarter 
allowed its enemy number one, the PKI.4 Meanwhile, the new regime's fear of potential 
political threats that could come from parties with large constituencies prompted 
intervention policies to paralyse the PNI and to refuse the rehabilitation of the Masjumi. 
The exclusion, or at least domestication, of the three former major political forces from 
the New Order's public sphere was regarded as an essential h3llmark of the new 
political order. 
In dealing with the inherited economic crises, the New Order came to the 
conclusion that mass political mobilisation and the disputatious civilian politics of the 
previous regime had neglected basic problems of the economy and social welfare. 
Economic recovery was needed to turn the attention of the people from politics to the 
economy by changing the national outlook from 'politik-scbagai-panglima' (politics as 
commander), as practised during the 'old order', to 'ckonomi-scbagai-panglima' 
(economy as commander). 
In emphasising the importance of economic growth and modernization, the new 
regime made every effort to restore links with the capitalist world and multinational 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, from 
which Indonesia had withdrawn in August 1965 as part ofSukamo's campaign of anti-
imperialism and capitalism. Economic development required capital, but as the country 
was bankrupt, the New Order had no choice but to open itself to foreign debt and 
3 It remains unclear whether this 'mandate' was issued at Sukamo's initiative or because of pressure from 
Suharto. 
4 The PKI was physically and legally eliminated. 
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investment. To guarantee the inflow of foreign capital and the success of economic 
development, political stability was considered essential. 
This provided the new regime with the justification to dismantle wluit it 
perceived as political barriers to modernisation. Under the slogan 'pembangwzan' 
(development), developmentalism was inaugurated as a new official orthodoxy. This 
was officially signalled by the launching of Suharto's first cabinet as president (June 
1968-March 1973),5 which was named 'Kabinet Pembangu11a11 /'(First Development 
Cabinet). Alongside this state technocratic ideology, political stability was made the 
primary political objective reinforced by a doctrine entitled the 'Military's Dual 
Function', which legitimised the military's role in non-military affairs. With thi~ pair of 
'magic' formulae, 'pemba11gzmmz' and 'stability', the New Order recycled a relic of the 
colonial-promoted kemadjocmz and mst c11 orde, and soon transformed itself into what 
Feith called (1980) a 'rcprcssivc-dcvelopmentalist' regime. Consequently, the 
Indonesian honeymoon with freedom in the New Order's public sphere did not last 
long. The regime used various repressive measures to curb freedom of speech and 
association as well as political opposition and intellectual criticism, as all of these were 
perceived as serious threats to political stability. 
There has been a range of scholarly views on the nature of the New Order state 
as it developed during the 1970s-1980s. In assessing that the New Order state had been 
so isolated from the people's conscience and left little room for give and take on policy 
issues ot for sensitivity to public needs, some analysts, such as Benedict Anderson, have 
described it as a strong, monolithic and purposeful state or a 'state-for-its-own-sake' 
(Anderson I972b).6 In finding that the state had suppressed class, interest groups and 
oppositions through the creation of a system of non-competitive representational 
monopoly expressed by particular functional categories, other analysts, such as Dwight 
Y. King, have described it in terms of 'state-corporatism' (1977). Judging that the state 
had been factionaliscd and incompetent with cliques, circles and patron-client tics 
overriding the importance of insr:a,;ons, some analysts, such as Karl. D. Jackson, have 
1 In March I 968 Suharto was appointed futt president by the (provisional) MPRS, instead of by the newly 
elected pennancnt MPR, as tlte general elections were delayed until mid-1971. 
6 Other views are: Geertz's description of the Indonesian state (in thr ~ 950s and 1960s) as a state manque, 
Emmerson's account of the strengthening of tlie Indonesian burca,·•;tacy, Fcitlt's description of the New 
Order ns a 'reprcssivc-devclopmentalist regime', Liddle's discussion of the institutionalisation of tltc 
'New Or•J.cr' and the 'relative autonomy' of the po1itician, and Mackie's nnd Macintyre's account of an 
increasing autonomous state. A good overview of these theories 113;5 been given by Jim SchiUer (1996: 1-
27). 
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described il as a weak and faclion-Jidden 'bureaucratic polity' (Jackson & Pye 1978). 
Finding that the slate had been personalised-because the control over key political and 
economic resources was in the hands of President Suharto and his immediate military 
circle and the ruler's power depended on his capacity to win and retain the personal 
loyalty of key sections of the political elite-some analysis, such as Harold Crouch, 
have described il as a 'patrimonial' state (Crouch 1979). Using the criteria that state-
sponsored modernisation had been accompanied by authoritarianism characterized by 
the state's dependency on imperatives ofintemational capital accumulation and division 
of .labour in conjunction with the military's leading role in politics and economic 
development, some analysts, such as Mochtar Mas'oed, have desclibed it in tenns of 
Guillenno O'Donell's Latin American 'bureaueratic-authoritalian' state (Mas'oed 
1983). 
Such wide variations in theorising about the nature of the New Order state 
reflect the differences in the vantage points of the observers. These different 
perspectives may also reflect the difference in synchronic political trends when these 
studies were umlertaken. Taken as a whole and from the distant present, it could be 
argued that these views may actually complement each other. 
This chapter will describe the authoritarian nature of the New Order state and its 
implications for the educated community and the political careers of the civilian 
intelligentsia, especially those of the Muslim intellectual political traditions. Special 
attention will ue given to various and conflicting Muslim intellectual responses to the 
New Order's modernization and marginalisation of political Islam. Discussions will also 
deal with the variety of responses based on generational criteria as well as on internal 
fragmentation within a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia. This will be followed 
by discussions of the implication of these differences for the upcoming Muslim 
intellectual movements and the polarisation within the community of Muslim 
intelligentsia. The chapter will argue that the New Order' • promotion of education and 
advanced training in Western countries, as well as changes in the international 
environment, had significant influence on the fonnation and positioning of Islamic 
intellectual movements. 
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5.1 Mass Education und the Devaluation of the lntelllgentsla 
The New Order's modernisation project necessitated educational development. 
Thus, despite its hostility towards intellectual-criticism, this regime actively promoted 
the improvement of education. From Repelita II (Five-Y car Development Plan II, 
1974/5-1978/9) up till Repelita IV (1984/5-1988/9) the Indonesian educational budget 
experienced a steady incrcasc,7 though as an average percentage of the GNP during the 
period (2.5%} it was always lower than the same figure of the neighbouring countries 
such as Malaysia (4.2%} and Singapore (3.0%}.8 
As a result, the Indonesian educational profile of the 1980s was vastly different 
from that of the 1960s. This can be seen from comparative figures of students (of the 
public and private schools} affiliated to the Ministry of Education and Culture. During 
the period 1965-1990, total enrolments in primary schools increased from 11,577,943 to 
26,348,3 76; those in the junior secondary school increased from 1,052,007 to 
5,686,118; those in the senior secondary school increased from 412,607 to 3,900,667 
(Ministry of Education and Culture 1997}; those in tertiary education (including the 
degree and diploma progran1s) increa~ed from 278,0009 (Thomas 1973: 13, 173} to 
1,590,593 (Ministry of Education and Culture 1997). 
From 1984, a national pot:~y of six-year-compulsory education was 
implemented. In effect, by the early 1990s there was virtually universal primary school 
attendance. For this achievement, in 1993 Indonesia won the Avicenna Award from 
UNESCO. This progress would soon be expanded to the (junior) secondary school, 
especially after the implementation of nine-years of compulsory education in 1994. The 
enrolment in the higher levels of education remained small but a significant increase is 
noticeable. The enrolment in tertiary education based on age group increased from I% 
in 1965 to 7% in 1986. This would increase even more markedly following the 
proliferation of higher institutions, especially private ones from the 1990 onwards. In 
1960 there were only 135 higher institutions (public and private) in the country. By 
1 !n Rcpelita 11 (Five Year Plan 11, 1974n5-1978/9), Ute educational budget accounted for 10.0 percent of 
Ute total; in Rcpelita Ill (1979/80-1983/4) the budget rose to 10.4 percent, and jumped to 14.7 percent in 
Rcpclita /V(l984/85-1988/89). See Dcpartcmcn Pcncrangan (1983, 1988). 
1 For the Utrce countries' public expenditure on education as a percentage oftltc GNP between 1975 and 
1989, see UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (UNESCO, 197€-1990). 
9 The accurate collection of higher education statistics in the 1960s was difficult. For example, based on 
the educational statistics of the Education Ministry, Thomas noted that total university enrolment in 1965 
was 278,000. But 'te added that the true total enrolment lor that year might have been less Umn tho! 
number ('Thomas 19'1:: 1~). Based on the records of the Ministry of Education and Culture (1997), toto! 
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1990, the number was 921, comprised of 872 private institutions and 49 publir ones 
(Oey-Gardiner and Suryatini 1990). 
Apart from this quantitative development, the anti-communist sentiment of the 
new regime drove it to be supportive of religious instruction in public schools and 
universities. Based on the (Provisional) People's Representative Assembly (MPRS) 
Decree, Number 11/1967, attendance at religious instruction became compulsory for 
students in the general school (sekolah) system, ranging from elementary school until 
higher cducatioil. Thus, despite the government's attempt to dissociate Islam from the 
public life, the New Order was responsible for assisting with the Islamisation of the 
academic world. 10 
The schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs also undcnvcnt a similar 
trend. Total numbers of students in madrasah of all levels, both in the state and private 
school, increased from 2,745,58911 in 1965 to 4,577,523 12 in 1990/1 (Lee 1995: 105; 
Dhofier, 2000: 98). A radical transformation in the curriculum of madrasah began in the 
1990s. By this time, attendance in the madrmah ibtidaiyah and tsanawiyah was 
recognised as part of the compulsory education system, while the madrasah 'a/iyah was 
given equal status with the general secondary school in terms of meeting the criteria for 
its students to enter any state university. Under this policy, the emphasis of teaching in 
the madrasah was placed on general (secular) subjects. 
At the tertiary level, the pro-modemi.;ation and accommodation policy of the 
Ministry of Religion Affairs from the time of the Mukti Ali period (1973-1978) was 
responsible for the improvement of general subject instruction in the JAIN. This was 
supported by the madrasah's emphasis on the teaching of general subjects which put 
pressure on the JAIN, as the main producer of madrasah teachers, to accommorlate a 
larger portion of general subjects and even to open non-religious faculties. Alongside 
this development, the number of state JAIN multiplied from only one in 1960 (namely 
JAIN Yogyakarta with its ~ffiliate in Jakarta) to become fourteen in the 1990s.13 Total 
numbers of university studeniS in 1965 were 46,000. TI1is number certainly excludes studeniS of i11e 
Erivnte universities and in diploma programs. 
0 Allhough it has to be borne in mind that other religions were also taught. 
11 TI1is number was comprised of2,637,559 madrasah ibtlduiyah students, 80,961 madrasnh tsanmviyah 
students, and 27,069 madrasalr 'afiyal, .. :~:Jdents. 
12 11tis number Y.11S comprised or '~,.167,669 m.in'rt~wh ibtirlaiyah students, 1,053,368 madrasa!J 
tsatJawiyah students, and 356,486 madra1'1!J 'aliya!J S1ur!ents. 
u Beginning in 1997, almost all brunches of the I A INs scattered in various cities were converted inlo 
Sekolah Tinggl Agama Islam Negcrl (STAIN, Stale Advanced Islamic School). 
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student enrolment increased from 19,871 in 1970 to 84,037 in 1990 (Thomas 1973: 78; 
Dhofier 2000: 93-4). 
This growing number of educated people outnumbered the growing job 
opportunities in public sectors. Thanks to the growth of the private sector which offered 
more lucrative salary and other incentives, the 'priyayi' mindsct of those with higher 
education, as reflected in their preference to serve as govemmcnt officials, began to 
change. Beginning in the mid-1980s graduates of universities tended to favour the 
private sector, and the prestige of being a public servant faded away. Since the late 
1980s, there has been a huge influx of intelligentsia into the private sector, more than at 
any time in the past. 
Yet, the demand side of the private sector was limited. By 1985, 9% of the 
university graduates could not be absorbed by the job markct. 14 This percentage steadily 
increased in the following years. The threat of educated unemployment was experienced 
most seriously by studcn''" of the social sciences and humanities, since more than 70% 
of university enrolments until the early 1990s remained in these academic disciplines 
(Latif 1994: 60). The matter was even more serious for lAIN students whose traditional 
job opportunities were confined mainly to the Department of Religious Affairs. Already 
in the late 1980s, this Department had no more capacity to absorb the bulk of lAIN 
graduates. This culminated in 1993 when the Department began to apply a policy of 
'zero growth', while at the same time the number of graduates of the lAIN reached 
11,299 (Dhoficr 2000: 96). Many lAIN graduates became teachers in private Islamic 
schools. However, the absorptive capacity of private maclrasalz and pesa11trc11 was also 
limited. In facing this reality, lAIN students had to find alternative j()bs outside the 
traditional religious sector. This pressure certainly influenced their religious attitudes 
and outlook. 
When large numbers of higher educated people could not be absorbed by the job 
market, the social prestige of the intelligentsia in general began to be eroded. Even 
university students, who since the colonial period had been regarded as part of the 
Indonesian illtelektuil, began to lose their status as ex ol!icio intellectuals. Henceforth, 
Indonesians tended to associate the term illlelektuil with pec~le of ideas, especially 
those who held degrees. 
14 By 1990 the figwc had become 10%, to reach 12% by 1999. Sec E. Tobing (77•e Prospect, 21 
December 2003). 
Clrapter S -17:e New Order's Reprcssi\•e-De\'Ciopmentall5m 323 
The exponential growth of Muslim university students from the 1960s resulted 
in an unprecedented number of Muslim sarjana (degree holders) in the 1970s. These 
smjana projected themselves as noble bearers of degrees who expected meaningful 
public roles. With their career paths as leaders/members of Islamic parties obstructed by 
the state repression of political Islam, they had to lind alternative ways to channel their 
need for self-a~tualisation. This challenge influenced their politico-religious forms of 
expression and interpretations of Islam. This in tum led to internal disputes within the 
Muslim intellectual community. 
Finally, the regime's ambition to adopt Western technocratic policies in order to 
catch up with Western technological and industrial development resulted in its strong 
encouragement of Indonesian scholars both from secular and religious institutions to 
obtain higher training in Western centres of study. In addition to international 
scholarships, Indonesian government agencies such as the Bappenas and the Ministry of 
Research and Technology (particularly under minister B.J. Habibie from 1978 onward) 
through their partnership with international donors or soft-loan funds from international 
financial organizations were able to provide their own scholarships. Bccau~~ of the 
steady growth of Muslim sarjana from the late 1960s, many Muslim intellectuals 
benefited from these scholarships. This contributed to the growing number of Muslim 
intellectuals with Masters and PhD degrees, which strengthened their bargaining power 
and the credibility of the Muslim intellectual movement. 
5.2 Discursive Practices and the Public Sphere: Modernization and Repression 
The openness of the public sphere curing the early years of the New Ordci 
period provided the opportunity for some media that had been banned during the guided 
democracy period to resume publication.15 Some dailies that had survived Sukruno's 
regime such as Kompas (est. 1965) and Sinar 1/arapan (est. 1962) became even more 
important.16 But new media also emerged with army newspapers being more prevalent 
after 1965.'7 
"Tite Mcrdcka daily (esl. 1945), the oldest of the newspapers that had been banned in February 1965, 
resumed publication on 2 June 1966. It was followed by the reappearance of Mochtar Lubis' Indonesia 
Raya (est. 1949) in 1968 and Rosihan Anwar's Pctloman (esl. 1948), and the Masjuml's Abadl (est. 
1951\. 
'
6 A~ong the media that survived during the Old Order and continued their publication under the new 
regime were the NU's Duta MllS)'arakat (est. 1953), Kompas (est. 1965) ond Sinor Harapan (esl. 1962). 
Kompas, a paper with affiliations with the Catholic conununity, began to develop into the best·infonned 
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In the new public sphere, reminiscences about the so-called 'intellectual 
betrayal' (pengklzianatcm intelektuillinte/igensia) or 'intellectual prostitution' 
(pelacuran inte/ektuillinteligensia) during the guided democracy period appeared as 
articles in the mass media. During April-August 1966, Kompas ran several pieces on 
this issue, side by side with articles on Sukamo's doctrines. 18 Later, from 14 to 23 April 
1969, Indonesia Raya ran a series of articles on '1]ontolz-1]ontolz Pelatjuran Inte/ektuil 
di Zaman Resim Soekamo' (Examples of the Intellectual' Prostitution during the 
Sukamo Regime). Written by someone with the penname Wira,19 these articles attacked 
those academic intellectuals who allegedly had produced scientific falsehoods in order 
to support the Manipol-USDEK and other official orthodoxies,20 while praising those 
who had bravely maintained their intellectual integrity at all costs. 21 Ironically, 
according to the articles, many of those who had prostituted their intellectual integrity in 
the past successfully assumed strategic positions as technocrats in the transitional 
government of the New Order.22 
independent neWspapers. Sinar 1/arapan, a paper with affiliations with the Protestant community, also 
experienced new growth. 
17 The daily Harian KAMI, the mouihpicce of the student movement, w:lS an important ncw.-:omer 
headed by Nono Anwar Makarim along wilh such literary figures as Taufiq lslJmil, Arief Budiman and 
Gunawan Mohamad OJ.S editors. Later, Tempo magazine with Gumwan Mohamad as its editor·in-chief 
emerged in 1971 and soon developed itself into the nation's premier weekly news magazine. Moreover, 
there also appeared after 1965 new am1y newspapers such as Angkalan Bersenja/a and Berila Yudlla 
along with the organ ofGolkar, Suara Karya. 
11 Among articles on intellectuals published in Kompas were S. Tasrirs 'Beracllirlall kini zaman 
Pengchianata11 Ka11m llllellektllilllldol!esia' (11te Era of the betrayal of Indonesian inlellecluals has now 
come to its end, pub. 27 April 1966), and 'Jtrlien Be11da clan pengc!Jianatan kaum inte/cktuil' (Juli•n 
Benda and lite betrayal of lhe inlellectuals, pub. 12 May); Wiralmo Soekilo's 'Apnkall sebab11ya Knum 
lntelckt11illndonesia tak terknla!Jkan?' (Whal made lhe Indonesian lnlelleclual remain undefeated?, pub. 
31 May); Salyagraha Hoerip's 'Apaknll benar kaum inte/ekt11illndonesia tak terkalallkan?' (Is iltrue that 
the Indonesian Intellectual remains undefeated?, pub. 27 June), Soc Hok Gie's 'Antara Kemerdekaan 
lntelcktuil dan lnstroksi Partai' (Between lnlellto!Ual Freedom and Party Instruction, pub. 20 August), 
and M. T. Zen's 'Tugas Tjendekiawan: Mengisi Kcmerdekaan' (The Role of lntcllecluals: lo give 
meaning to Independence, pub. 9-12 July). 
19 Based on information from Maskun Iskandar (a former joumalisl of the lndo11csia Raya) on 2 Augusl 
2001, Wira was a pseudonym of Indonesia Raya joumalisl, Djafar Husein A&<egaf (currenlly he is Ihe 
Editor-in-chief of Media l11donesia). 
20 Names direclly al1acked by Ihe articles were Prof. Sadli (for his criticism of foreign capital), Prof. 
Ismail Suny (for his crilici;m on Trias Politica), Barli Halim (for labelling 'text-book thinkers' those who 
did not support the 'national identity'), Emil Salim (for his obsessive use of Sukamo jargon in his 
academic writing), and Prof. R. M. Suljiplo Wirjosuparto (for his inle!Jirclalion of history based on 
Manipo/-USDEK doclrines). 
21 Among intellecluals praised by the articles were Prof. Babder Djohan, Dr. Mochlar Kusumaalmadja, 
and Dr. Bagowi for !heir courage to say 'no' lo the ruling power, lhough they had lo pay dearly wilh lite 
loss of their official po:;itions, -
u \Vim's articles provided examples of this tendency. Among otlters, Prof. Sadli who had been the focal 
point of anti-f~reign investment during lite Sukamo regime became Ihe initial chairman of the New 
Order's Committee of Foreign Investment. 
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These articles soon ignited polemics between the 'accused' intellectuals and 
other participants.23 Although they differed in various ways, they shared a common 
concern about the moral responsibility of the intellectual and intelligentsia: to speak 
truth to power. In actual fact, those who had been 'quiet' (cooperative) with power 
holders in the past-because of their long-standing control over politico-economic 
resources-tended to benefit from the regime change. The Suharto interim cabinet, 
Kabinct Ampcra yang Discmpzmzakan (the Revised Ampcra Cabinet, II October 1967-
6 June 1968) 24 reflected this tendency. It was largely composed of those who had 
supported 'guided democracy', with a dominant representation of the military 
intelligentsia.25 
As the terms 'illlclcktuil' and 'intcligcntsia' became derogative terms because of 
their frequent usc in association with 'intellectual betrayal', an Indonesianised 
Hindustani (Sanskrit) term 'ccndckiawatz ' or in old spelling 'tjcndekiawatz ' (intellectual 
or intelligentsia) began to gain new signification.26 Associated with 'intellectual 
respon:.ibility', the new term began to be widely used in intellectual discourses. In 
March 19.16, the Bandung chapter of the Indonesian anti-establishment sardjana front 
(KASI) launched its resistance journal, 1Jcndckiawatz Bcrdjuang (Intellectuals in 
Struggle). Next, with the New Order's project of replar.ing foreign loan words with 
indigenous ones, the term ccndekiawmz became popularly used in !he public sphere. 
Under the flag of intellectual responsibility, ccndekiawwz and mass media set up 
a fresh intellectual agenda as th~ !'ew historic project for the nation. They began to 
"Prof. Sadli wrote a counter article in Indonesia Raya on 21 Apri11969 followed by a similar articles by 
Prof. !snmil Suny published in Kompo; •; 2 ~pril) and in Indonesia Rayu (23 April). The polemic in 
Indonesia Raya also invo!ved J. SCK··:· .. r\"_i11d Djiwandono, 'Bcbcrnpa TjatalmJ TcntaiJg Person/an 
Pclatjur~n lntclcktuil' (Some Notes on the Issue of the Prostitutiou of!ntcllectuals, pub. 24 April), L. E. 
Hakim, 'Pclatjuran lntclckJuil di Zaman Rcsim Sockarnc: Scbuoh Tanggapan • (Intellectual Prostitution 
during the Sukamo R<gime: A Commentnry, pub. 25 April), and M-Zen Rahman, 'Sebualr Tanggapan 
tcntang P"/atjuran lntelektuil di Zaman Re.rim Sockarno' (A Commentary on !ntell<-ctu:! ProSlitution 
during tl1e Sukamo Regime, pub. 26 April). 
24 Ampcra was a popular Suk.amo slogan ns the acronym of Amana/ PcndcritaaiJ Rakyal (Message of the 
People's Suffering). The flTStAmpcra Cabinet (July 1966-0etober 1967) was led by Sukamo. 
15 The military proportion of this cabinet was nine of 23 ministers. Civilian tcclmocrats nssumed 8 
ministries with 3 of thr.m deriving from the Christian communities (Drs. Frans Seda as the Minister of 
Finance, Prof. G. A. Siwabessy "'· the Minister of Hea!lh, nnd Dr. A. M. Tnmbuntn, S.H. as tl1e Minister 
of Social Affairs). Some 4 ministe1~ derived from independent political figures andjoumalists (Sri Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX as the State Minister of Economic and Finance, Sanusi Hardjadinal:l ns tho 
Minister of Education and Colturc, Adam Malik us the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and B. M. Diah ns tl1e 
Minislci ofJnformalion). At this juncture, there remained two rcptesentatives of the traditionalist Muslim 
community (K. H. ldham Kh•li1 a.s 'be State Minister of Social Welfare witl1out portfolio and K. H. 
Mohamad DachJan as the Mini ;:cr uf'teligious Affairs). Surprisingly, the modernist-cum-the Afasjumi's 
intellectuals who had become •.11~~ i"'.!dtnry's main partner in cracking down on the PKI and Sukamo 
regime had no single reprec;entntivc in the cabincL 
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popularise the term 'moda•nisasi' (modernisation) side by side with the term 
'pambangunan' (development). Scholars and journalists engaged in this discourse. On 
6-9 May 1966, KAMI and KAPPI in cooperation with the economic faculty of the UI 
(FE-U!) held a symposium under the title Kabnngkita11 Scma11pat 1966: Mandjaladjalz 
Tracee /Jaru (The Rise of the Spirit of 1966: In quest of a 11.- ·: • Plan). Among other 
things, this Sym)!.:-sium criticised the primacy ofSukarno's 'pck:c•·in command' for its 
failure to address the socio-economic problems of the nation. Then, from July until 
December 1966 a prominent Indonesian journalist, Rosihan Anwar, wrote a series of 
articles on modernisation in Kompai7 which stimulated a flood of publications on the 
same issue. Discourses on the will to maintain econr;mic growth and political stability 
provided the military elite with a raison d'atra to pl~y a leading role in politics. Thus, 
these new intellectual themes gnin~d strong support from the military officers. 
The military conviction about the importance of the new agenda, 'economy-in-
command', gained scientific justification from academic intellectuals. During the final 
years of the Sukarno regime a group of economists from the UI, including Widjojo 
Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, M. Sadli, Emil Salim and Subroto, had given lectures on the 
economy at the Army Staff and Command School, Sckolalz Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Darat (Saskoad). Among the senior arnty officers who had attended the eight-
month Scskoad course was General Suharto. It is from this course that he obtained his 
basic knowledge of economics (Sadli, 1993: 39) . .o\s the Sukarno regime began 
crumbling, these economists began to openly criticise Sukamo's ecOII"mic policies and 
published their thinking in a special book in November 1965. Following oJn from this 
criticism, on 25-31 August 1966 the Army held a seminar giving the same group of 
economic professors an opportunity to elaborate their economic theories, which later 
metamorphosed into an economic blue-print for the New Order. Henceforth, 
'pambangrman' (modernisation) and 'stability' became the dominant discourse in the 
public sphere. 
From September 1966, Suharto (now General), in his capacity as the appointed 
chair of the presidium for all practical purposes in charge of the government, appointed 
"'For the etymology and genealogy of the term, see chapter l. 
27 Anwar's ar:iclcs in Kompas were 'Tanggung· cljawab kila cia/am modemisasJ ', 'Our responsibility in 
modernisation' (4-5 July), 'lnteligensia & Modcmisasi', 'Intelligentsia and Modernisation' (12 August), 
'Modemisasi, waklu dan kcrdja ', 'Modernisation, time and work' (29 Augwt), 'Afodernisasi & Agama ', 
'Modernisation and Religion' (14 September), 'Modcmisasi & Nilai', 'Modernisation & Values' (30 
November), 'Modcmisasi & Pcndlclikan ', 'Modernisation&: Education' (8 De.:omb<r). 
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a 'Team of Experts in the Fidd of Economics and Finance'. This team was comprised 
of the aforementioned five economists from the UI and coordinated by the late Major-
General Sudjono Humardani, an aide to Suharto.l5 The decisive role of this economic 
team in formulating the New Order's economic orthodoxy marked the ascendancy of 
the so-called 'economic technocrats'. They were largely comprised of PSI-type 
economists from the UJ who came to be known as the 'Berkeley Mafia', as several of 
them, including their leader Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, had pursued thrir 
postgraduate study at the University of California at Berkeley. The principal supporters . 
of this mafia were its Christian counter,Jarts, incll!ding Frans Seda, Radius Prawiro, and 
J. B. Sum:irlin. 
The pre-eminence of the5e economic technocrats cannot be isolated from a 
conducive environment. The implementation of their economic policies was made 
possible by the full support and confidence of Suharto, the guarantee of political 
stability, the strong support of multinJtional organizations, including Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (JGGI, the international aid consortium chaired by 
the Netherlands, est. 1967), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, plus the profits which came from the world oil boom of I 973-81. 
With the combination of effective econr.mic management, a supportive 
environment and political stability, Indonesian economic development soon became a 
fairytale story of success. By the late I 960s price stability had been achieved, and the 
Indonesian economy began to experience an unprecedented rapid growth, which was 
sustained for the next three decades. Throughout I %5-1996 the Indonesian Gross 
National Product (GNP) grew steadily at an average annual rate of 6.7%?9 The 
economic growth that Indonesia experienced during this period transformed the country 
from being a so-called economic 'basket case', which was poorer even than other 
Southeast Asian countries, into a 'Newly Industrialising Economy' (N!E). In 1993 the 
World Bank, in its famous but controversial report on the 'East Asian Miracle', 
" The first task of this team was to draw up a Program for Stabilisation and Rehabilitation, which was 
incorporated in Decree no. 23 of the MPRS. Based on this Decree the guidelines for Indonesia's 
· economic recovery were set out on 3 October, 'specifically p111icies on a balanced budget, the b:tbnce of 
payments, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, food production and agricultural developtnent'(Thee 
2002: 196). . 
29 By the early 1990s, the real Gross Dom<stic Product (GDP) had expanded by over 450 per cent, and 
per capita GNP had reached nlmost S 1000. Rice yields hod almost doubled, nnd production of most food 
crops had increased substantially. Rupid industrial growth transfonned Indonesia from nn economy highly 
dependent on agriculture in the mid· I 960s to cne in which the monufacturing sector contributed more to 
GDP than ngriculture in tlte mid-1990s. 
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classified Indonesia as on<: of the '!ugh pcrfonning Asian economics' (Hill & Mackie 
1994: xix; Thee 2002: 196-8). 
Alongside this economic development, Indonesian social structure undcf'• < .: a 
dramatic change. A successful family planning program reduced population g11.>wth 
from an average of 2.4% in the period 1965-1980 to an average of 1.8% in 1980-1996 
(World Bank 1998: 43). The poverty rate decreased considerably from 70% at the end 
of the 1960s to 27% in the middle of the 1990s. The proportion of Indonesia's 
population living in urban areas rose from 17% in 1971 to 31% in 1990. The share of 
professional, managerial and clerical occupations rose from 5.7% in 1971 to 8.8% in 
1990 (Hull & Jones 1994: 123-78). Beginning in the 1980s, sustained economic growth 
had given rise to the unprecedented accumulation of private capital. Vast private 
commercial conglomerates emerged, many owned by Sino-Indoncsians and a few by 
client indigenous bourgeoisie, all possessing high-level political connections (Hill & 
Mackie 1994: xxv). All these tremendous socio-economic achievements had their costs. 
The greatest cost was the sacrifice of political freedom. With the economy being in 
command, the role of politics was reduced to simply maintaining national stability. 
To strengthen his basis of socio-political legitimacy (domestically and 
internationally) in the early years of the New Order, Suharto recruited to his cause 
prominent civilian intellectuals who had an immense popular stature. Two particularly 
impo!1ant ones were Sri Sultan Hamcngkubuwono IX (the Sultan of Yogyakarta who 
was influential among the Central Javanese) and Adam Malik (a famous pcmocda figure 
during the revolution who had an established reputation in diplomacy and international 
affairs). Hamengkubuwono IX first became Suharto's Coordinating Minister for 
Economy and Industry (1966-1973) and the!l became the first of Suharto's Vice 
Presidents (1973-1978). Adam Malik first became Suharto's Minister for Politics and 
Foreign Affairs (1966-1978) and then replaced Hamengkubuwono as the Vi~c President 
(1978-1983). 
To guarantee national stability for the sake of economic modernisation, the 
military made itself the principal power broker of New Order politics30 supported by 
30 Already in Su!1artc..'s interim cabinet, Kubiuct Ampcra yang Discmpurnaka11 (the Revised Ampcra 
Cabinet, It Octob<r t967-6 June 1968) the military assumed eight out oftwenty·three ministers, which 
was the largest portion compared to representatives of otl1er political groups. Furtb:more, the sphere of 
influence of the civilian ministers was furtl1er limited by the appointment of anny officers to high 
positions in the civil service. As Harold Crouch noted (t978: 242): 'Oftl1e twenty departments concerned 
with civilian affairs in 1966, army officers held the position of secretary general in ten and n naval officer 
. was appointed in :mother. or the sixty-four directors-generals appointed at llle same time, fiflcen werr. 
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civilian 'technocrats'. At the nerve centre of the polity, President Suharto took C(ln!rol 
ow·• key political and cconvmic resources. To guarantee the personal loyalty of key 
sections of the political elite, he selected a group of army officers who enjoyed his 
confidence, and with whom he had worked in earlier postings, to play a decisive role in 
policy dccisions.3t Although this favoured circle was factionaliscd with various 
particularistic tics, interests and rivalrics,32 members of this inner circle were unified in 
their subservience to the President. 
A crucial component of Suharto's structure of patronage was his creation of a 
small team of personal staff (Staf Pribadi, Spri) headed by Maj.-Gen. Alamsjah 
P•awirancgara.33 In response to growing public criticism, the Spri was dissolved in late 
1968. As a replacement, Suharto created another smaller 'kitchen cabinet' called ASP~! 
am1y officers and eight were from the other three services.' 1l1e dominant position of Anny officers in 
the central gowmment was followed by a similar phenomenon in regional at!ministration. At the 
beginning of 1966, twelve out of twenty-four provincial governors were military officers. Next, aner the 
1971 elections, the military officers assumed twenty-two out oft\itenty-six govemorships (Crouch 1978: 
244). In Suhano's Kablnct Pcmbangrmgan IV (1983-88), ou; of' tl1iny-seven ministers, founeen had 
military backgrounds. At the same time, about half of sub-cabhn:t p~c:;itions such as sccrttarics-general, 
directors-general, and inspectors-s.:neral were held by seconded officers, and about lhree-quarters or the 
twenty-seven govemorships and a small majority of district headship!= were occupied by the armed forces 
(Liddle 1996b: 19). 
" At the very beginning, Lct.-Gen. Panggabean (b. 1922, a Protestant), and Maj.-Gcn. Basuki Rachmat 
(Javanese-abangan) exercised great influence on political decisions, In addition, Maj.-Gen. lbnu Sutowo, 
Brig.-Gcn. Suhardiman (both Javancsc-abanga11), and Brig.-Gen. Achmad Tinosudiro (fom1er HMI 
leader) enjoyed Sultarto's trust to take control respectively over Indonesia's oil and main export 
conunoditics, lhc giant trading corporation, PT. Derdikari, and the newly established National Logistics 
Board (Bulog). 
J21l1e existence of this favoured inner circl;: caused not only envy and jealousy among those outside the 
inner circle but also internal conflicts within the circle. At :.he very beginning there emerged a severe 
tension between Alamsjah versus Ali Munopo and Sudjono Humardhani. As Munopo (Javanese 
Catholic) and Humardhani (Javanese-abangan) preferred to build collaborations with Christian and 
secular inte11ectuals, Alamsjah (descendant of a santrl family) was forced to defend Islamic interests, 
though he himself was anti-lslamisnt Suhano attempted to maintain the balance of power between his 
loyalists. With Munopo and llumardhani being appointed (key) members of the ASPRI, Ala~nsjah was 
given a new task us lhc office head of the State Secretariat. In the end, however, the Murtopo-
lbmardhani axis won the competition when Alamsjah was appointed Indonesian ambassador for the 
Netl1erlands. The powerful competitive advantage of Munopo derived from his control over the 
intelligence offices, while Humardhani's from his control over financial resources includin~ the task of 
finding and developing off-budget sources of income for the new regime. 
n Members of the team were allocated fields of responsibility such as finance, politics. inte11igencc, socicl 
welfare, and other non-military affairs. At the time of its formation in August 1966 tlte Spri consisted of 
six anny officers supported by two teams of civilian !ipecialists. Tite two civilian teams were responsible 
for providing ad vic~~ in the fields of economic poli1..y and politics. The economic 1cam consisted of the 
fi\..: a: • .:mbers of the 'Berkeley Mafia' (Widjojo Nitisastro, Sadli, Ali \Vardhana, Emil Salim, and 
Subroto) plus a prominent PSI figure and ceonomis~ Sumitro Djojohadiknsumo. TI1e politics team 
consisted of Sarbini Sumawinata (PSI figure), Fuad llnssan (PSI sympathiser), Deliar Noer (former HMI 
leader) and some otl1crs. By !968 members oftl1e Sprl had become twelve and it was widely considered 
as an 'invisible kitchen cabinet'. The twelve were Alnmsjab Prnwiranegara (coordinator). Sudjono 
Humardhani (economy), Ali Munopo (foreign intelligence), Yoga Sugama (domestic intelligence), Surjo 
(finance), Abdul Kndir (social welfare), Slamet Danudirdjo (Economic development), Nawawi Alif(mass 
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(Asiste11 Pribadi, Personal Assistants) with Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani as 
key figures (Crouch 1978: 243-4; Mas'ocd 1983: 31). Murtopo's group of ASPRi-
intclligcnce officers formed a strategic alliance with officers in the Murtopo-lcd Special 
Operation intelligence agency (Opsus)/4 with those in the State Intelligence 
Coordinating Body (Baki11l5 and with the office of the Operations Command to Restore 
Security and Order (Kopkambtib). J6 The latter was the most oppressive security regime, 
interfering in the activities of every organization and arresting people at will with 
allegations of subversion. The axis of ASPRI and the upper echelons of Opsus, Baki11 
and Kopkamtib was a vertically shaped structure of patronage which played a decisive 
role in shaping the political architecture of the New Order. 
Policy-making by the New Order was techno-bureaucratic in nature, in contrast 
to that which requires a long process of bargaining among various political parties and 
interest groups. This was made possible by the government imposition of political 
mechanisms and infrastructure. Prior to the general election in July 1971, political rules 
and infrastructure for securing the regime had been ~c::ied. On 22 November 1969, the 
Indonesian provisional parliament (DPR-GR) passed a law on general elections and the 
composition of the new parliament (DPR), legalising President Suharto's rights of 
appointment to legislatures and the allocation of 100 of 450 scats in the DPR to 
members of the armed forces. 
The government also made every effort to paralyse the established political 
parties through intervention policies in order to isolate their influential leaders and to 
media), Sudharmono (general), Sunarso (politics), Isman (mass movements), Jusuf Singodikone (notionol 
l'Jojects). 
From I 968 Muttopo rcfbed and cxponded the existing Opsus (Special Operations) opporatus, 
demonstrating his special skill in recruiting a network of info11t13l civilian intelligence gatherers. 
35 Estoblished in 1967, the initio! heod of Bokin wos Generol Sudirgo ossisted by Ali Murtopo as the 
deputy heod. In I968 Sudirgo wos reploeed I968 by Moj.·Gen. Yngo Sugamo who hod o close 
relotionship with Murtopo's group. 
"It wos initiolly hooded by Suhorto from I965 with tl1c pUIJlOSe of tracking down PKI supporters. In its 
operations, Kopkamtib was ossisted by Bakin. In I 969 the heod of Kopkamtib wos transferred to tl1e 
newly oppointcd deputy commander of the armed forces, General Panggobcan (Batok-Christian). Under 
his conunand, it soon became the regime's 111ilin po1itical control involving army conun:mders at various 
levels of the military hierarchy to take actions against perceived threats to security. In 1973, the office 
wos headed by the newly appointed Commander of the Armed Forces, General Sumitro (abangan-
professional army), but he was soon dismissed in the wake of the Fifteenth of Januory Affair (Mulari) of 
1974. Shortly aficr, Suhorto himself resumed command of the office, with Admiral Sudomo (Javanese-
Protestant) as chief of staff. Under Sudomo's comm:1nd, Kopkamtib became the most feared and 
oppressive agency of the regime, interfering in the activities of every organization and arresting people nt 
will on charges of subversion. 
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secure compliant leadership in the parties.37 More importantly, prior to the election it 
had also prepared its own 'gold car' as a new political vehicle to win the elections, 
namely, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber-Golkar), that from 17 
August 1971 came to be known as Go/ongan Karya (Golkar, Functional Group).38 
Murtopo 'hijacked' the old Sckber-Golkar and gave it a new mission. He then 
recruited a committee known as Bapilu (The Body to Manage the General Elections), 
consisting largely of young intellectuals from his Catholic, aba11gan-Javancse, and 
secular-socialist networks, which would become the embryo of Golkar's intellectual 
organ.39 The committee devised numerous strategies to cripple the electoral support of 
the parties and embellish that of Go/kar.40 By these means as well as crooked vote 
counting,<1 Golkar scored an overwhelming victory in the 1971 election42 and continued 
to be the only ruling majority for nearly three decades. 
17 The regime made an attempt to refom1 the PNI leadership by appointing lladisubeno, S\dl3rto's old 
friend during his posting in the Diponegoro division, as the new chairman of the party. In the meantime, 
it refused Muslims' demand for the rehabilitation of the Masjuml party, though it promoted the 
cstab1ishment of a new Muslim party, Pammsi, with the exclusion of prominent leaders of the hfasjumi 
from the party lcadmhip. 
31 Suharto's plan for Golkar was initially to find a special place in Indonesian politics for flmctional 
groups with a capacity to stabilise the political system against the possibility of party rlominance. The 
existence of the so.called Sekber-Golkar since 1964, which had already some 92 repr.:sentatives in the 
DPR·GR, inspired him to tronsform this military.civilian partnership body into the structure of a st:1te 
party without party politicians. TI1e mandate to realise this ambition in a period of less than two yezrs, 
was entrusted to his enthusiast assistants, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono J-lumardhani. 
" According to Kenneth Ward (1974: 35-6), there were three groups or intellectuals surrounding Ali 
Murtopo who playl!d a decisive role in the fomution ofGolkar. TI1c first was the Catholtl! (Tanah A bang} 
group, consisting of Lim Dian Kic (Jusur Wanandi), Litn Bian Khocn (Sofjan Wanandi), Harry Tjan 
Silalahi and Mocrdopo. The second was the aba11ga11 (Gadjah Mada) group, consisting oi Sumisk'Un, 
Sulistyo, Sugiharto, Sukamo and Suroso. l11c third was the socialist (Dandung) group, consisting of 
Rachman Tollcng and Midian Sirait. All groups had a common ground in their antipathy towuds (large) 
political parties and the rise of Islam and in their preference for the military's leading role in the 
modernisation project. 
"R. E. Elson (200t: 187) rightly noted Bapilu's slr.ltcgics as follows: 'First, the effort wauld be made to 
construct an ideology based on non-ideological themes: development, stability, order, unity .... Second, 
Golkar would simply use its access to government largesse to buy itself positions by c::tablishing itsclfa 
patronage·dispensing apparotus .... Third, it would usc its access to political power to tum matters to its 
advantage.' -
41 Golkar's government and military sponsorship made it easier to mobilise political resources. TI1e 
minister for home affairs, Let.- GctL Amir Maclunud (Suharto's right· hand man behind the Supersemar), 
was determined th:i.t his department, through the association of its employees (Kok.1rmendagri), would 
become the backbone or the Golknr. He introduced regulations in t969 and 1970 which respectively 
prevented Golkar rcpr.:scntatives in rcgion:tl and local assemblies from having any p:1rty affiliation and 
disallowed military personnel and civilian Defence Department employees, as well as judges and public 
persecutors, from membership of parties. In approaching the clel!tion, civil servants were pressed to sign 
statements of •monoloyalty' to the government, implying support for the Golkar. At the same time, the 
minister together with the chief of the Election Commission's Logistics and Supplied Do:ud, Ali 
Murtopo, placed heavy pressure upon local government officials to secure special "quotas" of the vote to 
be mobilised for the Golkar in their districts. 1l1c Gollmr identification wiU1 both the armed ron:es and the 
government also facilitated election fund·rising and strong·nrm tactics. With an l'.bundnnce of election 
funds, attempts were made to woo influential ~J'al by financing overseas tours and providing funds for 
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Furthem10re, to divert the people's and parties' attention from ideo-political 
passions into New Order modernization projects, participation in politics was restricted 
1 
and the masses, including educated people, were depoliticiscd. In January 1973, the nine 
existing parties were forced to fuse into two composite programmatic partics.43 The 
fusion of parties reduced the arena of conflict but intensified internal conflicts among 
parties. Elements within the parties competed with each to promote their candidates to 
be appointed as the party's representatives in the parliament. As a result, the two 
composite parties were crippled by perennial intra-party divisions. After the 1971 
election, the government introduced the so-called 'floating mass' (masa mengambang) 
concept which prohibited people at the grass-roots level from involvement in party 
activities. Actively using Opsus, Kopkamtib, Bakin, and the Anny structural command 
to intervene in civilian political affairs, this concept was actualised as a means of 
prohibiting the parties' operation in the villages and mobilising villagers to vote for 
Golkar. 
The depolicisation of the academic world becume more obvious from the late 
I 970s. After a series of student demonstrations during 1974-1978, protesting against the 
deepening penetration of foreign investors, Sino-Indonesian financiers and government 
officials as well as Suharto's family in business activities, the Kopkamtib responded in 
January 1978 by disbanding all university student councils (clewa11 mahasiswa). 
Afterwards, student politics was regarded as an 'abnonnal'. To 'nonnalise' academic 
life, Ali Murtopo's right-hand man in the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
their pe.santre11. An institutional arrangement to mobilise lyai' support w:ts made in January 1971 through 
the reviving of the more-or-less moribund Association to Improve Islamic Education (GUPPI) under the 
patronage of Sudjono H!.lmardhani. Tite military's direct pressure on voters was also evident, espccia11y in 
the villages and in pressing fanner PKI mcmbl!rs and associates to vote for Golkar. 
" lr. the 1971 election Golkar won 62.80 percent of tl1c votes and 236 of tl1c elected seats, way above tl1c 
accumulated votes and seats generated by the other nine parties (PNI, NU, Pannusi, PSII, Parkindo, 
Partai Katholik, Pcrli, Murba, and iPKI). TI1c PNI and Parmusi (the heir to the Masjunu), the two 
leading parties with respectively winning 22.3 and 20.9 percent in the 1955 elections, suffered a serious 
decline winning only 6.9 and 5.4 percent respectively. TI1c only party to withstand the Golkar onslaught 
was tl1c NU. Its vote percentage even slightly hcreased from 18.4 percent in 1955 to 18.7 percent in 
1971. 
" The four ~xisting Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Pcrti) were merged into the United 
Development Party (PPP), representing the spiritual dimension of development. The five non-Islamic 
parties (PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkimlo, and Partai Katholik) were fused into the Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PD1), representing the nationnl-'l'atr:rial dimension of development. In early versions, Christian 
parties (Parkindo and Partal Katlw/ik) actually belonged to the 'spiritual' group. But tl1cy refused to 
merge into this group and chose to join t1te 'national' group. Alongside the two groups, titer.: was Golkar, 
which never claimed to he a political party, but rather n representation of t1tc 'functional' dimension of 
development. 
Chapter 5 · 71!11 New Order's RC'prcssh'C·Dc~or.lopmr.ntallsm 330 
(CSIS, est. 1971),44 Daud Jusuf, was appointed the new Minister of Education and 
Culture ( 1978-1983). Under his repressive policy, academic fora and student 
organizations were soon dcpolitieiscd through a policy known ru; 'normalisasi 
kelritlupan kampus' (the 'normalization' of the campus life). Thus, as student numbers 
grew exponentially, the fifth generation of the Indonesian intelligentsia (largely born in 
the 1950sl1960s) was rendered powerless politically. For this generation, academic fora, 
student organizations, publications, discussion groups and religious r.lubs were strictly 
controlled by the security apparatus. 
A systematic effort to maintain the hegemony of the state over the public 
conscience was carried out through the imposition of the state ideology. The 'abstract' 
ideology of the New Order was the official monolithic version of Pancasila as the sole 
legitimate political ideology, while the 'concrete' ideology which guided day by day 
social action and policy-making was developmcntalism. This ideology was a 
technocratic ideology idealising values of efficiency, effectiveness, harmony, con~cnsus 
and stability as prerequisites of economic growth. From 1978 the regime began to 
conduct a massive indoctrination campaign of official and monolithic interpretations of 
Pancasila known as P4 (Pctloman Pcng/rayatan clan Pcngamalan Pmrcasila, Guide for 
the Intemalisation and implementation of Pmrcasila). In a more excessive and thorough 
way than the indoctrination of the Manipo/-USDEK during the Old Order, P4 was 
applied not only at all levels of education and government but also forced on many 
social communities. Furthermore, the regime between 1982/1983 insisted that Pancasila 
" The CSIS was established by Chinese·Catholie intellectuals in collaboration with other Catholic and 
secular intellectuals under the patronage of Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Hurnardhani. Most of these 
Catholic·Chinese intellectuals, including the two brothers Lim Dian Kie (Iusuf Wanandi) and Lim Diun 
Khoen (Sofjan Wanandi), were fanner activists of PMKRI who showed in Elson's words •a passionate 
anti--communism and vigorous opposition to any tlueat of Muslim polhical ascendancy with the fierce 
personal discipline and unflinching corporatist ideas imparted to them by their mentor, the Jesuit priest Fr 
Iopie Deck' (Elson, 2001: 146). According to Abdurralunan Wahid (1992), leadm of the Catholic 
community during the early period of the New Order were actually divided as to how to handle Catholic 
relations with the state and Islamic community: sotm' supported the theory of minus malum, others 
favot.red that of mayos bomrum. According to the fanner, SU!)ported by Ali Murtopo's group, of two 
harmfulthin!?Jl the lesser is more favourable. TI1Us, in facing the dilemma of whether to choose the green 
oftl1e military or the green oflslam ('green' is identified as the colour of both groups) it was preferable to 
choose the military, on the grounds it was easier to use as a tool for marginalizing political Islam. But 
according to the latter, the Catholic conununity was not supposed to pit the military ngainst Islam, 
because its reverse impact would be to the detriment of Catholic interests. As altematlve strategy was: 
whoever/whatever brings advantage to Catholic interests is considered as friend. Those associated with 
tllis strategy were Chris Siner Keytimu, Eko Tjokrodjujo, Jakob Utarna, Mangunwidjaja, John Titely, 
Einar Sitompul, Nababan, and Frans Magnis Suseno. 1ltis strategy was, however, overshadowed by the 
hegemonic influence oftl1e former. For comparisons, see Dhakidae (2003: 615-6). 
Cllapler 5- Tltc New Order's Rcprcssh'C-Dcw:/opmcnlalism 331 
be proclaimed the sole philosophical basis (azas tu11gga/) of political parties and all 
other socio-political organizations. 
To curb opposition, the regime exercised a combination of state-corporalism45 
and repressive measures. Beyond the corporatisation of political parties, at the end of 
1971, the government began to create a single organization to cater for all government 
employees known as Korpri (Civil Servants Professional Association). The FBSI (All 
Indonesian Workers' Federation) was ~~'.nblished in February 1973 under the direction 
of the Manpower Minister as a sing!~ anion organization to embrace the needs of 
all workers. Soon similar associations emerged in a variety of social sectors.46 
Alongside state-corporatism, repressive measures were applied to inhibit criticism and 
resistance movements. This was especially evident in the violation of press and 
academic freedom and of the rights to speech, to assembly and io demonstration. 
Throughout the New Order, thousands of people were arrested, hundreds of them 
imprisoned with or without trial, and no less than 28 newspapers and magazines were 
banned_47 
Last but not least, the regime deliberately promoted the politics of language in 
order to maintair "1 .. -.Jlogical conformity to an extent that is well depicted in Evert 
" The tenn corporatism is explained by Philippe C. Schmitter as follows (1974: 93-4): 'A system of 
interest representation in which the constituent units nrc organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and grnnted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders 
and articulation of demands and support.' 
"The Cooperative Fanners Association (HKTI) and the All-Indonesia Fishers' Association (HNSI) were 
respectively established in April and July 1973.1n July 1975 the government promoted the establishment 
of a single ulama representative body: MUI (tl1e Ulama Council of Indonesia). In different functional 
categories tl1crc could also be found Kadin (the Chamber of Commerce and Industry) as tl1e 
representative body of business, PORI (Indonesian Teacher's Union) as tl1al of teachers, KOWANI 
(Indonesian Women's Corps) as that of women, KNPI (the National Committee oflndonesian Youths) as 
that of youth groups, PWI (Indonesian Journalist Association) as that of journalists, and so forth. 
"
7 There had been a striking disparity between the legal basis for domestic press opemtions and what 
happened in practice. Altl10ugh Indonesia's Press Act of 1966 declares that 'no censorship or muzzling 
shall be applied to the National Press' (section 2, article 4), and that 'freedom of the Press is guaranteed in 
accordance with the fundamental rights of citizens' (article 5.1) and that 'no publication permit is needed' 
(chapter 4, article 8.2), the reality was that during an unspecified 'transitional period' (applied until the 
end of the New Order) two related permits had to be obtained by newspaper publishers: tl1e penni! to 
publish, from the ostensibly civil Department of lnfonnation, and the permit to print, from the military 
security authority (Kopknmtib/Laksus). The official doctrine stated that the Indonesian press was 'free but 
responsible'. And under the elastic precept of 'responsibility' the state gained the rationale purposefully 
to control media content and language. Journalists and critics laboured under the constant threat of 
censorship, bans and arrest (Sen and Hill, 2000). In tl1e aftcnnalh of the so-called Malari Affair of 
January 1974, 12 publications were banned including Mocln.!r Lubis's Indonesia Raya. Next in the 
aftennath of nnti-govemmcnl students protests of January 1978, seven Jakarta dailies plus seven student 
publications were banned. TI1is would be followed by tl1e banning of several otl1cr publications in the 
following decades. 
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Vcdung's phrase (1982: 131): 'Manipulation of language occurs in political contexts in. 
all countries, but the dictatorships tend to be particularly systematic in these 
machinations.'48 Indonesian oublic discourse was coloured by the usc of ideologically 
laden language. Euphemism was excessively used as a defensive mechanism to hide the 
government's responsibility for its failures and oppressions, while dysphemism was 
used as an offensive mechanism to curb dissidents by discrediting critical voices as 
terrorism of the 'extreme left' (ckstrcm kiri) and 'extreme right' (ckstrcm ka11a11)!9 
In the absence of the PKI, the first victim of this repressive regime was political 
Islam. The 'extreme right', so to speak, became the scapegoat for past political disorder. 
As a signal of the new political order, political Islam was marginalised from the formal 
political arena. 
5.3 The Impasse of Political Islam 
The New Order regime moved further in continuing the project of 
dcconfcssionalising the political arena. Although Islamic groups provided critical 
support for the· anny in dismantling the Old Order, the New Order's actions over the 
ensuing two decades did not allow Islamic involvement in the cx~rcisc of stat.: power. 
Once it had consolidated its power, the new regime sci about systematically neutrnlising 
Islam as a basis for political und icgal mobilisation and increasing bureaucratic leverage 
over IslamfQ 
Acknowledging their major contribution as the main Army's partners in the 
er;.Jication of communism, Islamic groups welcomed the rise of the new regime with 
jubilation. The New Order's release of former Masjumi leaders from their imprisonment 
raised the hopes of its fom1er members and sympathiscrs for the rehabilitation and 
fulfilment of their political rights. 51 
" President Sulurto slated in his Independence Day address of 1973: 'Corrrct and orderly language 
reOects a way of thinking, attitudes, and behaviour which are also corre~.:t and orderly. And this 
orderliness is the main key for the success of the creation and development of the nation' (Quoted in 
Hooker, 1995: 272). In fact, what is defined as correct and orderly language is language lhal is fully 
subordinated lo the Stale's politics of meaning. Even if people used 'correct' language, ifil was used to 
criticise the government, that language cOuld be seen as 'incorrect' lar.gllllge. 
" For an elaborate discussion of language and power in the New Order period, see Y. Latif and I.S. 
lbrahim(l996). 
50 For a further discussion of the New Order's efforts to deconfessionalise the Indonesian legal basis, sec 
M. Cammarek (1997). 
" Already on 16 December 196~. a 'Coordinating Dody of Muslim Activities' (Badon Koordinasl A mal 
Mrislim) was formed, uniting 161slamic c:ganizalions which wanted lo work towards a rehabilitation of 
lhe Masjumi. In a service of tlranksgivinr, (lasyakkur) for tl1e gradual release of last Muslim political 
prisoners, which was conducted in the well-known Al-Azhar mosque (Jakarta) on 14 August 1966, 
---·-·-·-- -· -- ----- -
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To boost their own political chances, all Islamic groups that had joined th:: 
Sekber-Go/kar in the late years of the Sukamo era withdrew from this organization.52 
Because of this withdrawal, Islamic groups for a long period lost the opportuni:y to en-
steer Golkar from within and lcfi an uncontested space for their secular (abangan, 
Christian, and socialist) counterparts to dominate the government's political machine. 53 
In fact, thz new regime was not interested in sharing power with influential 
leaders of political Islam. The Army's bitter experiences in facing Islamic-inspired 
political resistance coupled with the pre-eminence of the abmtgan and non-Islamic 
lobbies in policy decisions of the new regime gave rise to a political climate that was 
unsympathetic to the revival of political Islam. Army officers who showed their 
sympathy towards Islam were subject to exclusion from the elite circle. Consequently, 
political Islam had to face the reality that the transformation of the public sphere from 
the Old to the New Order was fairly similar to the transition from the Dutch to Japanese 
occupation, as depicted in the Indonesian proverb 'exit from the mouth oftbe crocodile, 
to enter into the mouth of the tiger'. The new regime went much further in some ways 
towards restricting the political and social role of Islam than its predecessor had dared. 
The efforts of Muslim leaders to seck government recognition for the 
rehabilitation of Masjumi were not viewed with sympathy by the majority of the New 
Order's lea~ers. In reply to a letter from the last 1\fasjumi chairman, Prawoto 
Mangkusasmita, in January 1967, Suharto concluded: 'Legal, political, and 
psychological factors have led the armed forces to the opinion that the armed forces 
cannot accept the rehabilitation of the former political party, llfasjumi.' 54 As 
compensation, in May 1967 Suharto allowed the formation of a new party based on 
fanner top leadl!rs of the Masjumi with about 50,000 eye-witnesses called on the new regime to 
rehabilitate Islam alier its oppression in the times Umt lmd possed (Boland 1971: 148). 
" These Muslim organiutions were Muhammadiyah, AI-Djamiatul IVasliyah, Gasbindo, Nahdlatu/ 
IVathan, Nahd/atul Anwar, SNII, KB/M, Persat11an Umat Islam (PU/), Porbisi, /ISB/, PIT/, Al-/rsyad, 
and Wanita Islam (DPP Golkar, 1994: 102). The deciston of Muslim organiutions to withdraw from 
Golkar would be described by the late Lukmon Harun (a Mui.amnradirah leader) as 'the biggest political 
mistake the Muslims had ever made in Ute New Order era'. Interview wiUt the late Lukman Harun 
poto9/1998). 
3 In October 1969 the religious representative body (KINO-Keugamaan) disappeared from the Sekber-
Ga/kar. Aller Ute elections of Ute 1971; Catholic and Christian intelligentsia (such as Jusuf Wanandi, 
Cosmas Ilatubara, and David Napitupulu), sodalist intelligentsia (such us Rahman Tolleng and Midian 
Sirait), and abangan intelligentsia (such Sukijat and Pitut Suharto) held strategic positions in Ute military-
led central executive board ofGolkar of the 1973n8 period. It was not until Ute 1983/1988 period that a 
few of the Muslim intelligentsia (mostly from HMI backgrounds), such ns K.II. Tannudji, Akbar 
Tan~jung, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang Adenansi, and Qudratullah, were included among Ute 42 members of 
Golkar's central executive board (DPP-Golkar 1994: 102, 165·68). 
"Quoted in Solihin Salam (1970: 69-70), and H. Crouch (1988: 260) 
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mass organizations in the Masjumi stream, but did not penni! influential Masjumi 
leaders to lead the party. 
Aller negotiations that resulted in the appointment ofDjamawi Hadikusumo and 
Lukman Harun (both of the Multammadiyalt) as the chainnan and secretary general for 
the new party, in March 1968 the government accepted the establishment of this 
substitute party, known as Partai Muslimi11 llldo11csia (Parmusi). Because all influential 
figures of the Ma~j'iiltti had been excluded, delegates of the party's first congress held in 
November 1968 decided to elect Mohamad Roem, a senior but moderate leader of the 
Masjumi, as the general chaimmn of the Parmusi. Out of respect for the old Masjumi 
leaders, Hadikusumo and Harun agreed with the idea, but the government refused to 
agree to any arrangement to replace the leadership. Suddenly on 17 October 1970, one 
of the government-sponsored Parmusi functionaries, Djaelnni Naro (Ali Murtopo's 
original nominee for the chainnan of the party), announced that he had taken over the 
general chairmanship of the Parmusi. This political manoeuvre ignited disputes both 
within the party and within Suharto's inner circle, as Alamsjah Prawiranegara (the 
coordinator of the State Secretariat) sided with the incumbent Hadikusumo-Harun 
leadership.55 To handle these disputes, Suharto compromised and appointed M. S. 
Mintaredja (a minister of state, and an early leader of the HMI) as the new general 
chairman. 56 
In barring influential leaders of the Masjumi from the political arena, Suharto's 
right-hand-men manufactured the image that the Masjumi leaders were unwilling to 
support the New Order. To refute this story, Mohammad Natsit revealed the untold 
story to Tempo magazine, of how he had supported the regime by voluntarily 
persuading foreign authorities such as the government of Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
and other Arab countries to take a particular course of action to aid, (Jr to rehabilitate 
their relationship with, Indonesia (Tempo, 21/08/1971). Yet the regime remained 
unmoved. As leaders of the New Order continued to obstruct the comeback of Masjumi 
leaders to the political arena, Mohammad Natsir shouted at a meeting of tl1e reformist-
ss In the conflicting relationship between- Alamsjah and Murtopo's Aspri group, Alamsjah tended to side 
with the Islamic comn1un!1y. In r.untinuing disputes among Suharto's inner circle, however, Murtopo's 
group won Suharto's confidence when Alamsjah was rr.ade the Indonesian ambassador for the 
NcU:erlands in early 1970s (Interview wiUtthc late Lukman llarun, 10109/1998). 
56 For further discussion of problems encountered in the establishment of !he Pannus/, see Ward (1970) 
and Salam (1970). 
Cl1aptcr .S ·The New Order's Rcprcssh"C~Dc\'Ciopmclltalism 335 
modernist leaders on I June 1972: 'They have treated us like cats with ringwonn' 
(Quoted in Hassan 1980: 125). The political career of Masjumi leaders was over. 
In addition to the rejection of Masjumi and the exclusion of its leaders from an 
active role in politics, many Muslims were disappointed with the government's strategy 
of 'buying time'. The postponement of the general election schedule from 1968 to 1971 
was damaging for Muslim groups who believed that an early election would guarantee 
favourable re5ults for them. 
Unlike the Masjumi, the outlook for NU was much more favourable. After 
assessing the character of the NU's 'old-guard' leaders, Suharto's advisers concluded 
that it was not a potential danger to the New Order, 'since its habit had always been to 
shape itself to accommodate prevailing winds' (Elson 2001: 185). In the eyes of 
Suharto's advisers, Idham and his colleagues would support Suharto just as they had 
supported Sukarno earlier if they were given status and funds for their religious and 
other activities (Crouch 1988: 264). Thus, NU political interests for a considerable 
period of time remained secure. Influential NU figures as ldham Chalid and Mohammar, 
Dachlan were appointed ministers in the First Development Cabincr. (i968-1973). Until 
the general elections of the 1971, NU also did not serious!y suffer the indignity of 
Opsus intervention in its internal affairs.57 Apart from the NU, the other two Islamic 
parties, PSII and Pcrti, experienced government intervention to n lesser degree than the 
Parmusi, since they were assumed to be minority parties. 
Because of the regime's 'bulldozer' tactics, the ovcral: results for Islamic parties 
in the general elections of the 1971 were very disappointing. The total percentage of all 
Islamic parties was only 27 .I percent. The exclusion of the influential Masjumi leaders 
from Parmusi and government intervention in the party's internal affairs alienated many 
of the traditionalist supporters of refonnist Islamic activism. Consequently, Parmusi, 
the heir to Masjumi which won 20.9 percent in 1955, suffered seriously, winning only 
5.4 percent. Being relatively free from the regime's intervention, the NU's results 
increased slightly from 18.4 percent in 1955 to 18.7 petcent in 1971. The result of the 
other two parties was only 3.0 percent. 
Although Golkar won the elections overwhelmingly (62.8 percent), the regime 
still felt threatened by the slight increase in the NU vote. Shortly afttr the elections, the 
57 This is not to say that NU was fully free frorn government intervention. Accordir.~ to ~1t(g Fr.aly, one 
of the indications of government intervention in NU internal affairs b this period WI s that there WdS n& 
NU Muktamar (national conference) between 1967-t979. Fcaly, p:r.;onal commu•ication (08i04/2004). 
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government began to intervene in NU's internal affairs when two independently minded 
NU leaders, Mohammad Dachlan and Subchan Z. E., became the victims of an Opsus 
move that dumped them from the NU leadership in early 1972. Henceforward, no NU 
leader was appointed to Suhartn's Cabinets. Responding to the new swing against it, at 
the end of 1971 on the occasion of the NU Congress, Idham Chalid as the NU chairman 
called for a return to the spirit (khitah) of 1926, foreshadowing that the NU might soon 
shed its political functions to concentrate on socio-religious activities (Crouch 1988: 
271). 
in January 1973 all existing Islamic parties were squeezed into one, United 
Development Party (PPP). 111is fusion meant to some extent shining the arena of 
conflict from an outer locus cf conflict (inter-parties) to an internal locus of conflict 
(within the party). It was at this tim~ that the govenunent introduced the so-called 
'floating mass' concept, which for Islamic groups meant detaching people's affiliation 
to political Islam. Tl1ese measures were exacerbated by the government's interference 
and intimidation of !he party's activists, especially to secure its preferred leadership to 
guarantee the party's acquiescence in parliament. 
The unpleasant experience of the l'Sll and NU working in a single party (under 
the Masjumi) caused both parties to resi~t the government's idea of political fusion. On 
the oth~r hand, thl1 Parmusi welcomed the idea because of its possible positivi! impact 
on the strengthening of the Islamic brr·therhood (uklmwuh Jslamiyah). This possibility 
also caused many Army officers to disagree with the idea of merging the Islamic 
parties. But despite t:1e ccntrovcrsi~s surrounding the idea, the government insisted and 
the Islamic parties had no choice but to accept the fusion. At the first party Cor.gress in 
1975, agreement was reached to use the framework of federation as an expression of the 
fusion which would guarantee the relative autonomy of individual parties and reflect the 
proportional se&t allocation based on the achievement of each party in the 1971 
elections. In the n•:wly estal!lished PPP, Idham Chalid and Bisri Sjansuri of the NU 
respectively held the position of token President ami the head of Judicial Council of the 
Party, while M. S. Mintaredja of the Parmusi (henceforward called Muslimin Indonesia 
[MI]) became the chairman of the Party's executive board. From the very beginning of 
its establishment, however, the federative structure of this party meant that the four 
parti~s did not truly fuse into a new cohesive political entity. This made the PPP very 
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susceptible to internal rivalries especially in the face of government interference in its 
affairs. 
Under the agreement, the NU theoretically held a leading position in the par.:y, 
:!!"1d this was evident until at least the next 1977 elections-although it did not hold the 
chairnmnship. Even though the government used repressive measures and dirty tactics, 
the PPP still won 29.3 percent of the total vote in the 1977 elections. This was slightly 
better than the total percentage of !~Iamie parties in the 1971 elections. This increase 
along with th~ severe criticism of the party's leaders towards many government policies 
invited further government intervention to isolate the party's vocal leaders and to install 
its preferred leadership in the party. Soon aficr the 1977 elections, the government-
backed Djaelani Naro once again dcchrcd himself a new chairman of the party's 
executive board without the agreement o~ !he party's functionaries, let alone the party 
congress. 
Instigated by Naro, critical activists in tre party, composed largely of the NU 
clements, were removed from the party leadership and gradually forced out of 
parliament. This situation advantaged the MI activists, to the detriment of the NU 
faction. With the party's energy being spent in severe intra-party divisions and rivalries, 
PPP elections result continued to disappoint Islamic communities. The total percentage 
of this party in the 1982 elections decreased by 1.3% (or 28.0% of the total vote). In the 
lead up to the next elections, the NU's political disappointment peaked. This was 
signalled by the decision of this org~nization at its December 1984 Congress to totally 
withdraw from party politics and fully return to the spirit (khitah) of the 1926. This 
would be expressed in concentration on social and educational pursuits. Aficr this 
decision, members of the NU were free to choose their own preferred political vehicles, 
which dealt a strong blow to the PPP. With the absence of the NU support, the PPP's 
election result in 1987 dropped sharply to 16% of the total vote and in the 1992 
elections only increased by 1%. By the 1980s, the PPP 1·•as demoralised and had no 
capacity to articulate Islamic aspirations. 
The powerlessness of the PPP was made worse by the government's deliberate 
strategies designed ·to cripple the intellectual and electoral support of the party and 
strengthened that of Golkar. Through the creation of the Civil Servants Professional 
Association (Korpri) in 1971, the government introduced regulations as well as 
intimidations that prevented civil servants becoming members of the Islamic party. 
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Moreover, the PPP's opportunity tc havC' ;;ignificant influence both in the parliament 
(DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was obstructed by President 
Suharto's entitlement to appoint a signilicant number of the DPR and MPR 
membership. As a result, the PPP's political role was reduced to providing legitimacy 
for government policy. 
' The paralysis of the Islamic party was in contrast to the position of the Javanes~ 
abangan and Christian minority who were over-represented both in the cabine.t and 
parliament for a considerable part of the New Order period. The formation of Suharto's 
cabinets ignored religious representation, and the Christian communities benefited from 
their superior educational qualifications and strong lobbies inside Suharto's inner circle. 
Up until the Fourth Development Cabinet (March 1983-March 1988), the number of 
Christians (Catholic and Protestant) in the Cabinr· steadily increased from three in 
1968/1973, four in 1973/1978, five in 1978/1983, to becom~ six in 1983/1988.58 This in 
tum reflected the powerful influence of Christians in particular government offices. The 
same phenomena prevailed in the compooition of the parliament. Based on data from the 
Indonesian Statistical Bureau, the national average percentage of Catholics and 
Protestants in the population throughout 1971-1987 was respectively 3% and 5.5% of 
the total Indonesian population (Surbakti 1991: 52-94). At the S;•me time, the average 
percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the Parliament was respectively 8.2% and 
9.2% (Karim 1999: 121; Haris 1997: 96).59 Thus, the percentage of Christians in the 
ParHament was greater than their population percentage. By contrast, the average 
percentage of Muslims in the Parliament (80.2%) was below the flVerage percentage of 
the Muslim population (87%).60 
Besides the marginalisation of political Islam, the regime made efforts to 
neutralise Islamic overtones in thr political sphere. Leader> of the New Order were not 
only concerned to reduce Islamic cultural influence but also strove to increase the 
autonomy of the abangan religious variant as a political counterbalance. The new 
51 But it has to be borne in mind t1tat the size of each of these cabinets varied. Christians in the First Dcv. 
Cabinet were Frans Seda, G.A. Siwabessy, and A.M. Tambunan; those in the Second Dcv. Cabinet were 
M. Panggabean, Radius Prawiro, G.A. Siwabessy, nnd J.B. Sumarlin; those in Third Dcv. Cn~inet were 
M. Panggabean, J.D. Sumarlin, Ali Murtopo, Radius Prawiro and Cosmas Batubara; those in the Fourth 
Dcv. Cabinet were J.D. Sumarlin, Cosmas Batubarn, Radius Prawiro, Sudomo, J.H. Hutasoit, plus L D. 
Murdani (as the Militar; Chiei of Command). 
59 Tite percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the Parliament was respectively 8.3% and 9.4% in 1971, 
7.5% and 9.2% in 1977,9.6% ,.:viS. I% in 1982, and 7.4% and 9.4% in t987. 
60 Thc pcrccnta~e of Muslims .. "··Parliament was 79.2% in t971, 80.7% in 1977,79.7% in 1982, and 
81.2% in 1987. 
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regime's refusal to accord Islam even a symbolic place in the official sphere resembled 
the attitude of Javanese courts (under colonial rule) in the latter part of the 191h century. 
It began to glorify the nco-classical Javanese polity and culture developing a political 
language that was excessively Sanskritised. The glorious Hindu Mndjapahit kingdom 
was made an exemplary centre. The presidential palace was named 'Bina Grail a', the 
Pancasila d'lctrinal education was named 'Eka Prasctya Panca~arsa' and so on. In 
1973 the abangan-oriented leaders of the New Order went so far as to recognise 
'kcbatinan' (spiritualism) as a separate religious orientation. Their attempt to lcgalise 
this recognition through the so-called GBHN (The National Policy Guidelines) faced 
fierce opposition from orthodox Muslims, to whom this appeared as an attempt to 
encourage abangan Muslims away from the faith entirely. 
The government also moved to increase bureaucratic lcverag~ over Islam. In 
1973,lcadership of Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was traditionally allocated to a 
representative of NU or Mul:ammadiyah, was controlled by an 'independent' 
intellectual with Western (McGill University) postgraduate training, Prof. Mukti Ali.6t 
Fi\·e years later, this portfolio was even given to a military man with no Islamic 
credentials, Alamsjah l>r~wiranegara (a former member ot Suharto's Spn). The 
appointment of these men with strong accommodationist tendencies was intended not 
only to lessen the influence of organized Islam but also to direct Muslim leaders 
towards cooperation with gonrnment authorities for the purpose of national 
devclOJ•••tent. 
Having ensured that the Ministry of Religious Affairs would support national 
development, the govemmeat muv~d further to sccularise Islamic law. In July 1973, the 
administration put fmward a marriage law proposal which (on the face of it) would have 
deeply secularised lndr-r··;ian m~niage law ~nd effcctivrlv abolished much of the 
country' 3 Islamic court system. Although the proposal Wa£ o:::nsibly the initiative of 
the Department of Justice, its impetus came from Ali Murtopo and.his think tank, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Bypassing the authority of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, this law was also dralled without reference to or advice 
from organised Islam. Mark Can•mack described thhl propost:d marriage law as follows 
(1<197: 151): 
" Ahhough a Muslim intellectual (former STI student and PIT ••:1>•. '•t\, Mukti Ali had PO strong ties to 
any major Islamic group. 
C!taplcr 5- The New Order's Rcprcssi\'C·DC\'Ciopmcnlalism 340 
The proposal provided for a single set of marriage and divorce ru~~s applicable 
to all Indonesians regardless of religion. It required civil registration for 
marriage and court approval for divorce and polygamy. Both divorce and plural 
marriage, moreover, would becom~ •mbject to tight restrictions. Enforcement of 
the law was to be entrusted to the civil courts, which would have reduced the 
jurisdiction of the outer island courts to matters of inheritance only and left the 
Islamic courts in Java, Madura, and South Kalimantan with literally nothing to 
do. 
This provision can be interpreted as an attempt to secularise family law. At this 
point, the process of secularising Islamic law had come a long way. Since the last 
century of the colonial era, criminal and commercial law had been almost wholly 
secularised, while family law remained relatively 'Islamic'. The secularisation of family 
law seemed to have remained a problem and a serious one in Indonesia, as in many 
other parts of the Muslim World. The rea;.Jn may have rightly been given by Anderson 
(1959: 90): 'It is the family law that has always represented the very heart of the 
shari'a, for it is this part of the law that is regarded by Muslims as entering into the very 
warp and woof of their religion.' Probably for this reason, this proposal met with angry 
and determined Muslim opposition both inside and outside the legislature. Islamic 
action groups with several hundred Muslim youths overran Parliament until eventually 
the law was modifi "; to meet some of the objections put forward by the PPP. A 
breakthrough in solving this conflict was reached only after General Sumitro, a rival of 
Ali Murtopo, took over the matter by initiating discussions with Muslim leaders outside 
the formal legislative process. 
To ensure Islamic conformity •vith the official orthodoxy, in 1975 the 
government succeeded in cstabli&hing a single corporative-body of Indonesian ulama 
known as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI}. Government interv~ntion was involved 
in the election of its leadership at all levels. To ensure that all religious forums would be 
free from Islamic-oriented political messages the government, through a c!ecision of the 
Ministry of Religion ~ffairs No. 44/1978 and 70/1978, officially forbade political issues 
to be used as major themes in religious propagation, sermons, and lectures. This \Vas 
reinforced by th~ Kopkamtib Commander's Decree No. 152/1978 which among other 
things forbade religious preaching or outreach to engage in political matters or to 
dispute Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. About the same time, th.: government with 
the legal support of the MPR's decision No. IUI978 began its Pancasi/a indoctrination 
program (P4). With elaborate guidelines on moral values for everyday life, the P4 
-- -- ··-·--·----··----------·--· ---- ·------------------------------- -
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offered a challenge to the Islamic world view. Leaders of Islamic organizations were 
special targets for this indoctrination. 
A further breakthrough in secularising the Indonesian polity was achieved 
through the New Order's enforcement of Pancasila as the sole basis for social and 
political organizations. The debate in Indonesian religious circles regarding Pancasi/a 
as the azas trmgga/ (sole foundation or principle) carne to the fore in August 1982 when 
President Suharto staled that all social-political forces, particularly the political parties, 
should accept the state ideology as their azas trmggal. A major item on the agenda for 
the March 1983 general session of the MPR was the drafting ofGBHN. Incorporated in 
these guidelines was an MPR resolution that the two political parties and Golkar now 
adopt Pmrcasila as their sole foundation. 
The concept of azas trmggal attracted opposition from various Islamic clements 
and figures. Some perceived it as the government's imposition of a secularisation 
prcgram against the Islamic worldview. Some others viewed this government policy as 
reminiscent of the Dutch colonial policy of permitting Islamic religious expression 
while restraining all forms of political Islam. For peopk' like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
(a moderate Masjr:mi leader) and the great bulk of Muslim leaders at the time, the 
establishment of Pmrcasila as the foundation of the state and the basis for the 
constitution was acceptable. Nevertheless, they raised objections to the imposition of 
Pancasila as the sole foundation!princit>le of political and social organizations. 
Sjafruddin criticised this policy using the government's own terms, by arguing that it 
contradicted the 1945 Constitution. In !iis perscnalletter to.President Suharto on 7 July 
1983, he basically stated that ahh.,;;b!; 'Pancr.si/a was intended to be the Foundation of 
the State, and the basis for the Constitution, it was not intended to become the 
foundation of citizens' organizations, whether of a political, social or other character'. 
He based his argument on Sukarno's words in his Pancasila speech (I June 1945) that 
'this Indonesian state that we arc founding must be a 'gotong-royong' [mutual 
assistance] state'. 'This idea o: gorung-royc-~~;', Sjafruddin argued, 'implies that each 
person joining in this gotong-royong preserves his own identity and personality. The 
Muslims remain Muslim, the Christians remain Christian, the Buddhists remain 
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Buddhist, the Hindus remain Hindu, and so on. ' 62 He concluded with the following 
rhetorical statement: 
But if Christians arc no longer permitted to form organizations based on 
Christian principles, ... and if Muslims cannot establish organizations based 
upon Islamic ptinciplcs, and the same is the case for other citizens espousing 
other religions or ideologies, who arc forbidden to found organizations based 
upon their respective faiths or ideologies, but all citizens arc allowed only to 
have org~nizations based upon the Pancasila, then Indonesia, this fertile and 
prosperous couaty, with its many hills and valleys, must, as it were, be 
tmn~formcd into a barren Sahara dedcrt, consisting of only stones and 
undifferentiated particles of sand [yang zatnya sama]. 63 
Despite severe dissatisfaction and opposition from Islamic groups and leaders, 
however, this policy was finally accepted by major Islamic organizations. Islamic 
organizations such the Pll and a splinter group of the HMI known as HMI-MPO 
(Majc/is Pcrtimbangan Organisasi, Organizational Consideration Council, est. 1986), 
which remained unwilling to accept azas twrggal were banned or forced to become 
underground movements. 
To curb Islamic resistance, the government also used various forms of blackmail 
and repressive measures. What concerned many Muslims was not just the repression 
itself, but also the decisive role of Christian officers as key figures in the state-
repressive apparatus. This concern was expressed emotionally in the many books 
published following the fall ofSuharto.64 Until the late 1980s, Christian military officers 
had control over the three main components of the security regime: the military 
commar,; .nd defence ministry, intclligcnc~. offices, and Kopkamtib. Firstly, M. 
Panggabe~n (a Protestant) was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and Defence Minister in the 1973/1978 period, and L. 13. Murdani (a Catholic) held the 
same position in the 1983/1988 period. Second, Ali Murtopo (a Catholic) took control 
of the intelligence offices (Opsus and Bakin) aficr 1968. He was succeeded by his 
intcllig<mce protege, L. B. Murdani, who a'so \Vas responsible for the construction, in 
62 A similar view had actually be•n propounded by Sukamo in his speech at dte University of lmlonesi• 
on 7 May 1953. To clarify his controversial speech in Amuntai (South Kalimantan) on the position of 
Islam within the nation-state, he stated as fOllows: ' . .if I say that this state is a nation-sb.te, by no means 
do I forbid you all to promote communist state, communism, communist ideology, or to promote 
Islamism, Islamic ideology, Islamic ideals, or even if there is one among I!S who aspirct to socialism, 
nazidom, fascism, he/she has full rights to promote that nazism' (Soekamo 1999: 2-3). 
"An Enrlish translation of this Sjafruddin's letter can be found in lndollesio, No. 38 (Octobc1), 1984 • 
.. Examples of these books are Tamlj11ng Priok Bcrdaralr (PSPI 1998), Fakta: Diskriminasi Rczim 
Soclrarto tcrhadap Umat/s/am (Tim Pldllli Tapo/1998), Dl Bawalr Ba)'ang·Bayang Sockarno-Soclrarto 
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1983, of the new military strategic intelligence body (BAIS). Third, M. Panggabcan W?S 
appointed the head of Kopkamtib in 1969 and then Sudomo (a Protestant) held the same 
position from 1974 onwards. 
Ali Murtopo was wcll-knowr: for his covert operation to persuade militant 
Muslims, especially those associated with past Muslim rebellions (Difi'II}, to launch a 
renewed drive for an Islamic state. This was intended to discredit the Muslim political 
party, the PPP, and also to provide a pretext for a more general roundup of Muslim 
political activists.65 
Admiral Sudomo had a bad reputation in the eyes of Islamic community for 
allowin~; Kopkamtib to control the content of Islamic preaching and to interfere 
excessively in the activities of Islamic organizations. He was responsible for the arrest 
and imprisonment of Islamic activists whom he accused of subversion. Between 1977-
1980 alone, around 6000 Islamic activists were arrested (Sinar Harapan, 03/04/2003) 
and many of them were detained with or without trial.66 
General L. B. Murdani was the last member of the Ali Murtopo group. As an 
intelligence officer and then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces he had a 
reputation for the 'Christianisation' of the intelligence offices and al~o for promoting 
salllri officers more slowly than their abangan or Christian counterparts (Liddle 1995: 
(Jaiz 1999), Dari Mimbar ke Pcnjara (Fatwa 1999), Ncgara clan Peminggirm1 Islam Politik (Karim 
1999), and Kasus Pc/cclakan DCA /984 (Soeropranoto 2000). 
"This kind of blackmail was frequently launched in the lead up to the general elections. In June 1977, a 
month before tlte general election, tl.is .,,.·.,mnt proup was associated with a fictive rebellion called 
'Komanc/o Jihad' (Holy-War Conunand), while prior to the 1982 elections it was associated with the so-
called 'Islam Jamaa/r' (Islamic Community). In fact, the operations of these militant Muslims were 
masterminded by the intelligence offices. Concerning the • Komando Jihad' rebellion, Murtopo's agents 
had spread rumours about the Communist comeback among fom1er Darullslam activists who were still 
under Army surveillance and had promised them weapons to fight the leftist threat. Some former Dantl 
Islam leaders believed these rumours and then were lr:lppcd in the political game of Ali Murtopo's group. 
When brought 'to trial several years later, some of them argued in vain that they had been working as 
intelligC"nce agents for Opsus and vehemently denied the existence of a Komando Jilrad. According to 
Sutopo Juwono (head of the Baki11, 1969-1974.1· 'Ali Murtopo is belonging to this group. So for instance, 
you talk about Komando Jihad. It's not a ,., ' ISSue. From the beginning on hr. has tlris opinion. I had to 
stop that, at the time. He had the opinion that \\o'e must create issues ... Dut I can't stop that because he's 
ail••tys going to the president' (Quoted in D. Jenkins 19&4: 59). In tlrc eyes of Indonesian Human Rights 
G:t.up, Topol: 'The prime purpose of the Komando Jihad canard was to link Muslim activism in the 
public mind with alleged terrorist activities and to intimidate the Muslim community as a whole' (Topol 
1987: 15). The emergence of the so-called Islam Jamaalr in early 1980s also renects a similar case. It was 
o1en associated with a militant Islamic group under the leadership ofimmn bin Muhammad Zein which 
had been responsible fur the attack on the Ciccndo police station in·early months of the 1981 and the 
hijack of a civilian aircraft (Garuci1 U~-9 Woyla) on 31 March tltat year. In fact, ns admitted by Iqbal 
and Umar Ai>doch (two accused partie .~.mts oftl1e Cicendo attack), Is/am Jamaah was the creation of Ali 
Murtopo, und Imron's group only later realised that it had been infiltrated and provoked by original 
activists of Murtopo-creatcd 'Islam Jamaah', such ns Najamuddin (Sinar Harapan, 03/04/2003; Tapol 
1987: 16). 
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18-9). He was also responsible for the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tandjung 
Priok (Jakarta) on 12 September 1984, following the protest of local Muslims against 
disrespectful behaviour by local military officials.67 
Frustrated politically and economically, several Muslim leaders turned to 
opposition movements. Thus, old Masjumi leaders as Mohammed Natsir, Burhanuddin 
Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and younger Muslim activists such as Anwar 
Hationo and A. M. Fatwa, joined with a group of retired generals, including Nasution, 
Mokoginta, Yasin, Hugcng and Ali Sadikin. This group, sometimes referred to as 
barisan sa!.it hati (people who arc sick at heart), established an oppositional movement 
that came to be known as 'Kelompok Petisi 50' (Petition-of-50 Group).68 
Some militant Muslims with radical fundamentalist beliefs even turned to 
violent activities. Typically believing themselves to be the victims of non-Muslim 
conspiracies, the typical targets of their terrorist activities were non-Muslim 
properties.69 When the government clamped down on terrorist activities, some of these 
militant Muslims were drawn into underground movements or flP,d to neighbouring 
countries. 
Given the dangerousness and the vulnerability of these rad!cal movements, there 
were two other possible options to address the Muslim's political and economic 
frustration: accommodation with the state's orthodoxy and political structure, or ihe 
return to cultural-educational movements in general and the mosque-based intellectual 
movement in particular. These became the two mainstreams of the Muslim intellectual 
response to the impasse of political1slam. 
66 On lhe list of Muslim trial verdicts up to the 1987, see Tapol (1987: 112-4). 
67 It is said lhattwo local military officials had entered the As-Sa 'adaiJ mosque without taking off 01dr 
boots and lhen deliberately obscured an announcement of a religious lecture on the mosque wall with 
muddy water. Under the uneasy relationship between the lsl.mtic community and the security regime, this 
incident soon transformed itself into a riot wilh hundred< of people being killed by gun-fire. For nn 
elaborate description oflhis incident, see PSPI (1998). 
61 This name refers to a group of 50 people who composed a petitiGu and delivered it to the parliament on 
1:> May 1980. It strongly criticised Prcsidcn Suharto for ndopting a narrowly self-serving intci(lrctation of 
Pancasi/a, and for promoting the collaborntion of the military with Golkar, when the military should 
stand above a.ll Nocial forces. It also criticised his accumulation of wealth. . 
69 Three wreks nfier Ole Tandjung Priok massacre, several bombs exploded on 4 October 1984 nt 
branches of the Chinese-owned Dank Central Asia (DCA) in Jakarta; on 24 December, explosions 
occurred nt n Ca0101ic church nod a P10testant seminary in Malang (Enst Java); on 21 Jnnuary 1985, n 
series of explosions destroyed nine stupas on 01e upper terraces of lhe Dorobudur temple; and on 16 
MnrelL seven people were killed when n bomb went off prematurely on 01e Pemudi Ekspres night-bus to 
Dnli u it npproached Danyuwnngi on the eastern tip of Java (Tnpol !Jn7; !5ueropranoto 2000). 
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5.4 Intellectual Responses of the Second Generation of Muslim Intelligentsia 
Already in 1967, though it allowed its individual members to join political 
parties, the Mulzammadiyalz had officially reaffirmed iis role as hing exclusively one of 
dakwalz (Ar. lit. call or invitation, missionary endeavour) through non-political social 
welfare and educational work. In 1973 it had 7,000 primary and s~condary ~chools, 
several universities, five hospitals, 451 clinics, 3,250 mosques, 104 orphanages and 
2, 750 offices from which dakwalz was organized.70 In 1987 it operated 20,000 primary 
and secondary schools, sixteen universities, twenty-one academies, nine hospitals, 
hundreds of smaller clinics and over I 0,000 mosques (Tapol 1987: 5). 
Early in the same year, former leaders of the Masjwni began to realise the 
importance of extending the scc>pe of the Islamic struggle to non-political arenas. 
Having just been released from prisons and immediately encountering a new political 
stumbling block, they started questioning the shaky ground of political Islam. Soon after 
Suharto refused to rehabilitate the Masjumi in January 1967, Masjumi lcaC!crs and some 
reformist ulama held a meeting in ,!/-Mrmawarralz mosque (Tanah Abang, Jakarta) on 
26 February 1967.71 The meeting attempted to find reasons behind the weakness of 
political Islam, and then concluded as follows: 
First, Islamic parties have not gained enough support from the ummat in this 
country; second, Islamic leaders have no common vision and mission in their 
political struggles; third, the number of Indonesian Muslims was statistically 
large, but qualitatively small, whether in the quality of their aqidalz (correct 
belief), ibadalz (worship) and aklz/ak (ideal moral behaviour) or in their mastery 
of general knowledge and economy. 
Based on these considerations, the meeting recommended the urgent 
establishment of a special 'missionary' agency oriented to carry out Islamic endeavours 
in a wider and more comprehensive way. Thi~ agency, called the Dewall Dakwalz 
Islamiyalz I11do11esia (DOll, Indonesian Council of Islamic Daf..walz), came into 
existence in May 1967. The first executive committee of this organization was led by 
Mohatnmad Natsir and H.M. Rasjidi as chairman and vice-chairman, supported by 
prominent figures of the Masjumi and rcfonnist ulama such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, 
Osman Raliby, Zaininal Abidin Achmad and some others as mcmbcrs.72 
70 See Pandji Masjarakat, No. t67, January t5, t975. 
11 Among those who were present nt this meeting were Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangl;usasmito, 
Mohamad Roem, M. Rasjidi, Taufiqurrahman, Mansur Daud Dl. Palimo Kayo, Hasan Dasri, and Agus 
Cik (Angek 2000: 2-3). · 
12 For tho history and dovetopmenl of tho DDII, see Angck (2000), DDII (200t). 
'· 
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The DOll establishment was the last a:1empt by Muslim intellectuals ofNatsir's 
generation to Islamisc national politics through n•m-political means. In Natsir's words: 
'We arc no longer conducting dakwah by means of politics, but engaging in political 
activities by means of du~~!'ah. The result will be the same' (Quoted in Mahendra 1995: 
129). 
Henceforth the term 'dakwah' became popular in the Indonesian public sphere, 
especially among the Muslim community. Before then, Indonesian Muslims tended to 
usc the term tab/igh (transmission) which is more associated with verbal propagation. 
With the introduction of the term daf..wah, which implies a broader missionary 
endeavour, Islamic propagation moved from its preoccupation with verbal preaching 
(bi'l-lisan) to more practical action (bi'l-hal). Many Muslim leaders and scholars 
believed that the daf..~vah was the appropriate answer to the government-sponsored 
modernisation and Muslim political frustration. The dakwah approach was also believed 
to be an effective means for achieving the integration of the 11111111at both religiously and 
politically. 
'Integration' of the 11mmat and 'daf..~•·ah' beca·:;e the main themes of Islamic 
discourse, especially among senior Islamic leaders. A special seminar on this issue, held 
in Malang in July 1968 by the Foundation for the Collection of Funds to Aid Indonesian 
Candidates for the Pilgrimage (JDBTHI), highlighted the primacy of the dakwah 
approach over the political one. In the same year, calls for the unity of the Islamic 
community, as frequently happened in the past, gave rise to the wicksprcad demand for 
an All-Indonesian Islamic Congress. In the eyes of a promih.:nt reformist 11/ama, E. Z 
Muttaqien: 'Through the dakwah approach all Islamic forces can participate and be 
assigned tasks commensurate with their respective capacities. Inter-group conflicts will 
be minimized because whatever gains arc made will have come from the llmmat's own 
efforts and labor, and not from rewards handed out by the distributors of favors at the 
helm of national affairs' (Quoted in Hassan 1975: 83). This view was supported by 
other seminar participants such as Zakijah Daradjat, Shalahuddin Sanusi, Anwar 
Ha~ono, and Mukti Ali. According.to Sanusi, the author of the well-known Integrasi 
Ummat Islam (The Integration of Muslim Community, published 1967), the root cause 
of Islamic diaintcgration as well as of social and personal pr·< ;ems in the Muslim 
community was the non-practice of Islamic social and moral tcar.hi:lgs. As such, Ute 
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method of integration as well as of regeneration and reconstruction of the Muslim 
community had to be dakwalr as opposed to party politics.73 
To celebrate Muslims' euphoria about the dakwalr enterprise, in the late 1960s 
the DOll set up a special dakwalr publication called Media Dakwalr. Mohammad Natsir 
wrote a special handbook in this issue entitled Fiqlmd-Da'walr (Islamic Jurisprudence 
on DaJ..11'alr), published in 1969. Subsequently, more than 25 books under the '''IP. 
'dakwalr' were written by other Indouesian authors in the 1970s alone.7' 
The DOll positioned itself as the primary source and consultation agent for the 
effective propagation of Islam in modem society. In its concern to help improve social 
hygiene and medical care, the DDII ran a special birth control clinic and worked closely 
with doctors on the Jakarta Muslim Students' Health Institute (LKMII) and with the 
private Islamic medical college of the Islamic Hospitui Foundation (JARS I) in Jakarta. 
In its concern for the improvement of Islamic education, it helped to build and equip 
libraries in mosques, universities and daJ..walr institutions. It also made an effort to 
standardise the curriculum of pcsalllrcn through cooperation with a number of 
reformist-oriented pesantrcn ~ssociations (Hassan 1975: 105-6).75 
The DOll also expc.oimented with bringing together leaders of pesantrcn, 
Islamic activists from universities and social figures to continue what had been initiated 
by the Wirsosandjojo brothers (Satiman and Sukiman) in the pre-war period, namely 
'advanced pcsalllrcn' {pesantren lulmr, ma'luul 'a/)~. This kind of pestmlrcn was able to 
offer advanced religious teaching and secular subjects to students (sall/ri) from 
pesantren backgrounds or to offer in-depth Islamic study to students from secular 
university backgrounds.76 Pesa:>:ren Ulil Albab in Boger was the mo~l. success example 
of this experimentation. From this pesantren, prominent Islamic figures such as Didio 
7l For more elaborate discussions of this seminar and this issue, see Hassan (1975: 64~104). 
" For a lisl of books and otl1er publications on da411'a/o issues during 1969-1980, see Anshari (1986: 195-
8}. 
7 One of the success stories of this project was Pesmuren Dam/ Fa lair in Bogar; a boarding Islamic 
school which offers both religious and general subjects and with a special emphasis on training in modem 
agriculture. Among lhe leading {igures ofthispcsanlrclt were Gaffar I.mmil (father ofn well~knNvn poet, 
Taufik Ismail), Soleh Widodo (son-in-law of Mohammad Nalsir, a leelurcr at lhc IPB), and Aziz Darwis 
\aleclurcr a11he IPB). 
6 Examples of DDII~sponsorcd pcsanlrcn which offered secular subjects to students with Pcsantretz 
backgrounds were As-Syafi'iyalo in Jakarta and Pcsantre11 AI-Huda in Tasikmalaya; while examples of the 
pcsanlrclt which offered in--depth Islamic study.to students from secular university backgrounds were 
Pesantrcn Ulil Albab in Bogor and Pesall/ren Oudi Mulia in Jakarta. 
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Hafiduddin, an influential leader of the tarbiyah (Islamic educational) movement that 
became influential from the late 1980s, emergcd.17 
Moreover, the DDII also began to promote Islamic da~,vah through the mass 
media (notably the radio) and Islamic publications, and also regularly set up special 
training programs for Islamic prosclytisers tenned da 'i (many of whom would be sent to 
remote districts and transmigration zones). It also engaged in international Islamic fora 
and multilateral organizations, through which, especially from Natsir's lobby in the 
Muslim World League (Rabithat Al-A/am AI-ls/ami, est. 1962), the DDII gained access 
to donor institutions from the Middle East countries. This made it possible to finance 
dakwah activities and to send Indonesian students to pursue overseas studies in these 
countrics.78 Last but not least, the DOll made early c!forts to recruit young cadres for 
the purpose of creating 'organic' intellectuals for the mosque movements. All these 
efforts, especially the last, were the final step of the Natsir generation in the historical 
project of Islam ising the Indonesian intelligentsia. 
S.Slntellectual Responses of the Third Generation of Muslim Intelligentsia 
The third generation of intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born 
in the later part of the 1910s and ;n the 1920s, played a major role in the early political 
leadership of the New Order. However, the intellectual and political roles of Muslim 
intelligentsia of this generation was negligible. There arc at least two possible reasons. 
First, the New Order's political lcadcrnhip was dominated by the military intelligentsia, 
while Islamic clements in the armed f.;rccs had been marginalised from the time of the 
revolution, esptcially aflcr the desertion of Islamic gucr.illa forces from the national 
military corp. Thus, by the time of the rise of the New Order, there were very few 
Muslim military officers in the arn1ed forecs.79 Second, the intellectual development of 
Muslim intelligentsia of this generation was overtaken by history. Born in the late 
71 Interview with Adian Husaini, a fanner Islamic activist of tl1e IPB and U/il Albab as well as a young 
leader oflho DDII (23/0512001). 
71 Natsir's strong lobby in the Arab world gave the DOll leverage to influence authorities in the 
Indonesian Ministry of Religious AtTairs. During the period of tl1c 1970s and early 1980s, the DOll 
became n partner of this Ministry in recruiting students for overseas studies in the Middle East. 
79 Among the few were Achmad Tirtosudiro (fanner vice-chairman oftl1e HMI, 1947il950) and Bustanil 
Arifin (a fanner student of the HIS M11hammadiyah of Sigli wh~ had 'lrong net\\ilrks among activists of 
the HMI) who held relatively strategic positions in the New Order !'Oiity. Tirtosudiro (b. 1922) was first 
appointtd lhe head of the newly established National Logistics Board, Bulog (1966-1973) and tl1en 
became the Indonesian ambassador for the Fedora! Republic oi Gennany (1973-76) and Saudi Arabia 
(1982-85). Arifin (b. 1925) was first tl1c successor ofTirtosudiro as head ofBulog (1973-1993), and then 
Chapter j p 77Je New Order's Rcprc.ssiw:·De,'Ciopmcntall.sm 349 
colonial era, this generation had experienced the Dutch educational policy of favouring 
priyayi, resulting in small numbers of Muslim intelligentsia. To make matters worse, the 
higher education of this small number of Muslim intelligentsia was interrupted by the 
Japanese occupation and the independence revolution. In effect, ver; few santri of this 
generation completed their tertiary education. 
Prominent Muslim personalities of !hi~ 3cncration who completed their tertiary 
education were Lafran Pane (b. 1922), M. Jt:sdi Glu!7ali (b. 1923}, Mukti Ali (b. 1923}, 
Anwar Harjono (b. 1923), Anton Timur Djaelani (b. 1923)80 M.S. Mintarcdja (b. 1921}, 
Dahlan Ranuwihardjo (b. 1925), Harun Nasution (b. 1919}, Achmad Baiquni (1923}, 
Deliar Noer (b. 1926), Bustanil Arifin (b. 1925) Barli Halim (b. 1927), Ismail Suny (b. 
1929), and Ismail Hasan Mtia<~;um (b. 1929). Most of them became key figures in the 
establishment and dev~lopme~lt of the GPII, HMI, and PII. Most had their studies 
disrupted by the revolutionary struggle and were only able to finish their undergraduate 
educatiCin in the 1950s ur even in early 1960s. 
By the beginning of the New Order in 1966, there were only :! few Muslim 
intellectuals who had attended a postgraduate progrant in Western universities. They 
included Deliar Noer, Achmad Baiquni, Mukti Ali, Harun Nasuti.on, Anton Timur 
Djaelani, Barli Halim and Ismail Suny.81 Mintaredja had actualiy been exposed to 
Western higher education at the University of Leiden in the late 1950s, but he only 
attended courses in a non-degree program at the School of Law. 
Beside~ these people, there were actually four other well-known Muslim 
intellectu.tls who had studied at Western Universities (all in the USA) at this time: 
Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (b. 1931 }, Subchan, Z. E. (b. 1931 }, Imaduddin Abdulrahim 
(b.1931) and Ibrahim Hasar. (b. 1935).82 Each of these men was born in a transitional 
became tl1e vice-miniSier (mclltcri-muda) of the Trade and Coopcralive Minislry ( 197811983), and finally 
the Minisler ofthe Cooperalive Department (1983/1988, 1988/1993). 
10 The first five had studied in the STIIUII before getting their degrees from different universities: Pane 
from tl1c UGM in t953, Ghazali from Uni••.,sitas Islam Jakarto in 1960, Ali from Karachi University in 
1955, Haljono from Uni••ersitas Islam Jakarta in 1963 (he also got a PhD degree from the some universily 
in 1968), hnlon.Timur Djaelani from PTAIN in mid-t950s. . · 
11 Noer (chairman of the HMl, 1953-55) got his PhD degree in polilical science from Cornell University 
(USA) in 1963; Ali got his Masters degree in Islamic Studies from McGill University (Canada) in 1957; 
Nasulion got his Masters in Islamic Studies from McGill University in 1965; Djaelani got his Masters 
from McGill University in 1959; ijalim got his MBA from Univcrsily of California, Berkeley in 1959, 
Suny got his Masters in Civil Law from McGill University in 1960, and Baiquni got his MaSiers in 
Physics in lhe late 1950s and his PhD some years later from tl1e University of Chicago. 
12 Bintoro got his Masters from the Gmdulte School of Public end International Aff~.irs, University of 
Pittsburgh in 1969, Subchan had attended a non-degree program in Economic Developm:nt at the 
Universily of California Los Angelrs (IJCLA, !961-2), lmaduddin got his Masters in Electrical 
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period between the third and fourth generation and so were actually closer to th~ fourth 
generation, though the first two held senior leadership positions in the Islamic 
intellectual movement at the time of the rise of the New Order. 
The lack of competitive advantage of this Muslim generation also came from 
their academic disciplines. Most of them were trained in humanities and social sciences, 
which were not really compatible with the New Order's technocratic modernisation 
project.83 With the scarcity of highet"educated Muslims, let alone those with Western 
training, this mismatch meant there were very few Muslim intellectuals who could hold 
strategic positions in the early years ofthe New Order. 
Muslim intellectuals of the third generation shared a common dream with those 
of the Natsir (second) generation for the revival of Islamic political leverage, afler its 
devastation in the late Sukamo era. Even so, while intellectuals ofth~ second generation 
generally considered what Mintarcdja called 'formal victories' (e.g. the rehabilitation oi 
the Masjumi and the acceptance of the Jakarta Charter) as essential measures of the 
success of the Islamic struggle, those of the third generation generally gave priority to 
'material victories' (substantive achievements)."' Thus, the latter tended to be more 
willing to accept a new political arrangement so long as Islamic aspirations and politic~! 
representatives were accommodated in the new polity and bureaucracy. Even for a man 
like Deliar Noer, the New Order's modernisation project did not pose a theological 
problem because the essence of the modernisation project conforms to the social 
teachings of Islam. In his efforts to support Halla's proposal in the early years of the 
New Order to establish a new inclusive Islamic political party, Partai Demokrasi Islam 
Jndo11esia (Indonesian Muslim Democratic Party), Noer also called on Muslim leaders 
to end their obsession with the Jakarta Charter (Wahib 1981: 1947). Generally speaking, 
as children of the revolution who had intensely shared a comr.1on nationalistic identity 
and fraternal solidarity with other political groups and the national am-.y, the third 
generation of Muslim intelligentsia tended to be more accommodative in their political 
orientation, except those who were closely linked to the Natsir group, like Anwar 
Haljono. 
Engineering from Iowa Slate University in 1965, nnd Hasan gol his MBA from Syracuse University in 
1965. 
13 This is actmdly a general tendency in Indonesian society which h:1o cuniinued to prevail until the 
r.resent day. 
4 For further discussion of the difference between the 'formal' and 'material' approach to the struggle of 
Islam, sec Minlarcdja (t971). 
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Y ct, even adopting accommodative attitudes was not n guarantee for substantial 
political gains. Be?ause of their educational profile, Muslim intellectuals of this 
generation could not, by and large, compete with the superior and more 'appropriate' 
educational qualifications of their secular and Christian counterparts. Furthcnnorc, at 
the historical juncture when this gcncrntion was ready to play intellectual and political 
leadership roles, the New Order policy of domesticating political Islam constricted the 
public role of Muslim intellectuals. Thus, Muslim (civilian) intellectuals of this 
generation were unable to play a substantial role in the New Order polity and 
bureaucracy. At best, only two of them became ministers of the Suharto cabinets. Due 
to his political accommodationism and his role as Suharto's 'henchman' in the 
leadership of Parmusi, Mintaredja was appointed a State Minister (1958-73) and then 
Social Minister (1973-78). For his expertise in comparative religion, Mukti Ali was 
appoin:~d the Mini;.:,•t of Religious Affairs (1973-78). The remaining intellectuals 
could only occupy second-rank or mostly peripheral political and bureaucratic 
. • 8l post!Jons. 
Beyond the formal political arena, the major contribn:ion of this generation to 
the development of Muslim intelligentsia was their pioneering efforts in the 
establishment and development of Islamic student •nd intellectual associations. In the 
early years of the New Order, Muslim intellectuals of this generation a !temp!,.' to 
strengthen their political lcve~ge through the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Sardjana (Pcrsami) that had emerged in 1964. Given the engagement of the Muslim 
intelligentsia of the third generation, the chairman of this organizatit;n for two periods 
ahead (1966-71, 1971-74) was a man of the transitioh.JI period, Bint<.o:o Tjokroamidjojo, 
who served as a bridge between the third and fourth generation of ini~lligentsia. 
However, severe internal conflicts jcopardised the bargaining power of this 
organization. Former members of the HM1 and PMII within Persami clashed with Cl!Gh 
other especially over le~de:.;hip issues. In 1968 traditionalist intellectuals of Persami 
seceded from and established a new association of traditionalist sardjana, Jkatmr 
" Noer was appointe•! • member of the political tea~u of Suharto 's Spri (196G-1968) and then became tlte 
Rector of the Jhknrta·based IKIP (Teacher's Training College, 1967-7.:). Dintoro \\~S appointed to the 
personal staff of tlte President (1966-7) and then became the Secretary of the Nationall'lanning Board 
(BapenrutS, 1967-8). Suny was appointed a member of tlte Pi'R-GRIMPRS between 1967-69 but w •... 
recalled in 1969 because of his fierce criticism of the Electi•Jn Dill. Ghazati was appointed a member of 
the DPR-GRIMPRS between t970-7l.Later, Metareum (et.airman oftllC HMI, t957-60) was pennitted 
by the government to replace Naro as the general chairman of the PPP (t989-1994), while the rest mostly 
occupied ac&dcmic positions. 
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Sardjana Islam Indonesia (IS II), under the leadership of Subchan z. E.. Aller lite death 
of Subchan in 1970, however, the ISH soon disappeared from the public scene. 
McanwhHe, !'ersami continued to exist for some time to come with its membership in 
1974 being around 400 (Anwar 1995: 252). 
Persami's ideology and orientation reflected to some extent the accommodative 
tendency of the third generation of Muslim intc!ligentsia and the more pragmatic 
interests of its chairman, despite the fact that supporters of political Islam also cxi~ter' ir 
the organization. Occupying a relatively strategic position in the govcmm~1. • 
bureaucracy, as a personal assistant to the President ( 1966-7) and Secretary of the 
National Planning Board (Dapennas 1967-8), Tjokroamidjojo led Persami to be 
supportive of the government modernisation project. In his view, Muslims had to assess 
and respond to their socio-political environment dynamically, in order to adjust 
adequately to the continuvus changes of the socio-political environment. So as not to 
miss the development 'train' of the New Ord~;-, Muslims were expected to take an 
a~tive role in the process by offering constructive thoughts and actions. Persami 
engaged more in practical m~:ters than in philosophical ones. In the early 1970s, for 
instance, Persami conducted seminars on regional development, and began to 
popularise so-called alternative development (Hassan 1980: 140-1; Rahardjo 1993: 23). 
In this way, Persami and early upper-echelon smllri bureaucrats in the New 
Order bureaucracy, such as Achmad Tirtosudiro, Bustanil Arifin, Dintoro 
T''>kroamirljojo, Deliar Noer and some others,86 created the embryo of a Muslim 'bloc 
within' (inside the New Order polity and bureaucracy), which provided the foundation 
for ~ rapprochement between the Islamic intelligentsia and the New Order government 
in tlv: future. For a while, this process did not run smoothly as th.: New Ordc! !Jolicy 
afler 1973 became more and more repressive and provided little room for the expression 
oflslamic ideJS :Jod identities in the public sph~re. To avoid any possible con~cquences 
of being seen ..; the spokespeople for Islamic aspirations, the santi'i bureaucrats 
distanced themselves fi·om overt connections to and protection of Islamic collective 
actions. Thus, follow:ng the death o."its Secretary General, Sudjoko Prasodjo, in 1974, 
Tjokromidjojo withdrew from Persami resulting in its disappearance from the public 
16 Otl1er santri hlp.her bureaucrals in lhe early 1970< were Barli Halim (lhe Chairm:m of tl1c Indonesian 
Inveslment Coordinating Boanl!BKPM, 1973·80), Aehmad Baiquni (Director Generol of the N>tional 
Atomic Agency/BAT AN) Madjid lbrohim (a senior burcaucrol in Bappcnas and then Go>emor of Aeeh), 
Dakir Hasan (n senior bureaucrot in the Department ofTrode), Hariry Hudy (a senior bureacurot in the 
Bappcnas). For other names, see Rnhardjo (1993: 326). 
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sphere (Rahardjo, 1993: 23-4). In the absence of Pcrsami, however, the Islamic 
intelligentsia within the bure3ucracy continued to maintain a covert infonnal Islamic 
network, for example through infonnation exchange and family gatherings. This 
provided mutual support and rcsourc~ mobilisation, such as in the dissemination of 
• 
infonnation on particular projects or job opportunities in government departments to 
fellow Islamic aetivis~•. 
5.6 Intellcetual Responses of the Fourth Generation of Muslim Intelligentsia 
II was the fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, composed mainly of those 
who were born in the 1930s and 1940s, who responded to the challenge of 
m.•dt::m> 1tion and Muslim political frustration with energy and creativity. Like the 
generation of Salim and Natsir, this generation (in its fonnative phase) experienced, to a 
lesser degree, an intense exposure to ideological (Islamic) radicalisation, conditioned by 
political disputes on the national scene that ignited conflicts and tensions within student 
politics during •.~r. guided democracy period. On tho. otit~r hand, it was similar to the 
Pane generation in ternts of its intense exposure tc l!tc nationalistic 'language' and 
so;:~arity, conditioned by the urgency to build a common historical bloc to counter pro-
e,>t,:blishment political and intellectual forces and to dismantle the Sukamo regime 
around the mid-1960s. Unlike previous generations, however, this generation was much 
more confident psyrhologically and intellectually, conditioned by the dominant position 
of Islamic student organizations in the student politics of the 1960s. 
Organic intellectuals ofthi< gen,, tionlargely came from the HMI. In the early 
Jecaoes of the New Order, the standing of PM II and IMM remained below that of the 
HMI. At the time oftlte rise o>fthr New Order, the appearance ofPMII and IMM in the 
public sphere rerrtainc.: relatively new. As affiliates of the NU and Muhammadiyah, 
intellectuals of the PMU and IMM were also overshadowed by leaders of the NU and 
Muhammadiyah.81 Sometime in the future, there would emerge young iniei~·:.:tunls of 
---v------ .. ~--
;7 TI:o PMII's intellectual development was also inhibited by NU's political involvement in the formal 
political structure in the early yearn of the New Order. /\; the NU continued to be preoccupied with 
politics, rl.lny i-.adcrs of the l'MJI were absorbed io<o the NU party and then into the PPP. 1~te 
factionalism within the NU would in tum imply polarisation ·vithir.. the PM II, comprised of st:,>porters of 
ldham Chalid and tltose ofSubchan ":.il. Because of the strong links between PMlland NU, ir>tdlectu"ls 
of the PMU shared a common con!'O.rvatism with the NU lenders. An effort to make the [•Mil more 
independen' ~·om the !'IU was mado through the so-called 'Murnajati [':clarotion' in 1972 (Wahid 2000). 
Ncvcrtheles:; •. t took somettme to be effective. Moreover, the PMII condnued to have serious difficulties 
recruiting;.. !argc membership within secular universities. TI1e 9ersi;ting residue of coloninl hierarchies of 
knowledge t.hich had coalesced with a prolonged campaign of lslamic refonnism-moder.tism caused 
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the NU aml the Muhammatliyah who would play pre-eminent roles in intellectual· 
political leadership of the Muslim community. These intellectuals, however, would be 
considered as the spokespeople of the NU and the Mulwmmadiya!t rather than as those 
of the PMII and the IMM. Thus, during the early decades of the New Order, the HMI 
with its relative independence was a far cry from other Islamic student organizations in 
its ability to produce outstanding intellectuals in its own right. 
Because university life of the 1960s was interrupted by a series of student 
icmonstrations and tensions within the student politics, many HMI activists of this 
generation only completed their tertiary education in the late 1960s. Meanwhile, it was 
quite normal for activists ofthe HMI at that time to continue to take part in the activities 
of this organization though they might no longer be university students. Thus, during 
the rise of the New Order, the future shape of the HMI in particular and the Islamic 
intelligentsia in general was in the hands of this gen~ration. 
As a synthesis of the internal tensions 1 ;;ween Islamic mindedness on the one 
hand and nationalistic solidarity on the other hand, the HMI as an entity underwent a 
deg,·ce of political moderation. The HMI as an organization continued to maintain a 
balance between its Islamic and nationalistic orientations. Yet, individual intellectuals 
of the HMI were divided by and large into two streams: those who inclined to the 
aspirations of political Islam versus those who inclined to more inclusive political 
aspirations. Apart from individual psychologicai predispositions, the intellectual milieu 
and networks would strongly detennine the ideological and political inclinations of 
these HMI intellectuals. 
The chaimtan of the HMI during this cmcial period of the early years of the 
New Ord~r was Nurcholish Madjid. He was a unique person by origin. He was born in 
the strungho!d of th-.1 truditionalist community, Jombang (East Java), with his father, 
Abdul Madjid, belonging to the NU community by religio-cultural affiliation, but 
remaining a member of Masjumi afier the NU split. His father's political background 
members of secular universities in gcncrnl to look down on the tntditionalist Islamh: teaching. In addition, 
the heterodoxy of traditiondist teaching· also tcndod to be ill-matched with the psycho-religious 
inclination of secular ut•jvcrsity students who tended to prefer f('ligious nuthcnticiiy :md cert<.;nty a.; an 
escap~ from the plurality of life. worlds within the milieu of the secular university. 
Like the links between PMII nnd NU, the strons IMM links with Mullammadiyah ideology constricted the 
room for m:~noeuvrc of the IMM intellcctuab. For the same reason, the nppea! ~l.~ this org:mization to 
students from secular universities was far less than that of the HMI. Its major rl!crJits continued to derive 
from Muhammadiyall higher educational institution:<. 
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made it difficult for him to study in a traditionalist school. Thus, afier finishing his 
primary school plus two years of study in the traditionalist pesantre11, Darul 'Uium, in 
1955 he continued his study at the most prominent modem Islamic boarding school in 
the country, Damssa/am (est. 1926), in Ponorogo (East Java), which is commonly 
known as 'Pesantren modern Gontor'.88 In 1961 he lefi for Jakarta to enter higher 
education at JAIN Syarif Hidajatullah. In this city he began to encounter influential 
Masjumi and refomtistleaders. More importantly, he gained greater access to scientific 
literature and general knowledge. His encounter with students of diverse university and 
?cademic backgrounds in the HM.l provided him with a testing ground for st~engthening 
his intellectual capacity. 89 
With his intellectual capacity and multiple rcligio-educational affiliations, he 
was the right man at the right time. 1-Iis all-encompassing and non-sectarian outlook 
enabled him to be a bridge-builder in the internal fragmentation within the HMI. He was 
a leader and solidarity maker in the Tjokroaminoto mould. His invigorating Islamic 
ideas up until the late 1960s provided a common ground for his fellow HMI intellectuals 
of different ideological inclinations. The combination of his intellectual qualities and 
lead~rship style placed him in a special position. He was elected as the chairman of tht: 
HMI for two consecutive tenlts (1966-68, 1968-71), which had no precedent in the HMI 
tradition. 
During the period of Madjid's leadership, HMI activists experienced a kind of 
identity crisis. The HMI identification with Masjumi during the Old Order period meant 
that the domestication of political Islam at the beginning of the New Order was a great 
disappointment. Oa the other hand, the dominance of the HMI amone student 
organizations from the early 1960s had given rise to expectations of a significant public 
role in the future of the nation. This confusing >ituation placed them in limbo, between a 
return to the unfinished project of 'Islamising' the Indonesian polity-cum-intelligentsia 
or embracing the project ofliberalising Islamic thinking and political ar.tion. 
Fac,~d with these choices, this generation was forced to develop b discourse on 
some crucial issues conccrnin~:; the future shape of Islam and the HMI's historicity. 
11 TI1e modernity of this pcsantrcn refers to its adoption of modern teaching methods and educational 
teclmology as well as the ust. of English und Arabic as languages of instruction o.nd daily conversation. 
Although it wa• established hy modernist-reforntist 11/ama, Ahmad Sahat, Zai!•J\ Fanani and Imam 
Zarkasji, it is oricn'ed to ncccmtnodate Islamic students (.santri) from differen·. religious groups nnd 
orientations, as n.·flccted by its motto: 'Pcsantren Ganter stands above anJ for t~ll gh,up:;.' 
19 For further descriptions of his intelleetua\ biouaphy, seo Malik and Ibrahim (19Y8: 121-38). 
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Externally, there was a demand to produce strategic and rigorous responses to the 
challenge of modernisation and the peripheralisation of political Islam. At the same 
time, a response was required to the dilemma of whether to support the so-called 
'integrasi 11mmat' (integration of the lllllmat) or to side with the agenda of liberalising 
lslami.. ,hinkinr. that came to be known as the 'renewal movement' (gerakan 
pembalzanwn). Internally, HMI had to choose whether it should be politically 
independent or side with Islamic socio-political organizations and also whether it had to 
be a cadre or mass-based organization. 
Early general reaction of the HMI intellectuals to the modernisation project was 
defensin. Modernisation was perceived as a pre-text for westcmisation that contained 
within it a perilous process of secularism. In a further development, there emerged three 
kinds of response: libe; Jl, reactionary (Islamist), and moderate (moderate-reactionary). 
The initial liberal response came from a circle of HMI activists in the 
Yogyakarta branch, sometimes referred to as the Yogya Group; the branch that had 
supported Mmzipol-USDEK during the guided democracy period. Among prominent 
intellectuals of this group were Djohan Effendi, Almmd Wahib and Dawam Rahardjo 
':.vith Djohan and Wahib being far-liberals and Dawam being a moderate (centre)-
liberal.90 Outside the HMI, another Islamic cpistemic community that influenced the 
intellectual development of these young intellectuals was a study group known as the 
'Limited Group' (using the English words). This study group operated from 1967 up to 
1971 under the mentorship of Mukti Ali, a Western trained Islamic educator (a lecturer 
of the lAIN Yogyakarta) who introduced them to his expertise in comparative religion 
and to modem Islamic thinking. In Ahmad Wahib's case, he had a strong emotional and 
intellectual connection wilh some Catholic priests for he had spent some years at a 
Catholic student's don· . Realino. For this group, modernisation was first welcomed 
and then was percei a necessity for Indonesian Muslims, even if it might lead to 
Westemisation (\\. • ~81: 40, 149). 
The re~c nJry-I:.Iamist response came notably from activists of the HMI 
Dakwah Body, Lcmbaga Dakwalz Ma/zasiswa Islam (LDMI). Established in 11JU6, the 
first chainnan of this body was Imaduddin Abdulrahim assisted by Endang Saifuddin 
Anshari (both of the HMI's Bandung Branch), and Mifiah Faridl (of C1e Solo branch). 
As its centml leadership was located in Bandung, a group of intellectuals associated 
90 For t11e educational b.1ckground of these intellectuals, sec chapter 4. 
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with this body was oflen referred to as the Bandung Group. During the guided 
democracy period, the HMl's Bandung branch was a strong opponent of Manipoi-
USDF.K. The general attitude of this group to the modernisation project tended to be 
reactionary and suspicious, for semantic and political reasons. This group did not object 
to modem rationalism, science and technology, because the Islamic doctrine and 
scientific discovery, according to the standard apologetic argument of the lslamist, arc 
not really conflicting but complementary forms of belief. Nevertheless, this group 
objected to the term 'modernisation' since it was perceived as closely associated with 
the process of Wcstemisation and secularisation, and its adoption by the New Order 
regime was suspected to be a pretext for marginaliling Islamic political influence. 
That the views of this group echoed those of Masjumi leaders was not very 
surprising. Leaders of the LDMI, especially lmaduddin and Endang, maintained an 
emotional and intellectual connection with Ma;jumi leaders and the DDll. Fathers of 
these two men (Abdulrahim and Muhammad !sa Ansha!i) originated from Langkat 
(East Sunuitra) and West Sumatra respectively. An AI-Azhar graduate, Abdulrahim was 
well-known as a local Masjumi leader in Sumatra, while !sa Anshari, afier moving to 
Bandung, was prominent as a militant Masjumi and Persis leader. M•Jreover, both 
lmacloddin and Endang had been exposed to the same religious teacher, Rusjad Nurdin 
(a Persis and Masjumi leader). As the son of a Persis leader, Endang had a long 
association with Nurdin, while lmaduddin was in close contact with him after Nurdin 
became a lecturer in Islamic studies at the lTB in 1962.9t Thus, ethnically, 
ideologically, and intellectually, both lmaduddin and Endang had a ,.redisposition to 
identify themselves with Natsir.92 Moreover, both also belonged to a group of young 
intellectuals who had been trained by the DOll from the late 1960s to become !slr.mic 
propagandists for the Muslim community in secdar univen:ities. 
The moderate group, which tended to reinforce the ieactionary view and as such 
is appropriately referred to as moderate-reactionary (moderate-lslamist), accepted 
modernisation with qualification. This vk'w represented a general attitude of the HMI's 
central leadership (Pengums Besu.•; PB) in Jakarta. As a group with a wide range of 
ideological inclinations, the PB was situaied in the middle of a tug-of-war between the 
Jakarta-Bandung axis versus the Jak,;;•t:·Yogyakarta axis, with the former being what 
91 Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26/ 11/1998). 
92 Nalsirwas from Sumatra and was also well·known as n Persis intellectual in the 1920s/1930s. 
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Madjid called the 'lane of politics' (jalur politik) and the latter being the 'lane of ideas' 
(jalur ide). Madjid himself originally belonged to thb moderate-reactionary position. 
In 1968, Madjid wrote a series of articles entitled 'Modemisasi ia/ah 
Rasionalisasi Bukan Westemisasi' (Modernisation is Rationalisation, not 
Wcstcmisation), published by Pamlji Masyarakat93 and Liga Demokrasi. According to 
him, a simplified definition of modernisation is 'that which ic identical, or almost 
identical, with rationalisation' and if the tcnn is defined in this way, modernisation to a 
Muslim is an imperative. Nevertheless, he then warned that thtrc was a pob3ibility of 
secularism (including humanism, liberalism and communism) and Wcstcrnisation being 
disguised under the clc:>ak of 'mod~rnisation'. In his view, sccul~rism should be resisted 
for it coul~ tlestro~· the religious basis of the Indonesian state. At the same time, he 
emphasized the necessity of ideology and the indispensability of religion as conditionE 
for purpo.r~ful national existence. Modernisation in the Indonesian context, he added, 
should not entail the end of ideology, because life is not possible without a set of 
beliefs, ideas, attitudes and convictions. He finally warned that there was a hidden 
agenda developed by some of the indonesian Wcstcrniscd elite who developed a strong 
dislike for anything Islaw.ic. They therefore directed modernisation toward 
Wcsternisation in accord with the spirit of what he called 'Snouckism'94 to marginalisc 
Islamic political aspirations. He then came up a proposition: 
Whoever is courageous enough to be honest with himself will admit that the 
present difficulties an: due to the fact that minority groups which do not enjoy 
the popular support of the people arc playing too big a role, while the majority 
group is being ob~tructcd from.playing their decisive role. The role it is playing 
docs not correspond to its majority position.95 
Given that the article exhibited Madjid's advocacy for Islamic political aspirations, soon 
afterwards he was celebrated as 'Natsir Muda' (the Young Nalsir).96 
"Pandji Masjaral:at, nos. 28, 29, 30; the articles nrc dated I Muhnrnm 1388 HJ29 March 1968. 
9
" 11te tenn 'Snouckism' bet-;: referred to the architect of the Dutch 'association' policy, C. Snouck 
Hurgronje. 
"Liga Indonesia (p. 39). Quoted in Hassan ( 1975: 43) 
96 A similar view had actually been exprcss~d by Amien Rais, a former HMI activist but now representing 
himself as a leader of the !MM. In his ariicle in Suaro Mullammadijall (No. 16, August 1967) entitled 
'Agama, Modernisasf. dan Afahasiswa' (Religion, Modelnisalion and University Students), among other 
things, he stated that in the effort to overcome the misery and backwardness of Indonesians, students 
belonging to the '1966 Generation' had a vital role to play as 'agents of modernisation'. Admitting that 
modernisation 'bas become n nation01l consensus', he tl!gretted the existence of what he called some 
selfish clements in lndon~ian society who \!.o'Bh;.,;;d Ia usc the idea of modernisation as n bandwagon for 
panicularistic political goals. He then gave U1e following example (p. 10): ··n,e PMKRJ (U1e Catholic 
Students Organization of Indonesia), for instant<, in its Members' DeliberJting Council held in llandung 
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When the New Order refused to rehabilitate the Masjumi, the HMI intellectuals 
were at the outset overwhelmed by a geneml sense <'f frustr:~titon. The liberal group then 
came to tt.e view that commitment of the HMI and Muslims in general was not to 
Islamic organizations or leaders but rather to Islamic values. In their view, Islam itself 
was not supposed to be treated as an ideology but rather as a source of universal moral 
and ethical precepts. For this group, the formal demand for an Islamic party or Islamic 
state was not only unnecessary but also misleading. With this kind of thinking, the 
group moved further towards explicitly supporting Pmzcasi/a as the principle of the 
state. 
On the other hand, the reactionary group continued to be preoccupied with a 
standard apologetic argument that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way 
of life and that in Islam there is no separation between religious and political life. 
Despite of the New Order's repression of political Islam, intellectuals of this kind 
managed to find other ways to socialise their Islamic political aspirations. 
The moderate group altempted to avoid apologetic arguments through its 
willingness to criticise standard Islamic arr.uments as we11 as the shortcoming of the 
Muslim community, but it continued to perceive Islam as an ideo -political system. 
Madjid, for instance, in the l1rsttern1 of his chairmanship had criticised the HMI's usc of 
Tjokroaminoto's book, Islam ami Socialism in cadre trainings, for its apologetic 
tendency. At the same time, he wrote a famous handbook for HMI training purposes 
entitled !slamisme (Islamism), which continued to present Islam as an alternative 
ideology to communism, capitalism ond other secular ideologies (Malik & Ibrahim 
1998: 125; Wahib, 1981: 156). 
Concerning the integration of the ummat, the HMI inte11ectuals at first viewed 
this issue as a prime concern. The eighth National HMI Congress in Solo (10-17 
September 1966) supported the idea of an A11 Islam Congress. The liberal group then 
came to favour the agenda of the Islamic renewal movement, even though prioritising 
this agen!l~ coult'. •ause a strained relationship with the ummat. For this group, the main 
problem for Indonesian Muslims was not Islamic fracturing, but rather the obstinacy of 
last month adopted "modernization" as its national program. Dut, in addition to that, it categorically sbted 
that in order to accomplish renewal in Indonesia, the state should not m:magc matters pertaining to 
religion. This statement implied insistence on the abolition of the Department of Religion and its 
divisions ••. The motivo behind PMKRI's attitude is simple; that is, to hit the Muslim community (whose 
toleration has been excessive) whi:::h forms the majority of the population.' For a fu•.1hcr discussion of 
Indonesian Muslims' response to modemisntion, see Hassan (1975). 
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Islamic thinking. For the I~lamist group, however, Islamic disputes were regarded as at 
the root of Muslims' powerlessness, and the preservation of Islamic solidarity was 
considered as far more important than tli~ self-indulgence of intellectual adventure. For 
the moderates, the reconstruction of Islamic thinking was important, but not at the risk 
of severing the relationship with the Wlmrat and other Islamic organizations. 
Despite severe external (political) pressures imposed by the new regime, there 
was a positive internal development that helped boost HMI intellectual confidence and 
expectation. Tl:c preponderance of young Islamic intelligentsia during the Old Order 
became even stronger after the changeover to the New Order polity. In the wake of the 
dismantling oflcftist movements, there was an upsurge in student interest to learn about 
Islam and to join Islamic student organizations. At the same time, religious instruction 
in secular schools and universities was made compulsory. Consequently, in the 
stronghold of secular students such as the ITB, for instance, where students who 
practised the weekly Friday communal prayer (s/wlatjum'at) was previously referred to 
as 'Arabic Camels', many students now began to tum to lslam.97 
The growing interest in Islamic studies, practices and organizations (hereafter, 
referred to as the 'Islamic tum') received a different reaction from the HMI 
intellectuals. For the liberal group, the phenomena of the 'Is! antic tum' provided a 
means to end obsessions with formal and quantitative Islamic achievements. The HMI, 
according to this view, should become an independent organization and detach itself 
from !starr· organizations. Moreover, as this grou. believed that the urgent need was 
for the renewal of Islamic thinking, it was argued that the HMI should position itself as 
the·nurturcr of a creative minority rather then as mass organization. In contrary, the 
dakwah-oriented lslamist intellectuals viewed the growing interest in Islam as a fine 
opportunity to bring educated people to the 'house' of Islam. For this group, the HMI 
should increase its daJ..,vah efforts to reach a wider audience. In its eyes, to bring new 
converts into Islamic action groups was of paramount importance in order to strengthen 
their Islamic socio-political consciousness. To better respond to this challenge, the HMI, 
according to this view, should maintain its network with other Islantic organizations.98 
The moderate members agreed with the idea that the HMI should position itself as an 
"Interview witl>lmaduddin Abdu1rahim (26111/1998). 
"Interview with lmaduddin Abdu1rahim (261111 1998). 
Chapter 5 - 111c New Order's Rcprcssh'C·Dcl'Ciopmcntafism 36t 
independent and cadre organization, but by no means it should detach itself from other 
Islamic organizations and terminate its missionary efforts.99 
5.7 Power Games: Consolid2tion and Contestation 
The internal disputes among the HMI imellectuals reached a climax in the wake 
of the deepening affinity of the dakwah·oriented intellectuals with the DDII and the 
changing face of Madjid's intellectual orientation. This development began on the eve 
of the second term ofMadjid's chairmanship. 
The affinity of the dakwah-oriented intellectuals of the HMI with the DDII was 
especially strengthened by a common concern with the challenge of the dakwah 
movement. In the face of the 'Islamic turn', ( :;e had already emerged in the late 1960s 
embryos of the mosque movement in the . ·eu of secular universities. At the same 
time, when religious instruction became com,..ulsory, secular universities demanded a 
huge supply of lecturers for religious instruction. Already in 1968 Imaduddin, for 
instance, was asked by the ITB to he a lecturer in Islamic studies, though his academic 
background was electrical engineering. In response to such circumstances, in late 1967 
the DDII began to promote the establishment of campus mosques in Bandung, 
Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan and Makassar. It provided not only motivation but also 
financial assistance. About the same time, it 31so began to recruit dakwa/z-oriented 
intellectuals from diverse secular university backgrounds (mostly former activists of the 
HMIIPII) l-> be trained as lecturers for religious instruction and as mentors f:-r the 
mosque movcment. 100 
The cadre training of the dakwah movement were largely conducted in Jakarta 
with headquarters being in the ashmm of Pa11itia Haji l!ldo11csia (PHI, Indonesian Haji 
Committee) in Kwitang (Central Jakarta). The principal trainers were DDII intellectuals, 
such as Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, M Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. 
Besides an in-depth study of various aspects oflslam and Islamic tea,;hing, this dakwah 
group, sometimes referred to as the PHI group, made an attempt to standardize the 
content of religious instruction in universities under the banner 'Islam as a Scientific 
" For further discu,.ion oftl1is issue, see Wahib (l98t: t44-93). 
100 Among !he early recruits were tmaduddin Abdulrahim, Ahmad Sadaly nnd A.M. Lulhfi (oftl1e ITB), 
Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Rudy Sjarif (of Padjadjaran Univcrsily), Iusuf Amir Fcisal (of IKIP 
Bandung), Daud Ali, Djumalis Ali ond Jchlijanto (ofUI), A.M. Sacfuddin nod Soleh Widodo (ofiPB), 
Sahirul Alim and Amico Rnis (of UGM), Rofiq Anwar (of Diponegoro University), Dald;ri 
Mangundiwirdjo, nnd Fuod Amsjnri (of Airlangga University), Gadin Jlnkim, Bachtiar Fanani Lubis and 
Faiz Albar (ofNortl1 Sumatra University). Interview with A. M. Luthfi (03/09/t998). 
) 
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Discipline' (Islm11 Disip/in J/nw, IDI). This effort gained official support from the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs durin~Iamsjah Prawiranegara's period (1978-1983), but 
was then ignored by his successtt: Munawir Sjadzali, who disliked the formalisation of 
Islam.101 The IDI was in fact ~!..¢elude to the ambitious project of the Islamization of 
the sciences that would became an important Islamic theme in the following years. The 
network of the tlakwah-oriented young intellectuals with the DOll group provided the 
channel for the transmission oflslamic historical ideas and the impetus for the mosque 
movement that became more apparent from the early 1970s. 
Until the late 1960s, the tlakwah-orientcd intellectuals also benefited from 
Madjid's tenJency as the chairman of HMI to be sympathetic to the lslamist's ideas. 
Madjid had previously shared similar views with the Bandung group, in their opposition 
to the pro-Manipol and pro-liberal ideas of the Y ogyakarta b'I"Oup. He had been admired 
\:y the tlak11•ah group so much that lmaduddin named his son Nurcholish. Later, 
however, Madjid dissociated himself from the Islamist (tlak:,•ah) group. 
Madjid's shift towards liberal Islamic thinking was partly a result of his 
intellectual dynamism and environment. As Wahib stated (1981: 160-1 ): 'Nurcholish 
Madjid is a man oflcarning and reading. The book is his first beloved friend. Even if he 
has felt right, his willingness to continuously !cam will in tum force him to rc-qucstion 
what he has p;·eviously believed.' Because of his reading hobby, Wahib, added, 'Madjid 
has enough scientific tools so that with a mental switch he can leapfrog to catch up what 
other people have initiated' (p.I63). Madjid was also an independent individual with no 
special older mentor. 102 For an lAIN student, becoming the chai11nan of the HMI was 
very unusual and is also a reflection of his personal strength. Madjid also exhibited the 
strong tendency an1ong students of the lAIN and traditionalist Pesantrcn to be relati,. ly 
less radical and to (strongly) desire Wcstem scientific knowledge and the language of 
modem 'intellectual discourse', 
The impetus for his shift to the liberal cause, however, was his direct encounter 
with the Westem world. In October 1968, he was invited lo visit the USA by the State 
Department of the Federal Government of the United States of America under the 
sponsorship of the Council for Leaders and Specialists (CLS}. The reason behind this 
invitation, according to an official of the American Embassy in Jakarta, was ~ust to 
show him what he dislikes sc far' (Wahib 1981: 161). During two months of his travels 
101 lnlcrview wilh Utomo Donanjaya (29/1112000). 
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in America, he visited universities and learned about the academic life of university 
students, attended seminars and discussions with several academic and political figures, 
and witnessed some of the achievements of Western civilization. He also had the 
opportunity to meet with his compatriot, influential socialist intellectual, Sudjatmoko, 
lltcn the Indonesian ambassador to the USA, who welcomed his visit with great 
hospitality. Shortly afterwards, he continued his journey to France, Turkey, Lebanon, 
Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. Next in March 1969, at 
the invitation of King Faisal of the Saudi Arabia, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca along 
with some I 0 other HMI functionaries. Rcflec:ing on his visit both to the Western and 
Islamic worlds, he carne to realise the disjuncture brtwcen Islamic ideals and the reality 
of life in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the West that he had been so critical of, 
exhibited many positive dimensions and achievements. Henceforth, 'he began to 
appreciate the good aspects of Western humanism' (Wahib 1981: 161 }. 
Madjid's mental switch had begun, though this did not lead to a sudden radical 
change. For sometime, his new insight was submerged under a thick sediment of his 
established intellectual thinking as recorded in his work lslamisme. His thinking as 
described in /s/amisme, com!;incd with his new insights and other HMI intellectuals' 
idea;, were synthesised during and in the aftermath of the ninth HMI National Congress 
in Malang (3-10 May 1969}, to become a new formulation and guidance for HMI 
ideology, known as Ni/ai-Nilai Dasar Perjua11ga11 (ND!', the Basic Principles of the 
Struggle).103 Among other things, this ideology emphasised the centrepiece of Islamic 
monotheism, the tnuilid doctrine (the nature of God as an all-inclusive being), as the 
central guidance of the Islamic struggle. For the HMI in particular, it emphasised the 
need to maintain integration and coherence between ima11 (belief), ilmu (knowlcdgr) 
and amal (action) as well as between an Islamic and nationalistic oricntation. 104 
The remaining months of 1969 were critical ones for Madjid's thinking about 
Islamic liberalism. He continued to be overwhelmed by a pt~~;::;:; of self reflection, 
whether to side with the integration effort or to embark on the renewal movement. An 
influential factor in his move towards the renewal movement came from informal small 
group discussions which involved his closest fellows and one of the key figures 
102 Interview wi:h Utomo Dananjaya, one ofMadjid's closest friend (29/1 t/2000). 
103 The congress commissioned Nureholish Madjid, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Endang Saifuddin Anshari 
and Sakib Mahmud to perfect the NDP dr•fi that had been prepared by PB HMI. In fae~ Madjid 
contributed a larger share of ideas to the final version oflhe NDP (Silompul2002: 246). 
, .. For the content oflhc NDP, see Sitompul (2002: 323-SOS). 
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involved in this process was Utomo Dananjaya. He was a moderate leader of the Pll 
(chairman of the Pll, 1967-1969) and an intimate friend of Madjid who in 19t9 
reactivated the tradition of inviting the HMI chairman (at that time Madjid) to give a 
speech to the Pll National Congress (held that year in Bandung). In the same year, at a 
post-'/d c/-Fitr (Feast of Breaking the Ramadlza11 Fast) social evening (lzalal bilzalal), 
Utomo conducted a discussion m.der the theme 'Integration of the Islamic Community', 
which involved Subchnn Z.E (of NU), H.M. Rasjidi (of Mulzammadiyalz), Anwar 
Tjokroaminoto (of PSII), and Rusli Khalil (of Pcrti). In the aftermath of the event, 
however, Dananjaya got the impression that the agenda of integration had not been well 
received. So he began to conduct small group discussions, which involved his close 
fellows: Nurr.holish Madjid (of HMI), Usep Fathuddin (of Pll), and Anwar Simich (of 
GPIJ), to solve the dilemma of whether to support the impractical aims of integration or 
to side with the disir:, . ..,.ating renewal movement. 
In addition to the small group discussions, Madjid also conducted discussions 
with Masjumi leaders such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Mohamad Roem, and Osman 
Raliby from which he got the impression that these men did not really consider the idea 
. 
of an Islamic state as an urgeo1t priority. In his view: 'They had an idea about something 
like an Islamic state, but it had yet to be achieved through democratic mechanisms. 
Even a man like P.oem had no aspirations about it, though he retained his empathy with 
its supporters.'" 05 
Although these small group discussions did not arrive at any conclusive result, 
they provided new inspiration for the participants. Already in late November 1969, 
Madjid wrote personal letters to Ahmad Wahib and Djoh~n Effendi, two liberal 
protagonists who had resigned from the HMI on 30 September and I 0 October 1969 
respectively because of their disagreement with the Jslamist group of the HMJ. In his 
letter he stated his agreement with the principal ideas of these two men, while asking 
their understanding about the difficulty of implementing such ideas in the HMI (Wahib 
1981: 165-6). Then, in preparing a post-'/d ai-Fitr social evening (lzalal bilralal) in 
1970, which was organized jointly by four Muslim student-youth and sardja11a 
organizations, HMI, GPI, PII, and Pcrsami, the committee, which involved those 
participants in the small • 'iscussions, agreed to choose 'rethinking and integration' as the 
1
" Interview willt Nurcholish M•djid (t8/09/t998). Loter in t983, Mndjid nod Roem continued their 
discussion about the idea oflslamic state through letters between Jakarta-Chicago, as Madjid at this time 
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theme of the hal a/ bilw/al discussion. The original intention of choosing this theme was 
simply to stimulate discllssion and to underscore the determination of the leadership of 
the Muslim youth groups to find solutions to the deeply ar..onisinp, 1!•o~>'c•r·~ of the 
11mmat. Initially, the intellectual invited to give the speech on this ocCasion was Alfian 
(a Muslim in~·. ''.,ctual from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIP!). But he was 
unable to c . , so Harun Naslilion (a ralio•Jalist Islamic ~cholar of the lAIN) was 
chosen to be his replacement. In fact, Nasution was also unavailable. Finally, Madjid 
was appointed to be the speaker and 'the rest is history' .1()1; 
In this lzalal billa/a/ event, held on 3 January 1970, Madjid presented a paper 
entitled 'Kehamsan Pembaharuan Pemikiran !.•lam dan Masa/ah lntegrasi Ummat' 
(The Ncccss:ty of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the 
Ummat). In the speech he explained that in his view the agenda of integration was an 
impractical approach. The political opportunity structure of the New Order nccessi!ated 
changes in the bchavioura'r and emotional C<lndition of the Muslim community, whereas 
the idealistic approach of integration would only help to perpetuate intellectual 
impotence artJ stagnation within the rmmrat. He believed thatthc- Muslims' loss of what 
he referred to ru; 'psychological striking force' had caused a '25-year set-back' for the 
11111mat and was too complex to be solved through an integration-oriented approach. 
Thus, he considered the agenda for renewing Islamic thought to be a cure for the 
malaise of the 11mmat. Controversial issues of this agenda might undermine integrative 
efforts, but, in his judgment, the risk was worth taking; even if this project failed to 
produce the desired results, it would still be useful at least as an alicmptlc cast aside the 
burden of intellectual stagnation. This project, he added, became more urgent in view of 
the fact that established reformist Islamic organizations such as Mlllzammadiyalz, Al-
Irsyad, Persis and others had lost their reformist verve and clan vital that caused them 
to be i;:distinguishable from, and even less pr ogrcssive than, the traditionalist Muslim 
organizations. 
As he went on to outline his thinking on 'renewal', Madjid came to a very 
crucial poi~t. He believed that the renewal process should begin by liberath1g the lllllttwl 
from 'traditional values' in favour of 'future-oriented' values. This liberation process, 
he continued, necessitated the adoption of 'secularisation', the promotion of intellcctuzl 
was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, reachin3 agreement that tht! idea of an lsl:lmic slate 
is alien to the Islamic scriptures. Sec Santoso ( 1997). 
106 lnterview with Utomo Dananjayn (7/l2/2000). 
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freedom, the pursuit of the 'idea of progress' and the cultivation of open attitudes. What 
he meant by the term 'sccularisation' here is not identical with secularism, as the latter, 
in his view, is admit;cdly alien to the Islamic worldvicw. Madjid borrowed the 
interpretation of a Christian theologian, Harvey Cox, and of an American sociologist, 
Robert N. Bellah, so that by sccularisation he meant a process of temporalising values 
which arc indeed temporal, but which the ummrt had a tendency to regard as 
otherworldly (uk/. ·' ·' ·.· ; ltc term also meant to l• ·.1 the 'dcsacralisation' of cvcrythinp. 
J!~1cr than that which is truly transcendental. ."usi bui not least, in response to an 
encouraging growth of people's interest in Islam on the one hand and the impo~ence of 
political Islam on the other hand, hr cJme to the conclusion that numew••; Muslims at 
that time were in favour of: 'Islam: yes; Islamic party: no!' 
l\fadjid's courage in lc.khg the unpopular step of favouring the renewal 
movement although he ran Ute risk of attracting popular criticism was a decisive 
moment for his initiation as an avant-garde intellectual. As Max Weber indicated: 
'Intellectuals oficn face the dilemma of having to choose between intellectual integrity 
and extra-intellectual contingencies, between rationalizing the flow .1f ideas and 
dogmatic stagnation. Any decision in favour of the latter involves a 'sacrifice of 
intcllect'.' 107 A typical ambivalence arises from this position, described by Bernhard 
Giesen as follows (1998: 43): 
Intellectuals bewail the lack of understanding from a publk that is unaware, 
insufficiently aware, or even hostile to their interpretations. On the other hand, 
precisely this rejection by the public typically creates the tension that can be 
understood as the interpretative head start of the intellectual avant-garde. In his 
or her complaint about the public, Ute intellectual initially constructs the basic 
structure within which he or she can gain exceptionally as an intellectual. 
Conversely, the adoption of intellectual interpretations by a wider public always 
poses a danger to the distinction of an intellectual. · 
By prioritising ideas over public opini'ln, M~djid· tenced to be indifferent 
towards the social implications of his contemplative q•;estionings and statements This 
is especially true in his crucial statement about the necessity of 'serularisation'. No 
matter what his definition of secularisation was, language or terminology diJes not 
. operate in isolati.!Jn and cannot escape from history. Meaning is always constructed in 
social and historical contexts where social institutions and struggles engage in the 
)recess. As Jay L. Lemke argued (1995: 9): 'All meanings are made witllin Ute 
107 See Ahm:ld Sadri's Max Weber's Sociology ofltttcllcclllols (1992: 72). 
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communities and the analysis of meaning should not be separated from the social, 
historical, cultural and political dimensions of these communities.' In the cognitive 
struct•Jrc .. ,ithe Indonesian Muslim community, the term 'secular' and its derivations had 
an e~tablished negative connotation as signifiers of otherness. The term was commonly 
associated with the removal of religious influence from the public and political sphere-
which is considered as alien to an Islamic worldview-with a specific reference to a 
repressive Dutch colonial policy under Snouck Hurgronje's influence to marginalise 
political Islam. Muslims' objections to the tenn were exacerbated by Madjid's excessive 
reference to Western academic sources, which reinforced the sense of otherness of the 
term 
For similar reasons, Madjid's statement about '!slam: yes ; ;larnic party: no!' had 
also been misundcr;tood. Like Tjokroaminoto's statement b"'llre the Sarekat Islam 
congress in Surakarta in 1913 that 'Sl is not a political party, and not un organization 
that desires a revolution, and it is loyat to the government,' Madjid's statement is 
actually not void of political intention. It cr.'l be considered as a political strategy in the 
guise of a non-formal political approach; that in the powerlessness of political !slam, 
Muslims should seek other ways to survive. But again because it was perceived a& part 
and parcel of his statement on secularisation, his critics could not read the nuances of 
his statement. 
The clash between 'vision' and 'tradition' occurred around these two crucial 
points in Madjid's position and exhausted intellectual debates therea!\er. The debate was 
trapped in a semantic contention, which failed to deal with substantial issues. The scale 
of controversy and the seriousness of Madjid's vision became even more widl_,•:cad 
and forceful because of the intensity and density of media coverag~, especially by 
Tempo and Pandji Masjarakat magazines which became the m~in instigate c. of the 
polemic. Fired by the media coverage, the reactionary elements of >lle Muslim 
community both from the older and younger generations of Muslim intellectuals, such 
as H. M. Rasjidi (a Masjumi/DD!lleader), Abdul Qadir Jaelani (a militant PI! leader}, 
and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (a dakwalr-oriented intellectual of the HM!) began to 
laun~h severe attacks. Among others, Rasjidi criticised Madjid's view of secularisation 
as being an arbitrary interpretation, for it already had a standard signification. Rasjidi 
also emphasized that Muujid ignored the fact that the secularisation process would in 
tum lead to secularism. In supporting Rasjidi's critique, other polemicists objected to 
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what they perceived as Madjid's rejection of Islamic politics. They believed in 'Islam, 
yes; Islamic party, yes!' 108 
Polemics and categorisation made by the media or by analysts often force 
polemicists to hold a particular intellectual position more firmly even when they 
previously had some doubts. Although the original intention of Madjid's speech was 
only to stimulate discussion, the effect 'of hostile criticism and media exposure pressed 
him to move further along the path of the liberal cause. His move in this direction was 
welcomed by the liberal camp. Ahmad Wahid expressed this as follows (1981: 166): 
As we [Wahib and Effendi] got Nurcholish Madjid's paper from Dawam, via the 
post, we expressed our happiness by going around Yogyakarta to meet with 
leaders of the HMI and the ummat [to tell them about his speech]. To be frank, 
we exploited Madjid authority as the chairman of the biggest and the most 
respected student organization, who was often called 'the second Natsir', to 
popularisc the liberal thinking. 
On the other hand, Madjid's depa11urc from his original position greatly disappointed 
the dakwalz·oricnted group. This disappointment provided the impetus for the group to 
engage more seriously in the mosque movement. 
5.7.1 The Development of the Dakwah Movement 
To analyse the development of the cla~wah movement-as well us the renewal 
movement-theories of so=iai movements provide useful insights. There arc two major 
paradigms in the current debates about social movements. The first is the so-called 
'roourcc mobilisation' approach, and the second i• the 'personal motivation' approach. 
·;he first approach takes as its starting point the analysis of organizations rather than the 
individual. The prime research question of this approach is not who the actors are or 
what motivates them but ratlter, why some movements arc more successful than others. 
The resource mobilisation approach studies the mechanisms through which movements 
recruit their members and the organizati!lnal forms through which mobilisation of both 
human and social resources takes place. The second approach focuses on the personal 
motivations thai lead to participation in social movements. This approach investigates 
individuals' socio-psychological backgrouPil> ;Jr upbringing that lead them lo become 
involved in a particular movement (Eyerm"'· &. Jamison 1991: 23-29). Based on these 
10
' For a further discussion of lhe polemics on Madjid's renewal ideas, see Hassan (1975: 133-217), 
Rasjidi ( 1972), Anshari ( 1973), Islamic Research Cenlcr ( 1970). 
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approaches, this analysis of the dakwah movement will usc a productive cx~hange 
between the two perspectives, rather than an either/or choice. 
The driving force for the early development of the dakwah movement was the 
socio-political dislocation of Islamist intellectuals. They had to face threats from two 
directions: state political repression and the challenge of the liberal-minded Muslims. 
Driven by Islamic political aspirations on the one hand, but confronted by the 
government's obstruction of political Islam on the other, this Islamist b'TOUp experienced 
acute political dislocation. In the ·meantime, the general mass media, as another 
manifestation of the public l'J'·aere, tended to serve as the state id~ological apparatus in 
championing modernisation. The media was thus preconditioned to be sympathetic to 
the renewal movement. Realising that the public sphere was hostile to their ideo-
political aspirations, the lslamist intellectuals created a subtle and fluid social 
movement, which was relatively impervious to state control, as a new foundation for 
constructing collective solidarity and identity. In so doing they began to create the 
Muslims' 'bloc without' (outside the New Order formal political structure). 
The alternative resource tor the mobilisation of new lslamists' collective action 
wa:; found in the relatively 'free' space of 'independent' mosques located in the milieu 
of university campuses.t09 The function of the mosque as the central ground ofreligio-
political movements is not alien to the Muslim World. Even so, the presence of 
pernmnent 1110sques in the milieu of secular universities and their usc as the base camps 
ofrcligio-political movements of secular university students was a new phenomenon in 
Indonesian history. Most oflhc secular university mosques began to emerge in the New 
Order pcriod.110 The hallmark of this phenomenon was the establishment of campus 
mosques within the milieu of prestigious universities such as the Ban dung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) and the University of Indonesia (UI). 
The establishment of the ITB mosque, known as Salman Mosque, had been 
planned by a nucleus of Islamic activists of this institution since I 958. However, 
material and psychological barriers, especially the unfavourable response of the 
rectorate to the idea of establishing a mosque inside 'the bastion of the secular 
109 TI1e term ·independent mosqu""' here refers to the mosques that were not funded .:nd controlled by 
~ovemment authoriti~-c; and also not directly att:lchcd to any nujor Islamic organization. 
10 TI1e mosque of,..:,· North Sumab-a University. known l.1tcr as Alasjid Da/..1\•a/r, is the only campus 
mosque that had em...,;ed in the 1950s. At tl1" very beginning o! its esmblislunent in 1952/1953, however, 
it WllS only a relatively small mosque with its functions until the 1960s being confined to ritual and 
community interactions. Interview witlt Dachtiar Fanani Lubis (11111/2000). 
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intellectuals', delayed its materialization so it was only completed in 1972.111 The UJ 
mosque began to be established in 1966 and was finished in 1968. It was named Arief 
Rahman Hakim Mosque to commemorate the name of an Islamic activist of that 
university who became a martyr of the student movement of 1966. Most other campus 
mosques began to emerge from the latter part of the 1970s onwards. 
In the absence of mosques, Islamic activists began their religious activities in 
public spaces such as classrooms or auditoriums. With the frequent difficulty of getting 
official permission to establish a mosque inside the campus, many 'clever' strategies 
had to be developed. The establishmcn•. of the IPB mosque, AI-Ghifari, in early 1980s, 
for instance, is an interesting case. It was originally proposed to the authorities as a 
laboratory building. Once it had been built, however, Islamic activists shified the 
function of the building from scientific laboratory to 'spiritual' laboratory.112 On most 
other campuses, the strategy of involving the rectorate on the committee for the mosque 
establishment was very effective. This approach was effective because of the early 
performance of the mosque movement which gave the impression that it had no political 
agenda. 
It is worth noting that intellectuals who had been trained by the DDII in the PHI 
played a decisive role in the establishment and development of many early campus 
mosques, as most of them became lecturers in the secular universities where they 
originated. In short, the presence of mosques inside secular universities was a 
monument to the ascendancy ofthe da/..wail-oriented intellectuals. 
Early leaders (organic intellectuals) of the;Je mosque movements were larg·~ly 
drawn from the dakwail-oricnted HMIIPII intellectuals of the fourth generation. Their 
initial audiences were Islamic activists of the fifth generation of intelligentsia, especially 
those who entered university in the 1970s. In the gestation period, the principal 
proponents of this movement were composed largely of Ute HMIIPII members as well. 
Although the lelli~t student groups had been dismantled, activists of Islamic student 
organizations of the 1970s were still motivated by a fierce competitive political struggle 
with those of secular student fronts, especially to control intra-university student 
governments. In the face of this challenge, these Islamic activists shared the vision of 
the older generation of the dakwah activists to make the campt:s mosque the base of 
111 Interview with lmaduddin Abdulrnhim (26111/1998) nnd the public relntions officer of the Salmnn 
mosque, Budi Prnyitno (13/1212000). 
111 Interview with Adian Husaini, n fonnernctivist of AI-Ghifari (23/05/2001). 
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student activities, both to prepare and enlarge Islamic cadres and constituencies and to 
find ways of bridging the differences between student activists of different 
organizational backgrounds. For the older generation, however, there was another 
additional interest: to protect students of the secular universities from the influence of 
the renewal movement.113 
The prototype of this mosque movement emerged in the ITB's Salman Mosque 
in early 1970s, which adopted ideology and 'movement intellcctua1'114 from the so-
called Latiltan Mtyaltid Dalewalt (LMD, Training of the Dakwalt Fighter). The LMD 
was first introduced by Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his fellows liS to the community of 
Salman Mosque in 1973. Interestingly, the basic material of the LMD's ideology was in 
fact a modified version of the Madjid-composed NDP (of the HMI) with a stronger 
emphasis on the tau/tid doctrine and a special caution about the threat of the so-called 
intellectual warfare (gltazwul filer) with Western-influenced secular ideas.116 Inspiration 
for the emphasis on the tau/tid and gltazwul filer was taken from the doctrine of the well-
known Egyptian Islamic movement, lklnvanul Muslimin (IM, Islamic Brotherhood, est. 
1928). 
The exposure of the Islamist group to aspects of the IM ideology and dalewalt 
methods was made possible especially by the involvement of Abdulrahim in 
international networks of Islamic students. One of the most important was the 
International lslamic Federatio:lll of Student Organizations (IIFSO, est. 1969). With 
Natsir's encouragement, Abdulrahim began to be actively involved in this organization 
in 1971 and soon assumed the position of Vice-Secretary General. 117 Many leaders of 
this organization had been influenced by the IM ideology. Abdulrahim's encounter with 
them seemed to provide a catalyst for his rudimentary understanding of the U.f ideology 
and methods, which had a certain influence on the curriculum and meU10d of the LMD 
(Damanik 2002: 71 ). 
What made the LMD special and influential was its training approach. 
Participants had to stay in the Salman Mosque complex for about a week and were 
113 Interview with Chairil Anwar, an ;rly activist of the UGM (Shalalwddin) mosque (11/1112000), 
Muhammad Nub, an early activist of the ITS (Mananllllmi) mosque (11/11/2000), and Muchtar Abbas, 
an early activist ofthe lTD (Salman) mosque (29/ll/2000). · 
114 TI1e tenn 'movement intellectual' here is borrowed from Ron Eyerman, and means an intellectual of a 
~articular social movement (Eyerman & Jamison 1991: 94-119). 
"The principal instructors of the LMD were lmaduddin Abdulralrlm, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Mifiah 
Faridl, and Sakib Mahmud. All of them were former leaders of the IIMI's dakwah institute, LDMJ. 
116 Interview with Mucbtar Abbas (29/J 1/2000). 
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isolated from external contact. The training began an hour before early morning prayer 
(about 4.00 a.m.}, and during the day participants were involved in intense aw.l 
stimulating small group religious discussions. At night they had to perfonn the midnight 
(optional) prayer, and on the final night they had to ~.vear an oath before the trainers 
containing the profession of the Faith (kalimat syahat!at), 'There is no god but God, and 
Muhammad is the Prophet ofGod.' 118 
This very short-tcnn Islamic training in fact stimulated a radical new religious 
awareness. The birth of this new religious-mindedness was signalled by the wearing of 
jilbab (headscarf) by female activists, which speedily became the very symbol of the 
mosque (t!a~1\'ah) movement. In later developments, the LMD becantc the recruiting 
ground for junior mentors who led Islamic tutorials known as 'mentoring' (using the 
English tenn) for other ITB students. As the mentoring activity attracted students from 
other universities and even high school students in Bandung, the Salman accommodated 
this enthusiasm through the establishment of a Salman Islamic Youth Community 
(KARISMA). 
The mentori11g activities, in which participants were organized into small 
discussion groups, became the basis for the creation of circles of cohesive groups, 
tcnncd usrah (Ar. family). Each usrah cell had its own mentor who served as a 
motivator and role model, as well as a bridge to connect the small groups into the whole 
entity of the mosque movement. Members of usrah, in tum, became new propagandists 
w!Jo actively recruited new followers. 
The LMD soon attracted Islamic activists from other secular universities. Thus, 
its participants were extended to include students of diverse universities throughout 
Indonesia.119 After attending the LMD, representatives from each campus began to 
introduce the t!akwah training and mentoring program on their own campuses by 
modifying the material and approach of the Salman Mosque. In this way they laid the 
foundation for the establishment of the campus mosque dakwah body that came to be 
117 Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (2611 t/1998). 
111 For more elaborate description of the LMD, seeR. Rosyad (1995), H. K. Dipojono (2002: 215-221) 
and H. Radjosa (2002: 212-14). 
111
' Among prominent figures of the following decades who had joined this training were Hatta Radjasa 
(Secretary General of PAN and Minister of Research and Technology in the Mcgawati Cabinet), Al-Hilal 
Al-Hamdi (Minister of Manpower in the Abdurrnhm:m Wahid Cabinet), M.S. Ka'ban (Secretary General 
orthc PBB), Didin Haliduddln (venerable leader of the tarbiyah [dakwah] movement), Mutammimul Ula 
(leader of the Justice Party, PKIS), Hcrmawan K. Dipojono (Executive Director of the Salman Foundation 
in tllc early 2000s), Muchtar Abbas (a well-known NGO activist) and Faisal Basri (a leading economic 
analyst). For a complete account, see the Salman Database (2001). 
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known as Lcmbaga Da/..1vah Kampus (LDK). Furthermore, former participants of the 
LMD also provided connection chains for informal networks of dalnvah activists across 
universities and for the dissemination of the Islamist ideology. This informal network 
facilitated resource mobilisation such as the coordination of a common action plan, the 
exchange of information and the provision of religious preachers or instructors for 
particular religious events. The simultaneous action of the r.ampus da!nvah bodies 
rapidly extended the sphere of influence of the Islamist idem' .. 
The success of the LMD programs propelled the mosque movement outside the 
campus. The rise of the mosque movement outside the campus itself actually coincided 
with the 'Islamic tum' in the secular universities. TI1e 1970s was the tormative period 
the emergence of the so-called rcmaja masjid (the mosque youth) movement throughout 
Indonesia with many activists of the HMI/Pll backb'l'ound being involved in its gestation 
period. In a growing frustration with politics, the mosque youth began to popularise the 
slogan 'Back to the Mosque' (using the English phrase). Among major mosques in large 
cities which were well-known for the activity of their rcmaja masjid movement were 
Al-Azhar, Sunda Kelapa, and Cut Meutiah mosques in Jakarta, the Istiqomah and 
Mujahidin mosques in Bandung, Syuhada mosque in Yogyakarta, and Al-Falah mosque 
in Surabaya.120 In recruiting cadres and enlarging their constituency, these groups of 
mosque youths benefited from the material, method of training and mentoring programs 
of the campus mosque mo·:~ment. 
As the mosque youth movement grew in members throughout Indonesia, the 
Communication Forum of the Indonesian Mosque Youth (Bada11 Komrmib." Pr.muda 
Masjid ll!dol!csia, BKPM!) was established in 1977 to improve networkiili; among 
them. Structumlly, the BKPMI operated as an autonomous institution in the Indonesian 
Council of Mosques, while the latter was part of the World Council of Mosques (an 
afliliate of the· Muslim World League) with Mohammad Natsir being one of its 
members. The BKPMI, which transformed itself into BKPRMI121 after 1993, became 
the catalyst for the dissemination of Islamist ideas beyond the campus.122 
By the end of the 1970s the scope and force of this mosque movement began to 
enter a new st~ge in the wake ofthe New Order's increasing political repression. By the 
end of the 1970s student politics had reached a low point. Following the dissolution of 
120 S:me of lhe wtll-known figures of lhe remaja masjid movemenl were Toto Tnsmam (Cui Meuliah), 
Jimly Asshiddiqie (Al-Azhar), Faisal Molik (Sunda Kclapa) nnd Dnmhang Pmnowo (Isliqomah). 
111 DKPRMI stands for Badon Koordinasi Pemcda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia. 
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the dewan malzasiswa (student councils) and the imposition of the so-called 
'normalisasi kehidupan kampus' (NKK, the 'nonnalization of campus life) in 1978, 
student politics gradually lost its political significance. By the early 1980s, the ability of 
both extra-campus student organizations and the remaining intra-campus student 
government bodies (faculty-based student senates) as mediums for the actualisation of 
students' political aspirations had been severely impaired. The HMJ, for instance, began 
to Jose its attraction for Islamic students. 
In the face of the NKK-policy to isolate campuses from the influence of external 
socio-political organizations, the HMI lost its finn foothold inside universities. It also 
increasingly lost its credibility in the eyes of the campus-based Islamic activists because 
of its increasing cooperation w<th the slate orthodoxy and political structures. The HMI 
officially changed its organizational principle from Islam to Pancasila at the sil>leenth 
HMI National Congress in Padang (24-31 March 1986). This change caused the 
organization to split into two camps, as those who refused the r.cccplance of Pancasila 
as the sole principle of the organization seceded from the HMI and established a new 
rival organization that came to be known as the HMI-MPO (Majelis Perlimbangan 
Organisasi, Organizational Consideration Council). After this, the leadership of the 
HMI tended to follow an accommodationist line. 
With the depoliticisation of the student world, student activity inside campuses 
was channelled into intra-student organizations which catered for students' demands for 
recreation and professional development. Some student activities, however, did manage 
to actualise their criticism through the mosque movement and through the creation of 
general discussion groups that began to mushroom in early 1980s. 
The campus mosque movement and the general discussion groups displayed 
antithetical tendencies. While the fonner operated inside the milieu ofthe university, the 
latter operated beyond the walls of the university. The fonner aimed to recruit a larger 
constituency and this was made easier by its operation inside the campus. The 
discussion groups never attempted to recruit a large membership and tended to be 
alienated from day to day student life due to their operation outside the campus. While 
the resistance ideology of the mosque movement derived from lslamist ideologies, that 
of the discussion groups in general was highly influenced by. leftist and new-leftist 
ideologies. Whereas the mosque movement connected itself with local and global 
'"For the history nnd development of the DKPRMI, see DPP-DKPRMI (2000). 
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networks of Islamic harakah (movements), the discussion groups were mostly 
connected with local and global networks of socialist-minded non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
In a further development, the mosque movement became more successful than 
the general discussion groups and NGO movement, in being able to maintain its 
'communicative sphere' as a necessary condition for continuing and enlarging the 
intelle~tual community. Operating within the mosque, the former had a sort of cover to 
protect itself from direct control by the security apparatus, while the latter had no such 
cover and hence were more easily controlled or eliminated by the government. Taufik 
Abdullah takes it further (1996: 59): 'It is clear that religious discourses, with their 
references to the sacred texts, ar: one of the few channels relatively free from the 
imposition of the mastery of meaning by the powers that be.' 
Besides being an unintended consequence of the New Order's policy of political 
repression, the mosque movement benefited indirectly from the modcmi~ation project. 
In deviating from the general theory of modemiza\; .. n, which tends to assume that as 
modernization increases, religious faith and observance declines, the Ne·,.,. Order's 
modernization project brought a new religious awareness among a large segment of the 
modernised secular university students. 
One ofthe possible reasons from the growing religious awareness had something 
to do with the socio-psychological deprivation o!' newly urbanised students. Moving 
from the countryside or small towns into metropolitan cities for the sake of learning, 
these new student migrants were plunged into a sort of silent atomiscd individualism 
and experienced serious problems of dislocation. As R. W. Bulliet argued (1994: 202): 
Village life changes over time, but usually change is slow enough to leave 
undisturbed, at least in later memory, the illusion of stability and continuity. 
Migration to the city, however, is a profoundly disrupting experience. Even 
when there are previous migrants from the same village to cushion one's enlfY 
into urban life, !he loss of routines of the agricultural cycle, and of the village's 
closed so~:.-~:· i,; ;,<JI c:..o:ty •:ot,:~ensated for. 
For .;tudents from the middle and upper classes, wh.J had long stayed in 
m~tropolitan cities, a feeling of spiritual deprivation seemed to be a major drive for their 
tum to the mosque movement. One of the results of the New Order's modemisatic~ 
project, for those with money, was a hedonistic life-style and exhibitionism among the 
new rich, as well as corruption among state officials and government servants. Some 
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idealist students of these classes experienced a sort of 'cognitive dissonance', as a result 
of disjuncture between their conception of the good life and the real life of their family. 
Some of them attempted to find a spiritual sanctuary, as an escape from the 'dirty' 
world. 
These problems of social and spiritual deprivation became more acute because 
of the presence of heterogenous post-modem (global) cultures brought in by the New 
Order's technological successes. This was signailcd by the emergence of a diversity of 
means of mass communication and a bewildering experience of the prolif.··.,~'on oflife-
worlds, consumer lifestyles and the secularisation of culture. Trapped in thiS situation, 
urban settlers 'need new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning 
and purpose' (Huntington 1996: 97). To meet this need for moral precepts, the urban 
educated-Muslims faced a dilemma. Should they embraced materialistic and secularistic 
modem values in order to feel fully pm1 of the new world (thereby spuming their 
traditions), or should they, on the contrary, revive their local traditions, even at the price 
of material disadvantage. It was painful to spurn indigenous traditions, but it was also 
painful to remain under-developed. Many Muslims attempted to solve this dilemma by 
embracing neither modem Western values nor local indigenous tradition, but rather 
returning to what they perceived as their true origin; that is the Qur'an, the traditions of 
the Prophet Muhammad, and a religious community (Gellner 1992: 19). In extreme 
cases, this obsession with returning to Islamic authenticity led to the emergence of 
Isbmic fundamentalism. 
Having been poorly educated in religious matters, new migrant and urban 
students who crowded into secular universities in metropolitan cities from the latter pm1 
of the 1970s constituted what R. W. Bullict called (1994) the 'new edge' of the Muslim 
community. In the relative absence of corporate life (civil socicty)-in the European 
sense--in Indonesia, the need of these 'new edge' Muslims for a new community and 
moral precepts was met particularly by the presence of the network of mosque 
movements, sufi orders and other Muslim institutions. 
In their encounter with the Islamic cpistcmic community, these 'new edge' 
Muslims began to question their existence as Muslims. At the same tiu.c, secular 
policies that had created the public education system diminished the status of 
traditionally trained ulama. Thus, when the new edge began to ask questions about 
Islam, they did not tum automatically to the traditional kyai from whom their parents 
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would have sought advice. They turned rather to 'non-scholastic' assertive Muslim 
thinkers who, in many cases, had not received an established traditional religious 
education. As Bulliet noted (1994: 200): 'The fact that the answers these thinkers gave 
to the questions asked them were often at odds with traditional teaching, or manifestly 
predicated upon ideas deriving from Western academic study, did not deter the young 
men and women of the new edge from following them.' 
TI1e religious curiosity of this 'new edge' was also fed by the flourishing of new 
Islamic publications. Beginning in early 1980s, the fifth generation of Muslim activists 
established new Islamic pubFr';ing houses, such as Pustaka-Salma11 and Miza11 in 
Bandung, Gema l11Sa11i Press in Jakarta, and Shalalmddi11 Press in Yogyakarta, which 
provided alternative Islamic reading for the new cdg~. This reading material was 
initially derived from the trans' •. d works of foreign Islamic thinkers and then from 
anthologies of articles by Indonesian intellectuals. TI1roughout the 1980s there also 
emerged new Islamic journals and magazines such as Risalah, Ama11ah, Pesa/ltre/1, 
Sa/mall Kau and Ulumul Qur'a11. The emergence of this number of islamic publications 
reflected and affected the Islamic enthusiasm of the new edge. This contributed to 
making Islamic publications the trend setters in book production in the 1980s. Based on 
a suiVey of the 'Library and Documentation Section' of Tempo magazine, of the 7.241 
total book collected by this section between 1980-1987, the number of books on 
religious themes was 1.949-most of which being on Islamic themes (Tam pi 1987). 
The Islamic zeal of this new edge found its actuJiising space in the campus 
mosque. In this context, the mosque served as the melting pot for the new edge of 
different Islamic streams. Having no direct connection to any major organized Islam, 
the campus mosque was able to distance itself from historical Islamic disputes on 
matters of different interpretation. Slowly but surely, activists of the mosque movement 
began to fonn a new Islamic hybrid which disengaged itself from the long-established 
divide between traditionalist versus refonnist Islamic groups. At the same time the 
Islamic teaching of the campus mosque seemed to suit the religious disposition of new 
urbanised students. There was a strong indication that urbanization had been followed 
by the shift in tho religious disposition and affiliation of many students, from the 
characteristics ot rural Islam that tends to stress 'anthropolatry' towards the 
characteristics 'Jf tl1e l\rban middle-class Islam that tends to stress 'bibliolatry' (Gellner 
I 992). 'l'h~ shift in religious <lisposition and ;>,ffiliatiori is evident in my survey of the 
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religious profiles of the membership of the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intelligentsia (ICMI), an organization which attracted many of the newly urbanised 
Muslims. 123 
Another aspect of modernisation that helped boost the reputation of the mosque 
movement was the growing number of Muslim intellectuals with Masters and PhD 
degrees. Benefiting· from the government's drive for human resource development 
through overseas training, many dakwalz-oricnted scholars were able to improve their 
educational qualifications in Western countries, the very countries that were often 
viewed by Islamists with a double-consciousness. On the one hand, these Western 
countries were often portrayed as a source of moral degeneration and as a menacing 
threat to Islamic civilization. On .the other hand, they were commonly viewed as a 
source of admiration since tl10se who were able to study in the Western world were 
highly respected by their fell'''" compatriots. A significant number of Islamic scholars 
from secular univ~rsity backgroumc bcg&n to pursue PhD or Masters degrees in 
Western universities in thG 1970s. Amor:6 them w~rc such prominent dakwah activists 
~~: : "nien Rais, In:aduddin Abdulrahim, Syafi'i Ma'arif, Kuntowidjojo, Fuad Amsjari, 
and Djalaluddin Rahmat (all went to the USA), Endang Saifuddin Anshari (went to 
Canada), A. M. Saefuddin (went to Gennany). When they returned home, mostly in 
•: .. oi,· 1980s, they contributed to the ~;.;:ngthening of the intelle"'·"l credibility of the 
;nusqt\<.: 1 ·,,ovement. 
In "ddition to •he unintended consequences of political repression and 
t.; :>d~r;;i~;n:on, another driving force for the development of the mosque movement was 
tne ,o: ~linection of the J~donesian Islamic movement to that of global Jslant. Since the 
late i920s, much of the attention and energy ofth.~ )ndonesian Muslim community had 
been focused on domestic political struggles and intra-religious tensions that caused 
Indonesian Jslantic movement to be inward looking. The New Order obstruction of 
political Islam, which coalesced with the deepening modernization-driven international 
penetration of domestic life, provided the impetus for the younger generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia to reconnect itself \vith the global ummat. In this way the new Islamic 
movement tended to be more outward looking. 
This reconnection with the global rmmrat took place at the very time when the 
entire Muslim Workl was swept by a great tremor of lslamism as the new ideological 
"'Thl• will be discussed in the next clupter. 
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passion. Bcginmng in the 1970s, the failure of secular elites and their secular ideologies 
to offer an effective redemption for the socio-economic plight of Muslim societies in 
previous decades gave rise to a general social dissatisfaction. Thj·· •l;sappointment, in 
the context of the Arab world, culminated in the defeat of Arab countries in the 1967 
Arab-Israel war. H~ncefortl-., !1'•! efficacy of secular ideologies ~.'i'i1 as socialism, 
liberalism, and Arab ism were seriously questioned, and many Islamic activists began to 
call upon the Muslim community to return to the authentic source (ashala) of Islamic 
values. In countries with a moderate-secularism like Egypt, for instance, the literature of 
Marxism, existentialism, an•i -~ther Western theories that were widely circulated among 
student activists in Ute 1950s and 1960s now began to be replaced by the lslamists' 
works, especially those of the Jkhwanul Muslimi11 (!M, Islamic Brotherhood) figures, 
such as Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Groups of Islamic fundamentalist 
intelligentsia such as the Jama'al Jslamiyya in Egypt began to attract large numbers of 
recruits within the milieu of the universities in the Arab World and beyond. Even in a 
secular Muslim country such as Turkey, the term 'aydi11' (lslamist intellectual) became 
popular from the 1980s onwards. This tide of lslamism gained its material foundation 
from the boom in oil prices in the 1970s giving rise to 'Petro-lslam'. The trickle-down 
effect of this oil boom brought benefits for the dissemination of Islamism, as giants of 
Petro-lslm" like Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance to the dakwah 
organizations, especially through the Muslim World League (Abaza 1999: 86-92). 
Being receptive to external influences, the mosque movement in Indonesia 
became interested in Isl'll'nic ideas and methods of conte:nporary Islamic movements 
(harakah) in the Muslim World. In 1969, or.c of Sayyid Qutb's works, This Rcligio11 of 
Islam (published 1967), was translated into Indonesian (Inilah Islam) by A.R. Baswedan 
and A. Hanafi and published by Hudaya (Jakarta). In 1978 another translated work of 
Qutb, Masyarakat Islam (Islamic ·society), was published in Dandung. 124 Thus, in the 
1970s, Islamic ideas of this venerable intellcch:al of the Egypt-born Islamic harakalr, 
Ildnva1111l Muslim ill (IM), became acc~ssible to a particular segment of the Indonesian 
Islamic cpistcmic community. This would be followed in the subsequent decades by the 
arrival ofthe Malaysian :novement Dantl Arqam, the Indo-Pakistan-originated Jama'ah 
Tabligh, the Jordan-originated Hizbut Tahrir, and some others.125 
124 The translah'h was A. Mu'thi Nurdin. 
mAll Islamic ltarakalr share a conunon denu.ninator in terms ofti1eir obsession with the implementation . _.
1
1 
of the syariah. Titey differ from each other, however, on the method (manha}) to achieve this obsession. 
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The DDJI was the agent most rcs!)onsible for the dissemination of the lklnvamtl 
Muslimi11's ideology and t!akwah method. Natsir had a close relationship with leaders of 
the IM. The banning of Masjumi made '•im sympathetic to the JM that faced a similar 
fate in Egypt. 126 Moreover, the 1M's emphasis on the so-called /arbiyah movement 
(social-education based or. a tight network of usrah); was regarded by the DDII as 
useful method for the t!akwah movement in Indonesia. In 1980, the DOll's magazine 
and publishing house, Media Dakwah, published a translation of Sayyid Qutb's work, 
Ma 'ii/im fi a/-Tharlq, under the title Pctwrjuk Jala11 (Signposts). 127 The message of this 
!:.uok is that only Islamic a~:.:ncnticity can provide authentic guidance. Meanwhile, by 
:k· early 1980s some students who had been sent by Natsir to undertake overseas 
·. > :i('S in the Middle East had retuned home. Among them were people like Abu 
·.~ ,h,J'28 who hud studied in Saudi Arabia and had been influenced by the teaching and 
method of the IM harakah. When he returned home in 1981 he began to promote 1M 
ideologies and methodr. of da~wah among the DDJI activists. Thus, there emerged an 
early circle of the IM followers within the DOll, composed of Abu Ridho and some 
younger activists such as Mashadi (personal secretary of Mohamad Roem) and 
Mukhlish Abdi. 129 
IM ideas then spread to activists of the PIL '5 the long history of a clus~ 
relationship between the PII with Masjumi!DDII ac; ,s. the PII central office \\~s 
located in the same complex as the bOll office. During the period of Mutammimul 
Ula's leadership (1983-86), Qutb's translated works, particularly Pctwrjuk Jala11, were 
used in the cadre training of the PIJ. 130 The same book became compulsory reading 
material for alumni of the Salman's LMD (Damanik 2002: 96). Following the PII's 
rejection of Pa11casi/a as the sole basis of the socio-political organization, the PJI was 
banned from the public sphere which hindered the marketing of the IM ideologies in 
this organization. Nevertheless, Islamic ideas and dakwah methods of the IM continued 
Some consider a cultural or non·p.•!,'J._,ll npproach as. the most effective means, while others consider a 
polilical approach lhe mosl efTeclive. Jhoso who favour a polilical approach also differ from each olher 
on the political system as the space for the implementation ofth~syariah. TI1e IM tolerates representative 
democracy within the boundary of the nad•ln·state, while Hi:but Tahrir rejects representative democracy 
and the nation-state and is obsessed with the re-creation of the Ahalifalr (International Islamic state). TI1is 
difference in manllaj oflCn te3ds to intemul Islamic disputes among members of different llarakalr. 
126 lnlcrvicw wilh Mulammimut Ula, au early Indonesian follower oflhc IM (0311212003). 
127 The book was lranslaled by A. Raklunon Zainuddin, 
'" Ridho happened lobe an aclivisl ofPII and HMI. . 
129 in lhe 1990s lhesc lhree aclivisls would become ·leading figures oftl>e tarbiyalr·pany, Pa•Mi Keadilan 
(Juslice Pany). 
130 lnlerview wilh Mull!mmimul Uta, an early Indonesian follower of the IM (03112/2003). 
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to influence the Indonesian dakwah movement. Other works of IM leaders were 
translated by graduates of the Middle East universities. Abu Rid to played a conspicuous 
role in this project by translating works of Hasan Ai Banna, Mushtafa M~syhur and 
Sa 'id Hawwa, and establishing his own publishing house, Al-lshlahy Press to print them 
(Damanik 2002: 95). New Islamic publishers such as Gema lnsani Press, Al-Ka11tsar, 
Robbani Press and Era lntermedia enhanced the success of IM popularisation by 
translating and publishing other works of Qutb as well as works of 1M figures such as 
Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad AI Ghazali and Yusuf Qardhawi. As a result, IM 
ideologies and dak-wah methods greatly influcaced Islamic activists of the campus 
mosques and were soon adopted by the training and mentoring program of the LDK. 
"fhe reconneetion of the Indonesian Muslim community to global Islam was also 
signitied by the increase in numbers of Indonesian students in the Middle East. 
According to Mona Abaza's records (1999: 95-6, 117), in 1966 the total membership of 
the Indonesian student association in Egypt was 36; in 198211983 the number of 
Indonesian students in this country jumped to 415, increasing to 722-730 in 1987, and 
reaching around 1000 in 1993. In 1987, the total Indonesian student population in Arab 
~nd Persian nations was 1742 with most of them being in Saudi Arabia (904 students) 
''":1 Egyl.l (722 students). The rest of the students were in Iran (32), Libya (27), Syria 
(21), Sudan (10), Jordan (9), Iraq (8), Turkey (7), and Algeria (2) respctively. Unlike 
Indonesian students in Western countries, however, most Indonesian students who 
studied in Muslim countries were studying at undergraduate level. Influenced by the 
growing popularity of Islamic harakah ir. the Middle East, many of these students after 
their return home became strategic partners of the mosque activists in championing 
har-.:Wh ideologies. 
Another major ever! in the Muslim World that influenced the development of 
the mosque movement in Indonesia was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Although the 
majority of Iranians follow Shiite Islam, while Indonesians follow Sunni Islam, this did 
not discourage Indonesian Islamic activists from admiring the success of the Islamic 
revolution and even led a few circles of Indonesian Muslims, especially those of Arabic 
origin, to he attracted to Shi'ah teachings.'l1 For most Indon~sian Islamic activists, 
however, this did not lead to (internal) religious cor. version. For them, the significance 
131 The influence of Shi'nh teaching among circles 01~ Indonesian Muslims was c01mtcred by the DDII 
which developed n strong network witlr !he Saudi Arabi? Jominat<d Muslim World League. Saudi Arabia 
Choplcr J- The New Order's Rcprcssh·c·Dc\'Ciopnrc'Jialism 382 
of the Iranian Islamic revolution simply lay in its ability to provide an Islamic concept 
of revolution. 
Soon afier the Iranian Isl~mic revolution, the new Islamic publishing houses, 
especially the Bandung-based Mizmi publisher, published translations of the works of 
Iranian intellectual-revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati, Murtadla Muthahhari and Imam 
Khomeini. These works provided ~ndoriesian Islamic activists with additional 
inspiration and motivation for Indonesi~n Islamic Movements. Thus, Ali Shariati's term 
'rausyan flkr' (enlightened intellectuals),132 which advocated intellectual engag·"nent 
with the plight of human beings, appealed to activists of the mosque movement. 
The tide of lslamism which ~oincided with the windfall of the oil boom had 
given rise to a climate of optimism in the entire Muslim World that envisaged the 
arrival of an Islamic renaissance. The 'World of Islam Festival' in London in August 
1976, which exhibited the glorious past of Islam, expressed the spirit of Islamic 
revivalism. In the lead-up to the 1980s, the Muslim World League began to proclaim the 
15th century of the Muslim calendar (hijriyah-which started in 1981) as the era of 
Islamic resurgence. To mark this imagined historic moment, the Muslim World League 
conducted the very first Islamic Mass Media Conference which took place in Jakarta, 
the capital of the most populous Muslim countrf, 1-3 September 1980. The 
reverberations from this event further galvanized the Islamic zeal of the mosque 
movement in Indonesia. 
The campus mosques continued to serve as the exemplary centres of the mosque 
movement. Slowly but surely, almost every secular university developed its own LDK, 
and every LDK formed collaborations with lecturers of Islamic subjects to make sure 
that the 'mentoring' program becoming part of the lecture. Slowly but surely, the 
original content and method of dakwah as offered by the LMD was overshadowed by 
that imported from the international harakah. Terminologies of the dakwah movements 
increasingly drew on Arabic terminologies and replaced the English that had been 
widely adopted by Islamic student movements in the previous decades. By the late 
1980s, the mosque movement under the influence of the IM harakah beg~n to be known 
as the tarbiyah (educational) movement, using the same code as the IM. 
was hostile theotogieatty and politically to tl1e influence of the Ir:mian Islamic Revolution and the DDII 
expressed similar apprehension about a possible increase in Shi'ah followers in Indonesia. 
Ill The tenn 'rausyan fikr" became popular among Indonesian Islamic activists following the translation 
ofSyari'ati's work, •Jdcologi Kawn lntclcktual: Suatu Wawasan •, by tl1e publisher Mizan in 1984. 
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The daf..wah activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s were more dedicated than 
the HMI/l'll-dominated dakwah activists of the 1960s/1970s in their appreciation of 
mosque life. According t(l a well-known campus mosque activist of the 1990s, Fahri 
Hamzah, the mosque was not the main ground for the HMIIPII training and activities, 
ar.d it was not until the late 1960s that the dakwa/z-oriented HMI/PII intellectuals began 
to tum to the mosque as their base. For the later dakwah activists, on the other hand, the 
mosque was not only the main ground for their training and activities from the very 
beginning but also, for many of them, the home at which they stayed. This intimacy 
with mosque life caused the intemalisation of an Islamic identity and Islamic 
mindcdness of the later daf..wah activists to be much deeper than that of the dakwah-
oriented HMI intellcctuals.tJJ As such, the later daf..,vah activists were more susceptible 
to the influence c.f more puritan/militant Islamic ideas offere~ by the internt:ional 
Jslantic harakah. 
Moreover, there were at least two other reasons for the deepening identification 
of the Indonesian daf..wah activists with the intcmationai harakah. Muslims in the 
'edge' (new leamcrs of !slam on the periphery of the Muslim World) tended to glorify 
the 'centre' either as a reflection of their obsession with authenticity or as an over-
compensation for their lack of authority in Islamic studies. For people with this kind of 
psychological predisposition, the Islamic ideas of the international lzarakah offered a 
sense ofcrcdibility and authenticity, since organic intellectuals of this harakah mostly 
came from the centre of the Muslim World (Middle East) or at least from those who had 
studied in the Middle East. At the same time, there was a serious shortage of in-depth 
Islamic literature written by Indonesian intellectuals. 
In the deepening identification with the international harakah, the later dakwalz 
activists formed a distinct response to the challenge of the modem world. As the 
majority of Inrl.onesian Muslims had been intensely exposed to the process of 
modernisation, and most of the campus dakwah activists had also been very familiar 
with modem science and technology, the later dakwah activists began to depart from the 
historical project of previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia. While the concern of 
previous generations was how to modernize Islam, the concern of the later dalovah 
period was how to Jslamise modernity. Consequently, people like Imaduddin 
Abdulrahim and other dalovah activists of the 1960s and 1970s, who used to be viewed 
"'Interview with Fahri Hamzah (t5/08/1998). 
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as too Islamist by the standard of that time, came to be regarded as too moderate by the 
standard of dakwalt activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s. For instance, Abdulrahim 
did not insist that his wife wear the jilbab (veil), which came to be considered as a 
requirement for a true Islamic believer as well as an icon for the Islamisation of the 
modernity. Slogans such as 'Islam is the solution' and 'Islam is the alternative' now 
reverberated throughout university campuses. 
To consolidate groups of LDK and to strengthen the cooperation ~mong them, 
LDK activists from diverse campus backgrounds organized the first inter-LDK meeting 
known as Fonmt Silaturaltmi (FS)-LDK in the ITB's Salman mosque in 1986. At the 
second inter-LDK meeting, held in the IPB's Al-Ghifari mosque in 1987, the guiding 
principle (kltitalt) of the LDK was formulated: 'the LDK struggle rests on Islam as the 
religion of Allah (dinullalt) and as a way of life, and will be united through the tic of the 
profession of the faith ('There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Prophet of 
God'). 134 This informal forum formed a networl; that connected these dakwalt activists 
to one another, thus empowering their collective identity and solidarity. The forum also 
provided avenues for exchanging ideas, allocating resources, and strengthening 
networks. 
The FS-LDK with its ideology and networks served as the basis for further 
socio-political action. When the political opportunity structure in the New Order's 
public sphere changed in the late I 990s, dakwalt activists of the sixth generation of 
Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the 1970s, began to 
translate the LDK network into a political action group. In the midst of the 'reformasi' 
(reform) movement, the tenth inter-LDK meeting, which was followed by 64 out of the 
69 existing LDKs throughout Indonesia and held in the mosque of the Multammadiyalt 
University ofMalang on 25-29 March 1998, agreed to transform the LDK network into 
Kesatuan Aksi Maltasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI, the United Front of Indonesian 
Islamic University Students) with Fahri Hamzah of the UI as its first chairman. The 
acronym 'KAMMI' was inspired by 'KAMI', the HMI-dominated student movement of 
1966. In the newly established KAMMI, however, the HMI was not included and its 
role in the reform movement wns also marginal. The KAMMI was to become the most 
powerful student front in the 1998 student movement and beyond.IJS 
'"For the history ofLDK, sec Y.S. Hadi (2000) and A. Rahmat & M. Najib (200t). 
"'For a further discussion of Ute dcvctopmcnt of the tarbiyah movement in the t990s, sec Hadi (2000), 
Rahmat & Najib (2001) and Damanik (2002). 
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5.7.2 The Development of the Renewal Movement 
As the secular universities became the stronghold of the da!ovah movement, 
religious institutions, especially the lAIN, became the strongholds of the renewal 
movement. There arc several explanations for this phenomenon. In Islamic institutions, 
almost all students arc members of the santri {devout Muslim) community. As such, the 
level of competitive ideo·political struggle among students in Islamic institutions was 
less intense than that in the secular universities. The perennial conflict within the JAIN 
is an endogenous one, between the traditionalist and reformist-oriented Islamic students. 
Because of the lack of competition with supporters of secular ideologies inside the 
campus, students at Islamic institutions by and large tend to be less motivated than 
Islamic activists in sccul~r universities in their propagation of Islamic claims. 
In addition, 1\'•.•rcholish Madjid had a hypothesis that the lack of religious 
instruction in sccula · universities prompted Islamic activists there to be more 
appreciative of Islamic knowledge· and symbols. Needless to say, this lack of religious 
teaching could also lead students in secular universities to secular-mindcdncss.136 
Following the same logic it could be argued that the relative lack of secular scientific 
instruction in the lAIN and Pesantren could lead students of this community to highly 
value secular knowledge and symbols. Again, it could also be argued that overwhelming 
amounts of religious instruction could also lead students in Islamic institutions to 
Islamic conservatism. 
lmaduddin Abdulrahim believed •hat the persisting residue of colonial 
hierarchies of knowledge made students in Islamic institutions feel inferior to students 
in secular universities. To overcome this sense of inferiority, he believed, students in 
Islamic institutions tended to over-compensate by showing off thdr erudition in and 
openness to Western intellectual ideas {Asshiddiqie et. a!. 2002: 34). Pursuing this 
reasoning, we may assume that Islamic activists in secular universities tend to be 
obsessed with Arabic terminologies and Islamist ideas as an over-compensation for their 
poor mastery of Arabic and Islamic literature. 
Moreover, for many of the lAIN students, Madjid was regarded as a hero. His 
double term as chairman of the HMI and his reputation as the most celebrated Muslim 
ir.:,J:Jeclual of his generation heipcd raise the self-confidence and intellectual leverage 
· '" Interview witl1 Nurcholish Madjid (t8/09/1998). 
' 
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of the JAIN community. In this way, he served as a role model for many of the lAIN 
students and intellectuals and his renewal ideas provided a benchmark for a new 
generation of lAIN intellectuals. His period of study at the University ofChicago, 137 for 
his doctorate (1978-1984), provided the inspiration for m~;.ny JAIN scholars to study at 
Western centres oflslamic studies. 
The receptiveness of a great bulk of the JAIN community to the renewal 
movement was reinforced by the pro-modernisation and accommodation policy of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since the Mukti Ali period (1973-1978), this Ministry 
began to strengthen the teaching of general subjects in the JAIN and to encourage 
Muslim scholars to obtain higher education at Western centres of study. Apart from the 
government's general admiration for Western scientific and technological achievements, 
this encouragement wa~ intended to stimulate Muslim intellectuals to take a more 
'objective' view of religion's role and to appreciate the need to accommodate it to a 
secularised modem world. In doing this, as Ruth McVey noted (1989: 208), the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs had 'tried to bridge the gap between the santri community 
and the state by providing Islam with spokesmen who can communicate easily with the 
regime and share its general perceptions.' 
The immediate impact of this government support was a shift in the main 
destination for overseas postgraduate study of JAIN scholars-from centres of Islamic 
studies in the Middle East to those in the Western World. Until the late 1960s, only a 
few Indonesian scholars with Islamic educational backgrounds pursued Islamic studies 
at Western universities. Among the very few were H. M. Rasjidi, Mukti Ali, Anton 
Timur Jaclani, Harun Nasution, and Kafrawi. 138 From the 1970s onwards, however, the 
flow of JAIN scholars to Western universities multiplied and continued to increase 
exponentially (sec next chapter). It was returnees from Western universities who 
became the pol<.:'::• agents for the diffusion of renewal ideas among the lAIN 
community (and beyond) throughout Indonesia. 
Rcn~wal ideas also found fertile ground in the HMI. With the HMI being 
dominated by pragmatic and moderate intellectuals, renewal ideas provided the 
mainstream HMJ members with an idcolr.•gicallegitimacy for their integration into the 
m During his st•Jdy at the University of Chicago, Madjid was supervised by, among others, the prominent 
Pakistani libernl ('neo·modemist') Islamic thinker, Fnzlur Rahman. 
131 Rasjidi got his PhD from the Sorbonne University (Frnnce) in 1956; Mukti Ali and Anton Timur 
Jaelani got their Masters from McGill University in 19~7 und 1959 respectively; Hnrun Nasution got his 
PhD from McGill University in 1968. Kafrnwi got his Masters from McGill University in 1969. 
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New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the period of Ridwan Saidi's chainnanship 
(1974-76), it was thought that the HMI would provide an institutional basis for renewal 
ideas. Madjid and his colleagues, however, did not support the implementation of this 
idea, on the grounds that fonnalisation might lead to the stagnation of renewal 
concepts.139 Even so, HMI members continued to become a potential audience for 
renewal ideas. 
Beyond the lAIN and HMI community, the renewal ideas appealed to the 
accommodationist Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. The latter were mainly those 
who typically had no strong interest in theoretical Islamic thinking but provided the 
practical mechanism for the grounding of renewal ideas within the New Order political 
structure. Representatives par excellence of these politicians and bureaucrats were 
Akbar Tandjung (chainnan of the HMI, 1971-73) and Mar'ie Muhammad (prominent 
HMI activist). Behimt the two, there was a block of pragmatic Muslim intelligentsia 
who aspired to political and bureaucratic positions but could not achieve them through 
the vehicle of political Islam. Their incorporation into the New Order bureaucracy and 
polity strengthened t~e Muslim 'bloc within' that had been pioneered by the previous 
generation of Muslim ;ntelligentsia. 
For the Muslim intelligentsia of the bloc within, Madjid's slogan, 'Islam, yes; 
Islamic party, no!, ~lid the acceptance of Pancasila by major Islamic organizations after 
1983 were particuh.ny pertinent. These were viewed as indication of friendliness to the 
state orthodoxy and paved the road for a mutual rapprochement between the Muslim 
intelligentsia and the state as well as making the state more responsive towards 
Muslims' cultural and positional interests. 
The effect of the rene"'al ideas of fonner HMI leaders reverberated throughout 
society following in the pall; of the development of the renewal movement within the 
NU. The main protagonist of the renewal movement within this traditionalist 
community was Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940}, the NU's foremost intellectual and 
member of the mo~t honoured family-line in that community. He was a grandson of the 
venerable founding f.1ther of the NU, Hasjim Asj'ari, ami also a son of a prominent NU 
illleiek-ulama, Wachid Hasjim. 
Afler eight ye":!>:!} study in the Middle East (first at Al-Azhar University, Egypt 
and then at Baghdad University, Iraq), Abdurrahman Wahid returned to Jombang (East 
139 Interview with Utomo Dananjaya. one of the must enthushastic supporters of renewal ideas 
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Java), the stronghold of the Indonesian traditionalist community, in 1971. When he 
return•;d home having studied both Islamic and Western literature, he was soon 
confronted with two serious challenges within the NU community: the challenge ofthe 
government-promoted modernization and the beginning of NU's strained relationship 
with the government, following NU's significant results in the 1971 election. How to 
enable the traditionalist community to come to tenns with modernization and the (state-
defined) national interest soon became his main concern. 
As an intellectual, Wahid was challenged to d~velop a reinterpretation of the NU 
traditionalist legal and theological thinking in order to better deal with the challenge of 
modernization and national interest, while at the same time remaining respectful of 
indigenous local traditions. This was reflected in his early wor:(s such as Btmga Rampai 
Pesautreu (Capita Selecta of the Pesautreu, pub. 1979) a!!d Muslim di Tcugalt 
Pergumulau (Muslims in the Midst of Struggle, pub. I 98 I). 
His renewal ideas following nco-traditionalist lines were enriched by his 
socialization with intellectuals of diverse communities, especially with the Jak~rta­
based renewal intellectuals. From the I 970s he was invited by Tawang Alun, Dawam 
Rahardjo and Adi Sasono (pro-renewal HMI intellectuals in the NGO sector) to take 
part in a project concerning pesautreu community development, designed by twc 
prominent Jakarta based-NGOs, the Social and Economic Research, Education, and 
Jnfonnation Institute (LJl3ES, est. I 97 I) ami the Association for Pesautreu and 
Community Development (P3M, est. I 983). Through his encounter with NGO activists, 
· Wahid's intellectual ideas began to be imbued with the dominant themes among NGO 
dCtivists: alternative development, democracy and human rights.t40 
Wahid was also invited to join a circle of renewal intellectuals of nco-
modernism gathered around an NGO organization, LKIS,141 and around a pluralistic 
discussion forum known as Majelis Reboau (The Wednesday Circle, est. 1984).t42 Both 
these institutions contributed to. the reinforcement of Wahid's ideas on secularisation, 
(29/t 112000). 
140 Interview witlt Dawam Rahardjo (10/09/1998) and Adi Sasono (02109/1998). 
141 We will return to this NGO later in this chapter. 
'" Maje/ls Reboan was an experiment to develop an open and plurnlistic 'public sphere' in situations of 
authoritarian control. Beginning as nn informal discussion forum of renewal intellectuals with HMI and 
PII background, such as Nurcholish Mndjid, lllomo Dananjaya, Eky SjalllUddin, nnd Uscp Fathuddin, 
participation in tho Majelis Rcboan was ctteilded to involve intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, 
including non·Muslim intellectuals such ns Fnmz Mngnis Suscno nnd Mudji Sutrisno (Catholics) and 
Victor Tanja (a Protestant). 
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pluralism, non-sectarianism, inclusivism, and the contextualisation of Islam.143 This 
would lead to the formulation of his Islamic paradigm called 'pribumisasi Islam' 
(indigenisation of Islam). Through this paradigm, the traditionalist community found 
not only a new intellectual weapon to defend its historical religious oractic~s from 
reformist-modernist criticism, but also a new rationale for the subordination of Islam to 
the national interest. 
Wahid's individual intellectual ideas partly reflected his genuine commitment to 
pluralism, the national interest, and democracy, but they were not entirely devoid of 
political interest. As a man committed to defend the interests of the traditionalist 
community, he attempted to ease the· strained relationship between the NU and the 
authorities and to bring the NU along the accommodationist line. He came to sec the 
necessity of accommodationism because of the continuing marginalisation of NU 
politicians from the Islamic party, PPP. The government's imposition of Pancasila as 
sole political principle (azas tzmggal) provided him with a means to draw !he NU away 
from the PPP and to bring it closer to the government. Already in December 1983 he 
successfully influenced the NU national meeting in Situbondo (East Java) to accept 
Pancasila as azas tzmggal and to return the NU to its original spirit (klzitalz) as a social 
and religious organization. Like Madjid's slogan 'Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!', this 
return to the klzitalz is worth considering as a political strategy which used a non-for.rnal 
political approach to strengthen the NU's bargaining power with the New Order regime. 
Shortly after the Tandjung Prick massacrP. on 12 September 1984, Wahid made the 
controversial decision to invite General L. B. Murdani to visit some NU pesa111ren. 
Partly as a result of this friendly move towards the government he was able to be elected 
ru; the Chairman of the NU's executive body (tmzfidziyalz) in December 1984. In I988, 
he was also appointed as a Golkar representative in the Working Committee of the 
MPR. 
While maintaining his accommodationist strategy, Wuhid also was able to 
maintain the NU's reputation and his own in the eyes of civil society based on his 
participation in NGO activities and his outspoken championing of pluralism, democracy 
and human rights. In many cases, however, not all good things went together. His 
position as the defender of the interests of the traditionalist community interests drew 
him towards accommodation with the government, while his position as a free 
'" Jntezvicw witlt Nurchotish Madjid (18/09/l998) nr.d Utomo Dananjnya (29/ll/2000). 
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intellectual urged him to speak truth to power. Because of this he bc.:i11Tle known as the 
most controversial Muslim intellech;ai. Whatever he seemed, however, as the chairmar. 
of the largest Muslim organization in the country his renewal id~as made a significant 
contribution to the impact of the renewal movcnent. 
The hegemony of the renewal discourse in the puLlic sphere, which was made 
possible by the positive reception of 'regimes of truth' {the state ideological apparatus 
and media exposure} in a Foucauldian sense,144 would finally force the Muhammadiyah 
to support the renewal ideas, although in a mom limited way. The acceptance of thr. 
renewal ideas within the Muhammadiyah came rather later for at least two reasons. As a 
reformist organization, the Muhammadiyah could not easily bury its desire to maintain 
Islamic purity and authenticity. Moreover, prominent young figures of the 
Muhamn:adiyah such as Amien Rais and Syafi'i Maarifhad a close relationship with the 
DDIJ. Even 5o, the exposure of these young intellectuals to another epistemic 
community and the intellcct~:tl network had a significant impact on their later 
intel!ectual development. This espedally h&i1pened after Rais and Maarif undertook 
postgraduate studies in the USA. Botl1 Rais and Maarif finished their PhD programs at 
the University of Chicago in 1981 and 1982 respectively. During their study at t"at 
university, Rais was supervised by three Jewish scholars with one of them being 
Leonard Binder,145 while Maarif was supervised by, among others, a prominent liberal 
(nco-modernist) Pakistani Islamic thinker who also taught Madjid, Fa7lur Rahman. 
Through their encounter with these intellectuals who were promoting liberalism, they 
began to be more sympathetic to the renewal ideas. 
In November 1982 Amicn Rais surprised the Indonesian public by his move 
towards the renewal line. In his intcrvi~w with Panji Masyarakat (No. 376/1982), he 
rejected the existence of the Islamic state as a concept, because, according to him, is not 
evident in the Qur'an or the Suni1a (Way of the Prophet). Next, he stated he could 
accept Pancasila as the state ideology, on the basis that Islam is above ideology and 
Pancasi/a itself docs not contradict Islamic principles. Under the influence of young 
iniellcctual figures as Rais, the Muhammadiyah National Congress in December 1985 
accepted Pancasila as itt azas tunggal. Many Muhammadiyah intellectuals, however, 
tended to reject the idea of sccularisation on th~ basis that the concept is alien to Islamic 
'"For a further cxplanalion oftl1e lenn 'regimes oflrulh', sec Foucaull (t980: 12). 
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society. The rejection of an Islamic state, in Rais' view, by no mea.;: ... cant the removal 
of religious values and guidance from public life. The first principle of Pancasila, he 
argued, implicitly recognizes the indivisibility ef religion Jnd public life. This latt~r 
view made it possible for him and other Multammadiyalt intellectuals to remain on good 
terms with activists of the dakwalt movement. At the same time, this inhi~'!ted the 
further development of his liberal ideas. His renewal ideas were then focm.cd on the 
rethinking of Islamic legal theories (fiqlt), to enable Islam to respond better to the 
challenges of modem life, and then on the practical reform of the Indonesian political 
system. 
The gestures of Muslim intellectuals and organizations towards the st~tc 
orthodoxy freed the Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy from the stigma of being 
against the New Order and helped break the psychological barrier to expressing a'ld 
socialising cultural Islam within the milieu oflhe bureau~racy. Muslim bureaucrats now 
openly organized cnmmunal prayers, religious services and the celebration of Islamic 
D;; ;:.-;. ThP.y also established at fin;t small prayer houses (muslta/la) but th~n gradually 
built mosques (masjid) near most government offices. Slowly but surely, Muslim 
bureaucrats dared to express their Islamic identity, expressed through new fashions like 
using Islamic greetings (assalamu'alaikum) and making the pilgrimage to Mecca. A 
rapprochement between nominal and devout Muslims within U1e bureaucracy began to 
take place, as the former were gradually incorporated into the 'house' of cultural Islam. 
Many nominal Muslim bureaucrats began to learn more about Islam by inviting private 
Islamic teachers t;J their own houses with the Suharto family being a notable example of 
this phenomenon.146 
There were some surprising results from these developments as exemplified by 
the following B. J. Habibie story. Once in the late 1980s, he said, Suharto led and 
opened the Cabinet meeting wearing a peci (black cap, as an icon of Muslim identity) 
and reciting 'bismillalt' (a phrase used by Muslims for vruim•s occasions and considered 
an act of piety). Habibie then asked him: 'Why did you do that?' Suharto said: 
'Formerly, we were weak economically. That is why we needed the Catholic lobby for 
145 Leonard Binder is an expert in Islnmic and Middle Eastern Studies who has written much about Islam. 
His mast important book is /slarnlc Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (1988). Interview 
with Amico Rais (17/09/2003). 
146 Among well-known religi"-. ..: gurus ofSuharto's family were Qnsim Nurseba nnd Qurnisy Shibab. 
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the intemational capitalist community and why it was difficult for me to express my 
own Islamic identity. P.ut now we are sufficiently strong to assert our own identity.' t47 
5.7.3 The Development of the 'Third Way' Movement 
There had been some moments and some opportunities where supporters of the 
dalrwah and renewal movements could share some common grom1d. Both groups were 
frequently linked with each other over what Edward Said calls 'worldliness'. By this 
term he means an intellectual's constant engagement With the link between textuality 
(discursive consciousness) and the world (practical consciousness). It is a concern with 
the materiality of religious precepts and morality in the face of political, materi3l and 
spiritual deprivation of human beings, for in this material being, so Said argues, is 
embedded the matctiality of the matters of which ;; speaks: dispossessio\, .njustice, 
marginality, subjection (Said 1983). 
Realising the urgent need to respond to human sn !Tr.ring and the negative impact 
of development, some Muslim activists of different intellectual inclinatior.s began to 
move beyond Islamism and liberalism. By emphasising the transformative dimension of 
Islam through the empowerment of civil society ancl 'applied' morality and spirituality, 
these intellectuals constituted the 'third way' Islamic movement in response to the New 
Order polity and orthodoxy. This Islamic movement was actualised through the 'thirr! 
sector' in de Tocqueville's sense (1835); that is a new form of voluntary non-
governmental organization known as Lcmbaga Swadaya Masyaralrat (LSM, Self-
Reliant Community Institution) and the communities oflslamic spiritualism and art ililt 
began to flourish in the 1970s. 
At the outset, proponents of the Islamic renewal t.10I'tmcnts with rcl!gio-
scchHistic inclinations such as Tawang Alun, Dawam Rc'lurJjc, Utorr.o Danaujaya, and 
Mwab Mahasin began their engagement in thi~ tltir .. : w JY movement by joining the 
Social and Economic Research, Education, ?"d Infortnation Institute (LP:;;:s) a few 
years after its establishment in 1971. ·This prominent LSM was established by such 
well-known socialist intellectuals as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Emil Salim, Dorodjatun 
Kuncoro-Djakti, Nono Anwar Makarim and some others with funding from Friederich 
Naumann Stiflrmg (FNS, Federal Republic of Germany). In a later development, this 
LSM became a joint venture between socialist and lsl~mic activists, which resembled 
147 Habib!e told tltis story to leaders ofJCMI's :····,:'>forum (MASIKA) on S M•y 1998. Interview witlt 
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the close relationship between the grt~t socialist and Masjumi leaders, namri~•, Sutan 
Sj~ltrir and Mohammad Netsir. The main concem of the LP3ES WJ> to conect the 
nep"•i··1 impact ,_; the development and repressive politics of 1· :ew Order by 
o(terint _,· .. ~mative development options and positioning itself as o counterbalance to 
and counterpart of the government, as well as being an int~zmedidry institut;on betw~en 
the state and soeiety.148 About the same time, some other Muslim activists with HMI 
backgrounds such as Abdurrachman Saleh, Mohammad Assegaff and Abdul Bari joined 
the foremost NGO in the field of legal aid, the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid 
Institutions (Yayasa11 Lembaga Ba11/tla11 Hukum l11dollesia, est. 1971). This NGO 
aimed to promote the rule of law by strengthening the bargaining powers and 
constitutional rights of the poor and marginal in society. 
Following the emergence of the LP3ES and the YLBHI, several former leaders 
of the HMUPII (Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, and A. M. 
Fatwa) in collaboration with NU intcllcr.:uals (Abdurrahmar. Wahid, Fahmi Saefudrlin, 
and Abdu!hh Sjarwani) in 1974 established an Islamic LSM called Lembaga Kebajika11 
Islam Sama11hudi (LKIS, the Samanhudi Institute for Islamic Benevolent Service, •:.t. 
1974). Chaired initially by Madjid, this institute was intended to p•omo(•! Muslim 
entrepreneurship, alternative development and Islamic rescarch.149 
Nc~t, in 1982 Adi Sasono in collaboration with Muslim intellectuals of the 
LP3ES oegan to establish the Institute of Development St.:C:ies (Lembaga Studi 
Pemba11gzma11, LSP). Like the LP3ES, the LSP sought 1 ·, penetrate "'bcaucratic 
struct~;-es and influence policy from within, while at the same time buildi,;;; ''li groups 
at grass-root~ level as self-sustaining, economic units, and informing them of their rights 
and entitlements. The LSP's analysis highlighted the destructive impact of trans-national 
companies, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the marginalisation of local 
skills and enterprise. This &~~alysis was highly influenced by the perspective of 
dependency (nco-Marxist) theory, which underpinned much radical thinking about 
Indonesian alternative development a~~ f!Olitics during the 1970s-1980s (Eldridge 1995: 
i4-5). 
Si••;:11y afterwards, there ai.u dppeurcd an LSM. specialising in the pesmztre11· 
based cr:~·nuuity development known ·3s Perkumpulmz Pengemba11ga11 Pesantren da11 
the tlten chairm:tn ofMnsikll, A. Hnmid (29/08/t998). 
"'For n furtlterdiscussion of the history nnd development oflhe LP3ES, see I. Ahm:td (200t). 
'" Interview with Utomo Dnnnnjnya (29/lt/2000). 
. . 
' 
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Masyaral;at (P3M, Association for Pesantrcn and Community Development, csl.l983). 
This LSM brought together Muslim intellectuals of the LSP (Adi Sasono), Li'3ES 
(Dawam Rahardjo and Utomo Dananjaya), the NU (Abdurrahman Wahid, JusufHasjim, 
and Sahal Mahfudz) and the reformist group (Sholeh Iskandar and Hamam Dja'afar). 
1 ;,~ cxccuti vc of this organization was also comprised of a ymmger generation of 
Islamic activist~ from various streams, such as Muchtar Abbas (fomter activist of the 
Salman mosque), Mar· :our Faqih (former HMI activist), Masdar F. Mas'udi (young NU 
activist) and some others. Other young Islamic activists emerged in various LSMs that 
mushroomed in the 1980s such as Fachry Ali, Muslim Abdurrahman, Habib Chirzin, 
Imam Ahmad and many more. 
Furthctmorc, the emergence of the socially-oriented LSM provided an 
inspiration for the establishment of similar organizations specialising in the field of 
Islamic studies, publication and consulting. Various new lslnmic centres began to 
emerge in the later part of the 1980s to provide spaces lor sclf-actualisation, especially 
for returnees from overseas study. Four notable examples will be given here. Afier his 
return to Indonesian in 1984, Nurcholish Madjid with th. . upport of his fellow renewal 
protagonists founded the Paramadina Foundation in 1987, as a vehicle to propagate the 
so-called nco-modernist iitinking to people of Jakarta's upper and middle class ;,,·cond, 
in 1986 lmaduddin Abdulr.L·:;mtso collaborated with his disciple of the LMD program, 
Halla Radjasa, to found in 1987 the Y AASIN (Yayasan Pembina Sari lnsmri) 
founda:ion, specialising in an Islamic version of Achievement Motivation Training. 
Third, Dawam Rahardjo and his intellectual colleague.• ;:;orne of them were returnees 
from overseas study) founded in 1988 the Institute tor Religious and Philosophical 
Studies (i.SAF), as a vehicle to promote Islamic thinking relevant to the challenges of 
modem life and published through its prominent journal Ulrmml Qur'an. Fourth, aficr 
his ret\ il to Indonesia in 1982, Djalaluddin Rahmat with the support of some Shiitc-
influ~nced intellectuals founded the Muthahhari foundation in I 988, as a vehicle to 
promote the so-called 'Islam alternative' with its emphasis on non-sectarianism. 
ISO In the ~flermath of anti-government student demo:-r .... ·.'ations in January 1978, Abd•.tlrohim wns arrested 
ond imprisoned foro short period of time without triai. Soon a ncr being released from prison he ten the 
country to pursue o PhD degree in tlte USA (with Natsir's support ond • scho;..rship from the King Faisat 
Foundation). Even after completing his PhD, however, he was still regarded as an Islamic r~::;cmist and 
~nntinued to be under the sun•eill:mcc of tlte security regime. He decided to retum home under the 
guarantee of Alamsjah Prawirnncgara . 
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Most of the LSM3, and also some of the Islamic centres, brought together 
Muslim activists of diverse religious affiliations. In implementing their agendas, this 
fom1 of Islamic agency often gained ufficial or logistical support from lhe Muslim 
intelligentsia in the 'bloc within' and in the private economic sector; at the same time it 
also collaborated with a range of Islamic groups regardless of their theological and 
ideological inclinations. By involving •people of multiple affiliations, the LSMs and 
their activists provided bridges between intellectuals and associations that made 
possible the mobilisation of collective action. For prc.ponents of the renewal movement, 
engagement in community development and critical discourse also provided a balance 
to their support for the st:.tc orthodoxy. In this way, they were able to prescr1e their 
reputation before the emergence of the pro-democratic and civil society movement. 
In addition to the rise of LSMs and Islamic centres, the third way movement was 
also manifested in the revival CJfthc Islamic spiritualism ,,:,d art movement. Throughout 
the 1980s-1990s, the literature on Islamic Sufism was among the best selling books in 
the country.151 Islamic Orders (tareqat), such as tareqat Tijaniyyalt and new forms of 
Islamic orders allracted new memberships from segments of the urban and upper middle 
class, re .. ::; ·Hess of their religious backgrounds. Foundations of various Jslamk 
movements such as Mutltaizltari and Danll Tau/tid in Bandung, Pamnuu/ina, Se!tali and 
Tazkiya Sejati in Jakana actively promoted studies on this suhj.::cl. The interest of 
people with middle and upper class backgrounds in Islamic Sufism seemed to be a kind 
of compensation for their fe~lings of spiritual deprivation in the midst of the 
materialism and consumerism of metropolitan life. 
The Islamic art movement was expressed in various art forms. In music, L'le 
representative par excellence of this movement w~ the Bimbo group. Emerging in the 
1960s as 'Trio Bimbo' (composed of three brothers, Sjamsud~in Hai"'J•kusumah, 
Darmawan often referred to as Acil, and Djaka Pumama), this group originally 
performed Latin American and Spanish songs, reflecting the alienation of the 
Westemised uprooted generation of the 1960s. In the early 1970J, the youngest sister, 
lin Parlina,joined the group and it began to move to Indonesian pop music. 'We want to 
find our own musical character and are trying to formulate an Indonesian style,' said 
Acil (Sumarsono 1998: 134). Just as the group began to perform lndoncs. 1 pop songs, 
Sjamsuddin (then a student of the ITB) was becoming interested in the c.· _- activities 
ChapterS -l11c Ncr· ·.' ,.clcr's RcprcJsll'c-Dc\'C/opmcntallsm 396 
of the Salmar, mosque. Inspired by the delivery of a Friday prayer in this mosque, he 
began to write a religious song entitled Tultmz (God) in 1973, which became a hit 
throughout Indonesia as well as the turning point for the Bimbo's concentration on the 
genre of religious songs called kasidalz. Through its collaboration with a prominent 
Islamic poet, Taufiq Ismail, the Bimbo's kasidalz were given powerful lyrics which 
promised the beauty of religiosity and the serenity of religious devotion. These themes 
appealed especially to the urban middle class of diverse theological and ideological 
affiliations who were affected by rapid social change and spiritual deprivation amid t!le 
hustle and bustle of modern life. 152 
How .to respond to the contemporary problems of human beings by using the 
resource of Islamic traditions and spiritualism became the main concern of Muslim 
literati from the 1970s. Some Muslim literati made an auempt to draw on Islamic 
traditions and spiritualism to find new forms and inspiration for artistic themes and 
expression. This genre of ·sastra Islam· {Islamic literature) was ofien referred to as 
transcendental or prophetic or sujistic literaturc.153 Prominent figures of these Muslim 
literati were Danarto, Kuntowidjojo, Taufik Ismail, Abdul Hadi, Emha Ainun Nadjib, 
Mustafa Bisri, M. Fudoli Zaini, Ajip Rosidi, D. Zawawi Imron, Hamid Djabbar and 
Sutardji Calzoum Bachri. 
In the performing arts, similar concerns were expressed through the emergence 
ofMuslim theatre groups. Examples of these groups were Arifin C. Noer's Teater Keci/, 
the Yogyakarta-based Teater Muslim and Teater Sltalalzudtlill, and theatres of campus 
mosques throughout Indonesia. In the art of painting, similar concerns had inspired 
some Muslim painters to usc Islamic calligraphy. Prominent among these were the 
painters Alunad Shad ali, A. D. Pirous, Arnang Rahman, Arnri Jahja, and Abay Subarna. 
In the field of fashion, Muslim designers began to turn to Islamic dress. Most of these 
designers were women and some had bc-~n well-known as movie stars. Representatives 
of these designers were Anne Rulaidah, Fenny Mustafa, Ida Royani, Ida Leman, and 
Sitoresmi Prabuningrat. 
151 Intcrvk ... with Putut \Vijanarko and H~mowo. tt.~ manager and editor nfthe Mizan publisher house 
p3tl212w:•;. 
51 For an elaborate discussion of the role of the Uimbo's kasidalr in the 'Islamic turn', see Hnsbullah 
p999). 
53 For a further discussion of the emergence and development of transcendental or proviu~hc literature, 
see A. Hndi (t999). 
Chapter 5- The New Order's Reprcssi~'C·De\'Ciopmenlalism 397 
The emergence of this Islamic art movement and spiritualism represented the 
growth of a new Muslim habitus in Bourdie~'s sense. In his sense, habitus is more than 
habit. It is a collective schemata uf experience and perception which contains both a 
subjective expression of a particular identity and also an objective means for the 
naturalisation and affinnation of a particular identity (Bourdieu 1977: 73). Thus, the 
Islamic art movement expressed the Islamic (artistic) identity of the new Jslamiscd 
middle class, while at the same time serving as the principle of structuration and 
affimJUtion for the new Islamic identity of this community. By involving people of 
different religious affiliations and distancing itself from ideo-political disputes among 
the Muslim community, the Islamic art movement also served as a meeting ground for 
the articulation of the general interests ofthe Muslim community. 
5.7.4 The Development of the 'Second Sector' Movement 
Another essential struggle, which was often overshadowed by the clamour of 
other movements, took place in the private economic sector, the second sector in de 
Tocqueville's sense. Generally speaking, the Muslim economy under the New Order 
underwent a serious devastation. Although the ruin of the smllri economy started at least 
as early as the latc-c:Jlonial period, the New Order economic regime hastened its 
decline. The deepening integration of the national economy into the world capitalist 
community along with the pro-growth and pro-conglomerate economic policy of the 
New Order economic technocrats destroyed the economic backbone of the sa11tri 
merchant. As a result the traditional image of sa11tri as merchant bourgeoisie was lost. 
Richard Robison puts this succinctly (1978: 23): 
The largely Muslim asli [indigenous] merchant bourgeoisie have, in a very real 
sense, been overtaken by history. They arc the victims of the penetration of 
foreign and Chinese capitalists with overwhelming financial imd technological 
resources. They are also the victims of a tradition of politico-bureaucratic power 
(originating in the precolonial agrarian kingdoms of Java) which has 
successfully integrated itself into the neocolonialist structures of post-1949 
Indonesia. 
The most dramatic example ofthis phenomenon was the ruin oflocal indigenous small-
scale businesses and petty trading, traditionally in the hands of the santri group. These 
for instance were · clove-cigarette manufacturers in Kudus (Central Java), long-
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estahlished garment industries in Majalaya and Majalcngka (West Java), and small scale 
batik companies in Pckalongan and Pckajangan (Central Java).154 
Nevertheless, some Muslim businessmen, especially those from HMI 
backgrounds, were able to benefit from the New Order economic development 
programs. Benefiting from a rapprochement between the regime and the Muslim 
community and from the network of santri bureaucrats and politicians, some groups of 
Muslim businessmen transformed themselves into (lesser) economic conglomerates. 
Representatives par excellence of these groups were the Bakri group (owned by the 
Bakri brothers), the Kodel group (owned by, among others, Fahmi ldris and Sugcng 
Saljadi), the Bukaka Group (owned by the Kala brothers, Yusuf and Ahmad Kalla, and 
Fadel Muhammad), the Pasaraya group (owned by Abdul Latif), and the PKBI group 
(owned by the association of Muslim batik cooperatives). 
Although these Muslim businessmen might not directly engage in the 
devclopm~nt of the dakwah, renewal and third way movements, their presence made a 
special contribution to the Indonesian Islamic movement. Apart from providing job 
opportunities for Islamic activists from diverse movements, they also frequently 
provided financial support for the Islamic projects of various movements. As each of the 
groups needed some finance, this sector was also a meeting ground of Muslim interests. 
The failure or success of this sector would have a definite impact on the future shape of 
Islamic movements. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The New Order began with a discourse on the betrayal of intellectuals. At 
critical historical junctures, when national politics was beset by repression and structural 
disunity, there was a recurring tendency for Indonesian oppositional intellectuals to 
condemn intellectual engagement in the formal political structure. In actual fact, this did 
not stop Indonesian intellectuals' preoccupation witlt politics. Moreover, those who had 
been cooperative with the power structure in the past tended to benefit more from 
regime change. 
In Ute New Qrder political cosmology, conflicting civilian pv;idcs, and mass 
political mobilisation was responsible for economic and political turmoil. This provided 
the justification for the realisation of the military's long and keen interest to play a 
'" For a fu1U1er discussion of lhis issue, see L. Caslles (t967) and lhen compare wiU1 J. Durhanuddin 
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dominant role in Indonesian politics. With the promise of guaranteeing political stability 
for the sake of economic modernisation\ the military became the principal power broker 
of New Order politics in collaboratio~ with civilian technocra1s and the international 
capitalist community. 
Economic development (modernisation) and political stability became tb'' state 
orthodoxy and the dominant discourse in the public sphere. Under the new political 
maxim, the national outlook changed from 'politik-sebagai-panglima' (politics as 
commander) to 'ekonomi-sebagai-panglima' (economy as commander). For the sake of 
economic modernisation, political stability was maintained through the control of 
political freedom and participation. The New Order soon transformed itself into a 
rcpressivc-developmcntalist regime. 
Under the New Order's nts/ ell orde policy, political Islam that was regarded as 
responsible for political disorder in the past became the first 1•ictim of politicnl 
repression. Muslim intellectuals faced a dilemma, wt, ""i:r to take a cooperative or non-
cooperative stance. The different responses to this choice caused internal ideological 
disputes in response to the new order's modcrnisation-cum-sccularisation. 
The second generation of Muslim intellectuals (Natsir's generation) tended to 
choose the non-cooperative option. Finding their political role obstructed, they turned to 
education and the da~,•·ah movement. Among their ·last major contributions to the 
Islamic intellectual movement were the formation of cadres for the training of future 
leaders of the da~,mh movement and the provision of motivational and financial 
support for the establishment of university mosques. 
The third generation of Muslim intellectuals (Pane's generation), as children of· 
the revolution, tended to choose the cooperative option. They generally shared a 
common nationP'istic and political outlook with the military intelligentsia. The political 
role of this gcn",ation, however, was limited, because of their lack of competitive 
advantage particul~: f; in terms ofthcir educational qualifications. 
The fourth generation of Muslim intellectuals (Madjid's generation) was 
divided by and large into two camps: proponents of the dakwah or of the renewal 
movements. The former tended to be critical of the state orthodoxy, while the latter 
tended to be more supportive. Supporters of the dakwah movement came largely from 
m>Jsquc activists of the secular universities, while supporters of the renewal movement 
(1992). 
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largely came from the lAIN, HMI, groups of pragmatic politicians, and also from NU 
intellectuals and somewhat later from Muhammadiyah intellectuals. Despite their 
differences, both camps shared a common interest in action in the cultural field. Both 
also found a meeting ground in the 'third way' (civil society and art) and 'second way' 
(private economic) movements. 
The dakwah movement made a major contribution to the lslamising of the 
secular academic community, while the renewal movement made a major contribution 
to the so-called 'greening' (peughijauauj ur lslamisation of the Indonesian bureaucracy 
and polity. The synergy of these achievements in conjunction with a conducive political 
opportunity structure would lead to the establishment of the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI). 
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Chapter 6 
THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA 
(ICMI) 
71te emergence of /CMI cannot be isolated from lire Afuslims 'historical trajectory 
amltltc presence ofmrious contemporary Islamic mo,•cmciJis in Indonesia. 
Dawam Rahardjo (1993)1 
For S11harto, ICMI is a short tcmt marriage of con,·enicnce. 
He thinks he ca11 control [/CAll modernists] if they go too far. 
I'm afraid the strategy will badfire. 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1994)1 
Suharto's increasing satisfaction through the 1980s with his ideological and economic 
handiwork coincided with the waning influence of the old political brokers within the 
New Order polity. As Elson observed (2001: 244): 'Ali Murtopo's star, for so long in 
the ascendant, had begun to wane following his heart attack in 1978 (he died in May 
1984), while Sudjono Humardani's influence faded in the early 1980s with the arrival of 
more professional and technically skilled bureaucrats.' 
This brought a new political alignment within the inner circle of Suharto's 
patronage structure. The Golkar leadership during Sudharmono's period (1983-1988) 
heralded the diminishing influence of Murtopo's group, as Sudhannono preferred to 
accommodate Islamic activists.3 The appointment ofMurtopo's intelligence protege, L. 
B. Murdani, as the military commander in March 1983 temporarily sustained the 
influence of the non-Muslim lobby. The dismissal of Murdani as Commander in Chief 
ofi\,.· -'':" i Forces in 1988, however, marked the turning point in Suharto's attitudinal 
at~ " .:: , .. , relations with the military elites. The President began to welcome the 
p;::.,<,,ton .:>f Islamic-friendly-military officers sometimes referred to as the 'green 
army'. 
Friendly overtures by Muslim organizations towards the state orthodoxy 
encouraged the regime to accommodate Muslim representatives in the leadership of the 
New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the 1983-88 period, some representatives of 
1 RepublikD (29 November 1995). 
'Quoted in A. Schwarz ( 1994: 197). 
3 TI1c representative par excellence ofMurtopo's group in Golknr, JusufWanandi, was moved from his 
previous positions ns Gotkar's Secretary of d1e Organizational Planning and General Affair (1973-78), 
nud Vice-Treasurer (1978-83) to become d1c head oflhc Depaltmenl of Foreign Affairs. 
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the Muslim intelligentsia began to play important roles on Golkar's central executive 
board (DPP-Golkar). This group of Muslim intelligentsia was comprised of Akbar 
'fanjung (as the vice-secretary general), K.H. Tarmudji, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang 
Aucnansi, and Qudratullah (DPP-Golkar, 1994: 165-68). About the same time, Muslim 
intellectuals in the government bureaucracy such as Mar'ie Muhammad, Bedu Amang, 
Muslimin Nasur:c>n, Sajuti Hasibuan and some others were appointed to upper echelon 
positions. 
At about this time, the socio-economic base of the Muslim intelligentsia 
changed. The fourth generation of the Muslim intelligentsia began to challenge the long 
domination of the secular intelligentsia in the bureaucratic sector of the economy. 
Moving outside the traditional economic sector of the (old) smllri, that is petty trading 
and commercial farming (for the modernists) or land owning (for the traditionalists}, 
this Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy was often referred to as the neo-sa11tri. 
The government's policy of good will towards Muslim interests was also 
obvious through its increased support for cultural Islam, indi~ated by a sharp increase 
in its subsidies for mosques and religious schools.4 In addition to government subsidies, 
President Suharto himself, under the auspices of a presidential foundation for the 
support of Islamic initiatives (the A mal Bakti Muslim Pmzcasila), actively sponsored the 
construction of mosques and dalnvalt activities. During the 1970s and 1980s it had 
established 400 mosques and provid···• iinancial support to one thousand r..uslim 
proselytisers (da'i) who were sent to remote districts and transmigration zones.5 
As the rapprochement between the Muslim community and the government 
continued to develop, the composition of Suharto's Fifth Development Cabinet (1988-
1993) contained an unprecedented numher of sa11tri technocrats.6 The government 
accommodation of Muslim intellectuals was also signalled by the appointment of 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and sever:>! other prominent Muslim figures 
as Golkar representatives in the MPR. 
4 During the period of the Third Devclopmcnl Cabinet (1978-83), tl1e number of subsidized mosques was 
8,671, during the Fourth Development Cabinet (1983-1988) tl1is numln ;umped to 12,390 (D<partemen 
Penerangan 1983 & 1988). During tl1e 1l1ird Development Cabinet, tl1e number of classrooms (in 
religious private schools) that had been renovated under the sponsorship of the government was 26,280; 
during tl1c Fourth Development Cabinet this number had jumped to 50,734 ((D<partemen Pcnerangan 
1983 & 1988). 
' See Tempo (8 December 1990). 
6 There were now at1east live fonncr HMI activists, Akbar Tandjung, Azwar Anas, Sandillah Mursjid, 
Nasrudin Sumintapura, and Hasjrul Harahap, in addition to other santri technocrats who had no strong 
connection to any major organized Islamic group such as D. J. llabibic, Munawir Sjadzali, Dustanil 
Arilin, Saleh Aliff, and Arilin M. Siregar. 
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Alongside the elevation of Muslim ligures to the ruling elite, the government 
made a further gesture o'" ;;icndliness towards Muslim interests in legal and cultural 
matter.;, A new National Education Aet (Undang-Undang Pendidilum Nasional), which 
supported Islamic instruction in public schools and appeared to grant more security to 
private religious schools, was passed after exhaustive drafting in 1989. At the same 
time, a law on Islamic religious courts, well known as 'Undang-Undang Peradilan 
Agama' {The Religious Judicature Act) was also passcd.7 
As Muslim intellectuals became more and more acceptable within the New 
Order polity and bureaucracy, the socio-P.conomic achievement of this regime had its 
own unintended consequences. T~c growing accumulation of private capital, the 
explosion of higher educated graduates and a burgeoning urban middle class, the 
deepening integration of the national economy into the global capitalist community, and 
also the changing mood in international ;elations, increased tl1e possibilities for 
oppositional manocuvrings. 
However, no hegemony is so powerful that it exhausts all resources for 
resiGtance. When there is power there is resistance. James C. Scott, in Domination and 
the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990), shows the limits within which a 
ruling ideology actually operates and that even the most subordinate groups are able to 
penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology. In Scott's view, a hegemonic ideology 
tends to create contmdictions that enable it to be criticised in its own terms. 
As the New Order state became more and more hegemonic, political repression 
was experienced not only by Islamic and Ieflist groups, but also by other segments of 
the nation. In effect, counter-hegemony movements gradually involved a broad 
spectrum of Indon~.sian society. Apart from Islamic and student action groups, 
opposition also involved civil-society-oriented NGOs, literary, art and cultural acth•ists 
as well as ir ·:ndcnt journalists. Moreover, opposition also came from rr<Pntful 
groups of forru._ tuling elites, who had been expelled from formal political structures. 
The disintegration of New Order legitimacy as a result of the economic crisis of the 
1997/8 provided a catalyst for these scattered opposition groups to unite in a common 
historical bloc. 
1 This Act significantly enhanced tlte legal and institutional standing of tlte Islamic courts by providing 
form:tl legal guarnntees of their security and increasing tlte. level of state support. The act also 
strengthened the standing of the Islamic courts in relation to the civil courts by clitninating a rule dating 
from the nineteenth century which had required that decisions oflslatnic courts be rntified by a civil court 
to be enforceable. For a critical perspective oflhis Ac~ see Callllll3ck (1997). 
-- ~' 
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Thus, the deepening acceptance of Muslims into the New Order polity look 
place at the very time that oppositional movements were in the ascendancy and the 
Suharto regime was declining. 11tis paradoxical situation was a backdrop to the 
establishment ofthc Association oflndonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI). 
This chapter describes Muslims' efforts to form an ensemble of Muslim 
intellectual collective actio!ls; examines the background behind ICMI's establishment, 
its actual pl'liticnl achievements, its internal contestations and its external opposition. 
Special attention will be given to the factors !hailed some leading figures in ICMI to 
join the resistance mov~menl h: the last months ofSuharto's regime and also to ICMI's 
political dislocation following Suharto's resignation The chapter will conclude with 
discussions of the Muslim intelligentsia's political achievement during the early years 
of the reform (reformasi) era, from the rise ofHabibie's interregnum in May 1988 until 
the turn of the century. 
6.1 Educational Profile of 
Sarja11a 
l..atc 2011' Century: The Boom Time of Muslim 
The 1980s-1990s was the 'harvest' time for the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia 
in various movements. Not only did 1tbe number of Muslim intelligentsia with higher 
education qualifications reached an unprecedented level, but also the number of those 
with postgraduate degrees from overseas study, especially from Western centres of 
learning, was far greater than in any period of Indonesian history. 
The educational attainment of the Indonesian population by religion, based on 
the Indonesian Intercensal Survey of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistic (BPS), shows 
that from 1976 to 1995 the Muslim population experienced a steady educational 
improvement, especially after the late 1980s. This can be seen in the figures for the 
Muslim population in the age- eroup 20-29 years who completed undergraduate 
education (hereafter, UE).8 In 1976, there w~rc only 16,218 Muslims in this age group 
who had completed UE. This figure is about 0.009% of the tote! Muslim population in 
this age group but it represents 75.3% of the total Indonesian population in this age 
group (from various religious backgrounds) who completed UE. In 1985, there were 
71,516 Muslims of this age group who had completed UE. This figure is about 0.2% of 
the total Muslim population in this age group or equal to 76.0% of the total Jndoncsinn 
1 This figure does not include those who attended non·degree programs (the diplomn I, llnnd Ill program) 
nnd nlso dots not include the Muslim population in other age groups. 
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population in this age group who completed UE. In 1995, Muslims of this age group 
who completed UE rose to 553,257. This figure is ei]ual to 1.8% of the total Muslim 
population of this age group or 77.5% of the total Indonesian population who completed 
UE (sec Table-IV). 
The educational achievement of Muslims in this age group remained far below 
that of the Christians (Catholic/Protestant/Others) and Hindus. The ratio of Christians 
and Hindus with UE attainment to the total proportion of Christians and Hindus of this 
age group was much higher than that of the Muslim population. Even so, there is an 
indication that Muslims experienced a significant educational improvement between 
1985-1995. While the proportion of Christians and Hindus completing UE as a 
percentage of the total numhcr of those who completed UE of this age group began to 
decline, Ute Muslim proportion continu~-d to increase (see Table 5). 
Table 5: The Undergraduate Educational (UE) Attainment by Religion of the 
Indonesian Population in the Age Group of24-29 Years 
Year Muslim Christian Hindu 
A B c A B c A B c 
1976 16,218 0.0% 7!>.3% 4,191 0.4% 19.4% 520 0.1% 2.4% 
1985 71,516 0.2% 76.0% 18,706 0.7% 19.~% 3,024 0.5% 3.2% 
1995 553,257 1.8% 77.5% 132,657 4.1% 18.5% 16,604 2.8% 2.3% 
• Source: Base<! on the BPS s Indoncsmn Interccnsal Survey of the 1976, 1985 & 1995 . 
A= total number of the particular religious group completing UE (of this age group) 
B =percentage of A to the total number of the particular religious group(ofthis age group) 
C =percentage of A to the total population (of this age group) completing UE (which is 21,537 in 1976, 
94,024 in 1985 and 713,808 in 1995 respectively). 
Total Muslims oftltis age group= 16,270,299 (1976), 24,521,402 (\:':,5) and 29,353,740 (1995) 
Total Cbristians ofthis age group= 1,024,557 (1976), 2,628,280 (1985), and 3,173,710 (1995). 
Total Hindus ofthis age group= 335,252 (1976), 524,307 (1985) and 579,931 (1995). 
Of course, net all of these higher educa:.;.i Muslims belonged to the devout 
Muslim (smllri) conliilunity. With the deepening Islamization of the academic world 
and of official life throughout thl• 1970s-1980s, however, there developed greater 
conccn· . · · n: !If Islamic-oriented higher educated people than ever before. Thi;; 
achicvcrrtcilt was rwtiorced by the increru;ed credibility of Muslim intellectuals as a 
rcP<ilt of l~e greater numbers of those with PhD and Masters degrees from overseas 
study. 
Because Ute mosque movement was composed largely of those with science and 
engineering backgrounds, many activists of this movement were able to work as 
scientists anq engineers in government agencies and strategic industries, especially 
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those affiliated:':"- ·.he Habibie-led Ministry of Research and Technology. Thus, men like 
Supamo Satira, Zuhal Abdul Qadir, and Nur 1\Juhmudi Ismail (a former LMD recruit, 
Salman activist, and Al-Ghifari activist respectively) worked for agencies under this 
ministry.9 This ministry was the most !!clive government agency to promote the 
development of human resources. Embarking on a policy of overseas study through 
foreign scholarships, in 1986 it began to offer its own scholarships kn,wn as the 
Overseas Development Program (OFP) under World Bank sponsorship.10 With these 
s~holarships many more former activists of the mosque movement were able to pursue 
their postgraduate studies in Western countries. 
For Islamic activists from non-science and engineering backgrounds, their 
opportunities to pursue overseas studies were enhanced by the availability of other 
scholarships such as the so-called 'OTO Bappenas' and the MOF of the Finance 
Ministry sponsored by the World Bank. 
Meanwhile, the most serious effort to send JAIN graduates to Western 
Universities was undertaken by the Ministry of Rdigion during the period of Munawir 
Sjadzali (1983-1988, 1!/S:i-1993). The main objective, according to Sjadzali, was to 
integrate what he called 'Islamic intellectualism' with (secular) 'National 
intellectualism', specifically to enable Islamic scholars with JAIN backgrnund3 to better 
communicate with the intelligentsia from secular ur.',versity backgrounds (11~·-..fier 1992: 
20). Data from the Ministry of Religion ~bows that between 1987-1994 don;:, no fewer 
than 153 JAIN lecturers completed their postgraduate study in West~m ,·.•'·v:tsities and 
103 staffs were still participating in the same program. By the late 19"::Js, 90% of the 
JAIN lecture1s wllo joined the so-called ·'program pcmbibitan' (training program for 
preparing stafi for post-graduate study) preferred Western universities to those of the 
Middle East (Dcpartclli•'ll Agama 1998}. 
As a result of these ecucational achievements, the Muslim intelligentsia was now 
a ubiquitous phenom~non and even beginning to dominate socio-political discourse in 
the Indonesian pu,,lic sphere. C01ls~quently, Muslim intellectuals in the 1980s-1990s 
were much more confident than thdr predecessors, while also G ~manding greater public 
roles in society. 
9 Later, Satim would beeomo a senior r.xeeuth•e in the Indonesian Aircmft Industry (IPTN), Qadir would 
become the Minist'f of r-esearch and Technology in Habibie's cabinet, while Ismail would become the 
Minister of Forestry in Wahio's cabinet, . 
10 This would b• r.,!'owed hy other scholarships sucl: as Science and Technology Manpower 
Development (Sl'i•:J',p, 1989-1995) and >cience an-1 Technology for Industrial Development (STAID, 
1990-199S). 
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The effect of the ongoing dakwah movement, in conjunction with the 
introduction of general subjects in religious educational inst;.tutions and religious 
subjects in secular educational institutions, caused the distinction bctwcc:' '"-~ category 
of ulama and illlc/cklllil to become blurred. Many intclcklllil emerged as leading 
religious figures, while many ulama emerged as leading spokesmen on secular issues. 
Mor~Jver, with the proliferation of religious universities there were more and mo· . ., 
ulama with academic degrees, while the introduction of general faculties in religious 
universities caused confusio~ about whether graduates from these institutions should be 
called ulama or intclektuil. In sha.·ing a wide commonality in their knowledge bru:e and 
exposure to modernity and ~ .:sher education, the terms ulama and intelektuil, as far as 
they related to the group of degree holders, werr. no longer mutually exclusive. During 
this period, even the existing mediating terms such as 'intelek-ulnma' and 'ulama-
ime/ek' began to crumble, as both terms still implicitly recognised a distinction between 
ulama and intclt!kl!ti/. 
A new code was needed to mark the fusion of the two categori~.s. The meeting 
ground of this fusion was not in the word 'imelekwil' or 'ulama ', but rather in the 
neutral Indonesian neologism, 'cendekiawan' (intellectual or intelligentsia). 11 The term 
'Cendekiawan Muslim' was incr.;a;ingly used in the Indonesian public sphere from the 
1980s onwards, especially as a signifier for the explosive development of Muslim 
illte/ek-ulama and ulama-intelek. The term5 illle/ektuil and .. :am a, however, remahed in 
usc signifying their original (Indonesian) meanings. 
6.2. Discursive Practices and the Public Sphere 
The pcrio!\ 1988-1993 was the last five year phase of the first long-term 
Indonesian Development plan (PJP 1).12 AjJproaching the second term, official discourse 
and ceremonies begnn to be infatuated with a new slogan, 'take-ofr(lepas-landasJ, 
wh.ki. proclaimed the next phase in Indonesia's miraculous development. At the same 
time, the Indonesian economy underwent a radical change. The private and induotrial 
sectors became the driving force_ of the n ,,;,.nal economy. By 1991, manufac• ·;:·(; "·'· ·l 
share of GOP began to exceed that of agriculture and private banks began to hold larger 
sums in deposit than slate banks (Thee 2002: 198-201 ). 
11 For the elyrn.>logy oftlte :enn, see ch:tpler t. 
12 The tong lenn oflndonesian development pl•n.•ing was 25 years. 
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. With the success of the industrial sector, President Suharto came to realise thm 
technological advancement through the advancement of human technical capability was 
the best ro11te towards Indonesia's 'takc-ofl'. By late November 1984, he had said: 'I'm 
especially conscious of just how important it is to master science and technology for the 
progress of our nation in the future. To be able to achieve take-off, in the coming years 
we need to make gre~!c;t progress in the fields of science and technology' (Kompas, 29 
November 1984).13 Apart from economic considerations, Suharto's fascination with the 
mastery of hit;l technology seemed to be motiv~tcd by his need to show to the world 
that Indonesia had succeeded under his leadership. In this context, Suharto rested his 
ambition on his energetic and ambitious minister, B. J. Habibie {a famous Indonesian 
technologist with a Gcnnan university background, Tec/mische Hochsclmle Aachen, 
and the long serving Minister of Research and Technology [ 1978-1998)).t4 
In supporting the drive towards technological advancement, Habibie developed a 
new economic vision which differed radically from that of the established economic 
technocrats. In his view, the sustainability of Indonesian economic development could 
not rely simply on the principle of 'comparative advantage', based on an abundance of 
natural resources and cheap labour. Rather it should be based on the principle of 
'competitive advantage' based on the 'added values' of high technology and thr 
availability of highly trained and skilled labour. In this co :text, the mastery of scienc;; 
and technology (S&T) through human resource developmenl: ·1RD) should become the 
main priority of future Indonesian devr.lopmcnt. With the enthusiastic support of 
Suharto, Habibie developed an empire of high-tech strategic industries ranging from 
a'·~rafi to ships and even weapons. Alongside these ambitious projects, S&T and HRD. 
issues hecame the dominant discourse in the public sphere of the late New Order era. 
A~ the regime was dreaming of 'take-orr, the achievement of economic 
development b~gan to produce a reverse impact. The increasing Indonesian dependency 
on foreign debt and the global capitalist community made the country's economics and 
politics more vulnerable to foreign influences and changes in the international economic 
environment. Furthermore, as the price of oil began to fall afier 1982, the government 
began to develop a more efficient, deregulated and market-oriented economy. This was 
13 Quoted in Elson (2001: 264). 
14 Habibie was well-known for his special relationship with Suharto. Suharto's allaehmentlo him had a 
personal el.,menl, reflecting r.ol just Suharto's own small role in his childhood in Makassar but also 
certain qualilieo in Habibie thai e":', ,,red him to Suharto. As El!on noted (2001: 265): 'Habibie, like 
Suharto, was a 'can do' rr.an. Suhatto also admired his willingness lo forpo his own profitable clreer in 
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followed by a shifi from state-dominated import substitution towards a private-initiative 
export ()ricnted economy. This lificd the bargaining power of the private sector. As Hill 
and Mackie noted (1994: xxv): 'The international connections of private commercial 
conglomerates have undoubtedly tipped the balance of power between the state 
apparatus and these private actors in the latter's favour.' Moreover, the deepening 
integration of the national economy into the global capitalist community provided a 
catalyst for Indonesia's exposure to Western liberal and democratic values. 
By the early 1990s, a sizeable urban (educated) middle class, numbering around 
lifiecn million people, had emerged for the first time in the nation's history (Hill & 
Mackie 1994: xxv). The growing number of higher educated people together with the 
increasing urban middle class was responsible for a rise of ~xpcctations and critical 
aspirations. When the circulation of the elite at the centre of the political structure 
became congested, the opportunities for this class to wield political power were 
constrained. The long waiting list of power aspirants put pressure on political elites 
inside the political structure, leading to fierce internal political struggles among cliques 
and circles in the New Order's bureaucracy and polity. 
Although economic growth was sustained and the proportion of tertiary studellls 
remained relatively small, the problem of 'intellectual proletarianization' which had 
happened in the past became even worse. The main cause Ia) in :ilc mismatch between 
supply (the outpnt !Jf the tertiary institutions) and demand (the job markct).1s The 
proportion of social science students among all university students in the country until 
the period 1988-1990 was about 76,8%. At the sante time, the proportion of social 
science graduates among the total unabsorbed output of tertiary institutions (by the job 
market) was more than 60%.16 The threat of unemployment was even more frightening 
for students of non-elite private universities. Spending more money for tuition fees and 
other expenses than students in the public universities, graduates of the (non-elite) 
private universities tended to be marginalised in the job market. Being more aware 
politically, but deprived economically these upcoming ;ntellcctual proletarians were a 
time-bomb for future political unrest. 
Germany to serve his country. Most of all, pcrhaps1 he suc,:bmbcd to Habibie's willingness to flatter and 
accommodate him.' 
" The Indonesian manufacturing industry was characterised by the dominart presence of footloose 
industries or industries wilb low technological content. Titis kind of industry relied heavily on unskilled 
labonr and provided limited job opportunities for higher educated people. At the same time, for gradW!tes 
in the social sciences, absorption into the job market became more and more difficult. 
"For a furtlter discussion ofthis issue, see Y. Latif(l994). 
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All these consequences of development put pressure on the government to give 
greater concessions to demands for openness in the public sphere. From the late 1980s, 
'keterbukaan' (openness) became a counter-hegemonic discourse in the public sphere. 
In the Independence Day address of August 1990, Suharto himself embraced the idea of 
greater freedom of expression, though he saw this simply as a lessening of his executive 
roles. Even so, such political rhetoric elicited muted criticism and calls for more 
substantial reforms (including significant modifications to the military's dual function) 
and even calls for the President to stand down at the end of his current term (Elson 
2001: 268).17 
The winds of openness provided an impetus for intellectuals and the mass media 
to be more openly critical of the government. Towards the end of the 1980s, the student 
movement that had long been silenced began to revive on a limited scale. The focus of 
their r.ttention was concentrated on local and sectoral issues such as protesting against 
the government's confiscation of acricultural lands and the government-sponsored 
lottery (SDSB). 
Despite these moves, it was obvious that the long established repres~ivc security 
regime remained intact. Tile freedom for critical journalism and student protests 
remained restricted. On 29 June 1987, a newly established newspaper, Priori/as (est. 
1985) was banned because of its alleged 'cynical, insinuative, and tendentious' 
reporting. In October 1990, the government closed down a popular Jakarta based 
tabloid, Monitor, after it had published a readers' poll which ranked the Prophet 
Muhammad eleventh after President Suharto (who ranked first), Iraq's Saddam Hussein, 
and the editor of the tabloid itself, Arswendo Atmowiloto. This press repression 
culminated in I994, when three well-known publications, Tempo, Editor and Detik, 
were banned after reporting the government's plan to buy ex-East German warships for 
excessive sums of money. Meanwhile, on 5 August 1989, six student activists from the 
ITB 18 were arrested and imprisoned after protesting against the visit of the then Minister 
of Home Affairs, General Rudini, to the ITB campus. This was followed by the 
imprisonment and abduction of other intellectual activists in the following years. 
17 As Elson noled (200I: 268): 'Such calls emanated from senior civilian inlelleetuals such as former 
minister nnd close colleague Mashuri and Golknr figure Marzuki Daru.,.m:m, as well as retired senernls 
such ns Sumilro, Sayidiman Suryohadiprodjo and Nnsulion, and lhe Pelilion or SO group or which 
Nasution was n member (which was, to Suharto's apparent annoyanr\". invited to discussions nt the 
p,arliament in mid· I 99 I).' 
1 The six imprisoned studenls were M. Fajrul Rahman, Moh. Jumhur Hidayat, Ammar.yah, Arnold 
Purba, Dambang L.S.; and Enin Supriyanlo. 
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In this transitory phase between repression and openness, factional conflicts 
within tlie-ruling elite became even more intense. It was this situation in 1990 that made 
possible the realisation of a long standing Muslim ambition to establish an association 
of the Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia, to be called !kat an Ccndekiawan Muslim Se-
lndoncsia (ICMI). Emerging as the only major Islamic organization granted legal status 
during the New Order, in the midst of the growing oppositional movements, ICMI was 
the most controversial intellectual association in Indonesian history. It became a focus 
of political debates and m~dia attention in the late New Order era. Its political 
significance, however, did not last long, as the country was soon engulfed by a wave of 
reformasi (reform). 
The economic crisis that mired the country after mid-1997' 9 provided a catalyst 
for people to question the New Order's legitimacy and to imagine a future without 
Suharto. Suharto had survived crises before and had even emerged stronger as a result. 
This time, however, the economic crisis was too serious especially since it was 
exacerbated by a broad constellation of non-economic crises. The ruling elite displayed 
severe internal disunity. Scattered opponents had begun to unite in a common cause, 
while international support, especially from the financial institutions, had diminishcd.20 
All these and other factors occurred simultaneously and created so much pressure that 
Suharto found himself losing support. In effect, he had no choice but to step down on 21 
May 1998. 
6.3 Early Efforts to Unite Muslim Intcllcctunls 
There have been two major contending academic perspectives on ICMI's arrival 
on the Indonesian public scene. The first came from its critics. They argued that the rise 
of ICMI was part of Suharto's strategic plan to mobilise Muslim support as 
compensation for the potential diminution in ABRI's support for him and to detach 
Muslim intellectuals from more radical, political clements at the grassroots. The second 
came from the perspective of more sympathetic scholars. They argued that the genesis 
of ICMI should be understood as a natural consequence of the growing number of the 
1
' Indonesia's financial crisis was precipitated by a crisis of confidence. Following the depreciation of the 
TI1ai batl1 in July 1997, which through the 'contagion effect' led to similar currency depreciations in the 
Philippines and Malaysia, foreign investors and creditors in Indonesia also became jittery and scn'ntbled 
to reduct their exposure to Indonesia. The snowball effect of tllis situation resulted in th~ severe 
Indonesian economic crisis (TI1ee 2002: 232). 
20 The declin: in Suharto's international support was signalled by the IMF's refusal of the prupos:i:. ofthe 
currrney board system (CUS) put fonvard by Suharto and his economic team. For further discussion of 
tl1is issue, sec Steve H. Hanke (Tempo, 11105/2003). 
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new educated-middle class Muslims who needed an arena for sclf-actualisation and to 
give voice to the continuing economic and political marginalisation of the ummat. 
The first perspective was represented by an American political scientist, R. 
William Liddle, who argued that the rise and prominence of ICMI could best be 
understood 'as part of the president's political strategy and tactics rather than as the 
expression of the demands of the Indonesian Muslim community' (Liddle 1996: 631 ). 
He characterised the second perspective as a failure to understand the relationship 
between the state and political Islam in late New Order Indonesia. 'They all miss the 
crucial determining factor, which is the role played by President Suharto as pre-eminent 
simper both of the political system and the forces within it' (p. 620). 
To this charge, however, the same criticism can be raised. If the rise of ICMI 
was simply the result ofSuharto's initiative, how can we explain the enthusiasm of tens 
of thousands of non-Jakarta (non-elite) JCMI members who joined ICMI without being 
conscious of its elite personal political interests? How can we explain half a million 
buyers of P.T. Abdi Bangsa's shares in Republika (lCMJ's daily newspaper), who did 
not enforce their rights and never demanded public accountability of their shares? How 
cam we explain the fact that some leading figures in lCMI (say Amien Rais and 
Nurcholish Madjid) played critical roles in pressuring Suharto to step down. 
The second perspective was represented by American anthropologist, Robert W. 
Hefner, who argued that 'the effort to establish an association of Muslim Intellectuals 
did, at least in the first instance, originate within the Muslk c:.;;;n,unity' (Hefner 1993: 
20). In contrast to the first view, he proposed that 'however much it was to be drawn 
into bureaucratic intrigues, the idea for ICMI was not originally a matter of government 
engineering; its origins lay in a stale-society interaction with longer and more contested 
history' (Hefner 1993: 20). Viewing ICMI simply as an arm of government, Hefner 
argued, reflects a tendency among Western scholars to sec religion as no more than 
instrument for achieving more 'genuine' political-economic ends. This is despite the 
fact that many devout Muslims view politics not as ends in themselves, but as means for 
the creation of a greater good, the realisation of Islamic ideals in society (Hefner 1993: 
29). Hefner quoted Benedict Anderson's views: 
We a··e so accustomed to thinking ... only of politicians using religion for 
political ends, that it is extremely hard for us to understand what politics might 
look like if we could see it through religious eyes, or in a religious perspective, 
and thus imagine the possibility of religious people using politics for religious 
ends (Hefner 1993: 27). 
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Concerning this argument, however, there arc some questions that can be raised. 
If Suharto had no specific role in ICMI's establishment, why then did he support the 
establishment of a confessional-based association that had been depicted by one senior 
Indonesian general as 'the biggest disaster to hit the New Order' (Vatikiotis 1994: 133). 
Furthermore, if ICMI were an organization which used politics for merely religious 
ends, how should we understand the following view of Adi Sasono, a leading organic 
intellectual of ICMI: 'It is difficult to organize the masses for purposes of 
democratization and de-militarization if we don't usc the reason of religion' (Quoted in 
Ramag~ 1995: 75). 
The shortcomings of both perspectives arc obvious. Both arc looking for reality 
through one-sided spectacles. To borrow B. Smart's depiction (following Dcrrida}, both 
share a common cosmology of modernist metaphysics based on 'a series of 
metaphorical binary oppositions, in which one clement is accorded a privileged status' 
(Smart 1997: 402). The first perspective, as articulated by Liddle, reflects a lack of 
historical insight, a lack of comparative perspective, and a lack of understanding of the 
general theory of social movements. 
To judge ICMI simply as a Trojan horse for the President's political strategies 
and tactics just because the power-centre backed the process of its formation risks 
ignoring the mirror of history. The support ICM1 gained from the authorities is not a 
unique historical phenomenon, as similar cases had rccurringly happened throughout 
Indonesian history. The success of R.M. Tirto Adhi Suljo in establishing Soenda Berita 
(1903) and particularly Medan Prijaji (1907), which has been celebrated in 
Pramoedya's historical novels for pioneering the 'language' of nationalism, was partly 
ascribed to 'the access he had to Governor General van Heutsz, which provided him 
with protection from bureaucratic harassment' (Shiraishi 1990: 34). Su~h access to the 
political authorities, however, did not prevent Suljo from pursuing his own political 
intentions as hr could maintain his spirit of resistance and emancipation.2t 
In other cases, the establishment of Budi Utomo (BU) and Sarekat Islam (SI) 
was also achieved with the blessing of Governor General ldcnburg (Shiraishi 1990, 35; 
11 To quote from Shiraishi's phrase (1990: 34): 'Tirtoadhisocrjo created his 0\\11 journalistic style in 
Mcdan Prijaji, militant and sarcastic in tone .... Though the title of the newspaper was Medon Prijaji, it 
was no longer the forum for only the priyayJ, ... but as its motto <nys, 'the voice for all the (native) rulers, 
aristocrats, and intellectuals, priyayi, &~ivc merchants, and officers as well merchants of the subordinated 
peoples made equal (in status) with tlte Sons oftlte Country.' 
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Van Neil, 1970: 95-6). This official bkssing, however, docs not necessarily mean that 
SI was simply Idcnburg's Trojan horse-Dutch officials would later translate .SI as 
'Salah Idenburg' (ldenburg's Mistake). In a similar manner, Japanese scholar Mitsuo 
Nakamura (1999: 89) has severely criticised Liddle's view on the emergence of!CMI: 
Liddle even stated that ICMI should be regarded as an instrument designed and 
used by Socharto for his own purposes. However, Socharto did not complete his 
seventh term: ICMI did not work to safeguard him. Instead, it worked to replace 
him with Habibic. What went wrong? Aficr the second congress of ICMI, a 
number of Islamic activists were appointed to strategic positions in the 
government through their ICMI connections. Some of them were determined to 
take over power from Socharto sooner or later, with or without Habibic. 
Apart from historical precedents, the rise of the Muslim intellectual movement 
during_ the I970s-1990s is in fact not unique to Indonesia. In Algeria, there was a 
continuing tension between the so-called 'arabophone' intelligentsia (Islamist 
intelligentsia) versus 1ra11coplzone' intelligentsia (secular modernising intelligentsia). 
According to an Algerian scholar, Lahouari Addi (1997: 93), 'whilst it was assumed 
that independence would bring them together and serve to create a new elite, it pushed 
them further apait and even set them against each other.' In Turkey, a similar clash 
occurred between the so-called 'aydi11'22 (Muslim intellectuals) versus 'cllte/cktiie/' 
(secular intellectuals). In Egypt, a triangular tension took place between the so-called 
'mufakkir Is/amy' (Muslim intelligentsia) versus the 'secular intelligentsia' plus a 
conflict within the 'mufakkir Is/amy' between the moderate Muslim intelligentsia versus 
the radical one-under the banner of 'Jama'at Islamiyya' (Abdullah I991; Denoeux 
1993}. These examples strongly suggest that the rise ofiCMI cannot be ascribed solely 
to Suharto's initiative because similar phenomena can be found elsewhere in the 
Muslim world. 
Last but not least, Liddle's exaggeration of the Suharto factor is inappropriate in 
terms of the general theory of social movcm~cnts.23 Eyerman and Jan1ison (1991: 55-6) 
22 Aydin is a Turkish neologism to describe enlightened people (intellectuals), which is relatively free 
from Western overtones. In contcmpomry developments, this term is widely used by Muslim intellectu.,~s 
to distinguish themselves from their secular intellectual counterparts who have been attached to the term 
'cnte/ekttlei'(Mceker 1994: 86-7). 
n Some might argue that ICMI c;annot be viewed as a socinl movement, for it dot:S not express n sense of 
progrcssivity. In Eyerman and Jamison's observation, however, social movements arc not necessarily 
progressive nor need they always be morally commendable. In the twentielh century, there were various 
movements with a wide range of culturnl and political agendas, from the fascist and cmnmunist to the 
'reactionary modernism' of the Nazis and religious fundamentalism(l998: 10). 
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offer some premises to understand the phcuomcna of social movements. Among olher 
things, they state: 
{I) Social movements go through a kind of life cycle, from gcstalion to 
formation and consolidation. Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; 
instead they require long period of preparation. (2) No social movement emerges 
until there is a political opportunity available, a context of social problems as 
well as a context of communication, opening up the polcntial for problem 
articulation and knowledge disseminalion. 
In addition, lor !he social movement to appear on the public scene, political opportunily 
is a decisive factor. This point recalls the theory of 'political process'. The central focus 
of this Iheory is the relationship between institutional political actors and action, and the 
importance of (the so-called) a 'political opportunity structure'. When challenging the 
eslablished political structure, social movements interact with actors who enjoy a 
consolidated position in such an establishment. Based on comparative studies, Dona tell a 
della Porta and Mario Diani (1999: 9-10) highlighl the following research findings: 
Olher empirical research indicated important new variables, such as ... the 
availability of influential allies (Gamson 1999) .... Sydney Tarrow inlegrated 
these empirical observations into a lhcoretical framework for his study of protesl 
cycles in Italy, singling out the degree of openness or closure of formal political 
access, the degree of stabilily or instability of political alignments, the 
availability and strategic posture of potential allies (1983: 28) and political 
conllicls bel ween and within elites{'. 989a: 35). 
Based on theories of social movemenls, Suharto's support for ICMI can be 
viewed as a signal of the availability of a posilivc political opportunity which could be 
used to transform the well-prepared Muslim intellectual movcmcnls into a loosely 
organized Muslim intelligentsia association. Exaggerating the 'Suharto factor' runs the 
risk of ignoring the fact that ICMI might have ils own political agenda, even though 
the formal rhetoric of ICMI's leading figures kept insisting that ICMI was simply a 
'gerakan kebudayaan' (cultural movement) free of political interests. 
Having analysed !he shortcomings of the first perspective we now tum to 
examine the second one. To fully appreciate its historical background, the second 
perspective as articulated by Hefner, fails to reveal the essence of ICMI's struggle 
witl1i11 the web of actual power relations. By saying that 'its origins lay in a state-society 
int("Jction', this perspective reflects Marxist theories which Ieick the power locus into 
the relations between ruler and ruled and exaggerate the importance of the State in the 
maintenance of power relations. This monolithic view of power has been crilicised by 
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Foucault for its narrow understanding of the nature of power and its relations. The 
power struggle not only takes place along the axis of slate and society relations, but also 
occurs in clashes of individuals and groups within society. ICMI's power struggle is 
better understood by situating it in this broader context of power relations. 
It is worth noting that the second perspective characterised ICMI's historical 
project as the struggle for the Muslim middle-class. In fact, there arc several problems 
in describing ICMI struggle in terms of class action. First, the Indonesian intelligentsia's 
road to power did not really originate from its 'class' (economic) position, but rather 
from its privileged status group as a modem-educated stratum of Indonesian society. 
Second, ICMI membership did not really represent the (Muslim) middle class, but rather 
a structurally differentiated stratum of the Muslim intelligentsia both economically and 
educationally (sec Table 8 and Appendix C). The great bulk of its members belonged to 
the middle income level. A few others emerged with their wealth substantially 
enhanced, in many respects coming to share economic power with the owners of capital, 
while the rest were distinctly proletarianiscd. Third, the power struggle among groups 
of the intelligentsia had seldom b~en articulated in terms of class but mostly articulated 
in terms of cultural solidarity groupings. Last but not least, conflicts among groups of 
the Indonesian intelligentsia and between the Muslim intelligentsia and the state 
reflected not only clashes of economic interest but also cultural and symbolic ones 
which cannot be reduced to a struggle for 'class' (economic interests). 
In the light of these theoretical perspectives, the rise ofiCMI can be understood 
as the result of an interactional process. That is, the combination of a long period of 
Islan1ic intellectual movements in various fields and ideological orientations and the 
availability of political opportunity resulting from changes in Suharto's patronage 
structure. Intellectual networks and the cognitive structure of previous Muslim 
intellectual movements provided the preconditions for the mobilisation of Muslim 
intellectuals for ICMI, while Suharto's support opened up a new possibility for the 
materialization of a long-waited union of Muslim intellectuals. The rise of ICMI also 
reflected a combination of power struggles between state and society and between 
various groups within society (particularly within the stratum of intelligentsia) as well 
as a combination of the power struggle for politico-economic interests (class) and that 
for cultural-identity (status). 
As more and more concessions were given to the Muslim community and as 
Muslim intellectuals began to dominate socio-political discourses in the Indonesian 
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public sphere, it was natural for the Muslim intelligcntsllto want to play more decisive 
roles in the New Order polity and bureaucracy. Moreover, by the late I 9BOs, the fourth 
generation of the Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the 
I 930s and I 940s, was too old to remain on the periphery of political power. Behind this 
generation was a long queue of the fifih generation of Muslim activists who were 
waiting for a change in political opportunities for their upward mobility. 
Having been fragmented into a variety of groupings because of different 
responses to New Order political repression and modernisation, Muslim intellectuals 
were now, under a conducive political opportunity structure, united by a common will 
to reproduce a new social cohesion to strengthen Muslim bargaining power. This 
aspiration could be motivated by an ideal collective will to deepen the Islamisation 
process of the Indonesian polity or simply by pragmatic individual power interests. 
Rhetorically, this ambition was oficn disguised by the slogans of Muslim participation 
in and contribution to development, especially in the field of S&T and H&D 
development. 
To strengthen the political bargaining power of the Muslim intelligentsia, the 
formation of a Muslim intellectual united front was considered as vital. Throughout the 
I 980s there had been experiments in uniting Muslim intellectuals in particular collective 
actions and associations. In I 980, Muslim intellectuals in Surabaya and its sutTounding 
area began to form the Intellectual Community of Al-Fa/ah (Cendekiawan Muslim A/-
Falah, CMF) Jed by Fuad Amsjari.24 Tl:. · ... Jdquartcrs of this intellectual community 
was in the Al-Falah mosque, which was Wt:~l-known as a DDII affiliate. In early 1984, 
the CMF organized a wider meeting of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in line with its 
ambition to form an Indonesian society of Muslim intellectuals.25 This meeting was 
attended by Muslim intellectuals from Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta, and Bandung.26 
Then in December 1984, the MUI organized a meeting of Muslim intellectuals in 
Jakarta, attended by 31 participants from Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor, Yogyakarta, Banda 
Aceh, Mcdan, Padang, and Makassur. The meP.ting recommended strengthening 
" Among members of the CMF were Fund Amsjari, Samsuri Martojoso, Usman Affandy, Muhammad 
Usnun, Latief Burban, Nizar Hasjim, Munawar Thohir, and Sukanto. Interview with Fund Amsjari 
~/11/2000). 
At this juncture, Amsjaai claimed tlaat his group had already introduced 'lkatan Ccndckiall'an Muslim 
Indonesia' (ICMI) as a proposed name for this society.lnterview wilh Fuad Amsjari (9/11/2000). 
26 Among intellecluats who attended tlais n:eeling were Fuad Amsjari and Mohammad 11aohir of 
Surabaya, Usman Affandy of Malang, Sahirul A lim of Yogyakarta and Rahmat Djalnika of Dandung. 
Interview with Fuad Amsjari (9111/2000) and Usman Affandy (2511112000) and Muhammad 11tohir 
(27/10/1998). 
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cooperation among Muslim intellectuals with a special concern to assist the MUI in 
providing consultation teams. The meeting was followed by the 'Symposium of Muslim 
Intellectuals to prepare for the Industrial and Information Society', held in Ciawi 
(Boger) in March 1986, attended by more than 100 Muslim intellectuals. Soon afier the 
Symposium, a special meeting of Muslim intellectuals was conducted in Cibogo (West 
Java) on 7·8 May 1986 resulting in the establishment of the Communication Forum of 
Indonesian Development (Fonmz Komzmikasi Pembangzman Indonesia, FKPI) (Anwar, 
1995: 253-254). This forum did not include tliC word Islam or Muslim to avoid raising 
government's opposition. With Achmad Tirtosudiro as its chairman and Dawam 
Rahardjo as its main organizer, this forum proposed the establishment of an association 
of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and even prepared its statutes. Afraid of government 
rejection, however, the MUI asked the FKPI leader to postpone the implementation of 
such :i:l idea. 27 
The next effort to unite Muslim intellectuals in a common action front was 
attempted by lmaduddin Abdulrahim. For two years afier his return to Indonesia, he was 
not allowed to give speeches or lectures on campuses (except in mosques). During this 
time he witnessed from a distance the fragmentation within the Muslim intellectual 
community, while also learning from Aswab Mahasin that the existing FKPI was not 
performing effectively as an organization of Muslim intellectuals. His strained 
relationship with Nurcholish Madjid had been restored through a close family 
relationship during their study in the USA and he had the ambition to rcconcik Muslim 
intellectu~l disputes on a large scale. With some minor financial support from Alamsjah 
Prawiranegara he organized a meeting of Muslim intellectuals in Yogyakarta. in early 
1989. The meeting was attended by about 50 participants from dil'erse Islamic 
movements including prominent Muslim intellectual figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, 
Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Syafi'i Ma'arif. The meeting reachrd agreement about 
the establishment of a Muslim intellectual association, but the securi;y apparatus 
suddenly used force to break up the mceting.28 
The failure of early efforts to establish a Muslim intellectual association on a 
large scale reflected the difficulty of realising such an ambition without the blessing of 
the (political) power holder. As well, until the end of the 1980s the influence of the old 
• 
'lslamo-phobic' political brokers within the security regime remiltned relatively strong. 
21 Interl'iew with Dawam Rnhardjo (10/09/1998) and Ahmad Zoeky Siradj (23/09/1998). 
21 1nterl'iew wilh lruaduddin Abdulrahim (26/1111998). 
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6.4 The Rise of ICMI 
History is often created in an unimaginable way. Soon after the Yogyakarta 
meeting, Imaduddin Abdulrahim was invited (for the first time) to give a religious 
speech on campus by the Malang-based Brawidjaja University to celebrate lsra Mi 'raj 
(the Night Journey of the Prophet) day. The-then rector of the university was a former 
HMI activist, Z. A. Ahmady, who took the risk of inviting Abdulrahim to speak publicly 
on the campus. The principal organisers were student activists from the engineering 
faculty, under the leadership of Eric Salman, who admired Abdulrahim for religious and 
academic reasons. The encounter between campus Islamic activists and the pioneer of 
the campus dakwalt provided them some food for thought. 29 Apart from this event, 
Dawam Rahardjo also happened to meet with Islamic activists ofthe university because 
his daughter was a student 1:1ere. While visiting his daughter he was frequently invited 
to give religious lectures in the university's Raden Patah mosque.30 The meeting of the 
campus junior Islamic activists with their senior mentors paved the road for informal 
inter-generational intell~ctual networks. 
The students were forcefully struck by the ongoing cleavages among the Muslim 
intelligentsia. They werr. bothered by the leadership polarisation in the Muslim 
community, ;·eflected by the emergence of the Salman group, the Paramadina group, the 
Al-Falah group, the Sh~lahuddin group and so on. In February 1990, they suggested the 
idea of a symposium which would bring together Muslim intellectuals from all over 
Indonesia. Originally the symposium was to be conducted between 29 September-! 
October 1990 with the theme 'The Muslim intellectual's contribution to the 'take off' 
era of development'. They gained support in principle from the rector of the Brawidjaja 
University and the rector of the Multammadiyalt University of Malang, Malik Fadjar, 
though the Brawidjaja rector raised objections to the heavy costs of the seminar. Even 
so, for these students, with key figures among them being Eric Salman, Ali Mudhakir, 
· Mohammld Zaenuri, A wang Surya and Mohammad Iqbal,31 there was no possibility of 
retreat. Using their personal and limited resources, they began to visit centres of the 
Islamic epistemic community throughout Java to raise support from prominent Muslim 
intellectuals. They met with Abdulrahim and Rahardjo in May 1990. 
"Interview wWcl=duddin Abdutrnhim (26/tt/t998) nnd with one oflhe event's organizers, M. Zaenuri 
~0/tt/2000). 
Intcrviow with Dawnm Rahanljo (10/09/1998). 
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Both Abdulrahim and Rahardjo had long dreamt of bringing together Muslim 
intellectuals from diverse movements both from the 'bloc within' and 'bloc without' to 
form a kind of Muslim intellectuals' 'historical bloc'. The students' proposal of a 
symposium ofTen,. - promir.ing channel to materialise their ambitions. Aller discussing 
this idea with Rd,•.,•;,, Abdulrahim told the students: 'If you want to create history, 
this symposium should not be an ordinary one. It has to be a vehicle for establishing an 
assoriation of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. '32 To make the dream come true, he 
recommended the students revise their proposal and meet with B. J. Habibie to ask him 
to be a kP.ynote speaker ~~ the symposium, as well as to lead the association. 
Abdulrahim had received advice from Alamsjah Prawiranegara that it was important to 
make Habibie a patron if the association were to succeed. Apart from his reputation as a 
leading Indonesian scientist and a committed (non-activist) Muslim, his close 
relationship with Suharto would be very useful. In fact, the students had long admired 
Habibie for his scientific achievements and for his religious commitment, after reading 
his short biography in the Kib/at magazinc.33 They therefore agreed with Abdu!rahim's 
suggestion. 
Representatives of the students were able to meet for the first time with Habibie 
in the mushalla of his office, Agency for the Assessment and Application of 
Technology (BPPT), after the Friday prayer on 2 August 1990. Habibie responded to 
the idea of .• symposium positively and asked the students to send him a formal letter 
and proposal. In their letter, the students requested a special meeting with Habibie to 
explain the program comprehensively. This meeting occurred on 23 August 1990, led 
by student representatives, Eric Salman and Ali Mudhakir, who were accompanied by 
Abdulrahim, Rahardjo and Syafi'i Anwar. Once again Habibic stated his willingness to 
come to the symposium. Con~eming his nomination as the chairman of the proposed 
association of Muslim intellectuals, Habibie did not mind in principle, but said that as a 
minister he had to get permission from the President. To do this, he needed to be able to 
give the President some proof that Muslim intellectuals requested him to lead the 
proposed association. 34 
Aller Habibie's positive response, these students with the help of Abduhahim's 
and Rahardjo's circles of Muslim activists began to collect signatures of Muslim 
31 A'l of these students were students of U1e engineering faculty as well as activists of the Raden Patah 
mC'~que. 
"Intervi"w with lmaduddin Abdulrnhim (26/1111998). 
"1r.terview wilh M. Zaenuri (10/1112000). 
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intellectuals as proof that they supported the establishment of the associatior. 
Habibie's nomination as Chair. In this effort, peopk wiih multiple affiliations and wide-
ranging personal networks provided a useful bridge to mobilise the support of 
intellectuals from diverse Islamic movements. For example, Nurcholish Madjid only 
agreed to give the students his signature aller Abdulruhim called him. To persuade 
Yogyakm1a's intellectual circles, a letter from RaharJjo, as a Multammadiyalt 
functionary and former activist in Yogyakarta, to Amien Rais, 'the god father' of 
Yogyakarta's Muslim intellectuals, was very effective. When the students finally 
handed the list of signatures to Habibie on 25 September 1990, they had been able to 
collect 49 signatures with 45 of them being the signatures of PhD graduates.35 
While the students were collecting signatures, Achmad Tirtosudiro took the 
initiative to ask Nurcholish Madjid to write a paper on the basic concept ofthe proposed 
association which could be given to liabibie and [•resident Suharto.36 In his paper, 
Madjid basically argued that when the majority of Muslims accepted Pa11casifa and the 
1945 Constitution as the basis of the Indonesian state and social organization, the issue 
of the ideo-philosophical foundation of the nation had been settled. As a result of the 
success of New Order development programs there had been an unprecedented increase 
in the number of Muslims with higher education. Unfortunately, Madjid said, internal 
disputes within the Muslim intellectual community inhibited their optimum contribution 
to national development. He then suggested that one way of addressing the prob!em 
would be to establish a Muslim intellectuals' association. He named this prr;:·)sed · 
association lkata11 Sarja11a Muslim illdoltcsia (ISM!, Association oflndonesian Muslim 
Sarja11a), which would strengthen scientific research and development (R&D) through 
an interdisciplinary approach as a means of perfecting the dev~lopment process (Madjid 
1990). 
Aller receiving the symposium proposal, the supr .Jrt of the 49 signatories and 
Madjid's paper, Habibie arranged an appointment Wiih President Suharto. To his 
surprise, during their six-hour meeting Suharto advised him I•> accept the offer. Habibie 
had been worried that his acceptance would distance him from the long-identified 
'aba11ga11' president, but Suharto was able to demonstr:~te his knowledge of the finer 
34 lnterv;ew with Dawam Rnhardjo ((10/09/1998). 
"Interview witl• M. Zaenuri (10/11/2000). . 
36 Achmad Tirtosudiro had been close to Habibie since he became U1e Indonesian Ambassador for U1c 
Federal Republic of Germany (1973-76). At that time Habibie was well·knoWT! ns nn outstnn~ing 
Indonesian technologist and as a Vice-President of Germany's aircraft industry, MBB (1974-78). . 
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points of Islamic doctrine and assure Habibie that this project was significant. Suharto 
also promised to ensure that other senior ministers would offer their support. 
Suharto's positive response ref •.:·, ·d the changing alignment within the ruling 
elite following instances of acute inl~:nal elite rivalry in the lead up to and in the 
afiermath of the presidential election of 1988. Among other factors, the elite rivalries 
were driven by the souring ofSuharto's relationship with General L.B. Murdani. On 10 
February 1988, a month bcfClrc the presidential election and just two months aficr 
Suharto had granted Murdani a twelve-month extension of service, he suddenly relieved 
Murdani of his post as military commander and replaced hirn with Try Sulrisno (army 
chief of staff and former presidential adjutant-1974-78). Speculation had ·' that 
Murdani's break with Suharto was the result of Murdani's criticism of Suharto's 
favouritism towards his children's business interests and Murdani's refusal to favour 
them with lucrative military procurements. Apart from this view, R. E. Elson noted 
other underlying factors as follows (2001: 259): 'Murdani's apparent incapacity to 
appreciate the fresh socio-political currents in Indonesia's ncy; :;ccie!y, his obsession 
with developing intelligence networks, and his unblinking firm-mindcdness and his lack 
of political suppleness had inevitably set him against tl•.e President.' 
The tension between the two people culminated in the matter of the vice-
presidential election. Suhartc had made a decision to grant the then Golkar chainnan, 
Sudharmono, the position of the vice-president, as a reward for his acute political 
sensitivities, his vast experience in the bureaucracy and his success in building 
patronage networks. In the eyes of the army, however, Sudharmono was not, nor should 
he be expected to be, a popular choice as vice-president. His hostile competition with 
Murdani for favour within the upper echelons of the ;·.~w Order was well-known. 
Moreover, senior officers could hardly respect him for his 'civilian' military 
background.37 They were also hig.'tly conscious of his efforts as state secretary (1973-
88), at least in a later period, to distance them from the lucrative contracts from which 
they had prospered. Instead, Sudharmono favoured Suharto's children. Thus, in the lead 
up to the vice-presidential election, Murdani launched a campaign among the military 
representatives in the M!'R to deny Sudharmono the vice-presidential post (Elson 2001: 
260).38 This Murdani-lcd political manoeuvre could not prevent the elevation of 
37 Sudhannono had a background in military law and had ne1·er commanded troops. 
"11te result of Murdani's manoeu''" was the nomi"Jtion by the PPP faction of Djae!ni Naro (fonner 
right-hand-man ofMurtopo), withdrawn only at the last moment under intense pressure from Suharto. 
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Sudhannono to the post of vice-presiclcnt, but it strained the relationship between 
Suharto and many military officers, especially the Murdani loyalists. 
The long-standing ambition of some Muslim figures to establish an association 
of Muslim intellectuals now found a favourable political opportunity in the context of 
Suharto's need to find a new strategic partner to compensate for possible lessening of 
military support for him. Although it started as a students' p10jcct, the Muslim 
symposium became a major political event for the national elite. The title of the 
symposium capitalised on the contemporary discursive obsession with Indonesia's 
'take-ofT' through S&T and HRD development, namely, 'The National Symposium of 
Muslim Intellectuals on the Development of Indonesian Society in the 21 51 Century'. 
Opened by President Suharto in the pre~•''lCe of several ministers and the military 
commander, as well as upper echelons of New Order bureaucrats on 6 December 1990, 
this three-day-historic event was attended by more than 500 Muslim intellectuals from 
diverse movP.mcnts all over Indonesia. On the second day of the symposium, some 460 
invited part:cipants affixed their signatures to the charter for the establishment of a new 
intellectual association and elected B. J. Habibic unanimously as its chainnan. The 
name of this n<W as~ociation was not 'Jkata11 Smja11a Muslim Indonesia· (ISM!, 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Satjana), as proposed by Madjid, but rather 'Jkatatl 
Cendekiawan Muslim Se-bulonesia' (JCMJ, Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Ce11dekiawan), as proposed by Habibie and other intellectuals. 
The shill from the tcnn 'saljana' (degree holder or scholar) to 'cemlekiawan' 
(intellectual or intelligentsia) indicated a radical departure in the politics of meaning and 
signified very different political implications. If saljana had been used, the 
association's membership might have been restricted to degree holders and would have 
emphasised its links with academic interests. By u~ing the tell'" crndekiawr.n, which 
was defined by Habibie as 'everyone who had a concern with Jman fUITering and a 
sense of responsibility for the bettennent of sc;cial life', the membership of the 
association was open to a larger constituency, while its scope of activities could 
transcend the boundaries of academic interests. With its broad membership and its range 
of activities, the collective nature of this association soon shilled from an ensemble of 
individual intellectuals to a communal grouping of the Muslim intelligentsia. As such, 
even through its name, this association reflected a politically laden collective entity. 
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6.5 Power Games: Consoli!lation and Contestation 
With the establishment of JCMI, urban Muslim 'intellectual' movements of the 
1970s-1980s, which involved the fourth and fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, 
had arrived at a turning point. Although ICMJ's arrival could be seen as the natural 
institutionalisation of previous movements, once the ideas engendering these 
movements become formalized in an established political structure, 'they had for all 
intents and purposes left the space ofthe movement behind' (Eyerman & Jamison 1991: 
60). The institutionalisation ofthc Muslim intellectual movement in the form of a single 
organization (JCMJ) transforntcd the activities of the movements into an interest 
group.39 To become an interest group, ICMl inevitably adapted to the existing power 
structure. This paralysed the dynamic force of these social movements. 
Resembling Tjokroaminoto's rhetoric about the Sl's political void in 1913, the 
ICMI functioroarics insisted that ICMI was not designed as a political organization and 
would never become a political organization. As an interest group, however, ICMI 
could not escape the necessity of articulating collective interests and identity in the 
public sphere. Although its main objective was to empower human resource 
development through the improvement of the quality of faith, the quality of thinking, 
the quality of work, the quality of professionalism and the quality of life, it could not 
hide its inherent nature as a political vehicle. 
As a political vehicle, JCMI encompassed conflicts of interest and 
controversies. The appointment of Habibie as its chairman, an 'outsider' with no 
experience in Islamic activism, was made in the hcpo that he could bridge the gap 
between factions of the Muslim intelligentsia. He perfornted this role effectively to a 
large extent. Yet, he could not escape his bias towards his own origins as a teclmocratic 
bureaucrat. 
Just five weeks after the establishment of JCMI the seeds of internal conflict 
began to emerge. In the structure of the ICM! leadership, announced by Habibie on 13 
February 1991, Habibic adopted the matrix system usually applied in large business 
corporations such as in the Boeing aircraft industry. In this system, there was no place 
for the position of secretary general-a position that was expected to be held by Dnwam 
Rahardjo, a man who had played a critical role in the establishment of ICMI as well as 
being a representative of the 'bloc without'. Although Islamic intellectuals from non-
39 Interest groups are generally d~f.ned as orgnnizations, 'separate from government though oflen in close 
portncrship with government, which nllcmpt to influence public policy' (Wilson 1990: 1). 
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bureaucratic backgrounds, who were sometimes referred to as 'the real ICMI' :o 
anticipated that they would play a major role in ICMI's leadership, Habibie had his own 
way. The leadership composition of ICMI's boards (a board of counsellors, a board of 
advisers, a board of experts, and an executive board) was dominated by bureaucrats 
many of whom had no Islamic credentials. Habibic defended his decision by arguing 
that later through social interaction and social learning in ICMI, these (nominal Muslim) 
bureaucrats would experience the process oflslamisation.41 
Whatever Habibie's reason, the dominant representation of Muslim bureaucrats 
paralysed intellectual criticism. The 'real' ICMJ activists were not happy with the 
prospect of this newly established association. The unity of Muslims intellectuals in 
ICMI did not bring an end to their heterogeneity. ICMI was characterised by diversity, 
by contestation, and by various opposing positions. They clashed with each other 
especially on the basis of the difference in intellectual backgrounds and in the level of 
Islamic-mindedness as well as competing for access to the inner circle of the New Order 
power holders. 
The emergence of JCMI also raised critidsm and controversy in the public 
sphere. There had been no single intellectual organization in Indonesian history whose 
scale of controversies and media coverage were equal to those of ICMI. This is 
indicated by the number and range of publications about it.42 
Throughout the 1980s there were only ten articles in the media on 'intellectuals' 
with none of them making a specific reference to Muslim intellectuals. During that 
period, the term 'intellectual' was mostly used in relation to intellectual labour and the 
academic world, having no direct links with any political struggle. In contrast, 
!Proughout the 1990s there were 116 articles on the 'general intellectual' (with no 
specific reference to the Muslim intellectual) and 108 articles on lhl' 'Muslim 
intellectual'. Of the total 224 articles, there were only 7 articles published before 
"The tern\ 'the real ICMI' was actu•lly a matter of self-claim It was conunonly associated wiUt Islamic 
activists from a non-bureaucratic background. Titcse included university lecturers (cspecia.lly exponents 
of the dal..-wah movement), NGO activists, ulama-inte/ek, and IshmUc artists and cntreprcnews. Lecturers 
of state universities having no 'structural position' (such as rectors, deans, etc.) were not considered as 
bureaucrats. Goll~nr's functionaries were considered as bureaucrats. Tims, 'the real ICMI' basically 
referred to those who had not yet been fully integrated into the New Order's polity nnd bureaucracy. 
41 Interview with Habibie's right-hand-bureaucrat, Wardiman Djojonegoro (01/09/1998). 
42 For the purpose of this study, I asked the clipping centre of the Jnkarta-based Center for Strategic nnd 
International Studks (CSIS) to collect nil articles on 'intellectuals' whose titles contained Ute words 
'intclekJua/', 'cendekiawan' nnd 'ir.teligensla', published by Jakarta-based newspapers in the 1980s nnd 
1990s. Tite Jakarta-based newspapers nrc Angkalan Bersenjala, Berita Duana, Blsnis Indonesia, Jakarta 
Post, Kompas, Media Indonesia, Merdeka, Pelila, Republika, Sinar Harapan/Suara Pembaroan, nnd 
Suara Kurya. 
Cbaplcr 6 ~ Tile Rise and Decline of/CM/ 426 
ICMI's establishment with 5 of them being on 'general intellectuals' (sec Appendix A). 
Thus, it is obvious that the rise of ICMI was a major impetus for the formation of an 
Indonesian intellectual discourse on the intellectual in the 1990s. 
The articles of the 1990s reflect a clash of discourse among Indonesian 
intellectuals over the meaning of 'intellectual'. This was reflected in text production, 
inter-textual relations and text signification. Articles on the 'general intellectual' were 
published most frequently in Kompas (46 times), a newspaper that had a close 
relationship with the Catholic community. Articles on the 'Muslim intellectual' were 
published most frequently (22 times) in ICMI's newspaper, Repub/ika, which was 
launched publicly on 3 January 1993 (sec Table 6). The authorship of the 46 Kompas 
articles on the general intellectual reflected the dominant voice of Christian 
(Catholic/protestant) intellectuals (13 authors with 15 articles),43 followed respectively 
by the voice of secular intellectuals (13 authors with 13 articles),44 and the voice ofNU 
intellectuals and Abdurrahman Wahid's intellectual circle (3 authors with 6 articlcs):5 
while the remJining articles expressed the voice of JCMI's members and other Muslim 
intellectuals (II authors with 12 articlcs).46 On the other hand, the authorship of 
Republika articles reflected the dominant voice of ICMI intellectuals (12 authors with 
18 articles) with only one article being written by a non-Muslim intellectual.47 
" The 13 Christian intellectuals are Mudji Sutrisno, Parakitri, 111. Sumartana (two articles), Alex 
Dungkal, Anton Hagul (two articles), William Lidd!e, Adrianus Suyadi, L. Wilardjo, F. H. Santoso, F. M. 
Farapat, Ignatius Hary:mto, lgnas Kleden, and P. J. Suwamo. 
'" The voice or secular intellectuals was represented by Adig Suwandi, Prasetya lrawan, Hendardi, 
Koentjar.mingrat, Ahmad Bahar, Ju1ia I. Suryakusuma, Hermanto E. Djatmiko, Harimurti Kridalaksana, 
A. H. Pudjaatmaka, Saratri Wilonoyudho, Dudi Susanto, Usadi Wiryatn>ya, and Jiwn Atmaja. 
45 The voice orNU intellectuals and Abdurnhman Wnhid's intellectual circle was represented by 
Mohammad Sobary (3 nrticles), Mohammad Fajrut Fataak11 (2 nrticles) nnd Ali Masykur Musa. 
46 The voice or ICMI's members and other Muslim intellectuals was represented by Dambang Pr.mowo, 
Aldrinn Munanto, Samsul Hadi, Hajriyanto Y. TI10hari, Muchtar Surman, Novel Ali, Abdul M. Mulkan 
(two articles), Mubyarto, Hcru Nugroho, Tajuddin Noer Effendi, and Mochtar Duchori. 
"These 12 ICMI intellectuals were Adi Sasono, Kuntowijoyo (2 articles), Nasir Tamara (2 articles), M. 
Dawam Rahardjo (3 articles), Faeluy Ali (3 articles), M. Rusli Karim, Aslam Nur, naharuddin Lopa, 
Anwar Harjono, Sutjipto Wirosardjono, Novel Ali, and Affan Gafar. TI1e Voice of non-Muslim 
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Table 6: Articles on Intellectuals in Jakarta-Based Newspapers, 1990-1999 
Name of Newspaper Number of Articles on Number of Articles on Total 
Gcnernllntellectuals Muslim Intellectuals Number 
Anr.katan Bcrscnjata 
-
2 2 
--Berila Buana 
-
13 13 
Bisnis Indonesia 3 3 6 
Jakarta Post 3 2 5 
Kompas 46 14 60 
Media Indonesia IS 23 38 
Mcrdcka 16 I 17 
Pc/ita 6 21 27 
Rcvublika 9 22 31 
SinarHarapanl• II 2 13 
Suara Pembaruan 
S11ara Karya 7 5 12 
Total Number 116 108 224 
• Sinar Harapa11 was closed d0\\11 by the government in September 1986. Four months later, Suara 
Pembaruan arose as its successor. 
The most crucial competing discourse dealt with the very definition of the 
concept of'intellectual'. As Zygmunt Bauman has argued (1989: 8): 
Definitions of the intellectual arc many and diverse. They have, however, one 
trait in common, which makes them also different from all other definitions: 
they are all self-definitions. Indeed, their authors arc the members of the same 
rare species they attempt to define. Hence every definition they propose is an 
attempt to draw a boundary of their own identity. Each boundary splits the 
territory into two sides: here and there, in and out, us and them. 
The contending perspective in defining the intellectual is also obvious when articles in 
Kompas arc compared with those in Rcpublika. 
The Kompas articles on 'general intellectuals' were highly biased towards 
personal characteristics of the intellectual. Twenty articles exclusively defined 
intellectuals in terms of their personal characteristics, while five articles added to these 
personal characteristics the social function and structural position of the intellectual. 
These articles associated the intellectual with a free and independent agency, a person of 
ideas, a creative and constructive individual, a person who has a moral commitment, 
idealism and wisdom, and who dares to speak truth to power. 
On the other hand, Repub/ika's articles on 'Muslim intellectuals' were highly 
biased towards the social functions of the intellectual. Seventeen of the 22 articles 
associated intellectuals with their specific functions in the society, among others, as 
agents of change, as articulators of collective will and identity, as educators and 
intellectuals was represented by Victor I. Tanja, while the remaining were other activists (Afnan Malay, 
Yudi Lnlif, and Fachri Hamzah). 
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defenders of society, as the bridge between the elite and the masses and between the 
government and the ummat, and as interpreters of the cultural foundations of society 
(sec Appendix B). 
The inter-textual chain also became part of a competing discourse. To support 
their ideas, authors attempted to connect their textual arguments to other texts written by 
perceived authoritative scholars on this issue. Ninety seven out of 224 articles were 
~mbcllishcd with citations of opinions of particular scholars with only 51 of them 
.. ling the reference. The sources of the citations in these articles derived 
disproportionately from foreign non-Islamic schoiars!sources (97 people and sources). 
The number of citations from foreign Islamic scholars/sources was only 9, while those 
from domestic scholars/sources were 46. 
The scholar most frequently cited in thc.urticlcs was Julien Benda (II times), a 
man who strongly opposed intellectual engagement in pol!iics. CJiher sources that were 
cited were Edward Shils (7 times), Clifford Geertz (6 tir1cs), William Liddle (5 times) 
and Antonio Gramsci (4 times). Julien Benda's famous conrlemn~:ion of'the betrayal of 
the intellectuals' was frequently cited as a weapon to attack ICMI's political passion 
and partisanship. Antonio Gramsci 's view on the intellectual as determined by his/her 
relationship to power was used as a contending perspective (sec Appendix A & B). 
The vehemence and extensiveness of the discursive contestation on the 
definition of 'intellectual' reflected a power struggle between proponents and opponents 
of ICMI. As Sara Mills argued (1999: 96-7), idculogical struggle is the essence of 
discursive structure, and the discursive structure is the site where the power struggle is 
played out. Both parties of the polemic in Kompas and Republika, however, missed a 
very crucial point. They seemed to take it for granted that JCMI was a collective 
representation of 'intellectuals'. In fact, it was a collective representation of the Muslim 
'intelligentsia'. Although the original intention of ICMI's establishment was to provide 
a forum for reconciling disputes among Muslim intellectuals, once ICMI had been 
established and had recruited a large membership and transformed itself into an interest 
group, it no longer expressed the voice of individual Muslim intellectuals but rather the 
collective interests of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
ICMI' s formation was attacked by its opponents basically because of its 
sectarianism and exclusiveness, its political accommodationism, and its lack of 
commitment to the cmpowennent of democracy and civil society. Such accusations had 
their own justifications, but at the same time reflected clashes of political interests. 
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The first powerful opposition came from the then chairman of the NU, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, and his intellectual circle. His opposition partly reflected his 
genuine commitment to plurality and democmcy. But at the same time, it also seemed to 
reflect his apprehension about NU's political position. The latter proposition was even 
mised by Rofiqul Umam, the then chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the NU's youth 
organization, Ansor. In his article in Media !Juloncsia (08/1 2/1 995) Umam argued that 
the NU's return to the spirit of 1926 was a stmtcgic approach to promote a good 
relationship between the NU community and the state, in order to strengthen NU's 
ability to meet the interests of its community. The presence of ICMI with its strong 
human resources, according to him, could endanger that stmtegy. 
The combination of Wahid's commitment to plumlity and his political envy 
forced him to fonn collabomtions with other opposition intellectuals. This led to the 
establishment in March 1991 of Fonmz Democracy, a working group of about forty-five 
prominent intellectuals of different religious backgrounds under the chairmanship of 
Abdurrahman Wahid:8 
The second opposition can1e from secular and Christian intellectuals, especially 
those who had played strategic roles in the formation of the New Order. Men like 
Rahman Tolleng (a socialist intellectual) and Harry Tjan Silalahi (of the CSIS) who had 
been architects of the New Order were very critical of ICMI's political 
accommodationism.49 For intellectuals of minority (religious) groups, there was a 
reasonable fear that the emergence of ICMI might lead to the Islamisation of Indonesian 
politics which could undermine minority rights and religious tolerance. Apart from this 
reason, however, the opposition of the secular and Christian intellectuals was not devoid 
of some political resentment. As J. M. Barbalet noted (I 998: 68): 'Resentment is a 
feeling that another has gained unfair advantage. Social actors experience resentment 
when an external agency denies them opportunities or valued resources (including 
status) which would otherwise be available to them.' According to Barbalet, resentment 
can emerge as the emotional consequences of membership in groups undergoing a loss 
"
1 Among prominent intellectuals of the Forum Democracy were Abdurrahm:m \Vahid, Dondan Gunawan, 
Djohan Effendi, Y. B. Mangunwidjaja, Todung Mulya Lubis, Rahman Tolteng, Marsitam Simanjuntak, 
Daniel Dhakidac, Mudji Sutrisno, D. Riberu, Fmnz Magnis Suscno, Aricf Budiman, Ghafar Rahman, 
Aswab Mahasin, and Sutiipto Wirosardjono (tl1c last two were also members of ICMI). The inclusion of 
the last two lCMI members was cseful for avoiding tl1e imprrssion that it was designed in direct 
oJ'posilion to ICMI. 
• Tolteng joined the Forum Democmcy which was very critical of ICMI white Silalahi criticised ICMI 
intellectuals for tl1cir inability to read Suharto's political motives behind ICMI's cstablishmcnL For 
Sitalahi's criticism in this context see Ramage (1995: 85). 
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of position. Groups that used to b~ dominant economically and politically develop 
resentment congruent with status defensiveness directed to those perceived as 
threatening their establishment (1998: 75). 
Last but not least, opposition also came from military officers, especially 
Murdani loyalists. Titis was represented by the strong criticism of ICMI by Gen. L. B. 
Murdani, Let-Gen. Harsudijono H<:rtas, Maj.-Gen. Sembiring Meliala and many 
others.5° For the military intellectual, the politicisation of Islam by ICMI and the 
confessionalization of Indonesian politics could jeopardise the legitimacy of Pa11casila 
as the state ideology. As Murdani noted: 'ABRI is always most powerful in dousing 
SARA [disturbances based on ethnicity, religion, race, and class] problems.'51 Apart 
from this ideological reason, however, this military criticism also reflected resentment 
at the ascendancy of an external agency which could threaten their political 
establishment. This perception was justified by the 'de-militarisation' issue articulated 
by some members of ICMI, including Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono and Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas. In the lead up to the election of the Vice-President in 1993, Rahardjo 
opposed emphatically the nomination of General Tri Sutrisno as expressed in his 
interview with the weekly Detik (10 March 1993). On many occasions Sasono stressed 
the necessity of democratisation and an eventual reduction in the military's political 
role, while Pamungkas was well-known as a vocal critic of military involvement in 
politics. For senior military ligures, all these criticisms were evidence of the anti-
military character of ICMI (Ramage I !i95: 96-7). 
Beyond the political controversy, ICMI's membership continued to grow 
attracting Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia from diverse Islamic streams and 
movements across the country and even from some overseas countries. A common 
assumption has been to view ICMI as a '11eo-Masjumi' organization or a representation 
of refonnist-modemist intellectual collective action. Serious research suggests a 
different conclusion. Although the central leadership of ICMI was dominated by 
intellectuals from the reformist-modernist intellectual tradition, ICMI membership in 
regional and local units attracted a vast number of intellectuals with traditionalist family 
backgrounds. 
lO For a further discussion oflhc mitilllry criticism ofiCMI, sec Ramage (1995: 122: 155). 
"Quoted in Ramage (1995: 127). 
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Some intellectuals from traditionalist backgrounds might have joined ICMI for 
the sake of pragmatic politics or to support their bureaucratic careers. 52 F~r many of 
them, however, their incorporation into ICMI reflected a shifi in their religious 
disposition and affiliations. This was indicated in my survey of the rdigious and social 
characteristics of ICMI membership. 
For the purpose of this study, some 500 questionnaires were distributed by post 
to members of ICMI throughout Indcnesia from September to !);;~ember 1998.53 
Selection of names was based on the cluster-random sampling method to represent all 
ICMI's regional units (ORWIL) throughout Indonesia. The total number of 
questionnaires was equal to 2.7% ofthc total registered ICMI members up to June I998; 
that is 18.377 (ICMI Database 1998). Unfortunately, only 210 of the 500 questionnaires 
were returned by the respondents. With regard to the religious stream of their parents 
and the respondent themselves, the result was as follows. For the religious affiliation of 
their parents, 70 out of 210 respondents revealed that their parents belonged to the NU, 
54 belonged to the M11ltammadiyalt, 18 belonged to other Islamic organizations, and 68 
did not belong to any major Islamic organization. When the question turned to the 
religious affiliation of the respondent, the results were particularly interesting. Sixty six 
(66) respondents revealed that they belonged to the M11ltammadiyah, 34 belonged to the 
NU, 21 belonged to other established Islamic organizations, while 89 reported that they 
did not belong to any established Islamic organization (Sec Table 7) 
The responses to the survey show that the shifi in religious disposition and 
affiliation had occurred especially among students from traditionalist family 
backgrounds. In contrast to their parents, most of them were no longer attached to any 
established Islamic organization, and only a few of them had shifted to Mllltammad(yalt. 
Those who had no affiliation to any established Islamic organization were potential 
recruits for the HMI and dakwalt movement, or they had already been exposed to HMI 
and dakwalt movement. Twenty out of 70 respondents whose parents were affiliated to 
NU had joined the HMI, while some of the rest had joined the mosque movement. Thus, 
the exposure of intellectuals from traditionalist family backgrounds to HMI and the 
dakwdt movement seemed to be one of the preconditioning characteristics for their 
decision to join ICMI.54 
"Intcrview(via email) wilh Abdurrnhman Mas'uu, nn NU intellectual who joined ICMI (1511111999). 
"I provided envelopes nnd stamps to make it easy for respondents to return !he questionnaires. 
" Engagement in !he HMI and dakwah movement ns a precondition for tlte incorporation of some 
intellectuals from NU family backgrounds was nlso admittru by Muhanunad Titohir and Muhammad 
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Table 7: Survey of Religious Affiliation of Parents and Children of ICMI Mcmberr. 
N=210 
432 
Religious NU . \ fullammatliyaiJ Other Established Not Affiliated to Any Esl:lb . 
Affiliation of Islamic Organizations Islamic Organization 
Parents 70 54 18 63 
Children 34 66 21 89 
By 1997, the total number of registered ICMI members was 10,501. This 
number rose to 18,377 by June 1998 (ICMI Database, 1998). The actual ICMI 
membership including followers, however, was much larger than this registered 
membership. Many of those who were well-known as ICMI activists did not fill in 
registration forms. In addition, in running its programs ICMI developed some 
<!Uionomous bodies whose participants were not necessarily direct members of!CMI. Of 
the 10,501 total registered memberships of 1997, there were at least 154 members with 
PhD degrees and 506 members with Masters degrees. The educational background of 
the majority of ICMI members was undert;raduate education (9,009 members}. The 
remaining ICMI members did not have higher educational backgrounds. There were 711 
ICMI members with upper secondary school backgrounds, 85 members with lower 
secondary school backgrounds, and 36 members with r,rimr.ry schooling only (ICMI 
Database 1997, see Tuhle 8)). 
Table 8: Educational Background of Registered ICMI Members in 1997 
-
Educ~tior.al Level Total Num\Jer 
PhD 154 
Masters 506' 
Under~duaie Education 9,009 
Upper Secondary School 711 
Lower Secondarv School 85 
Primary School ~6 
Total Number 10,501 
Source: ICM! Database 1997 
ICMI's institutions and prr.gt~ms continued to develop as its membership grew. 
Stmcturally it was organised into departments within which local units (ORSA T), 
regional units (ORW!L) and the tentral core unit (ORPUS) operated. A number of 
specific activities were organised oy autonomous bodies. In September 1992, the Center 
Nul~ two ICMI functiouarics from NU and BMI backgrounds. Interview with Muhaml1llld Titohir 
(2711011998) and Muhornmad Huh (I 1111/2000). 
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for Infonnation and Development Studies (CJDES) emerged as ICMI's think tank. To 
provide a voice for the Muslim community, the Repub/ika new"paper began to operate 
publicly in January I 993. To assist poor but talented student~, 1CMI inaugurated the 
ORI3IT scholarships. To help small businesspeople gain access to credit, ICMI set up a 
syariah financial institution called Baitul Maa/ wa '- Tamwil (BMT). To develop micro-
enterprises at the grass roots level, ICMI together with the 1\:IJI established the 
Foundation for Micro Enterprise Incubation (YINBUK). To provide alternative ideas 
for regional development, ICMI fonned the Councii of Regional Development Studies 
(MKPD). To provide a discussion forum for young Muslim intellectuals, ICMI fonned 
the Young Intellectual Discussion Forum (MASIKA). To improve the reading habits of 
Indonesian society, ICMI promoted the so-called 'Movement for Book Donations' 
(Gerakan Wakaf Bulat}. A special effort was made to improve the quality of instruction 
in the field of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and English with the creation 
of the MAFIKIBB.55 Last but not least, to promote human resources and technological 
development in the Muslim World, ICMI initiated the establishment of the International 
Islamic Forum for Science, Technology and Human Resources Development 
(IIFTIHAR).56 
Most of these institutions and programs involved the support of government 
bureaucrats and the bureaucracy. T:1us, their lifespan heavily depended on individuai 
commitments of particular bureaucrats and was susceptible to positional changes within 
the bureaucracy. For this reason, their sustainability was fragile. 
Despite ICMI's achievem"nt in the socio-cultural field, its significance 
continued to be measured by both insiders and outsiders in tern1s of its political 
influence. When asked their perceptions of ICMI's significance for the Muslim 
community, some 210 of the surveyed ICMI members replied as follows: 77 oflhe 210 
respondents (36.6%) stated that the greatest ICMI contribution was its role as a unifying 
factor among Muslim inteiiC\'tuals and as a bridge between the government and the 
ummat as well as a channel for the actualisation oflslamic aspirations. Fifty-three out of 
the 210 respondents (25.2%) stated that ICMI helped bringing Muslims from the 
periphery to the centre of Indonesian politics leading to a better Muslim political 
representation. Thirty-two out of the 210 respondents (15.2%) stated that ICMI helped 
"MAFIKIBB stands for Matematika. Fisika, Kim fa, Bio/ogi dan Bahasa lnggris. 
" The IIFfiHAR was organized by ICMI in collaborntion with Ute Muslim World League, the Islamic 
Development Bank, the International Fcderntion of Arnbic and Islamic Schools, the Commission on the 
Scientific Miracle of the Qur'an and 1l1e Sunna, nnd the International Institute of Islamic Thoughts. 
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create a more Islamic bureaucratic environment, improved the image of Islam and 
boasted the self-confidence of the ummat. Only 37 out of the 210 resf<•.Jdents (17.6%) 
viewed ICMI's significance in terms of its contribution to the problems of society, such 
as social welfare, education and human resource development. The remaining 
respondents viewed its contribution in terms of the combination ofthe above: three roles 
(see Appendix C). The emphasis on the ICMI's political dimension was more obvious 
in the perspective of outsiders. Critical views of ICMI tended to ignore its achievements 
in the cultural field. 
6.5.1 ICMI's Political Achievements 
What then was ICMI's actual achievement in politics? Stimulated by intense 
media coverage of ICMI, t0"'"rds and afler the General Elections of the I992, the 
Indonesian mass media speculated about a 'greening' (Islamization) process (ijo royo 
royo) in Indonesian politics. In reality, this process of Islamisation was not as 
remarkable as the public perceived it to be. ·: msudin Haris (I 997: 95-97) found that 
Muslim representatives in the DPR only increased by 1%, from 80.8% in 1987 to 81.8% 
in 1992. Muslim representatives in the Golkar faction of the DPR increased by 1.1 %, 
from 78.3% in 1987 to 79.4% in 1992. Yet, there wew very few ICMI members among 
these new Muslim representatives and fewer still of the ICMI activists from non-
bureaucrat backgrounds. Suharto did not appoint any JCMI activists from the NGO or 
daAwalt intellectual backgrounds as member of the 1992 MPR (Ramage 1995: 1 00). 
A similar phenomenon appeared in the composition of the Sixth Development 
Cabinet (1993-1998). Although there were now only four non-Muslim representati.ves 
in the cabinet, which marked a decline compared to pre>'ious cabinets, Suharto did not 
elevate any ICMI activist from a non·bureaucrat background to this Cabinet. To please 
the Muslim intelligentsia, the Cabinet did contain some ten ICMI members from the 
bureaucracy. St;tl, o11ly three out of the ten ICMJ ministers were really active members 
ofiCMJ. These three ministers were B. J. Habibie and his allies of the BPPT, Wardiman 
Djojonegoro and Haryanto Dhanutirto. B. J. Habibie (the chairman of ICMI) was 
reappointed for a fourth term as the Minister of Research and Technology, Wardiman 
(the executive secretary of ICMI) was appointed as the Minister of Education and 
Culture, and Dhanutirto (an assistant of the ICMI chairman and also a Golknr 
functionary) was appointed as Minister of Transport, Post and Telecommunications. 
• 
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The temaining ICMI ministers in the Sixth Development Cabinet were only 
nominal ICMI members who were appointed to ICMI's boards because of their high 
status in the government bureaucracy. These included Azwar Anas, Beddu Amaug, 
Hannoko, Saleh Aliff, and Sujudi (all were members of the ICMI's Board of Advisers), 
Tannizi Taher, and Hatjono Sujono (both w~re member of the ICMI's Board of 
Experts).57 Thus, it is possible that these bureaucrats were appointed as ministers 
because of their bureaucratic backgrounds and/or loyalty to Suharto/his f1mily rather 
than because of their affiliation with ICMI. 
Even so, the 'ICMI·sation' process did happen on a micro-scale, especially ill 
particular departments whose ministers were active IC~,·; members. Wat·<liman 
Djojonegoro, who admitted that he was an aba11ga11 Muslim with some degree of 
Islamopi<vbia until the rise of ICMl, disclosed the fact that during his tenure as Minister 
about 30% of the upper echelons of the Department of Education and Culture contained 
!CM! members. 58 The intensity and density of media coverage on ICM! had also 
inspired authorities at the provincial and municipal level to join ICMI or at least to 
support its activities. 
As ICMI ministers had strong bureaucratic backgrounds, they had intensely 
internalised the bureauc;atic culture of the New Order. The dominant feature of \1 is 
bureaucratic culture was cltt.. Jcterised by, antong otlter things, corruption, cronyism, 
and so-called 'Bapakism' (loyalty without reserve to a patron). In this respect, ICMI 
ministers were not more trustworthy or 'cleaner' than their secular counterparts; they 
sometimes looked even worse because of their lack of experience in the 'art' of 
bureaucratic manipulation. At the satne time, the influence of these bureaucratic figures 
within the ICMI, made it difficult for ICMI as an organization to promote intellectual 
criticism. This was obvious in its silence when the three well-known publications, 
Tempo, Editor and Detik, were banned in 1994. 
Unhappy with their political gain in the wake of the 1992 election, the so-called 
'real ICMI' activists hoped for better fortunes in the next term. Yet, it was obvious that 
"Azwar Al13s was a former Minister orTransport in tho Fifih Cabinet. In the Sixth Development Cabinet 
he was appointed the Coordil13ting Minister for People's Welfare & Poverty Eradication. Beddu Amang 
was a former Deputy Head of Bulog and was appointed the Minister of Food Pnd Head of Bulog. 
Hannoku was reappointed the Minister oflnformation for a third term. Saleh Afiffwns a former Minister 
of the Bureaucratic Reform o.f tl1e Fourth Cabine~ the Minister of the Natio113l Planning of the Fifth 
Cabinet and he was appointed the Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance, and Industt)'• Sujudi 
was a former Rec1or of the Uland was appointed tl1e Healtlt Minister. Tamlizi Taher W&s a fanner deputy 
of the Religious Minister and was appointed tl1e Minister of Religion. H>tjono Sujono had been the head 
ofthe Family Planning Agency since 1983 and was appointed the St.lte Minister for Family Planning. 
"Interview with Wardiman Djojonegoro (01/0911998). 
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ICMI activists from a non-bureaucratic background could not ~asily adjust themselves 
to the political culture of the New Order's ruling elite. Just a few months after the 
formation of the Sixth Development Cabinet in March 1993, Amicn Rais (Assistant to 
ICMI's chairman during the 1990-1995 period ar·l Head of ICMI's Board of Experts 
during the 1995-2001) period) broke a New Order p•J!itical 'taboo' by raising the issue of 
the presidential succcs~ion. At this stage in the New Order to canvass publicly the idea 
of the President stepping down was unthinkable. Rais's pointed criticism conti;mcd to 
be expressed in his regular column in Rcpub/ika from late 1996. The most important of 
his articles was entitled 'Inkonstitutional' (Unconstitutional) published on 9 January 
1997. In this article, he exposed the exploitative and corrupt practice of the gold mining 
industry as operated in Busang (East Kalimantan) and West Papua (Freeport), which 
involved Suharto's family anu cronies. This article enraged th~ Suhurto family and led 
to Rais's position in ICMI being qucstion~d. 
To save the collective (political) intcrcs:s of ICMI, Rais agreed to step down 
from his position as the Head of ICM!'s Board of Experts on 24 February 1997. Some 
months before this event, another ICMI notable and PPP parliamentarian, Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas, found hirr.sclf sentenced to almost three years in jail for ir.~ulting the 
Presi}lent during a lecture at a Berlin university in April 1995. He was expelled from 
parliament and the Board of ICMI. These events turned Suharto and his family against 
the non-burcaucM ICMI activists. In the lead up to the Gene~! Elections of the 1997, 
several of the nun-bureaucrat ICMI activists previously nominatd as Golkar 
representatives to the DPRIMPR, such as Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo, were 
removed from the list. 
This situation was quickly exploited by Abc: :ul.mtan Wahid to rebuild the 
NU'> ulliance with the New Order p:1wcr brokers. During the elcctio: campaign, he 
frequently appeared •vith Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Suharto's daughter and a tltcn 
deputy chairman of Golkar) at public appearances before the traditionalist community. 
Thus, the result of the 1998 election placed no single JCMI representative in the MPR. 
Jimly Asshiddiqic (Vice-Secretary of ICMI) did become an MPR member, but in his 
capacity .is a representative of the MUI. Other ICMI members only became members of 
the DPR:MPR as a result of their positions as members of Golkar or other political 
parties. 
The com:,osiiion of the Swe!lth (last) Suharto Cabinet reflects the same pattern. 
As the couatry began to feel the impact of the economic crisis (after mid-1997) and to 
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experience social unrest, Suharto created a cabinet of loyalists. Habibie was appointed 
Vice-President, despite strong opposition from a major faction of Golkar and the 
military. 59 Habibie's appointment was probably made on the basis of his perceived-
political 'naivety' that did not threaten Suharto's position. At the same time, Suharto did 
not want to share power with any ofthe critical intellectuals of the ICMI. 
The list of Cabinet members announced on 14 March 1998 contained only one 
iCMI member from a non-bureaucro\ background, Tuty Alawiyah, as the Minister of 
Women's Affairs. Nevertheless, as a vice-head of JCMI's Board of Advisers she was 
not a vocal figure in ICMI. Her appointment as a minister also seemed to reflect her 
long established relationship with Suharto's late wife (Tien Suharto) and his daughter, 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, rather then her ICMI membership. Other JCMI members who 
were appointed as ministers were from bureaucratic (including Golkar) backgrounds. 
One was an active deputy chairman of ICMI's Executive Board, Haryanto Dhanutirto 
(as Minister of Food, Horticulture and Medicine}, four were passive members of ICMI, 
namely !'t::.u Bawazier, Rahardi Ramelan (both were members of ICMI's Board of 
Advisers), Muladi (a vice chaimmn of ICMJ's Board of Experts) and Quraish Shihab 
(an assistant to the ICMJ Chaimmn) who became the Minister of Finance. the Minister 
of Research and Technology, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Religious 
Affairs respectivct,· 60 Thus, until the last Suharto c~binet, JCMI activists from non-
bureaucrat backgrounds failed to gain political positions within the New Order power 
structure via ICMI. It was this failure which became a catalyst for their later support for 
the reform movement. 
6.5.2 The Shifl to the Reform Movement 
Many of the non•i:>ureaucrat ICMI intellectuals reached the conclusion that there 
was no place for them in the New Order polity. Thus, when student demonstrations 
supporting the reform (reformasi) movement began to occur, men like Adi Sasono, 
" Hannoko at that time was Golkar Chairman (t993-1998) and mobilised Golkar's support for his 
nomination as the Vk:e~President. At the same time, a faction within the military nominated Geneml 
Ho.rtono. 
60 Some other appointed ministers in the Seventh (last) Suharto Cabinet were included on ICMI's boards, 
but simply reflected ICMI's ncconunodation with those who held powerful position.> in the bureaucracy. 
Titeir positions were either on the Board of Counsellors or Doard of Advisers. TI1ese ministers who were 
nominaiiCMI members included Hartarto Sastrosunarto (the CO<:cdinating Minister for Supervision and 
Administrntive Refonn), Girumdjar Knrtasasmita (the Coordinating Minister for Economic, F~nancc and 
Industry, Hnrjono Sujono (now the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfal'<' ,-,. Poverty Eradication), 
Ali Alal:ls (the Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mohammad Hasan (tltc Mininr:r of Trade and Industry, 
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Dawam Rahardjo and even Aehmad Tirtosudiro joined Amien Rais in advocating 
change. On 9 April 1998, Achmad Tirtosudiro in his capacity as an acting chairman of 
ICMI (following Habibie's appointment as the Vice President) made a public statement 
that student demonstrations should not be banned. On 4 May, Adi Sasono (a general 
secretary of ICMI)6 t wrote an article in Rcpublika warning the government that social 
unrest at the grassroots level was a prelude to social revolution and called on the 
authorities to meet the people's demanrls for refonn. On 6 May, ICMI officially 
conducted a press conference stating that in response to the public's demand for reform, 
no group should try to prevent the possibility of an Extraordinary Session of the MPR or 
of a cabinet reshuflle.62 On 14 May, Tirtosudiro and Sasono explicitly welcomed 
Suhurto's statement in Egypt concerning his wiJ,ingness to step down (Repub/ika, 
15/05/1998). 
ICMI intellectuals with their divergent political inclinations then played a 
critical role in historic moments surrounding Suharto's resignation. Amien Rais became 
the icon of the resistance movement. His principal support came from the sixth 
generation of Muslim intelligentsia, especially those affiliated with the United Front of 
Indonesian Islamic University Students (KAMMI). On 12 May 1998 he led the 
formation of a resistance front, Maje/is Amana/ Raf..yat (MAR, People's Mandate 
Council), consisting of 55 prominent reformists •:epresenting a broad spectrum of 
society. 
About the sume time, another ICMI intellectual with moderate tendencies, 
Nurcholish Madjid, drafied a proposal for a peaceful accelerated transfer of power. 
Fol!owing his discussions with some military officers (among others. Chief-of-Staff for 
Territorial Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) on 14 May, ,wo days later he 
convened a press conference in the lobby of the Hotel W~sata. At the conference, 
Madjid proposed that parliamentary elections be brought forward fiom 2003 to January 
2000, while an extraordinary session of the MPR and a presitklltial election should take 
pb~~ by April 2000. ln addition, he also demanded a fornml apology from Suharto and 
the return of the Suharto family's ill-gotten wealth. 
Abdul Laticf (the Minister of Tourism, Arts & Culture), Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya (the Minister of 
Cooperatives & Srrtllt Enterprise), Akbar Tandjung (U1e Minister ofPublie Housing). 
61 Jn the second tenn ofiCMI's Board (1995-2000), Habibie as the re-elected Chairrrtln began to respond 
partially to the reallCMI's repeated call for a position of secretary general, by creating the position of 
'.rekrctarls ztmum' (general secretary). Being less prestigious than the position of secretary·gcneral, this 
r:osilion was given to Adi Sasono (a spokesrrtln ofthe reaiiCMI). 
'Kompas (07/05/1998, Republika (07/0511998). 
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On the evening of 18 May, the state secretary, Saadilla!t Mursjid, summoned 
Madjid to meet with Suharto in his private residence at Jalan Cendana. Suharto agreed 
in principle with Madjid's proposal and said he planned to establish a reform committee 
(Komile Reformasi) to implement it However, Madjid told the pr.~sidcnt that the events 
that had transpired that day had already rendered his proposal impossible. Not only had 
the parliamentary speaker, 1-larmoko, called on Suharto to step down that afternoon, but 
the ICMI had done so as well. Madjid ~xplained that his original timetable now seemed 
far too distant. He then told Suharto delicately: 'The people's understanding of reform is 
that you step down. '63 
Suharto made an attempt to buy time. On 19 May, he invited nine Muslim 
leaders, including Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, but excluding Amien 
Rais, to Jalan Cendana. In summoning these Islamic leaders, Suharto seemed to be 
making one last attempt to 'divide and conquer'-a tactic that had long been a hallmark 
of his rule. Befor~ the meeting with Suharto, most of these leaders, except Abdurrahman 
Wahid and several others, assembled at Malik Fadjar's house where Amien Rais was 
staying. Foreseeing Suharto's tactics and fearful of being branded as traitors to reform, 
the group pledged not to accept the reform committee (Komite Reformasi) if it was 
proposed by Suharto. In the meeting with Suharto, Madjid once again explained that no 
reform measures would succeed without the president's resignation: 'You musi find a 
way to end your presidency gracefully and honourably. '64 
As a group, these Islamic leaders did not accept Suharto's proposals. As 
individuals, however, they might have had something different in their minds. In a 
public appearance later that same afternoon, Wahid bluntly demanded that the students 
quit demonstrating and give Suharto a chance to work on reforms. To many, this 
statement by a prominent campaigner of democratisation was puzzling. Kevin 
O'Rourke offered the following analysis: 'The only explanation for his r.ontinued 
support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, wzs leading the anti-
Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid 
was more concerned with defeating !lis modemist rivals than with bringing down 
Soeharto' (O'Rourke 2002: 128). 
Another ICMI figure who played a critical role in the twilight of the Suhnrto era 
was 1-labibie. Inside the New Order 'ship' that was about to sink, 1-iabibie was a vice-
----···------
63 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18/09/1998). See also O'Rourke (2002: 127) 
64 For u dcmilcd description oftl1cse events, see O'Rourke (2002: 121-35). 
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captain who had been ignored by his superior. Suharto had rejected the idea of one 
Muslim delegation, who proposed the transfer of power to the vice-president, on the 
basis that Habibie's capability was questionable. When he learned of Suharto's 
comments about him, Habibie expressed outrage and humiliation. This provided him 
with a pretext to stand firmly against his longstanding political mentQr. It was not until 
tl1e resistance movement became violent, his refl'rm proposal met with no response, and 
the DPR/MPR chairman and even his key ministers urged him to step down that Suharto 
began to think of transferring power to the Vice-President. 
On 20 May, Suharto asiced another ICMI member, Yusril lhza Mahendra, who 
was the President's speech writer and legal adviser, to prepare a legal document for the 
transfer of power to the Vice President. On 21 May, Suharto finally resigned from the 
Presidency and announced that Vice-President Habibic would serve out the reminder of 
his term through 2003 and that a new cabinet would be formed immediately (O'Rourke 
2002: 128-30). 
The resignation of President SuharttJ and the rise of Habibic as his successor 
brought about a new political opportunity structure. Habibie's lack of political 
legitimacy, his public image as Suharto's protege and the uncertainty of his period of 
tenure caused many figures such as the economist Kwik Kian Gic to refuse his 
invitation to join the Cabinet. This situation was a major step forward for ICMI figures 
with non-bureaucratic backgrounds. Finally they had representatives in the cabin-.•. 
Representatives of ICMI members with NGO and dakwah backgrounds in the 
Habibie cabinet were Adi Sasono, A. M. Saefuddin, and Malik Fadjar, who became 
Minister of Cooperatives and Small Enterprise, Minister of Food, Horticulture and 
Medicine, and Minister of Religious Affairs respectively. Other ICMI activists who 
were appointed for the first time as ministers were those with bureaucratic and Golkar 
backgrounds, namely Muslimin Nasution as Minister of Forestry and Plantations, and 
Saleh Solahuddin as Minister of Agriculture, Marzuki Usman as Minister of Tourism, 
Arts and Culture, and Fahmi ldris as Minister of Manpower. The remaining ICMI 
ministers were among the twenty last ministers of Suharto who were reappointed in 
Habibie's cabinet, including Tuty Alawiyah, Muladi and Rahardi Ramclan. Thus, the 
principal members of the Habibie cabinet were a combination of former ministers from 
Suharto's legacy with new recruits mostly from ICMI. It was this combination of 
ministers not committed to reform and inexperienced new-comers that formed Habibie's 
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transitional government and had lo face the challenge of financial crisis and political 
refonn. 
6.6 The Decline of ICMI 
Habibie actually had a constitutional mandate to continue Suharto's tenn 
through 2003. Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution stipulated that if the president 'stops 
serving', the vice-president will complete the remainder of the president's tenn. 
Nevertheless, the nation's general mood urged otherwise. Habibie had no choice but to 
follow public opinion which demanded new parliamentary elections as soon as possible. 
He finally scheduled the elections for 7 June 1999. 
Three weeks after Habibie occupied the Presidential office, it was still unclear 
whether or not he would run for another tenn himself. On two separate occasions in the 
second week of June 1998 he declared that he would not run in the next presidential 
election.65 Achmad Tirtosudiro and other ICMI figures, however, warned that it was too 
early to arrive at such a conclusion and recommended he test public opinion.66 Thus, on 
29 June, Habibic clarified his previous remarks and stated that he ()ad not yet decided 
whether to seck clec·,ion to another tcnn.67 Later, with the enthusiastic support of his 
inner circle, he decided to join the contest for the presidential dection, expecting to use 
Golkar as his main vehicle. 
Notwithstanding Habibie's willingness to join the presidential contest, the 
significance of ;cMI as a political vehicle had begun to diminish. The decision of 
Habibic's Minister of Home Affairs, Sjarwan Hamid, in early June to lifi the ban on 
political party fonnation gave rise to the euphoria of a new-found freedom to engage in 
political expression. This soon resulted in the proliferation of parties of all kinds 
numbering well over I 00, with 48 parties being eligible iu take part in the elections. 
Realising that parties would now become ::. : main path to political power, ICMI figures 
began to loosen their attachment to ICMI and establish parties in their own right. 
Under the free public sphere and political fairness of the refonn era, the Muslim 
intelligentsia showed their original diverse nature. Fuelled by a mixture of ideological 
differences, modernisation-driven political pragmatism, elite rivalries, and the sudden 
explosion of freedom, Muslim groups competed with each other to establish their own 
"See Jakarta Post (13 June, 1998) and nlso O'Rourke (2002: 147). 
66 Based on A:~rn.1rl Tirtosudiro's statement before the meeting of ICMI's Executive Board on 
14/08/1998). 
61 See Jakarta Post (30 Juno 1998). 
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political parties. As a result, Muslim politics became more fragmented than it had ever 
been. 
Initially there was an idea of C5lablishing a replica of Masj11mi by merging the 
PPP with Masj11mi's heirs gathered around the DDII, with Amicn Rais as its chairman. 
In fact, Amien Rais now emerged with different political interests. In the face of the 
hegemonic discourse of pluralism and inclusivism, as championed by the renewal 
movement, Forum Democracy, and mainstream mass media, he had long bcpn 
stigmatised as sectarian. As he began to project himself as a rising Indonesian leader, 
this stigma seemed to haunt him. His encounter with intellectuals of diverse identities 
during the reform movement seemed to stimulate him to explore pluralism as a political 
ideology.68 Thus, he now felt that the Islamic 'dress' was too tight. He preferred to 
establish a pluralistic party that came to be known as the National Mandate Party 
(Indonesian PAN). 
Having failed to attracl. Ami en Rais, PPP continued on, a survivor of the Suharto 
era, with Hamzah Haz as its new chairman. The DDJI activists established the Crescent 
and Star Party (Indonesian PBB) under the chairmanship of another ICMI member, 
Yusrillhza Mahendra. Unable to agree with Amien Rais's ideals for PAN, followers of 
the da~,vah or tarbiyah (Islamic educational) movement, who had rallied behind him 
during the struggle for reform, came out with their own party, the Justice Party 
(Indonesian PK), with Nurmahmudi Ismail (an activist of ICMJ's IIFT!HAR) as its 
president. Encouraged by his position as the Minister of Cooperativ~-.; and Small 
Enterprise, Adi Sasono established the People's Sovereign Party (Indonesian PDR) as a 
vehicle lo achieve his power interest through the advocacy of a 'people's economy' 
(ekottomi rakyat). 
Other JCMI figures from NU backgrounds, such as Jusuf Hasjim and 
Sholahuddin Wahill (a younger brother of Abdurrahman Wahid), formed the Ummat 
Awakening Party (Indonesian PKU). Meanwhile, Abdurahman Wahid and the 
mainstream NU leaders formed a pluralistic party, the National Awakening Pany 
(Indonesian PKB). There were also several other small parties which used Islamic 
names to attract followers. 
" Shortly after Suharto's resignation, a prominent Protestant intellectual who had joined the MAR, the 
late Th Sumartana, invited Amien Rais to give a talk before Protestant clergymen in Solo. After the 
even~ Amicn was asked by one of his fellows, Samsul Rizal Panggabcan, about how he felt about giving 
n talk inn church. He said, 'I felt liken newlywed. I should have done to do this earlier.' Conversation 
with Samsul Rizal Panggabean (14/08/1998). 
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Apart from these parties, the New Order hegemonic party, Golkar, underwent an 
unpre<~edcntcd scale of 'Islamisation'. The leadership of this party came to be 
dominated by members of the Muslim intelligentsia with HMI backgrounds. Although 
this party had a secular basis, members of the Muslim intelligentsia in this party were 
part ofthc spectrum of Muslim politics. In particular critical moments, they would share 
a common political stance with other groups of Muslim politics. 
Like Golkar, PAN an~ PKB based their ideological principles on Pancasi/a. The 
networks of the main ligures and the constituency of these latter two panics, however, 
were closely associa!cd with Islamic organizations. Like PAN and PKB, the PDR took 
Pancasila as the party's basic ideology and its leadership also came from Muslim 
activists. Its constituency, however, was not associated with any particular Islamic 
organization. The rest of Muslim parties took Islam as their political ideology. Y ct, even 
for these Islam-based parties, the influence of the hegemonic discourse of pluralism was 
evident. This is especially true in that most of these parties made an attempt to free 
themselves from being branded as exclusive parties by emphasising their nationalistic 
outlook and oy claiming themselves as open parties in their statutes. 
With this severe internal fragmentation, Muslim politics faced serious 
difficulties in mobilising political resources and support. Moreover, the image of 
Muslim intellectuals' position as being at the centre of power from the period of the late 
Suharto era up to Habibie's interregnum also had its own political liability. Islamic 
leaders were now identified with the status quo and the policies of the New Order. In 
effect, Islam that had previously been idcntilicti by people at the grass roots level as an 
alternative resistance ideology was now perceived as a ruling ideology. In hoping for 
political redemption, a vast number of wong ci/ik (poor people) gave their allegiance to 
a 'secular' messianic vision, which was offered by the image of oppressed Sukamoism, 
embodied in Sukamo's daughter, Megawati. 
These factors along with other shortcomings contributed to the poor election 
results of Muslim parties. In the general elections of 1999, the total percentage of 
Muslim parties, including PKB, PAN and PDR, based on the total votes in the 
parliamentary election was only 36.38%. While the total percentage of Muslim parties 
based on the total scat~ :.f the elected members ofDPR (462) was 37.46% (173 seats). 
There were II Muslim rartics which gained at least one scat iu th<: parliament, namely 
PKB, PPP, PAN, PBB,I'K, PNU, Parlai Persaluan (PP), Parlai Politik Islam Indonesia 
Masjumi (PPIIM), PDR, PSII, and Partai Kebangkilan Ummal (PKU). Based on total 
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votes, the PKB got the highest percentage (12.60% of the total votes), followed by PPP 
(10.70%}, PAN (7.11%}, PBB (1.94%), PK (1.36%), PNU (0.64%} and then 5 other 
remaining parties with 2.03%. Based on total scats in the Di'R, however, PPP obtained 
the largest proportion; that is 58 scats or equal to 12.55% of the total 462 elected 
members of the DPR. It was followed by PKB (51 scats= 11.04%}, PAN (34 scats= 
7.36%), PBB (13 scats= 2.81%}, PK · · •ats = 1.52%}, PNU (5 scats= 1.08%}, and 
then five other parties with I scat each (5 scats= 1.1 %). By comparison, the Mcgawati-
lcd PDIP (the heir ofSukamo's PNI) obtained 33.73% of the total vote and 33.12% of 
total scats (=153 scats}, while Golkar got 22.43% of the total votes and 25.99% of the 
total scats (=120 scats). 
With no single party gaining a majority of scats in the parliament, it was obvious 
that whoever wanted to win the presidential election had to find a special formula for 
building a broad coalition. At ICMI's Coordinating Meeting (Rakornas) held in 
Bandung on 9 July 1999, the association recommended the establishment of an Islamic 
axis and the collaboration of this axis with Muslim activists in Golkar. 
To follow up this recommendation, Achmad Tirtosudiro, in his capacity as the 
acting chairman of ICMI, organised a meeting of representatives of major Muslim 
parties and Golkar at his house (Kuningan) on 29 September 1999. Attending this 
meeting were, among others, Amien Rais (PAN}, Yusril lhza Mahendra (PBB), 
Nurmahmudi Ismail (PK}, Zarkasji Nur (PPP), and Eky Sjahrudin and Manvah Daud 
Ibrahim (Golkar). The following day, a similar meeting was held in Tirtosudiro's house 
involving, amon!l others, Ami en Rais and Dawam Rahardjo (PAN) and Akbar Tanjung 
and Manvah Daud Ibrahim (Golkar). AI this juncture, it was agreed that Habibic would 
be the candidate for the presidency, but disputes occurred in deciding the candidate for 
the vice president, and for the positions of the speaker of the DPR and MPR.69 Even so, 
the idea of establishing a strategic alliance among Muslim parties continued to grow in 
the midst of a heighten~d anti-Habibie sentiment. This finally led to the creation of the 
so-called 'Poros Te11gah' (the Central Axis}, which claimed it was mediating between 
proponents and opponents ofHabibie. 
Although it had been anticipated that Habibie would be the sole Golkar 
candidate for president, it soon appeared that he had no such strong hold in th~ party. 
Already during his candidacy for Vice-President in 1997, there had been strong anti-
"Interview with Mnrwah Dnud Ibrahim (OI/IO/t999) nnd with Tntnt Rahmitn Utami, U1e office manager 
ofiCMI who nllended the meetings (Otll011999). 
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Habibic opposition in Golkar. Now, although the eastern parts of Indonesia, as the main 
Habibic constituency, contributed to a larger portion of the Golkar scats in the 
DPRJMPR, Akbar Tanjung took powerful control over the party. Following Suharto's 
resignation, Habibic did not take over the leadership of Golkar's Patrons Board, a 
position formerly held by the President. \\1Jcn this position was removed from the 
pl!rly, he was no longer Golkar's top official. This gave Akbar Tanjung room for 
political manoeuvring. 
Akbar's ambition to become th~ president or at least vicc-prcsidcn! was not in 
line with Habibic's preference for the military commander, Wirunto, to assume the 
position. Internal Golkar competition together with hostile public opinion led to 
parliamentary rejection of Habibic's presidential accountability speech on 14 October 
I 999.70 As a result, Habibic withdrew from the presidential election. 
The end of Habibie's presidency marked the end of ICMI's political role in the 
Indonesian polity. As political parties became the major means for the actualisation of 
the intellectuals' preoccupation with politics, JCMI lost its political ahraction. Designed 
'as a vehicle for Muslim intellectuals' contribution to the developing of Indonesian 
society in the 21" century' (as proclaimed in its first Symposium in Malang), ICMI's 
fighting spirit had been quenched even before the dawn oflhc new century. 
With the collapse of the Habibic regime, many of ICM1's institutions and 
programs began to crumb!.:. Their cstablishJ;:cnt had been motivated by ad hoc political 
interests under the sponsorship of the inner circle ofthc New Order power l.0i;lcrs. With 
the change in regime, many of these institutions lost their relevance and supporting 
base. The enthusiastic CIDES, for instance, disappeared soon afler the collapse of 
Habibie's transitional government. 
Even so, this by no means terminated the political life of ICMJ's individual 
members, and is certainly not the end of Muslim intellectuals' strategic position in 
Indonesian politics. When Akbar Tanjung wru: unable to fulfil the formal requirements 
for presidential candidacy/' the alliance between the Central Axis and Golkar 
successfully elevated Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidential position. 
70 Tile main formal Ieason for opposilion parties to reject his accountability speech w:JS his decision to 
offer a refcrcndun, for the self detcnnin3tion of East Timor without parliamentary procedures. 
70 Late at night after Habibie's presidenlial accountability speech was rejected, a mccling w:JS l1eld in 
Habibie's house (in Kuningan) attended among others by Akb.r Tandjung, Amico Rnis, and Mnrw:~h 
Daud Ibrahim. At tl1is meeting, Akbar persuaded Habibie not to witl1druw from the presidential contest 
wiU1 a promise that he would consolidale Golkar support. Haoibie refused to do so nnd appointed Amico 
Rais to rcploce him. Amion Rnis refused Habibic's offer, on U1e ethical grounds that he had just been 
appointed the speaker of the MPR nod had nominalcd Abdurruhman Wnhid as a presidential candidate. 
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Indil'idual Muslim intellectuals played important roles during the period of the 
Wnhid presidency. In the first Wahid cabinet, there were at least six minir.ters with an 
ICMI background, excluding nominal ICMI members,72 plus other Muslim intellectual~ 
from different organizatiottal backgrou~ds. Beyond the executive posts, the leadership 
of other high state institutions was clearly dominated by intellectual.> with a,, Islamic 
t'rganisational background. The speaker of the DPR {Akbar Tanjung), the speal:r.r of 
MPR (Amien Rais}, the chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, DPA (Achmad 
Tirtosudiro), the chairman of the Supreme Court (Bagir Manan), the Chairm: · .he 
Audit Board for State Finance, BPK (Satrio Budihardjo Judono) were intellectuals from 
a Hlv,J and/or lCMl background. 
The ability of Amien Rai;: and Abdurrahman Wahid to become the speaker of 
the MPR and President respectively, although their parties (PAN and PKB) only won 
respectively 7.36% and 11.04% of the total seats in the MPR, partly reflects the 
powerful influence of the Muslim intellectual lobby in the MPR. This was achieved 
because of the improvement i;o individual caracity of Muslim intellectuals and the more 
Islamic friendly-political elite (compared to previous periods of the Indonesian history), 
as a result of the Islamisz<ion of the Indonesian intelligentsia and bureaucracy in the last 
decades of the New Order.73 
When Megawati replaced Abdurrahman Wahid as the Indonesian President on 
23 July 2001, the Muslim representatives in the Cabinet and other state institutions 
remained about the same.74 Thus, the journey of Muslim intelligentsia Utrough the 
century, to move itself from the periphery to the centre of Indonesian politics, had 
arrived at its destination. The affiliation with political parties within the milieu of a free 
public sphere as well as free and fair elections provided the means and opportuntlics for 
the elevation of Muslim intellectuals to state officials. In essence, however, these 
Finally, Akbar got his own way by deciding to join the presidential contest. However, he failed to fulfil 
the formal requirements for nomination before tlte deadline of IS October 1999. Interview with Marwah 
Daud 1brnhim (16 October 1999). 
n Ministers of tlte 1CMI background were Yusril lhza Mahendrn, Jusuf Kalla, Nurmalunudi Ismail, 
Yahya Muhaimin, Tolchah Hasan, and Hasbalah M. Saad. Ministers of tlte nominal 1CMI nffiliation 
included Alwi Shihab and Juwono Sudarsono. 
" Tite powerful influence ~f the Muslim intellectual lobby was nlso indicated by the npproval of the 
Educational Law of 200~ by tlte Parliament and President, which contnined nmong other things 
coll'.pulsory religious education in public nnd private schools and tlte provision timt every student ncquire 
religious instruction from teachers with similar religious backgrounds. 
74 Muslim intellectuals nlso held dominant roles in the (new structure of) the Genernl Election Committee 
(KPU), th" (new structure of) the National Commissiou for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), tlte newly 
established Constitutionnl Court (Ma!Jkama!J Kon.rtltusi), and otlter new independent commissions which 
played importnnt roles in detennining the futwc shape oftl3tional politics. 
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political gains were made possible because of their remarkable educational 
achievements. 
This achievement can easily be seen in the contrast between the educational 
qualifications of the nationalist and Islamic political figures. Previously, the pre-eminent 
leader of nationalist politics, Sukamo, was a degree holder, while the pre-eminent leader 
of Muslim politics, Natsir, was only a secondary school graduate (AMS). Ry the end of 
the 201h century, however, the pre-eminent leader of nationalist politics, Megawati 
Sukilmoputri, was only a secondary school graduate (though she did attend university 
for a short time), while leaders of Muslim political parties were degree holders. In 
effect, despite the unconvincing results of Muslim parties in the 1999 elections, Muslim 
intellectuals' representation in the public sphere was very influential. 
Having achieved full participation in the political process, many Muslim 
intellectuals, especially those of the fourth and fifth generation, tended to be less 
obsessive about their Islamic identity. A well-known lslamist figure such as Amien Rais 
was now willing to accommodate pzople of different identities in his patty and also had 
no more ambition to reinstate the Jakarta Charter. At the same time, many Islamic 
activists no longer objected to joining non-Muslim parties. Thus, figures such as Zulvan 
Lindan and Heri Ald1madi felt free to join the PDIP. Political pragmatism also had its 
own positive dimension. For the sake of power, Muslim parties did not hesitate to build 
alliances with non-Islamic parties. As a result, the distinction between Muslim parties 
and secular parties became blurred. 
Muslim parties and identities continue to survive and the contestation of political 
idcntitic~ will also continue. Nevertheless, the Muslim intelligentsia's willingness to 
forget and to share substantial consensus with other identities has begun to bloom. This 
is a significant watershed for national reconciliation. 
Meanwhile, al\er the decline of ICMI, a new generation of the Muslim 
intelligentsia emerged but continue to show the almost characteristic tendency to 
diversity. A new generation of dakwah activists, led by the fil\h generation of Muslim 
intellectuals but comprised largely of those of the sixth generation (mostly born in the 
1970s/1980s), al\er exposure to the post-modem global conditions became more deeply 
incorporated into I!!.: global Islamic harakah. Nevertheless, they were by no means 
homogenous. Contestation and rivalries occurred between followers of different 
harakah over the difference in manhaj (method of reasoning), intellectual networks, and 
leadership competition. The most influential Indonesian harakah was that under the 
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influence of Iklnvamli Mus/imi11, namely KAMMI and its political party, the Justice and 
Welfare Party (PKS). 
On the other hand, a new generation of PMII activists, influenced by 
Abdurrahman Wahid's liberal thinking, experienced an unprecedented degree of 
liberalisution. In parallel with this development, the renewal movement continued under 
the leadership of young intellectuals from lAIN and NU backgrounds in collaboration 
with young Islamic-friendly secular intellectuals from secular university backgrounds. 
At the beginning of the 21 51 century, these young protagonists of Islamic renewal ideas 
began to promote the so-called network of liberal Islam (Jari11ga11 Islam Liberal, JIL). 
New intellectuals of this movement such as Ulil Abshar-Abdallah and Saiful Muzani in 
their exposure to the post-modem global condition went deeper than their predecessors 
in their appreciation of Western liberal-secular values. 
Thus, the exposure of Muslim intelligentsia to post-modem conditions and the 
deepening globalisation at the tum of the new millennium resulted in an antithetical 
tendency. One extreme gravitated towards Islamic fundamentalism, while the other 
extreme gravitateii towards Western liberalism and secu!:.rism. Yet, the majority of 
Muslim activists continue to accept and to extend the hybridity between different 
culturall' . .';l;ons. 
The energy of Islamic fundamen,~.ism continued to be checked by the energy of 
Islamic liberalism. The internal varieties of Indonesian Islam provided a built-in 
mechanism for Islamic moderation. Under these conditions, the possibility of 
transcendinr, ineluctable religio-cultural differences, to soften and render :hem tolerable 
to civil order, continued to be imaginable. 
6.i Conclusion 
The preponderance of Muslim int~h;~!uals in the twilight of the New Order and 
beyond reflects the limits of political reprr.ssicn. Every act of repression or 
discrimination has its own reverse imp~ct. A hegemunic power anrl ideology tends :o 
cr.:ate contradictions tllat permit subordinate groups to penetrate the prevailing ide;~logy 
in its own ter,ns. Behinl! the stick of politicnl repression, the New Order provided the 
carrot of r.conomic and educational development. 
As happened in the colonial period, Muslim frustration with politics meant the 
shift cr the Muslim struggle to the realm of culture and ed•1cation. As a result, by the 
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1990s the Muslim intelligentsia had a better competitive educational advantage than at 
any ethel' time in the past. 
With a better educational competitive advantage, Muslim intellectuals of diverse 
backgrounds began to demand greater political participation. Since the modernization 
program of the New Order did not encompass change in the political power structure, 
the Muslim intelligentsia's desire for power n~cessitatcd their further accommodation 
with the existing power structure. To stn.'··· ·':•~ their bargaining power they produced 
an ensemble of Muslim intellectuals which i,;!:oi·.y Jed to the formation ofiCMI. 
In fact, Suharto 's support for ICMI was not followed by signiticant changes in 
his basic power structu~c. Until his last cabinet, virtually none of ICMI's organic 
intellectuals from non-bureaucratic backgrounds were elevmed to the cabinet. This 
caused general disappointment among the so-called 'real ICMI' mcmb~rs. As the 
countrv became mired in economic crisis, which undermined the very foundations of 
the New Order's political legitimacy, organic intellectuals of ICMI began to join the 
resistance movement. Suharto's resignation and hi:; replacement by Habibie provided 
the opportunity for ICMI figures with strong Islamic credentials to achieve considerable 
political power and influence. 
The inception of the refomt era marked the strong·cmcrgcnc~ of Muslim 
intellectuals as a political and functional elite, a situation that had never occurred in any 
political transition in Indonesian history. At the same time, Muslim intellectuals' 
encounter with intellectuals with different identities, especially during the resistance 
movement, provided them with a new experience in denling with •i,.'~r.tity in difference' 
and 'difference in identity'. As a result, they bcc,me more willirg to share substantial 
consensus with other political groups. Insofar as political fairness and correctness 
continue to prevail, there is room for optimism that Indonesia will achieve the virtue of 
political civility. 
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When I come to ask what is signified in their mm 
by thcst!jimdamental desires of political pass/otis, 
I ji11d they appear to me as the two essential composites of man's will 
to siltlate himself in reiillife. 
To want real life is to want (a) to possess some material advantages, 
and (b) to be conscions of oneself as an indirldual ... tofeel yourself distinct from other men ... 
Julien Benda (1928)1 
To Allah belong the East ant/the West: 
whithersoever Ye turn, there is Allah's Face. 
For Allah is All-Embracing. All-Knowing. 
Qur'an (2: 115) 
The end of a century and of a thesis is a moment for retrospection and reflection. The 
tum of the 21'1 century is just a numerical event, which does not necessarily con!Rin 
historical sillJlil1eance. In the Indonesian context. however, histocical events at the dawn 
of the new c~r.tur; invoked a parallelism with th2•d at the dawn ofthe 201h century. 
The cri · ;~ of the Liberal economy in the NEI in the twilight of the 19th century 
provided the impetus for the regime change in the Netherlands, which marked the 
beginning of the Ethical 'reform' era in the colony. Speaking from the throne in 190 I, 
Queen Wilhelmina promised that the Netherlands would bear ethical responsibility for 
the people of the Indies. Education and social welfare were regarded as the moral duty 
of the govr:mment. This accelerated the formation of the intcl!ip,ent:b as the new ~lite 
of the Indies society. 
Apart from economic crisis and regime change, the dawn of the 20'h century also 
heralded the inception of Islamic reformism-modernism concomitant with !he 
deepenir.g penetration of Western secularism in the Indks life-world. The;~ contesting 
new intellectual currents in t.:dr encounter with historic indigenous intellectual 
traditions h3<i a great impact on th~ formation of the Indies intelligentsia. Some 
members of the intelligentsia gravitated toward Western secularism, while others 
gra1·itated toward Islamic reformiom-modemism. Most of them, however, gravitated 
toward 'translation', by celebl1'.\it-,t hybridity and syncretism-the fusion betwee.n 
different intellectual currents and cultural :raditions. These varieties of responses 
1 Quoted from Uoe second printing of the Beacon paperback odition (''159: 25·6). 
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combined with differences in socio-economic underpinning to give rise to the diversity 
ofintcllcctual-politicultradilions of the intelligentsia. 
A century later, the crisis of the New Order economy in the :·.v;!ight of the 201h 
century provided the impetus for the regime change, which marked the brginning of the 
new 'ethical' rcfonn (reformasi) era in Indonesia. Speaking from the house of 
parliament around the tum of a 21" century, leaders of the politiciscd intelligentsia-in 
some ways the offspring of the Dutch Ethici-promiscd the government would bc?.r 
ethical responsibility for the Indonesian people. Education and social welfare were once 
again regarded as the moral duty of the government along with the responsibility of 
eradicating corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). 
Aimost one hundred years after the implementation of the Dutch Ethical policy, 
many regimes have crumbled, political and economic systems have risen and fallen, 
generations of the lndonesi.m intelligentsia have passed on. But the Indonesian 
inttl'o,;cntsia continue to be the kernel of the Indonesian elite. Although the social 
prestige of the intelligentsia has lessened as a result of the quantitative explosion of 
educated people, the basic mentality of the current intnlligcntsia continues to reflect the 
Iong-standingpriyayi attitude: elitism. Under the spirit of elitism, populism continues to 
be strong as a discursive consciousness, but weak as a practical cunsciousncss. 
Since the intelligentsia's de facto control over t!Jc private capitalist mode of 
production is weak, this elitism led to the intelligentsia's preoccupation with politics. 
This became even more important during the economic crisis. Individuals and groups of 
the intelligentsia contcstccl with each other to gain control over the state economy and 
bureaucracy. High political and bureaucratk positions continue to be seen as the climax 
of an 'intellectual' career. In the face of a repressive political regime, intellectual 
discourse on the 'intellectual' has frequently been dominated by a 'Bcndaian' platonic 
view of the intellectual as necessarily an outsider, living in self-imposrrl exile and on 
the margins of society. But soon after the regime change, most of those who had been 
designated as inte/ektuil or cendekiawa11 (intellcctual)-even proponents of intellectual 
inciependence-wcre overcome with the desire for political power. 
Apart from the cctmomic crisis, regime change, and the intelligentsia's 
preoccupation with politics, the dawn of the 21" century heralded the deepening 
penetration of global ';Iamie fundamentalism, concomitant with a deepening 
penetration lJf global mass-cultur~ and Wcs:cm liberal v~Iues. Some members of the 
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intelligentsia were obsessed with the notion of Islamic purity, unity and certainty, while 
some others were entranced by Westcm liberal values. Still, the majority of them 
celebrated hybridity-the fusion between different cultural traditions. The difference in 
this cultural orientation would once again contribute to the plurality of intelligentsia's 
collective identities. 
From time to time, the stmggle for material-political interest and the struggle for 
meaning-identities have been at the heart of the intelligentsia's power struggle, even 
though aspects of material-political interests and the construction of mcauing-idcntitics 
have been subject to historidzatbn and transformation. From time to time, economic 
crisis has become a major impetus for political and regime change, while political 
changes and challenges have become a major factor in changes in religious thinking and 
movements. 
With the intelligentsia being the ruling elite of Indonesian society, intellcctu~! 
life has always been the heartland of social conflict and disagreement. This is not to say 
<imt no agreement ever occurred. 'Intellectual conflict', said Ratnlall Collins 'is always 
limited by focus on certain topics, and by the search for allies ... Conflict is the energy 
source of intellectual life, and conflict islimilcd by itself (Collins 1998: 1). 
Ideological conflicts between different intellectual traditions of the intelligentsia 
do Mt necessarily lead to mutual rejection, as they may also lead to mutual 
rapprochement. Ideological conflicts between the first generation of the modernist 
Muslim intelligentsia and its communist counterparts, for instance, resulted in the 
construction of 'Islamic socialism', which was high;y influenced by Marxist thoughts. 
In the intermingling of diverse intellectual-political traditions, radical and puritan views 
were drawn into more moderate positions, while conservative views were forced to 
adopt certain clements of the radic;\1 and puritan views. In addition, internal vari<'lies 
within Islam prevented its presence in politics from becoming monolithic. Internal 
contestation within Islam r.ombi11ed with pragmatic political intcre.:;ls forced particular 
sectors to make alliances with political groups outside Islamic intellectual-political 
traditions. 
Furthermore, social identities of the intelligentsia arc not only defined by 
religious orientation, but also by various sets of lived relationships (class, cthnicity, 
educational ::talus, and so 1;1tth). Thus, there have always been social clements that cut 
across diverse groups of th~ intcHigentsia aud opportunities for multiple-affiliations. 
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This has made possible the creation of 'historical blocs'. Otherwise, Indonesia would 
never have existed. In short, the Indonesian intelligentsia continues to prcgent itself as a 
collective expres~ion in terms of'identity in difference' and 'difference in identity'. 
In such a way, the shape and development of the Muslim btelligcntsia could not 
escape the presence and innuencc of significant 'others'. The different Muslim 
perceptions of 'others' would lead to different power strategies and identity 
formulations of the Muslim intelligentsia. Thus, however strong the nostalgic 
fundamentalist quest for authenticity and certainty, it is subject to imitation and 
uncertainty. 
Throughout the 201h century, Indonesian Muslims faced a serious challenge from 
the rapid modernisation and secularisation that transformed some fundamental aspects 
of their rcligio-political system. On the other hand, the strengthening of JsL:mic 
innucnce in the educational field and the public sphere and the ongoing formation of 
Muslim political parties and movements is also a fact. The dialectic between 
secularisation and Islamisation continued to be the chief feature of Indonesian polity 
and society, and both processes occurred simultaneously. 
This recognition of persisting continuities is not to ignore the presence of 
discontinuities. In the early 201h century, the state was an alien colonial state practising 
irreversible power relations (domination); education was a privilege of particular status 
groups, while the intelligentsia was a new prestigious social stratum; the public sphere 
was limited in its degree of freedom and in its quantity of participants, while discursive 
practices in the public sphere were initially centred on micro-cultural issues. At the end 
of the 2o'h century, the hegemonic New Order state crumbled to be followed by the 
installation of the 'Reform Order' (Orde Reformasi) state in which reversible power 
relations as 'strategic games between liberties' prevailed to an unprecedented degree; 
education had become theoretically accessible to all citizens, while the social prestige of 
the in!elligentsia began to decline; the public sphere ~xperienced an unprecedented 
degree of freedom and participation, while discursive practices became saturated with 
political issues, in which intelli!!en\~ia of varic.us academic disciplines pretended to be 
experts in political analysis. 
Between the early und the late 201h century, many generations of the 
intelligentsia succeeded each other. Each generation emerged with different mindsets 
and knowledge interests, different cdu~,,tional access and achievements, different 
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political opportunity structures, different dominant discourses and public sphere 
participatic'1, different codes, and different fonnulations of ideologies and identities. 
Thus, alongside diachronic continuity there have been synchronic changes. 
As far as the Muslim intelligentsia is concerned, the dynamic approach of this 
thesis reveals that throughout the 201h century there had been diachronic Muslim 
intellectual networks across generations that made possible the continuity of Muslim 
intellectual political traditions. At the same time, there had been synchronic changes in 
the fonnulation of Muslim intelligentsia's identities and ideologies across generations. 
The interactive approach of this study reveals that ideological fonnulation and power 
strategies of a particular generation of Muslim intolligentsia cannot be isolated from the 
influence of the previous generation, the presence of significant others and the interplay 
of various arenas of power relations. The intertextual approach of this study reveals the 
interc.icpendence of inter-generational texts of Muslim intelligentsia and the relationality 
of diverse texts as well as of discursive and non-discursive fonnations. All these can be 
seen in the following section. 
7.1 The Continuity in Historical Development of Muslim Intelligentsia. 
Throughout the 201h century, Muslim awarenes~ .:~f the relative lc·ck (size) of an 
Islamic-oriented intelligentsia and the powerful influence of educated people in 
-.. ompc.titive political struggles provided the impetus for each generation of the Muslim 
intelligentsia to bear a common historical project of 'lslamising the lndronesian educated 
community'. Until the 19. Js, this project was approached especially through the 
'modernising' ofJslamic institutions and expressions. Beginning in the 1980s, however, 
the ubiquity of modern technology and civilizations in the Muslim world along with the 
deepcnin~ penetration of globo! Islamic fundamentalism led some segments of a new 
generation of th~ Muslim intelligentsia io move from the approach of 'modernising' 
Islam towards that of 'Jslamising' modernity. 
Throughout the century, the historically structured intellectual institutions, 
traditions and collective identities inherited from the previous generations of the 
Muslim intelligentsia became the springbourd for the reproduction and refonnulation of 
those institutions, traditions and identities by the following generation. Because of this 
intercoru!r.-Jtedness and interdependence of Muslim intellectual thinking and discourse 
~--~-~--------------------------------
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between generations, there was no such a thing as originality in ideas of a particular 
generation. 
The long-term intellectual and institutional chains of the Muslim intelligentsia 
can be seen in the Figure 2: A Schema of the Genealogy of Muslim Intelligentsia. This 
schema only represents Weberian 'ideal types'; that is analytical constructs which may 
or may not corresp<:mt\ in detail to actual cases but which help us analyse the general 
pattern ofintellectual and institutional genealogies of the Mu5lim intelligentsia. 
The genealogy of Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia rooted in the emergence .,; 
prototypes of 'ulama-intclek' and 'intelek-ulama ', Sjeikh Achmad Khatib can be 
designated as the prototype of the Indonesian 'clerical-intelligentsia' (ulama-intelek). 
He had been expose,! to Western education before continuing his study to Mecca. His 
major concern and erudition was, however, in religious knowledge. Agus Salim can be 
designated as the prototype of Indonesian Muslim 'intelligentsia' (intelek-ulama). His 
major educational background was Western schooling (HBS, !he prestigious school of 
his generation). But he was able to improve his religious knowledge in Mecca under the 
mentorship of Achmad Khatib. As well as being erudite in modem scientific knowledge 
he was also literate in religious knowledge. 
Khatib influenced later Islamic intellectual movemcrats through his students. 
Some of his students became leaders of the reformist-modernist movements such as 
Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin, M. Djamil Djambek, Abdullah Achmad, Abdul Karim 
Amru!lah (Haji Rasul), M. Thaib Umar (of West Sumatra}, and Achmad Dachlan (of 
Yogyakarta), white some other became leaders of the traditionalist Islamic movements 
such as Sjeikh S11laiman al-Rasuli (of West Sumatra) and Hasjim Asj'ari (of East Java). 
Some of Khatib's students had been exposed to western elementary schools, such as 
Djamil Djambek and Abdullah Achmad-and notably Agus Salim, while some others 
taught themselves Western language and knowledge. Being erudite in religious 
knowledge, as well as literate in modem knowledge, most of Chatib's students listed 
here constituted the first generation of Indies 'ulama-i"'dek ', 
The first generation of refonnist-modcmist (RM) ulama-imelek pioneered the 
establishment of madrasah, modem Islamic organizations, public~ .• uhs and other 
institutions. The most prominent cultural·educational organization along the reformist-
modernist line was Muhammadiyah in Java and Sumatera Tlrawalib in West Sumatra. 
Following in the footsteps of the reformist-modernist ulama-intelek, slightly later the 
Chapter 7 · Conclllslor. 456 
first generation of traditionalist (T) 'ulama-illlelek' such as Wahab Chasbullah in Java 
and Siradjuddin A bas in West Sumatra became the forerunners of the establishment of 
madrasah in the traditional community. The exemplary centre of the modernised 
Islamic school in the traditinnal community was madrasah Sala{ljah Sjafi'ijah of the 
Pesantren Tebuireng (East Java) under the headship of Kjai Ma'sum and then 
Mohammad lljas. The well-known early organizations in the traditional line were 
Nahdlatul Ulama in Java and Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) in West Sumatra. 
Meanwhile, Salim and other members of the first generation of 'Muslim 
intelligentsia' (MI), such as Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Muis and Smjopranoto, pioneered 
the development of modem Islamic p()litical movements through their major role in the 
leadership of Sarekat Islam (Sl) and early Islamic political parties. 
Intellectual linkages between the first and second generation of ulama-ittlelck · 
were mediated by madrasah and other modernised Islamic institutions. In addition, 
Indonesian student societies in the Middle East, especially in Egypt (Djama 'all a/-
Chairiah), also played an important role as breeding grounds for the second generation 
o( u/ama-i/1/clek. Prominent personalities of the Djamaah ai-Chairiah were Muchtar 
Lutfi, Fathurrahman Kafrawi and Kahar Muzakkir. Upon their return to the home 
country Lutfi played an important role in the transformation of the Sumatra Thawalib 
into the first political organization of West Sumatra, Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia 
(PERM!); Kafrawi joined the NU, involved in the Advanced Islamic School (STI) and 
Masjumi Party; Kahar Muzakkir joined the Muhammadiyah, became the first director of 
the STI and was involved also in the Masjumi party. 
Intellectual linkages betwe<' ;; !he first and second generation of the Muslim 
intelligentsia were mediated by Islamic political parties, associations (Masjumi [non-
party]), and stude~:t associations. Members of the second genemtion of Muslim 
intelligentsia were exposed to parties and associations of the first generation, while 
intellectuals of the first generation influenced U1e second generation in the establishment 
and activities of student associations. The main vehicles for the transmission of 
ideologies and intellectual traditions from the first to th•: second generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia (MI) were Jong Islamieten Bond (Jill) and Studenten Islam Studicclub 
(SIS). A forerunner of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia (MI) was 
Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, UJe first Muslim intellectual with a Netherlands university 
background. The most prominent intellectuals of the second generation of MI were 
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Samsuridjal, Mohammad Natsir, Kasman Singodimcdjo, Mohammad Rocm, Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, JusufWibisono and M. Rasjidi with Mohammad Natsir being the most 
celebrated. 
The first generation of the reformist-modernist {RM) ulama-intelek made a 
significant contribution to the formation of the second generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia. The Islamic literacy of this generation was made possible through its 
exposure to madrasa!t. publications, and da~,va!t of the RM ulama-intelek. 
The first generation of traditional (T) ulama-intelek made a small contribution to 
the formation of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia. Its sphere of influence 
was confined by and large to the second generation of traditionalist ulama-intelek. Most 
prominent personalities of the traditionalist ulama-i/1/elek of the second generation were 
Wachid Hasjim, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, and Mohammad Jljas. As well as being erudite 
in religious knowledge, Hasjim taught himself European languages and modem 
scientific knowledge; Kafrawi was a graduate of Al-Azhar (Cairo) who acquired both 
religious and secular subjects, while Jljas was a HIS graduate. These three figures of the 
traditionalist ulama-inte/ek became the forerunners of the traditionalist (NU) 
intelligentsia. 
The second generation of MI and u/ama-intelek (both rcformist-1nodcmist and 
traditionalist ones) played a major role in the establishment and leadership of the STI, 
Masjumi Party and NU Party. These institutions became the main breeding grounds for 
the consti . .tion of the third generation of Muslim intelligentsia. With the support of 
intellectuals of the second generation, the third generation of Ml pioneered the 
establishment of the first post-colonial student-youth associations. Thr¢e students of the 
STI, Anwar Haljono, Lafran Pane and Jusdi Ghazali, respccti y Jed the formation of 
GPII, HMI and PII. Other prominent intellectuals of the third generation were Ahmad 
Tirtosudiro, M. S. Mintaredja, Mukti Ali, Dahlan Ranuwihardjo, Deliar Nocr, Maisaroh 
Hila!, Tedjaningsih and Zakijah Daradjat (the last three being women). 
The second generation of traditionalist ulama-inte/ek began to contribute to the 
formation of the Muslim intelligentsia. Fathurrahwan Kafrawi and Wahid Hasjim were 
both involved in the Jcadcn:hip of the Masjumi Party and in the development of the STI. 
Some students of a traditionalist background also began to enrol in universities, 
especially the STI, and I r \41 and PII. Thus, in the rise of the third generation of 
MI there emerged the c: "i';litionalist intelligentsia. At this juncture, however, 
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students with a traditionalist background such as Toha Masduki and Mukti Ali had not 
yet created a separate traditionalist student association. 
The HMJ and PIJ along with the Masjumi and NU political parties became the 
main catalysts for the intellectual-political linkages between the third and fourth 
generation of Muslim intelligentsia. The equality of access to education and the 
establishment of!NN increased educational opportunities for the Muslim intelligentsia. 
Forerunners of the fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia were Jmaduddin 
Abdulrahim, !email Hasan Mctareum and Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo for the modernist 
intelligentsia and Subehan Z.E. for the traditionalist intelligentsia. Prominent 
personalities of this generation were Nurcholish Madjid, Arnien Rais, Djohan Effendi, 
A' Jd Wahid, Dawam Rahardjo, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Usep Fathuddin, Utomo 
D.. njaya, Djalaluddin Rakhmat, Ida Nasution, Zoer'ani Djamal and Aniswati (the !::3t 
three being women)2 for the modernist and Mahhub Djunaedi, Chalid Mawardi, and 
Abdurrahman Wahid for the traditionalist. By the rise of the fourth generation of 
Muslim intelligentsia, there emerged separate organizations of traditionalist students 
such as JPNU and PMIJ. At this time, Muhammadiyah student activists also established 
the Muhammadiyah student association, !MM. 
Meanwhile, senior members of the Muslim intelligentsia from the third and 
fourth generation established an association of Muslim sarjana (Persami) under the 
leadership of Subchan Z. E. (of the NU) and H. M. Sanusi (of the Muhammadiyah). 
Afier the withdrawal of the traditionalist intelligentsia from Persami, an association of 
the traditionalist sardjana (IS II) was formed. 
The old and new post-colonial student associations became the transmission 
chains of Muslim intellectual-political traditions from the fourth to fifih generation of 
Muslim intelligentsia. Under the New Order's repressive-developmentalism, however, 
intellectuals of the fourth generation split into two main factions: proponents of the 
Jslamist 'dakwah' movement and those of the liberal 'renewal' movement. Islamic 
activists of the secular universities became the main recruits of the former, while 
Islamic activists of State Islamic Institutes (JAIN) and NU educational institutions 
became the main recruits of the latter. This division influenced the ideological 
construction of the Muslim intellectual tradition ofl!lC following generation. 
2 Aniswali was actually a younger sister ofNU intellectual, Subchan z. E., but associated herself with the 
HMI and modernist intellectual conmmnity. 
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The dakwall training institutions (LMD), religious circles on university 
campuses and independent mosques, and Islamic 'mentoring' programs became the 
main vehicles for the transmission of the Islamist dakwall ideology from the fourth to 
the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. On the other hand, the HMI, PM II, NGOs, 
and student and intellectual circles of the JAIN and NU became the main catalyst for the 
transmission of renewal ideas. Prominent personalities of the dakwall movement of the 
fifth generation of MI were Halla Radjasa, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, Mutammimul Ula, and 
Hidayat Nur Wahid. Prominent personalities of the renewal movement of this 
generation were Azyumardi Azra, Fachry Ali, Masdar Farid Masudi, Komamddin 
Hidayat, Marwah Daud lbruhim and Khofifah Indar Parawansa (the last two being 
women). 
In further developments, '<lte HMI split into two organizations after opponents of 
the so-called asas ttmggal formed an underground HMI called HMI-Majc/is 
Pcrtimbangmt Organisasi (MPO). The Pll for its opposition to asas tunggal went 
underground. Because of their bias towards NU and Mullammadiyalt, PM II and IMM 
were less attractive for independent-minded students. 
Thus, by the rise of the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, historic 'extra' 
(trans-campus) student organizations such as HMI, PMII and IMM began to lose their 
credibility and appeal. Muslim intellectual and student :nr..vcments continued to be 
divided by and large into two major intellectual currents: 'rejectionism' (anti state-
orthodoxy) of the 'dah ,lit' movement versus the 'accommodationism' (pro state-
orthodoxy) of the 'renewal' movements. To survive under the New Order repression, 
members of the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, especially those who were 
born in the 1960s, became the mute generation. 
Despite their differences, proponents of the dakwalt and the renewal movements 
of the fourth and fifth generation united in 1990 to establish the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI). In opposition to ICMI, a small group of 
Muslim intellectuals under the leadership of Abclurrahrna." Wahid collaborated with a 
small group of s;;~ular and Christian intellectuals to establish Fonmt DPmokrasi 
{Fordem). 
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G = Generation Trad. =Traditionalist 
RM =Reformist-Modernist Ml =Muslim Intelligentsia 
Alongside the ICMI presence, the transmission of conflicting intellectual 
traditions continued. The Campus Da~,mh Bodies (LDKs) of the secular university, 
underground student organizations, and the newly adopted globnl Islamic harakah 
(movements) became the main trallsmission chains of the dakwah (Islamist) intellectual 
tradition from the fifth to the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. On the other 
han:!, HMI and PMII along with discussion groups of the lAIN and NU young 
intellectuals became the main transmission chains of the renewal (liberal) Muslim 
intellectuals. Some figures of the dakwah movement of the sixth generation of MI were 
Adian Husaini, Anis Mala, Eric Salman, and Moh. Tubagus Furqon (all belong to the 
transiticnal generation/forerunners of the sixth generation), Alfian Tanjung, Fahri 
Hamzah, Fcbry Nur Hidayat, Andi Rahmat, and Mukhammad Najib. Some figures of 
the liberal movement of the sixth generation of MI were Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, Luthfi 
Assyaukanic and Saiful Mujani (all belong to the transitional generation/forerunners of 
the sixth generation}, Burhanuddin, Novriantoni, Nong Darol Mahmada and Aisyah 
Yasmina (the last two being women). 
In i 998, dakwah activists of the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia 
established a new student association, KAMMI. Somewhat later, liberal activists of the 
fifth and sixth generation of the Muslim intelligentsia set up a network of liberal !slum 
(Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL). Still, the majority of Muslim intelligentsia fell between 
the lslamist and liberal intellectual positions. 
Over time, membership of the Mu~lim intelligentsia steadily increased in 
keeping with its continuing educational improvement both in quantity and 
qualifications. Consequently, the Muslim intelligentsia's credibility in discursive 
practices and its bargaining power in bureaucratic (positional) allocations became 
stronger and stronger. In contrast, Muslim political parties consistently failed to attract a 
majority vote and became a divisive factor for the Muslim intelligentsia. 
From time to time, Muslims' frustration with politics provided the impetus lor 
their return to support for cultural-educational movements. As the educational 
qualifications ofthe Muslim intelligentsia became better and better, it generally became 
more and more elitist in social relationships and orientation. As a result, its cultural-
I 
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educational movements catered more and more to the educated urban middle class. 
Generally speaking, as the elite ~ccamc more and more 'l•lamiscd', the masses became 
less and less 'lsl;:;;,;seu'. Jl,\c Uclrtg so, the re-introduction of a democratic political 
system following Suharto's resignation made Muslim politiol parties, at least 
temporarily, less attractivP. at the gmss-roots level. 
At various times during the 20'h ccntu;y, Muslims' awareness of their political 
precariousness and fragmentation-in the face of perceived external 'thrcats'-had 
frequently provided the impetus for the rise of movements for Islamic unity. These 
movements usually called for lslJmic fraternal solidarity (uklmwa/1 1~/amiyah) 
rccurringly mediated through an 'All-Islam Congress'. Thus, despite internal varieties 
and contestation:; within Islamic int~llcctulil-political traditions, there has always been a 
centripetal force for Islamic un:ty. The first generation of Muslim intelligentsia and 
'clcrical-ir.tclligentsia' were united in the Sl and MIAI. The second generation of 
Muslim intelligentsia and 'clerical-intelligentsia' were united in the Masjumi (non-party 
and party) and in the Constituent Assembly. The third generation of Muolim 
intelligentsia were united in Islamic paramilitary groups and student-youth associations 
(GPII, HMI, PII and Pcrsmm). The fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia were 
united in the anti-communist and anti-establishment student fronts of 1966 (KAMI and 
KAPPI) and to some extent in ICMI. The fifih and sixth generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia were united in order to remove Suharto from the presidency. 
The reverse is also true. Whenever there was a centripetal force for Islamic unity 
there was always a centrifugal Ioree for Islamic di~unit)'. During the colonial period of 
the 1920s, Muslim leaders' calls for lslan1i.:: political unity-in the fare of the growing 
influence of comr.mnism and secular nationalism-produced an unintended result: the 
disappointment of traditionalist ulama caused by the domination of rcformist-modcmist 
intelligentsia and 'clcrical-intclligcntsi:,' in the lcad~rship of All-Islam Congresses and 
in the Indies Muslim delegation to thr 'Caliphate Congress' in Mecca. During the early 
years of the new independent Republic, !vi us lim kaders' calls for ls!amic political unity 
through the Masjumi-as a rcspcnse iO !he political dominance of the secular nationalist 
lcaders-produ·:ed r: centrifugal !brcc: the establishment of Pcr!i as a separate political 
party and the secession ofPSII 1md NU from the Musjumi. During the early years of the 
New Order period, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic integration-in the face of the New 
Order marginalisation oipoliticu!Is1a1J-produced a further unintended result: the birth 
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of the 'renewal' movement. During the late years of the New Order period, Mu,;Fm 
leaders' calls for Islamic intellectual unity through ICMI-for the sake of better Islamic 
political gains-produced a centrifugal force: the rise of Fordem. In the beginning of 
the rcformasi (reform) era, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic political unity through the 
formation of an Islamic axis, 'poros tenga!J' (lit. middle axis)-following the 
unconvincinr election result of Muslim political parties-produced an unhappy end: 
personal ril 1cs between Muslim political leader>. 
In s' .Jrt, the Muslim intelligentsia continues to present itself as a collective 
.:::pression in terms of 'Muslim '·-,tity in difference' and 'diff~rcnce in Muslim 
identity'. Within its unity, there is a room for diversity; within its diversity, there is a 
room for unity. Whether it is united or divided depends on the dominant synchronic 
outlook and perception of threats and rewards, which are conditioned and constructed 
by political opportunity structures, discursive formations, characteristics of the public 
sphere as well as the economic and international climate. 
7.2 Discontinuity in the Historical ~e\'elopment of Muslim Intelligentsia. 
Alongside the diachronic continuity, the historical development of the Muslim 
intelligentsia exhibited recurring synchronic changes and small deviations concomitant 
with the rise of each new generation of the intelligentsia. This change and 
transformation was evident in the formulation of Islamic ideology identity. The notion 
of Islamic ideology and identity differed from generation to another as a result of 
differences in the political opportunity structure, the structure of intellectual conflicts, 
cognitive structures, discursive formations, and the condition of the public sphere. 
The. formative phase of the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia occurred 
during the I 900s-191 Os. It was a period when issues of social welfare resulting from the 
Ethical PoJ:;y, alt•ng with the propaganda of Marxism and socialism, influenced 
intellectual discourse. As a response, the formulation of Islamic ideology by the first 
generation was framed und~r the rubric of 'Islamic socialism'. 
The formative phase of the second generation to• ' Juring the 1920s-
1930s. It was a period when the Indonesian intelligentsia .. to .. xperience ideo-
political cleav::~cs, the rise of Indonesian nationdism and the call for independence 
became the main concern of intellectual discourses. In response to the secular 
conception 01' nationalistr and state, championed by secular nationalist leaders, the 
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fonnulation oflslamic ideology ofthc second generation was framed under the rubric of 
'Islamic nationalism and the Islamic state'. 
The fonnntivc phase of the third generation took place in the 1940s and early 
1950s. It was a period when the 'revolution for independence' and 'constitutional 
democracy' became the main intellectual concerns. In sharing a common revolutionary 
and nationalist spirit with other groups of the intelligentsia, the ideological fonnulation 
of Islamic ideology of this generation attempted to maintain hannony between the so-
called 'keis/ammz' (Islam-ness) and 'keindonesinau' (Indonesia-ness). 
The fonnative phase of the fourth generation took place in the late 1950s and the 
1960s. It was a period wh~n severe ideo-political conflicts during the guided democracy 
era as well as the need for p ,itical alliances along the axis of pro- and anti-
establishment (the Old Order rc,;ime) influenced the intellectual position. As a result, 
alongside the continuing attempt to fonnulate Islamic ideology based on the harmony 
between 'keis/aman ' and 'keindonesiaan ', there emerged an attempt to reproduce the 
fonnulation of the Islamic ideology of the second generation. The first attempt carne out 
with the 'renewal' ideology, while the second attempt crune out with the 'lslarnist' 
(dakwah) ideology. 
The fom1ative phase of the fifih generation took place in the 1970s and early 
1980s. It was a period when the repressive-dcvelopmentalism of the New Order became 
hegemonic in the public sphere. With limited opportunities for political-intellectual 
articulation and manoeuvre, this generation emerged as a mute generation which could 
only serve as an incubator for the consolidation or· renewal and dakwah ideologies. 
As a result, there emerged two antithetical Islamic ideological fonnulations: 
'accommodationism' (appropriation of the secular-state orthodoxy) versus 
'rcjectionism'. 
The fonnative phase of the sixth generation took place in the late 1980s ant! 
1990s. It was a period of the late modemisaz.ion of the New Order and the globalisation 
of the post-modem condition. By this time, the public sphere began to show a certain 
degree of openness which provided the catalyst for the deepening penetration of global 
Islamic fundamentalism as well as global mass-culture and Western liberal values. This 
contributed to strengthening of the degree of lslamic-mindedness as well as liberal-
mindedness of different segments uf this generation, compared with previous 
generations. There emerged two major contending ideological fonnulations: 'Islamic 
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revivalism' versus 'Islamic liberalism', although large numbers of this generation 
continued to celebrate hybridity of various cultural traditions. 
The change in ideological formulation reflects changes in discursive formation. 
'Islam and socialh 1' became the uominant intellectual discourse of the first generation. 
'Islam and nationalism/the nation-state' became the dominant intellectual discourse of 
the second generation. 'Islam and indcpendence-revolution' become the dominant 
intc:!ectual discourse of the third generation. 'Islam and modernisation-secularisation' 
became the dominant intellectual discourse of the fourth generation. 'Islam alternative 
and alternative development' became the dominant intellectual discourse the fifth 
generation. 'lslamising modernity' and 'liberalising Islam' became the dominant 
intellectual discourse of the sixth generation. 
Religious attitude and identities had also been subject to change. The 
'fundamentalist' groups of the early decades of the 20th century, such as 
Multammadiyalt and Persis, became far more moderate by the end of the 20th century. 
The conservative groups of the early decades of the 201h century, such as NU, became 
the catalyst for the liberal Islamic movement by the end of the 20th century. In contrast 
to earlier times, an unprecedented numher of activists from the Islamic fundamentalist 
movements of the late 20'h century came from non-santri family backgrounds. At the 
same time, many students from NU and Multammadiyalt backgrounds no longer 
affiliated with these organizations as they preferred to join new Islamic collectivities 
such as the tarbiyalt (dakwalt) group and other Islamic ltarakalt. 
At the individual level, changing religio-political attitudes and identities were 
exemplified by some Islamic intellectuals. Agus Salim had a strong religious upbringing 
but soon became a secular man after being exposed to Western education (HB~). His 
encounter with Achmad Khatib in Mecca and Tjokroaminoto in the SI, however, 
reactivated his religious identities. Abdullah Achmad was a protagonist of the reformist· 
'fundamentalist' movement of West Sumatra. His interaction with Dutch officials and 
the Dutch subsidy for his madrasalt, however, changed him into a moderate-
accommoda:'onist. Young Nurcholish Madjid was known as the 'Young Natsir' 
(lslamisl). !'<·:· ,.1heless, his adventurous and critical mind in combination with the 
pressure ofE~IV Order modernisation, his socialisation with liberal Islamic circles, and 
his encounter with Western civilisation converted him to become a protagonist for 
Islamic 'renewal' ideas. Imaduddin Abdulrahim was well-known as a central figure of 
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the dokwolz-'rejectionist' intellectuals in early years of the New Order. Soon aflcr 
ICMI's establishment in 1990, however, he became a modcratc-accommodationist 
intellectual. Amicn Rais was once known as an cxclusivc-Islamist. Nevertheless, his 
encounter with liberal scholars at the University of Chicago and his further interaction 
with secular and non-Islamic leaders during the 'reform movement' of 1998, 
transformed him into a moderate-inclusive personality. 
Change and transformation also took place in Muslim education. In the early 
20'h century, only a few so11tri (devout Muslims) were educated in seko/olz (Western 
system of education). Most so11tri at this juncture were educated in peso11tre/l and 
modrosolz. Consequently, the membership of the early generation of Muslim 
intelligentsia was small. The m;;jorily of scmtri were more erudite in religious 
knowledge than in general knowledge. By the end of the 20th century, the majority <>f 
so11tri were educated in Stale-run seko/olz. Even the curriculum of the modrasolz 
contained more general subjects than religious ones. Consequently, the membership of 
the Muslim intelligentsia became disproportionately larger; at the same time, the 
majority of them became more erudite in general knowledge than in religious 
knowledge. This will have a significant influence on the future religio-political attitude 
of the Muslim intelligentsia. Lack of religious knowledge can be a precondition for a 
liberal outlook. Or, the oppo;ite may be the case. Sometimes insufficient exposure to 
religious teaching can also raise the value of religious knowledge. A 'thirst' for religion 
can ignite a religious S?irit. Religious spirit without erudition in religious knowledge is 
a precondition for fundamentalist attitudes. 
No less important was the transformation in the structural position of the Muslim 
intelligentsia. The early generation of the Muslim intelligentsia preferred to leave their 
positions in the government· bureaucracy and associate themselves with the Kooem 
Mordika (the independent community) of the Muslim petty bourgeoisie. With the 
continuous deterioration of the solllri economy, however, members oflatcr generations 
of the Muslim intelligentsia sought employment in the government bureaucracy. Thus, 
by the end of the 20'h century, the image of the solllri as trader was overshadowed by 
the image of the so11tri as nco-bureaucrat. 
The politicnl leverage of the Muslim intelligentsia also changed from one 
generation to another. The first (Salim) generation of the Muslim intelligentsia had a 
powerful political influence signalled by the political magnitude of the SJ. The second 
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(Natsir) generation was overshadowed by the powerful influence of secular nationalist 
leaders, but remained able to hold national political leadership in the early 1950s. The 
third (Pane) generation showed the weakest political influence; its educational and 
political career was overtaken by history. The fourth (Madjid) generation was initially 
overshadowed by the militmy and secular intelligentsia but finally developed a strong 
political influence in the late Suharto era and in early years of the reform era. Titc 
political iilfluence of the fifih and sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia remains to 
be sren. With better educational qualifications, however, it is expected that their 
political influence will be strong, though the political affiliation of their membership 
will be more dispersed than ever in the past. This situation is, however, again subject to 
change as other groups of the Indonesian intelligentsia arc also no; static. 
Next, codes of the Muslim intelligentsia have also changed from one generation 
to another. The first generation of Muslim intelligentsia was part of the 'baugsawa11 
pikirau ' (the nobility by intellect). It also belonged to the 'Kaoem Maeda' (young 
group) of the newly educated people in opposition to the 'Kaoem Toea' (old group) of 
the old aristocracy. In keeping with this pattern, the first generdtion of reformist-
modernist ulama associated themselves with the '/slmuic Kaoem Maeda' in opposition 
to 'Islamic Kaoem Toea· of the con,;ervative-traditionalist ulama. 
In further developments, the term 'baugsawau pikirmr • was transformed into 
kaoem terpc/adjar (educated community) beginning in the 1910s, into iutel/ectueeieu 
(intellectuals) beginning in the 1920s, into iuteligeusia (intelligentsia) beginning in the 
late I 930s, and into ceudekiawau (intellectual/intelligentsia) beginning in the late 1960s. 
The newly born intelligentsia, educated in secular-oriented Western schools, 
tended to be poor in religious knowledge and detached from the ulama and Islamic 
epistemic community. In the interaction between the Muslim intelligentsia and 
reformist-modernist u/ama, however, members of the Muslim intelligentsia gradually 
became literate in religious knowledge while some ulama became literate in general 
knowledge. Thus, there emerged the so-called illlcfek-rrlama (modem 
intellectuals/intelligentsia who were literate in religious knowledge) and ulama-illlefek 
(ulama who were literate in modem scientific knowledge). Later in the century, the 
traditionalist rrlama followed in the footsteps of the reformist-modernist ulama in 
incorporating general subjects and modem educational apparatus to their schools. As a 
Chapter 7 · Conclusion 468 
result there also emerged the traditionalistu/ama-inte/ek. This situation was sustained 
until the 1960s. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the distinction between the category of ulama anci 
intelectueelen (intelektui/) began to blur-following the introduction of a large portion 
of general subjects to religious schools/universities along with the religious instruction 
and da!.wah movement to the public 'secular' schools/universities. Many intelcktuils 
emerged as leading religious figures, while many ulamas emerged as leading 
spokespeople of secular issues. At this juncture, even the existing mediating terms such 
as 'intelek-ulama' and 'ulama-intelek' began to crumble, as both terms implicitly 
presumed to recognise the distinction between ulama and inte/ektuil. A new code was 
needed to mark the fusion of the two categories. The meeting ground of this fusion was 
not in the word 'intelektuil' or 'ulama ', but rather in a neutral Indonesian neologism, 
'cendekiawan' (intellectual or intelligentsia). The term 'cendekiawan Muslim ' began to 
gain popularity in the 1980s. 
The public sphere was also transformed not only in the scope of its participants 
but also in its degree of freedom. Originally the site of discussion for exchanging ideas 
among a small group of Western educated people mostly of the priyayi origin, it soon 
expanded beyond this limit to include 'clerical-intelligentsia' and other groups of 
Indonesian society. By the 1920s it had already become the site of conflicting power 
&truggles between political groups and organizations. With the continuous changes in 
political systems, the degree of freedom of the public sphere swung between restrictiun 
and openness. The continuous change in the nature of the public sphere became a major 
drive for continuing change in the ideological formulation and discursive formation of 
the Muslim intelligentsia. 
The change in the ideological formulation and discursive formation in tum 
changed Muslims' perception of Islamic political institutions and affiliations. Under a 
general nationalist ideology with a religious tinge, the early SI's p<cscnce in the 1910s 
represented what Muis called 'nationalistisch-lslamistisch' organizations which 
attracted both devout and nominal Muslims of diverse religious and cultural 
inclinations. The decision to make the Islamic principle the sole basis of SI (PSI!) in 
the 1920s limited the meaning of'Muslim' and the constituency ofthis organization to a 
particular segment of the Muslim community. The credo of 'Islam, Yes', Islamic Party, 
No', which emerged during the New Order, opened the possibility for Islamic activists 
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to join Golkar. As a result, Golkar that previously had been seen by Muslims as non-
Islamic institution became an arena for the actualisation of Muslims' political interests. 
The hegemonic discourse of pluralism and inelusivism in the late Suharto ern influenced 
the Muslims' construction of political parties during the refonn 'ern'. In the past, 
Muslim parties had never opened their membership to non-Muslims. By late 201h 
century, even a long-acclaimed 'Is!amist-Natsirist' such as Amien Rais considered an 
Islam-based party as too restricting and preferred to establish a pluralistic-oriented party 
(PAN). Many members of the Muslim intelligentsia also became more willing to enter 
'secular-nationalistic' parties. At the same time, even the Islam-based party opened 
itself, at least in rhetoric, to non-Muslim membership. As a result the distinction 
between Islamic and non-Islamic parties became blurred. 
7.3 Postscript 
The dynamic, interactive, and intertextual approach of this study has attempted 
to examine the development of Muslim intelligentsia from many different positions and 
llerspectives as well a£· to see the diversity of impulses and interactions which 
influenced the develop·.nent of the Muslim intelligentsia. This study, however, has been 
unable to cover all dements, perspectives and impulses related to the historical 
development of the Muslim intelligentsia. 
The thesis is unable to cover the rising influence of young NU intellectuals and 
the expansion of the tarbiyah movement in the 1990s because the focus of attention for 
this period is given to the fonnation of ICMI. For the leading role of young NU 
intellectuals in contemporary liberal Islamic movements and the magnification of the 
tarbiyah group's influence in contemporary Islamist movements, further studies arc 
needed to analyse the specific development of the traditionalist and tarbiyuh 
intelligentsia, especially after the 1980s. 
This study also virtually ignores the Islamic intellectual movement in the realm 
of sufi orders, for its main focus is directed to the relationship of the Muslim 
-
intelligentsia and power. The current allraction of Islamic spiritualism for segments of 
the urban middle and upper classes has influence on the socio·political attitudes of 
particular groups of the Muslim intelligentsia. Thus, it is important that a specific study 
be devoted to this subject. 
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In emphasising the collective entity of Muslim intelligentsia, rather than 
individual Muslim intellectuals, this study has tended to ignore the role of 'independent' 
intellectuals who might not have joined any major Muslim student and intellectual 
association/movement. A specific study might examine the possible existence of 
Muslim intellectuals of this kind. In focussing on the most prominent organic 
intellectuals of each generation, this study has virtually ignored the role of female 
intellectuals. With the growing concern about the issue of empowering women in 
politics, a specific study on the development of female intellectuals is recommended. 
By limiting itself to the genealogy of Muslim intelligentsia, this study also docs 
not devote sufficient discussion to the genealogy of other intellectual traditions of the 
Indonesian intelligentsia. Just as the development of the Muslim intelligentsia cannot 
escape the influe.1ce of other intellectual traditions, the reverse is also true and the 
development of 'secular' intellectual traditions cannot escape the influence of Muslim 
intellectual traditions. Thus, a specific study is necessary to examine the development of 
other traditions of the Indonesian intelligentsia and their interaction with the Muslim 
intelligentsia. 
In emphasising the cultural-political dimension of the development of the 
intelligentsia, this ihesis pays little attention to a micro-analysis of the transformation of 
economic and occupational positions of the intelligentsia. As the structural position of 
the intelligentsia detennines its status within society, a specific study is needed to deal 
with this issue. 
Looking ahead, it can be said that dr.::r.;,.., tile declining social prestige of the 
intelligentsia, the intelligentsia for some decades to come will remain the ruling elite of 
the Indonesian polity. The percentage of people with tertiary education backgrounds at 
the tum of a 21" century was less than 10% of the total Indonesian population, so 
educational qualifications will remain a major factor in determining the elite recruitment 
pattern. This situation will continu" !o benefit individual intellectuals and intellectual 
traditions that have a strong investment in the educational sector. The victory of .:1 
particular party in the general election may not translate into actual positional gains in 
the broad spectrum of political administration and government bureaucracy, unless 
supported by powerful human resources. At the same time, as long as the non-state 
economy remains unable to absorb a great percentage of university graduates, many 
individual intellectuals of particular intellectual traditions who have strong educational 
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qualifications will be forced to join powerful political parties in their effort to gain 
strategic political and bureaucratic positions. The willingness of these segments of the 
highly educated intelligentsia to join powerful political parties, regardless of the parties' 
principles and traditions, will help blur the distinction between diverse established-
political trad:tions. 
Indonesia is just a tiny spot on earth, but it is part of the planet. It cannot escape 
from global currents. It is, to borrow the title of Pramoedya Anania Toer's historical 
novel, 'A child of All Nations'. As the wave of world capitalism and religious 
revivalism of the previous centuries penetrated Indonesian societies, so too the wave of 
globalism and postmodcrnism that pcncttatcd Indonesia from the late 201h century will 
being new directions. Indonesia will become a centnml for the tension between the wave 
of cultural homogcnisation and cultural hcterogcnization. The deepening penetration of 
global mass-culture and Westcm liberal-secular values will run simultaneously with that 
of global religious resurgence anci fundamentalism. The end result, at least in the ncar 
future, is unlikely to be 'either or' (total sccularisation or Islamisation}, for each pole 
has its own arenas and strategies to survive. In effect, the hybridity and the fusion of 
different cultural traditions will continue to be the main charzctcristic of the Indonesian 
polity and intelligentsia. Every effort to homogenise Indonesian society has to 
transform a reversible power relation into the practice of 'domination'. Every 
expression of domination will contain within it discrimination and repression and finally 
produce its own reverse impact. 
One century is long enough for historical writing but short enough for a nation 
and member.: of the nation to forget. The domination by authoritarian governments and 
particular groups in the past limited the margin of liberty and r.pace for political 
manoeuvre of many segments of the nation. This resulted in a long painful reiuCmbering 
for various groups of the Indonesian society. As the refomzasi era attempts to bring 
back democracy and freedom to the public sphere, domination will gradually tur:• t.) 
reversible power relations. In a position to choose and to influence freely the texis and 
praxis of other peoples, there is a chance for various segments of the nation to share a 
sense of being 'partners' in a whole, a sense of sharing a common substance. This 
makes it possible for diverse segments of the nation to transcend ineluctable divisions 
and to cultivate the virtue of civility. 
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As the intelligentsia continues to be the political elite of the nation, it is in their 
hands that the future of the nation resides. For a bellcr future for the nation, the main 
responsibility of the intelligentsia is to transform populism from discursive 
consciousness into practical consciousness. II is unlikely that the main source of 
national political problems lies in the backwardness of the people, but rather in the 
reluctance of the elite to free itsclffrom the past and the status quo. The politicisalion of 
the past and the mystification of the status quo have to give a way for the release of 
national reconciliation and reconstruction. II is time for the Indonesian intelligentsia of a 
diverse groups to unite in a common historical calling: to serve and save the nation. 
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Muhammad Thohir (27/10/1998) 
Muslimin Nasution (04/09/1998) 
Mutammimul Ula (03/12/2003) 
Nasir Tamara (18/08/1998) 
Nur Mahmudi Ism~il (13/08/1998) 
Nurcholish Madjid (18/09/1998) 
Pami Hadi (04/09/1998) 
Pict Hizbullah (10/01/2003) 
Pupun Purwana (11/11/2000) 
Putut Wijanarko (13/12/2000) 
Ray Rangkuti (22/03/2002) 
Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo (08/09/1998) 
Sajuti Hasibuan (20/12/1998) 
Samsul Rizal Panggabcan ( 14/08/1998) 
Sibawaihi (01/12/2000) 
Solahuddin Wahid (02/09/1998) 
Sulthon Nur Rahman (25/11/2000) 
Suparwan G. Parikcsit (13/11/2002) 
Sutjipto Wirosardjono (04/09/1998) 
Tatat Rahmita Utami (01/10/1999) 
Tri Laksono lndriyanto (05/12/1998) 
Usman Affandy (25/11/2000) 
Utomo Dananjaya (26/08/1998, 07/12/20:10, 29/11/2000) 
Wardiman Djojoncgoro (01/0911998) 
Wirawan Sumin:r Hadi (25/1112000) 
Zainal Arifin Achmadi (09/12/1998) 
Zur'aini Djama1 (15/09/1998) 
498 
THE MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA OF INDONESIA: 
A Genealogy of Its Emergence in the 201h Century 
by 
Yudi Latif 
VOLUME II 
APPENDICES 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Australian National University 
Canberra 
May,2004 
APPENDIX A 
Appendix A Appendix A 
I. Artitles on Generallntelleeiuals in Jak:lrta-Based Dailies in the 1980s 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
: 
I 28/9/1984 Andi Hakim Nasution Sina.r Harapan1 A wal Mula Republik Opportunities and challeng'!s of No References (Rector oflPB, the Cendekia universities outside Java in 
Bogar Institute of (The Birth Place of the producing young academics 
Agriculture) Intellectual Republic) (intellectuals) 
2 30/8/1985 G. Moedjanto Sinar Harapan Kaum lntelektual lntelleotuals are generalist Julien Benda (Lecturer at !KIP Indonesia, Masih people (of ideas) who have the Selo Soemardjan 
Sanata Dharma) Perlukah? power of reason, wisdom, Dick Hurtoko (Indonesian moral hravery, and autonomy; Wiratmo Sukito 
Intellectuals, Are They interested in spiritual m:ttters, (sources are not 
Still Needed?) and have no •ested interests. mentioned) 
They are needed as sources of 
alternative ideas and guardians 
of truth. justice. and monll 
excellence. 
Intellectuals in bureaucracy are 
tolerated as far as consistent 
with intellectuaJ values and 
missions. 
3 15/4/1987 Hamid Abdullah Suarn Pembaruan Pcr.m:m Pemikiran Intellectuals are educated No references 
(Lecturer at Diponcgoro Altematif dari people who produce intellectual 
University) Kelompok lntelektual works. They don't attach 
1 Sinor Harapan i.~ the former n:Jme of Suara Pcmbaruan before being b3nned by the Suhano regime in 1987 
Appendix A 
Appendix A 
U. Articles on General Intellectuals In Jakarta-Based Dallies In the 1990s 
Period · th 1blishm fiCMI - .. ........... • ...... .., ........ •-;u.a-.-• ... •• ........... ~ ...... 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
I 2712/1990 Don Bosco Selamun Media Indonesia Pam Caton Cendekio: Indonesian students are more FuadHassan (Joumali!<) Antara Jcpitan Politik interested in political Daoed Joesoef 
dan Akademik movements rather than BJ. Habibie (Intellectual-to-be: academic or intellectual ones. (sources are not I 
Between Political and On the one b:md, this has been mentioned) 
I 
' Academic Pr=ssure) a result of politically-laden 
agendas of the Indonesian 
educational policies, and the 
lack oi academic tradition on 
the other hand. 
The ideal/nte//ectua/attitude is 
perceived here as apolitical. 
2 19/511990 Danny Ramdhany All Pelita Perguruan Tinggi, Titc Intellectual is a higher Knopfclmacher (Educational Obmver) Gelar, dan Manusin educated person who is Padmo Wabyooo 
Intelektual interested in human affairs ( esp. SWSarwono 
(Higher Education, momland political problems) (Sources are not 
Degrees. and and able to express his/her mentioned) 
Intelleetuals) convictions both orally and 
litemlly. 
A degree bolder is not identical 
with an intellectual. 
5 
.App~ndix .A 
i ~!~ Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
3 2VS/1990 Mudji Sulrisno Kompas Kesadaran Kritis The intelleetua1 is a higher Paulo Freire 
(Churelunan, Lecturer Cendekiawan? educated person able to 
at STF Driyarkara) (Critical Conciowness translate his/her scientific 
of7he Intellectuals?) knowledge into critical 
consciowness, p13.ying the role 
as critical liberator. innovator 
and transformer. 
The critical intellectual is 
facing the dilenU113 between 
joininJ the bureaucracy in order 
to gain material welfare or keep 
defendmg his/her independent 
position in order to maintain 
his/her criticism. 
I 
4 14/6/1990 Adig Suwandi .:nmp:!;:. Pragmatisme University students (young No references 
I (Social Observer) lntelektua1 Muda intellectuals) tend to be mor< (The Pragmatism of pragmatic, and lack social 
Young Intellectuals) sensitivity and responsibility. 
This was particularly due to the 
implementation of the so-called 
I 
NKKIBKK (nonm!isation and 
coordinath:·n of campus lives) 
policy implemented by Suharto I 
regime. 
s 3112/1990 Nove! Ali Suara Pembaruan Kemunaftkan Indonesian intellectuals did not 
(Lecturer at Diponegoro Komunikasi di dare tC'I spe:tk negative aspects 
Universit) \ Kalangan Inte1ektua1 of Indonesian realities in their 
Kita homeland. 
I 
--
i 
6 
App~ndixA 
'odfoU 
- -··-- ·---- ..•.. lh blishm 
--- -----------··· --------
No. Date Author Media Tille Main I~:mts I "!.fain References 
(The Hwoerisy of They only dared to speak out No references 
Communication of our outside lndones!a. 
lntellecrnals) 
6 12/1211990 DeliarNoer Pelitl Cendekiawan, PoEiisi The intellecrual is o highly Moha=d Hattl 
(Political Scientist) dan Teknokrat educated person \\ith a (source is not 
(The Intellec!Ual, generalist tendency who has a mentioned) 
Po1itici:m and wide understlnding of 
Teclmocrat) knowledge, certain degree of 
autonomy and commitment to 
hui113n suffering and morai 
vaJues. 
., The politician has a rel:Jti\'ely 
high educational background as 
wdt, but not necessary has a 
deep nnd wide understanding .:.f 
knowledge. He/she is more 
' 
committed to recruit followers. 
' Th.: technocrat is a specialist 
scholar recruited by the I 
' government to handle specift. 
problems of development. 
• ICMI was estlbli•hed on December 7, 1990 in Malang, E>stJava 
7 
·--c·---------
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Till• Main Points Main References 
7 311111991 De liar Noer Pelim Cendekiawan Indonesia From tl:e historical perspective Julien Benda 
nod (Political Scientist) Dalam Perspectif tltere have been two kinds of Mohanunad Halla 
112/1991 Scjamh Indonesian intellectuals: J. A. Schumpctcr 
(Indonesian intellectuals in the traditional Daniel Regan 
Jntellec:uals in era, and the modem one (dated 
Historical Perspective) from the emergence of the 
National awakening 
. movements). Trarliti..:mal 
intellectuals were basically 
religious scholars (thinkers) and 
used to be partners of rulers. In 
the modem era. this position 
and characteristics of 
: intellectuals has changed. 
Although intellectuals as 
. religious scholars remain. there 
has been a growing number of 
intellectuals who mainly 
engage in secular knowledge. 
This last kind of intcl!ectuals 
started showing their significant 
roles in the era of the national 
awakening movements. Unlike 
their predecessors. instead of 
becoming the partner of the 
rulers they opposed the colonial 
• rulers. During the Japanese 
occupation many of those 
intellectuals collaborated v.ith 
I I 
-
the incumbent government 
--· 
s 
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
without losing their moral 
commitment and integrity. The 
exclusion of intellectuals from 
I 
their roles and activities began 
during the period of the so-
called ••guided democracy". 
under Soek::uno regime (since 
1959-1965). To survive 
intellectuals had to stop their 
criticism. and be ready to 
support the govemmenL By the 
epd ·fthe Soek:uno regime, the 
term "the betr.1yal of the 
intellectuals" thee appeared in 
I 
the public discourse. But this 
did not stop intellectuals 
joinin3 the bureaucrncy. During 
the New Order. there were 
more and more ir.tellectu:J:l10 
recruited as problem solvers for 
the National Development, and 
then gradu>lly lost their 
intellectual integrity, .00 
became merely pragmatic 
technocrats. 
8 1712/1991 Marwah Daud Ibrahim Media Indonesia Cendek.iawan, Tidak Discourses on intellectu:J:ls h:lve No references 
: (Researcher at BPPT) Harus Sendiri tended to be dominated by the 
' (The Intellectual Need objecti\·e~positivistic Cartesian 
not be Alone) ap~roach (that intellectuals 
s~uuld be free from 'nterests). 
- --
9 
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
and dichotomist perspectives 
and that by joining bureaucracy 
means leaving intellectual 
ch:lracteristics. The qucostion is, 
where did Soedjatmoko leave 
his intellectualism while be was 
the Indonesian ambassador in 
USA? The intellectualism is 
not a social location or political 
status, but mtber it reflects an 
attitude~ vision, commitment 
and concrete action. To be 
intellectual is to be conunihed 
to social problems. Thus, 
he/she has to leave the ''ivory 
tower .. and start working on the 
dirty ground. 
9 2312/1991 Prasety.:llrawan Media Indonesia Cendekiawan adalah Although even the most idealist Anne Wortham 
(Educational lndividualis intellectual may some day sell (source~· not 
Administrator) (The Intellectual is out his/her idealism for the mentioned) 
Individualist) sake of pragmatic needs, the 
intellectual is naturally an 
individualisL Although an 
individualist is not 
autom:J.tically an intellectual. an 
intellectual who h:ls no 
indi\idualist character cannot 
be descnbed as a real 
intellectual. Thus, it is unustml 
for intellectuals to be 
organized. 
10 
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No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
-
10 231211991 S. \Virosardjono Suara Karya Cc:ndekiawa~ To be intellectual, someone No rc:fercncc:s 
(Fonner Chainnan of "Reason", dan cannot depend only on the 
BPS & ICMI Activist) "Conscience .. power of reason. Reason 
(The lntelle<tual, without orientltion is empty 
Reason and rhetoric. This means that reason 
Conscience:) has to be guided by conscience:. 
The power of reason can be 
strengthened by the 
accumulation of knowledge and 
experience. The power of 
conscience can be strengthened 
tlunugb transcendental 
communic:ation. Muslim 
intellectual are supposed to put 
the conscience above the 
reason. in order to give a right 
oric:ntltion to the reason. 
II 21311991 Novel Ali Pelita Golpu~ yang A warn People who were not satisfied No references 
(I..ccturer at Diponegoro dan Cendc:kiawan with the performance of general 
University) ("The White Group", elections in Indonesia preferred 
the Lay People and not to choose ~ny particular 
Intellectuals) parties. This kind of people was 
called 'Golpttt' (Golongan 
Putih) or White Group. This 
group were comprised of lay 
people and intellectuals. 
12 23/4/1991 UmarJunus Pelita "Ronggeng Dul"Ub This is a review on Toh:ui's Roland Bartbes 
(Lecturer at The Paruk" dan Tugas trilogy novel, "Ronggeng Linda Hutcheon 
University of Malaya) (Suci) lntelektual Duk:lh Parole, Lintang Peter V. Zintl 
-
- -
11 
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No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
-
("Ronggeng Dukuh Kemu/.:us Dinihari and Jantera 
Paruk" and The Task of Biangla/a." Aceording to 
The Intellectual) ]unus, through this trilogy, the 
author appeals the reader, 
which is an intellectual work, 
to be more conunined to 
eradicate human poverty and 
ignorance. 
No references 
13 J0/6/1991 Parakitri Kr~as Takhyul Para There Ius been a tendency for 
(Journalist) Cendekiawan (The Indonesian intellectuals both in 
Superstition of tr.tditional era and modern one 
Intellectuals) . to respond to concrete problems 
of the oation by producing false 
consciousness in the form of 
myths or ideologies. 
No references 
14 16/J J/191 Rustijono Media Indonesia Kekual3n lntelektual GlobaiW.tion has brought abcut 
(Social· Economic sebagai Pelawan Aru.s neg:uivc impacts on Indonesian 
Obsever) Demoralisasi society in the form of hedonism 
(The Power of the and consumerisiiL In this 
lntellecrual in Resisting context. the intellectual is 
the "Threat of believed as able to play a 
Demoralisation) significant role in creating a 
counter-culture. Unfortunately 
the performance of Indonesian 
intellectuals seems to be in the 
process of declining. 
---
12 
.Appendix .A 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References I 
15 41111992 Mochtar Bucbori Kompas Kemampuan Bahasa, It is said that while the No references 
Lecturer and Pengetahuan Umum language ability, general 
Educational Observer) dan Tingkat Intelektual knowledge and cognitive 
(Language Ability, (intellectual) capacity are 
General Knowledge, necessary conditions for the 
and Intellectual existence of academics and 
Capacity) scholars, the reality of 
Indonesia shows that these 
fundamental requirements have 
been in the process of 
declining. 
16 11/111992 Prasetya lrawan Kompas Proposal Pcnelitian dan Supporting Buchori"s statement No references 
(Educational Kadar Intelektualitas by showing the example from 
Administrator) (Research Propo~l and the research project proposal by 
The Intellectual university lecturers (staffs). 
Capacity) Only few proposals show 
strong arguments and lanb'Ua&C 
properness. 
17 191111992 Ml Affandi Suara Pembaruan "Intelektual Pinggiran" The term Intellectual in No references 
dan Kcterasingan Indonesian public discourses 
lntelektual had different mea:tings for 
(The Peripheral ditferent people. For the author 
Intellectual aod the himself, intellectual is a person 
Alienated Intellectual) who has an ability to develop 
his/her own idei!J and then to 
crystaUise these ideas into 
praxis in order to chaoge social I 
realities. There arc two kind ~ 
13 
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
intellectuals: the peripheral 
intellectual and the alienated 
intellectual. The frrst one is a 
person who is able to develop 
his/her own ideas but does not 
\W.nt to engage in social 
changes, afraid of unintended 
consequences that might 
endanger his/her \'ested 
interests. The second one is a 
person whose ideas has no any 
relevance with acrual needs of 
hisfher society. The intellectual 
alienation can be restricted by 
offering a freedom of speech. 
This can be achieved if the 
political power has been 
governed by intelligent people. 
Thus, the intellectual may take 
part in political practices. 
18 30/1/1992 Mohamad Sobary Kompas Kemapanan Politis, The establislunent in politics Julien Benda 
(Researcher ofLIPI) Ekonomis,dan and economy is a neutral Soedjalmoko 
Jnteleklual concept It can be perceived as Goenawan 
(The Political, good or bad. Bullhe Mohanunad 
Economical, and esbblisbment in lhinking or (source is not 
Jntellecrual intellectual life connotes a mentioned). 
Es~ablisbmenl) negative meaning. The 
lnlellecrua1 is a freedom and 
creative human bein~. 
-
14 
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I 
Therefore he/she never stop in 
an established state. Based on 
his/her freedom and creativity, 
lhe inlelleclual is always 
oriented to achieve a higher 
trulh, and never compromised 
this commianent wilb 
pragmatic interests. He/she is a 
solitary person. Thus, the 
inteUectual is naturally anti-
establishment. It is unusual for 
intellectuals to· be organized. 
19 10/911992 Muzhar Muchtlr Merdeka Cendekiawan, Mereka Using Rendra's words, !he Julien Benda 
(LIP1 Stltl) yang Benunah di Anrri'l intellectual is person who Le\\is Coser 
(The lnlelleclual, Those "dwells in lhe air". He/she does Edward Shils 
who· Dwells in the Air) not want 10 be bound by a Mannheim 
system th:!.t might restrict (resource.~ are not 
his/her freedom. The tmin mentioned) 
function of the intellecrual is to 
develop a high culture and lhe 
power of reason. Therefore, 
he/she must not involve 
themselves in the political 
sttuggle. 
20 121111993 A. Sarbini Merdeka lnlegritls 1nlelel-rual For the success of social No references 
(NGO Member) dan Dimensi \Vawasan developmen~ young 
Kebangsaan intellectuals should mke part in 
(The lnlelleclual lhe process. In Ibis regard lhey 
lnlegrily nod lhe have to have an intellectual 
--
15 
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Dimension of the Integrity, which indicates the 
National Outlook) possession of professionalism 
and autonomy and enable them 
to defend themselves from 
external pressures. 
21 30/1/1993 Nor Pud Binarto T Bisnis Indonesia Profesioi131-Intelektual Indonesian professionals as the Robert B. Reich 
(Radio Programme sebagai Kelas core of the Indonesian middle Mohammad Halt! 
Producer) Menengah Indonesia class have sho\m their relath·e Soedjannoko 
(The Professional- independence economically but 
. Intellectual as the remain powerless politically. 
Indonesian Middle To achieve Indonesian 
Class) democratic society, it is needed 
to combine this professionalism 
with the spirit of freedom of the 
intellectual. 
22 29/411993 Akmal Djamarao Pelib Potret Diri lntelektual A tnbute to ProfSelo T .A. Tomagola 
(Journalist) Indonesia Soenwdjan. an Indonesian (source is not 
(The Self-portrait of an Intellectual who has been able mentioned) 
Indonesian Intellectual) to combine theoretical mastery 
with practical capability. 
23 25/6/1993 Th. Sumartana Kompas Kebcbasan dan Para The intellectual is a critical No reference 
(Religious Activist) Cendekiawan person who has never stopped 
(The Freedom and questioning things th:U happen 
intellectuals) in a society. The intellectual 
works \\ith question and his/her 
weapon is words. Once he/she 
stopped to ask or become an 
agitator of the ma~es or 
-
16 
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political machine, he/she is no 
longer the intellectual. 
Although it is possible for the 
intellectual to involve in 
political practice, this might be 
different if the political 
recruitment exhausts the stock i 
of independent intellectuals, to 
the extent that the critical 
' question is no longer the 
' 
. intellectual activity . 
24 25/6/19:}3 Mohamad Sobary Kompas Kemarau di Dunia The Indonesian intellect".Jal No reference3 
(LIP! Researcher) ' lntelektual KiLl world bas been in a "dry 
('The Dry Season" in season" indicated by the 
Our Intellectual World) absence ofalteiniltive thinking 
that might bring freshness into 
the Indonesian polity and 
culture. Indonesian intellectuals 
ha\'0 been trapped in technical 
practices in the bureaucratic 
and technocratic fields !hat 
weaken their freedom. 
creativity. That is the betray:li 
to their social and political rules 
as people of ideas. 
25 15nt1993 Moh. Fajrul Falaakh Kompas \Vacana tentang The encounter of the Julien Benda 
(Lecturer at Gadjah Cendekiawan dan intellectual lvith political power Ian Maclean 
Mads University) Kekuasaan is not a matter that has to be Jerzy Szacki 
avoided. If the source of Ernest Gellner 
- - -· 
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(Discourses on the the social unrest is in the Dick Hartoko 
Intellectual and political poY..-er, the intellectual Sayyed H. Nasr 
Political Power) should try to find the answer in 
the political realm. The 
participation of the intellectual 
in the political power is not a 
problem especially when the 
political power is no longer the 
"'enemy .. of the society that has 
to be avoided. The question is, 
is it true that the intellectual in 
the political power has 
struggled for the eradication 
of social unrest. or just 
struggled for their own interests 
in the name of religion or social 
suffering. 
26 24n/J99J Aklunad Z..lni Ab:r Merdeka Kaum Intelektual: Refusing perceptions that the Mochtlr Lubis 
(NGO Activist) membangun Kata-Kata, Indonesian intellectual worJd is 
Bukan Realita? in a stage of crisis. Indonesian 
(The Intellectual: intellectuals have been 
I Developing Word!;, productive in contributing their 
alternative ideas to the society. 
The crisis is not occurred in the 
production of ideas (the 
intellectual world) itself but in 
the symbolic world, that is how 
to tr.mslate the word into the 
I 
reality. This is due to the 
I human hypocrisy on the one 
--
18 
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No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
not Realities?) band, and the corrupt power 
structure on the other hand. 
27 26rl/1993 Aldrian Munanto Kompas Ketika Dunia The Indonesian intellectual No references 
I (Student Activist) lntelektual Meredup world is not in a dry season. but (When the Intellectual the bargaining pow·cr of the 
World is Overcast) intellectual vis a vis the 
political power is obviously 
weak. Thus, the intellectual is 
unable to tmnsl:ue his/her ideas 
! into praxis. 
' 
28 26nl1993 Syamsul Hadi Kompas Bobolnya Pilar-Pilar The intellectual is an 3.SCetic Julien Benda 
" (Student Activist) Kecendekiawanan person who takr.s a distance Edward Shills 
(The Collapse of the from social and political events Selo Soemardjan 
Intellectual Pillars) surrounding him/her. He/is a 
creative minority with a long 
I forward vision. On the other 
band the author realized that in 
I Indonesian history, the 
intellectual was in fact born in 
the polilic:d movement. in the 
' 
struggle for freedom. The 
I struggle for freedom and 
emancipation is the basic 
commiunent of the intellectual. 
Thus, it is a betr.lyal to their 
sacred mission if intellectuals 
sell out their freeclom by 
joining primordial groups or 
collaborating the status quo. 
I 
--
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29 28n/1993 Hendardi Kompas Refonnasi Intelektual The main ::~.ctivity of the Tempo 
(NGO Aktivist) dan Demokr.ltisasi intellectu:J.l is thinking and 
(The lntellech•·J articulating his/her though 
Reformation and publicly to stimulate plur.dity 
Demoo·atisation) of ideas and arguments. Bu~ 
due to the hegemony of the 
sttte this plurality of ideas has 
been repressed under the 
ideology of unity. To open a 
free pubJic sphere, intellectuals 
itave to tD.ke part in the process 
of political refonn and 
democratisation. 
, 
30 30n/1993 Alex Dungkal Komp:tS O:tSe Bagi The Indonesian intellectuals No references 
(Book Editor) Cendekiawan KiL1 had lost their soul and 
(The Oasis for Ow, character. The political 
lntel!ectuals) hegemony had paralysed their 
perform:u.o:e. But this was not 
due to the incorporation of 
some intellectuals into the 
political power. Their 
31 30n/i993 Alex Dungkal Suara Klitya The same article as participation in the bureaucracy 
(Book Editor above is legitimate. The problem in 
fact lied on the intellectual 
outside the bureaucracy. They 
criticism toward the 
government had been paralyzed 
due to the media undercover. 
The medi:J. tended to expose 
development azendols, without. 
--
20 
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giving enough space!!> for the 
intellectual dialogues and 
criticism. Inter-intellectual 
dialogues are important in order 
to gain a fruitful vision. In thb 
regard the present of any kind 
of intellectual groupings are 
welcomed as far as coni.ribute 
' to the strengthening of moral 
values and justice. 
32 12/R/1993 Mohamad Sobary Kompas Kaum lntelektual dan The Intellectual is 2Il ageitt for No references 
(LIP! Researcher) RanuiEmas complaining. He/she is a 
(The lntelleerual and spiritual barometer. Therefore. 
the Golden Chain) they have to be outside th:.! 
I formal political structure. On 
the other part. the author 
mentioned Soedjatmoko, as a 
great intelleetual-bureaucra~ 
Who had succeeded both 
" 
intelleetually and politically. I It 
~3 13/811993 Th. Sum.."Jtaru:: Kompas Cendekiawan dan Social changes in the last20 No references 
(Religious Activ'st) kekuasaan years had brought about new 
(The Intellectual and areas, roles and function for the 
Pow.r) intellectual. The problem arose 
when intellectuals sold out their 
independence and critical mind 
for the sake of power or 
I 
1113terial interests. Both the 
economic and political power 
21 
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needs the intellectual as a 
partner for corrective feed back. 
Thus, the free public sphere has 
to be enlarged, and the 
intellectual should remain an 
independent agent. The 
intellectual will not stop his/her 
criticism towards the 
go\-ef'Tlment bec:ausc of the 
samenc:ss ofreligic.rt. ideology 
and primordial background 
between him 'her wiL'I the rllling 
people . 
... 
34 219/1993 AntonHagul Kompas Kinerja Cendekiawan The intellectual is zn ascetic Driyarkar.l 
(Social & Cultural dan Dinamib Buday> person who has an intrinsic Edward de Bono 
Observer) (Intellectual motivation as a guardi.m of Kevin Pakenham 
Performance and scientific ethics and prophetic Daniel Bell 
Cultural Dynamics) mission. high .Jealism and 
wisdom. dedicated his/her life 
for honoring hunun dignit"j and 
freedom. 
' 
22 
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rather than for power and 
weahh. 
35 41911993 R. Willi•m Liddle Komp:IS Kebeh:IS•n lntelektual As personal desire a concept of No reference {American Political ( Intellectual Freedom) the free floating inteHectual can 
Scientist) be supponed. But in reality, the 
I intellectual does not live in the 
sky but rather on the earth. 
He/she c•nnot •lways depend 
on ide3l values. but inescapably 
has to be grounded in the social 
and political realities. The 
intellectual cannot escape 
him/her self from the economic. 
cultural. social ilnd political 
sphere. And rhese •II are not 
alw:1ys in an ideal situation. 
The intellectual who claims 
him/her self as independent 
from the social context has 
demanded too much for his/her 
role and status. 
36 4/9/1993 Kompas Cendekiawan dan There are two l;nds of R. T. De Geof£e 
Adri•nus Suy•di \Vcwenangnya authority: non--executive and S.J.Benn (Student Activist) (The Intellectual nnd executive authority. The non· R.S. Peters 
his/her Authority) executive authority docs not M .. ~weber 
conbin rights or power to force 
orher people. The example of 
this authority is the epistemic 
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authority. The intellectual 
belongs to the oMter of this 
authority. Therefore he/she 
cannot force other people to 
follow his ideas. Things might 
be different if the intellectual 
gains a political power. The 
mixture be~en the non-
executive and executive 
:tuthority in one band is 
conflicting. which will. in 
abusive way. Jead to 
authoritarianism. 
37 18/9/1993 M. 83Jllb:tng Pranowo Kor.tpas Kapasitas dan Kualitas The intellectual does not have Martin Lipset 
(Researcher of the Cendeki:twan to dichotomize his position vis Collins English 
Ministry of Religious (The Capacity and a vis the formal political Dictionary 
Affairs) Quality of the structure. The term inteilectual Edward Shils 
Intellectual) can be interpreted as an Antony D. Smith 
adjective or noun. As an J. K. Galbraith 
adjective the tenn intellectual 
refers to a type of personality 
and mental attitude 
characterized by cre:~.tivc~ 
I critical and analytical cap:tcity 
as well as the quality of moral 
commitment that can be found 
in every path oflife. Thus. 
intellectuality can be practised 
both inside and outside the 
formal political stru=_.__ __ l 
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38 21/9/1993 Moh. Fajrul Falaakh Kompas Cendekiaw:m dan Although the intellectual No reference I 
(Lecturer at Gadj:th Desakralisasi incorporation into the political 
Mada University) Kekuasaan (The structure is tolerate~ the co. 
Intellectual and the optation of religiously-oriented 
I Desacmlisation of the intellectuals by the political 
Po~":'!"! power might strengthens the 
authoritarian state:. By using 
intellectuals as agents for 
I manipulating symbolic 
legitimacy, the power can I 
hardly to be criticised. In the 
same Date the religious 
I 
intellectual may use religious 
symbols to sacralize the Power 
that may make the power is 
resistant to critique. 
39 29/9/1993 Emha .,.·.,mun Nadjib Republika Cendekiaw:m: Who Do The political power. instead of No reference 
and (Cultural Activist) You Think You"re? must be free from the I 
30/9/1993 (The Intellectual: Who intellectual involvement. it is I 
Do You Think You supposed to be ruled by 
Are?) intellectuals or at least by those 
who h:lve certain degrees of the 
intellectual capacity. In the 
complexity of the National 
problems. only intellectuals 
who might have capabilities to 
solve the social problems. The 
! opinion that intellectuals have i 
to avoid the political power just 
reflects the tr.lumatic 
---- - --
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experiences with the power I 
performanee. Peoplo in n:ltural 
sense, however, cannot be 
unrealistic to the dem.md of 
the political power. 
I 
40 19/11/1993 Akltmad Zaini Abar Bisni.i Indonesia Oin:lmika Hubungan The pr:ss has a significant role No reference 
(NGO Aetivist) Intelektual dan Pers in supporting the existence of 
Indonesia Saat Ini the intellectu:ll. The press is the I 
extension of the intellectual 
ideas, while the intellectual 
ide:~s exposed by the press is a 
I barometer of the press idealism. 
The history of the Indonesian 
intelleetual is parallel with the 
history of the press. The 
I Indonesian intellectual was 
used to be the journalist In the 
pressure of commercializ:J.tion 
and authoritarianism. however, 
Indonesian presses have tended 
to aviJid intellectual criticism. 
Otherwise, in a more open 
public sphere, the intdlecrual 
criticism is simply treated as 
sensation for the sake of 
commercial interests. 
; 
-·· 
26 
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
41 I 0/ll'!l993 ZaimUchmwi Republika Intelektu:ll Criticising the Intellectual as No references 
(Journalist) (The lntellechllll) having to much discussion 
without caring and solving the 
actual problems CJ!'the society. 
42 611/1994 Hajriyanto Y Thoh:lri Kompas Trndisi Ccndekiawan Indonesia has so far no tradition William Liddle 
(Political Activist) .. Abdi Dalem"' of a free floating intellechlllls Karl D. Jackson 
(The Tradition ofThe both in traditional and modem Harry J. Benda 
•King Servant' era. A long history of the 
Intellechllll) hegemony of the state has made 
the intellectual position as 
subservient to the state. 
43 2612/1994 Andre Donaz & Media Indonesia Cendekiawan. The intellectual existence Michael Foucault 
Ch. Umam \Viranu Kekuasaan dan cannot simply be grounded on Antonio Gramsci 
( J oumalists) Kemiskinan moral imperatives. it is also Mikhail Bakbtin 
(The Intellectual, Power depend on the intellectual (sources are not 
and Poverty) position in the production :md mentioned) 
power relations. Quoting 
Foucault and Gramsci, it is 
argued that the knowledge is 
impossible to be neutral, and 
free from tile power interests. 
E\'Cn when people struggle for 
moral excellence, this does not 
necessarily mean has nothing to 
do with material and power 
interests. Thus, the choice of 
the intellectual struggle is not 
based on moral and inunoral 
consider.ltions. but much more 
-- --
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on the strategic calculation in 
the struggle for better condition 
of human life. 
44 715/1994 Koentjar.mingrat Komp.:~s Cendekinwan, Pemikir The Intellectual is a thinker, as Edward Shils {Anthropologist) Genemlis, <fun Ilmuw;:m such he has to be an educated 
Pakar person. On the contrary, an 
{The Intellecru.l, educated person is not 
Generalist Thinker, nnd necessarily able to be a thinker, 
Expen Scientist) and then not automatically an 
intellecru.l. To be an 
intellectual, an educated person 
should creati\'cly produce ideas 
as well as disseminate his/her 
ideas to influence other people. 
To be able to produce 
influential ideas, the intellectual 
is usually a generalist thinker. 
45 9/S/1994 HS. Dillon Media Indonesia Cendekiawan dan The National unity is the key No references {Agricultuml Policy Persatua.n Bangsa. word to answer the challenge of 
Advisor) ' {The lntellecru.l and the DevclopmenL In this 
the National Unity) regard, the emergence of social 
regroupings based on the spirit 
of sectarianism or 
primordialism should be 
blocked. The proposal for 
establishing ICKI. Association . 
of the Indonesian Natiotu1l 
Intellectual. therefore. c-an be 
accepted. 
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46 101511994 Syamsul Hadi Media Indonesia Demokr.tsi dan In the authoritarian state of Nancy Berrueo 
(Student Activist) Cendekiawan Sejati Indonesia, the intellectual has Bertrand Russel 
(Democracy and the lost his/her power as an agent SoeHokGie 
Genuine Intellectual) of change. He/she has been 
simply a producer of symbols, 
while the actual socio-political 
dynamics have been conducted 
by the political power. To 
regain his/her significant role. 
the intellectual should engage 
him/her self in the process of 
democr.ttis:ltion. 
47 141511994 Bagong Suyanto Suara Pembaruan Dilema To find an indhidual excellent No references 
(Lecturer at Airlangga Pcngorganisasian dan intellectual in Indonesia is 
University) Integritas Kaum extremely difficuiL In this 
Cendekiawan regar~ the initiative to gather 
(The Dilemma of intellectuals in the form of 
Organising and the organisations is someway 
Integrity of the positive. The question is. is true 
Intellectual) that such association of the 
intellectual has contributed to 
the proliferation of constructive 
ideas and the national 
de\'elopment as well? To take 
ICMI as an example. it is 
proved that the association has 
deviated from its original 
design as a scientific 
mo\'cment. sub\'erted by 
political interests. 
---
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48 16/5/1994 Edy Suh:lrdono Su.ara Pembaruan Serikat Cendekiawan, The intellectual exists when Edward Shils (Lecturer at Airlangga Antara Pemih:lkan dan he/she produces intellectual 
University) Pengucilan works and actions. not becau.c;.e 
(Intellectual they join a certain group or 
Associations, Between association of intellectuals. 
Isolation and exclusion) Intellectual associations instead 
of contributing to the creation 
of a free publif! sphere as a 
necessary condition for the 
' 
intellectual creativity. it has 
tended to be exclusive, 
prioritising self.-centticity and 
:gnoring "'the other ... 
49 19/5/1994 Syurif Hidayutullah Merdeka Kebangsaan, It is said that the Indonesian AI· Ghazali (Journalist) Ccndekiawan dan national senDatent seems to be (source is not 
Kebijaksanaan in the process of erosion. To mentioned) 
(Nationalism, come to term with problem the 
Intellectual and Indonesia~ as indi\idu.al or 
Wisdom) group has to stop calling for 
ethnocentrism, sectarianism, 
and primordialism. The 
intellectual '"ith their 
knowledge and wisdom should 
become an exemplary centre. 
His/her present is supposed to 
be useful for the society in 
large not just for his/her own 
I 
group. 
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so 191511994 AntonHagul Kompas Quo Vadis The emergence of various No references 
(Social and Cultural Cendekiawan Indonesia intellectual associations based 
Observer) (Quo Vadis the on religious or nationalist 
Indonesian senDatents is not a new 
Intellectual?) phenomenon in the Indonesian 
history. The Indonesian proto-
nationalism was in fact based 
on primordial senDatents. This 
phenomenon is not something 
to be \Vonied as IC3ding to the 
' national disintegration. The 
religious intellectu3l \\ith 
his/her knowledge and criticism 
is almost impossible to call for 
fanaticism. On the contrary~ 
with his/her devotion tr 
religious wlues. the reli,bioto 
intellectu3l can become a moral I 
reference fur the nation. 
51 20/S/1994 Moeryanto G. Munthe Suara. Pembaruan Cendekiawan dan Aller ~0 }"'ars of the No references 
(Lecturer at IISIP) Politisi Kita lnd"nesiln independence, the 
(The Intellectual and na•ittna: ::enDatent is said to be 
Our Politicians) in the t·rocess of erosion. The 
emergence of various groups 
and organisations based on 
primordial sc:nDatents have led 
to self--centricity and weakened 
the national solidarity. The 
establishment of various 
intellectual association which 
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have originally been oriented I 
toward the welfare of the ·i\·holl!' 
nation seem to be deviated into 
political ~gens for narrow 
interests. 
52 2415/1994 Mukht:.r Sannan Kompa..; Cendekiawan di:J.n Kiai The intellectual characteristic No references (Soeiol Observer) (The Intellectualond and role is not much different 
''Kiai .. , Religious wiL'l the Kiai (traditional 
I.eodor) Islamic leader). Someone 
cannot claim him/her self as 
kioi or intellectualjnstl>econse 
ofh:l\;ng s~hodl experiences or 
joining organis:ltiom of the 
intellectual or kiai. The 
~ 
predicate ofintellectu."ll or kiai 
is given by society in 
considering his/her general 
understanding of knowledge 
(secular or religious), 
cormnitmcnt to social 
problems, and moral 
authenticity. 
53 261511994 L. Wilardjo Kompos Cenrlekiawan Jan I!Jiek The term 'ccndekiawan' can be Robert K. Merton 
(Lecturer ot UKSW) (The Intellectual' ood syc.onymous with the term (source is not 
Science and .. Intelligentsia' or mentioned) 
Tochnology) ••inti.Hectual." The first one 
. refers to group of people, the 
second one n:fers to individual. 
But both tenninology indicotes 
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people whose activities are 
using the power of thinking, 
free from prejudice and based 
on rational considerations. 
They have moral bravery and 
love justice and truth. Their 
ideas might influence other 
people but they do not actively 
mobilise social movement and 
posit themselves as the leader. 
Their motiV3tion to act is 
directed by moral commitment 
not by political or economic 
interests. 
54 26/5/1994 Nove! Ali Kompas \Va\\"asan Kebangsaan The existence of the intellec~i No references 
(Lecturer at Diponegoro Cendekiawan Indonesia is not defined by the qu:mtity 
University) (The National Outlook and quality of academic 
of the Indonesian degrees, but by his/her social 
Jntellectuol) commitment and dedication to 
the implementation of science 
and technology for the 
improvement ofsoci .. ·~ life and 
the national dignity. The 
Indonesian national outlook is 
not sectarian in nar.ae. But this 
does not necessarily mean that 
primordial groups are 
automatically sectarian. An 
association might have been 
est:lblisbed based on primordial 
---· 
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ties insteau ofNational symbol, 
but if it contributes to the 
welfa.ooe of the nation ~ a 
whole, it can be said as having 
nationalism. 
55 261511994 AhmadBahar Kompas Cendekiawan dan The intellectual is a free agent. No references 
(Social Observer) Primordialisme l::•;he cannot be dictated by 
(The Intellectual and external controL in the form of 
Primordialism) power or primordial 
' 
senDatents. 
The unification of the 
intellectual into u single entity 
based on primordial senDatent 
seems to be contradiction in 
terms with its nature as a free 
and rational agent. Primordial 
group usually lends to be 
irrational and exclusive, self-
centred and ignorant with the 
out group people. And this of 
course has betrayed the nature 
of the intellectual. 
56 31/511994 F. H. Santoso Kompas .. SayaBukan Kompas had surveyed 377 No references 
(Kompas Researcher) Cendt"kiawan .. responJents asking their 
(I am Not an conunents on the initiati\'e to 
Intellectual') establish the so-called "Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Kebangsaan 
Indonesia," ICKI (Association 
of the Indonesian National 
Intellectual). 174 (46,15%) 
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Cemfekiawan P.a.ncasila 
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Main Points 
respondents expressed their 
criticism to the planning. Some 
oft.'tcm said that the spirit of 
nationalism cannot be claimed 
just by the name, but h:lvo to be 
proved in pra...-is. Other 
organisations II13Y not put the 
national attributes in tbeir 
name, but if wh•t they do ""' 
meaningful for the nation they 
c&n be said as having the spirit 
of nation:".l'sm. Some of them 
also expf'l __ ::ed their 
disagn:em-~,t for intellectuals to 
be orga11ized. 
One indicator of educational 
improvement in Indonesia iS a 
growing number of 
intellectuals. This in tum has 
led to the ~=nd of 
intellectual organisations. TI1e 
emergence of various 
intellectual groupings nuy 
become embryos for the revival 
pf political parties b.lSed on 
communal line. To avoid tltis 
happens,· any initiativ'!s should 
be taken to unite all intellechlal 
associaticns under the banner 
of the Pancasita Intellectual. 
Appendix A 
Main References 
No references 
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58 2/611994 Novel Ali SuaraKarya Mencegah Konflik Conflict between the No references 
(Researchrr in Cendekiawan dan Intellectual and the state 
I 
Diponegoro Uni\·ersity) Penyelenggara Negara apparatus is a universal 
(Preventing Conflicts phenomenon. This is due to the 
between the Inteltectual different implementation of 
and the State their devotion. The intellectual 
Apparatus) mission in human rivilisation is 
to achieve an~ maintain the 
truth by using scientific and 
r.uionJl tools. While the 
go vet :unent orientation is to 
achie,·e a pragmatic ends to 
me~t the actual ne-eds of 
society. To prevent destructive 
conflicts, both need the 
diaiogue. The intellectual is 
supposed to understand 
interests of the government. 
wbih: the go\·emment must 
understand the inteltectual 
obsession Y.ith the truth. 
59 6/61;994 Acwari Merdeka Dinamika Intelel"tual lntelle.:tualism in the ongoing J.M. Keynes 
Social & EconoClic dan Perekonomian stage of Indonesian J.M Buchamn 
Researcher) Pasar Bebas development is forced to enter Adam Smith 
(The D) ".amic of multiple settings of economic 
Intellectuals and the and SOC'ial problems. Because 
Free Market Economy) the mismatch in economic and 
social fields are preceded by the 
defect in intellectual ideas. The 
role that has to be played 
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The intellectual is in fact not 
simple. The rime proposition of 
! the intellectual is to set up 
actions and inst:tutional rules to 
integrate multiple concepts ond 
decisions of economic 
opcratioaal. The role of 
intellectual is more significant 
in facing the challenge of the 
free market economy. The 
intellectual existence depends 
on hislber ability to produce 
theoretical fr.uncworks to 
suppon ideological position 
leading to radical changes in 
the economic sphere. 
60 7/6/1994 H. Moeslim Taber Suara Pemb:uuan C('ndekiawan One consequence of the No references 
(Rector of Jayabaya Berwawasan Pancasila de\'elop~t process is a 
University) Sangat Diperlulom growing numbers of the 
. (The Intellectual that intcllcctu:ll. This intellcctu:!l in 
has a Pancasila Outlook rum needs medium for seJf. 
is Truly Needed) actuaHsation. The establishment 
ofv:trious intellectual 
associations is therefore a 
resporue to such a need. The 
rise of these associations, 
howe\·er, tended to be 
primordial in their orientation. 
To prevent the negath·e effect 
of this, Pancasita•s outlook 
·-
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should be internalized as a 
conunon ground of any 
intellectual associations. 
61 7/6/1994 Julia I. Suryakusuma Kompas Cendeki..:.w:m Sejati = Although she is agree that No references 
(Researcher) Binatang Mitologis intellectual should be free from 
(The Genuine any institutional bounds, the 
Intellectual = The fact sho ... -.. that the Indonesian 
Mythological Animal) intellect..tal ~'"'-'no strong 
material basis to suppon ~is/her 
I 
independence. In this reg:..:.ds. 
the so-called ••genuine free 
floating intellectual" is jwt a 
mythological animal. 
62 8/6/1994 Harmanto E. Djatmiko Komp .s Cend-:kiawan, Bisabh The Intellectual predicate will No references 
(Social Observer) Direkayasa? be gi\'en in tum by society 
(The Intellectual. O:m it when one has met the 
be Engineered) intellectual capacity. It is not 
something that has to be 
declared. To be intellectual is 
by no mean to join an 
intellectual association. Instead 
of stimulating members to 
produce intellectu:ll worksy the 
intellectual association might 
hamper the production of ideas 
in the name ofloyalty to the 
corp. 
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63 13/611994 Maruli H. Panggabean Suarn pcmbaruan Mendirikan Wadah The objective of estllblishing No references 
Ccndekiawan the intellectual association is 
(Estllblishing the supposed not to be political. 
Intellectual Institution) An intellectual association 
which is manipulated t:> 
achieve political ends will 
gradually paralyze it self. It is 
true tlut the intdlectual may 
has a great influenc: on 
political thoughts of society, 
but he/she is not in the position 
to reconunend other 
intellectuals to struggle for 
political interests. 
164 161611994 F.M. Parapat Kompas "Cendekiawun" There are two kinds of (Retired Anny) Berpolitik, tidak intellectuals: the "pure 
Bennoral Wa\\"aSiln intellectual" and the "political 
Kebangsaan intellectual ... The ftrst one is a 
(The Political uni\'ersal thinker, who is 
Intellectual hru: no looking for and working based 
Natiorutl Outlook on the truth. He/she is 
Morality) dedicated the truth for the 
welfare of human being. The 
second is a person who us-:s 
ideas for political interests, :md 
creates boundaries among 
people that leads to suspicious 
and h:ured. Intellectuals who 
claim themselves as the 
representation of the majority 
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of the people has established a No references 
sectarian organisation that has 
sent a threat signal to the 
minority of the people. This 
kind of intellectuals h:lvc no 
national outlook mornlity that 
can endanger the survival of the 
nation. 
65 lJn/1994 SyarifHidayatullah Merddca Cendckiawan Sejati dan A person who gets invoh:ed in J.P. Nettl (Journalist) Orienusinya data and analytical ideas is AlGgazali 
(The Genuine scientist. A person who engages Edward de Bono 
Intellectual and their in practical application is (sources :ue not 
Orientation) technocrat A person who mentioned) 
struggles for maintaining and 
disscrr.inating normative ideas 
Is moralisL The intellectual is a 
person who is able to anulgam 
all those attributes, and tries to 
actualise those attributes to 
maintain sociocultural dissents. 
66 21811994 Harimurti Kridalaksana Komp:J" Ccndekiawan Sarjana The etymology of the term Julien Benda (Lecturer at the dan Saljana 'ccndekiawan• is derived from 
University of Cendek.iawom the Hindustani (Hindi)'s word 
Indonesia) (The Scholar •chhandiky:l', which means lo 
lntc:Jiectual and The slander. In the classical Malay 
Intellectual Scholar) this is synonymous with the 
word ••durhaka'' 
(insubordinate), "khianat" 
(betrayal), and "culas" 
i deceitful). 
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In Minangkobau, this word 
""cendekia" (chh:mdikya) means 
tricky. Nowaday, however, the 
word .. ccndekiawa.n'' means an 
educated and smart person, not 
limited to the scholar. It is 
I 
synonymous with the word 
' 
intellect in English. In English 
I this word is attached to the term 
' intellectual (personal mon of 
ideas) or intelligentsia (in 
political sense). 
67 121811994 A. H. Pudjoolm:lka Kompas ~cp353ng Impian ThC' separation of intellectuals No references B. (LecturcratPakuan terhodap lkat:m into religious based 
University) Cendekiawan associations is wuvoidable, 
Keagamaan bec:J.use without the present of 
(A couple of Dre.:mts any forms of intellectual 
for the Religious association, religions 
Intellectual themselves have been ::omehow 
Association) separated. Looking positively, 
the present of religious based 
inteUectual associations might 
complement conventional 
religious associations by 
helping their members to 
nchicve a balance between 
knowledge/profession and 
religious tenets as a way of life; 
and helping the Church persC'n 
(ulama) vocations 
41 
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In guiding religious 
conununities in coupling with 
social and spiritual problems. 
As far as there is a dialogue 
between those associations, 
there is no reason to be worried. 
I 68 25181199• lgnatics H:uyanto Kompas Pengharg;um untuk The Indonesian society has lack Kompas 
(Student Activist) Cendekiawan Indonesia appreciation on the intellectu:J.l 
(An Appreciation of work. To give an example, the 
The Indonesian is the Adinegoro award for the 
Intellectual) journalist, the Usmar Is!amil 
award for cinematography, the 
Yap Thiam Hien award for 
hunl:ln right issues, and the A. 
Teeuw award for literature. But 
there is no ilY.'Urd for 
intellectual (scientific) works. 
This is ironical in the midst of 
calling for the intellectual 
independence. The intelJec:uat 
independence cannot st:md 
individually. It depends al!o on 
the support and appreciation of 
the society to the intellectual 
works. 
69 51911994 Saratri Wilonoyudho Kompas Cendekiawan. In the midst ofv:uious Joachim \Vach 
(Lecturer at!KIP Eksklusivisme dan intellectual regroupings based Mudji Sutrisno 
Semarang) Budaya Dialog on religious affinities. the Faery Ali 
dialogue is very importmt. C. Geenz 
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As it is said, when one religious (sources are not 
tradition is in revival, there will mentioned) 
be a signal ofthreatto the JMvanKroef 
.. neighboring religion". To 
avoid a mutually exclusive 
religious exprcssio~ eotch · 
religious intellectual 
association should be ready to 
share a common ground with 
others. That what had been 
shoMI by founding fathers of 
the Nation. 
70 3/10/1994 BobS. Hadiwinata Suara Pembaru;an Dimensi Praktis dan The existence of religiously Antonio Gramsci 
Spirilu:!l Pam based intellectual associations Toynbee 
Cendekiawan has been proved as having Ikeda 
(The Practical and serious political consequences. 
Spirirual Dimension of Efforts should be made to 
the Intelleetual) prevent the political 
invol"w·ement of intellectuals 
leads to .!Cect~rianism. There are 
two kinds of intellectual: the 
practical intellectual and the 
spiritual intellectual. The first 
one is an intellectual who gets 
involved in political practice of 
various classes or groups of 
society. He/she calls for the 
spirit of the corp. The second 
one is an intellectual who is 
able to bilD!)Cend him/her self 
- . 
---
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from ci01Ss or group bounds. He 
ser\'es as a guardian of 
universal moral values and 
justice for the welfare of all 
human being. Indonesia needs 
more spirir.ml intellectuals than 
the practical one? to save the 
nation from tbe pull of 
sectarianism and disintcgmtion. 
71 27/10/1994 Ar.an-:u.-! 1\ferdeka Pembebasan The program of rntionalising Daniel Bell 
' (Social and Economic Masyarakat. Ekonomi Indonesian industry h:ls not yet J. K. Galbraith 
Observer) danKaum been the intellectual agenda. In Michael No\·ak 
Cendekiawan fact. impacts that might be 
(Society Liberation. resnhed from the imnionality 
Economy and the of industrial policies and 
Intellectual) pract • .:es are able to paralyse 
the consumer sovereignty. 
Indonesian Intellectuals have to 
create a new tr.ldition that 
migh~ stimub.te them to engage 
in the economic field. 
72 I4/2/1995 Frans Maniagasi Mcrdeka Ccndekiawan dan The intellectual is a person Robert Michels 
(Cultural Activist) Transformasi Sosial whose activities deal with tht: (source is not 
(The Intellectual and elabor:1tion and dissemin:ltion mentioned) 
Social Transform.1tion) of ideas. Therefore, bel she h:ls 
a vital ro~e as an agent of 
change. As an agent ofchan(;e, 
he/she belongs to the privilege 
grou,. This does not 
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necessarily mean that he/she 
belongs co the ruling elite. The 
relation between the lntc:Ucctual 
and the ruling elite is always in 
dilemma. With the power of 
ideas, the intellectual Ius a 
bargaining power to be pan of 
the ruling elite. But to chose an 
autonomous and independent 
posicion is important to be an 
authentic intellectual. The 
tension between the .. closeness .. 
and .. remoteness .. of the 
intellectual position to the 
political power determines the 
I quality and significance of the 
! intellectual. 
73 111311995 Abdul M. Mulkh:m K<.'"",~'Pas Peran ABRI dan The swtlinability of Indonesia No references 
(Lecturer at lAIN Jntelektual dahm as a nation stlte is determined 
Sunan Kalijaga) Demokr.ttisasi by functional conunitment of 
lntegrnlistik all strata and groups of society 
(The Role of Armed to the ideal objective of the 
Forces and the nation state in bringing the 
Intellectual in welfare to entire society. In this 
Integra listie regards, it seems to be urgent to 
Democr:lti~tion) develop political mechanism 
that will gives a guarantee for 
the ann forces and intellectual. 
as the strategic elite of the 
I society. to c.ury out -~~ 
45 
Appendi.rA 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
Titei:: ;nophetic mission in 
order to improve welfare and 
autonomy of the entire society. 
74 28ntl995 Muby.uto Kompas Intelektu:slme 'hazar' This is a commentary on Ignas No references 
(Lecturer at (Retail Intellectualism) Klcden statement in one 
Gadjalunada semiuar(l7nt95) that the I 
University) characteristic of Indonesian 
intellectuals can be depicted in 
Gecrtz's word as the "'hazar ... 
(retail) intellectualism. The 
author raised objection lo fhc 
' 
identification ofclJe "'hazar' .. 
term with negative 
connotation. For him, 'ba:r..ar' 
economic has proved to be 
r.10rc efficient and sustainable 
rather than economic-
conglomeration. I(Jhe tenn 
refer.; to the Indo; .n 
intcllectu:al inabilit:: develop I indigenous autonom) .n the process ofthecretical 
production aod reproduction, 
Kleden him self belong to this 
category as he has highly . 
depended his arguments on 
Geenz's theories and premises. 
' 
--
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75 10/8/1995 lgna" >aeden Kompas Diskusi lntelektualisme This is a Kleden9 S response to c. Geertz I 
and (Sociologist and NGO 'hazar': JawJban untuk the Mubyarto's critique. To (sources are not 
111811995 Activist) Prof. Mubyarto him. the critique in social mentioned) 
{The Discussion on scienc~s is by no means 
"''b3Z3r"' discarding the old dress nod 
Intellectualism: A change it with the new one. The 
Response to Prof. critique can be started by 
Mubyano) posing a certain theory, and 
then trying to evaluate the 
possibility and the limit of such 
11 theory in coupling with 
empiricnl realities. To use 
Geertz's terminologyof'bazar' 
economy in understanding the 
chamcteristic of Indonesian 
intellectuals does not 
necessarily mean agree with the 
whole Geertz's argument ofrhc 
nature of .. bazar" economy. 
This is just an indicatio~ that 
Indonesian intellectuals share a 
common characteristic \\ith 
'bilZllr' traders, which is 
signified by individualistic 
orientation, unorganised 
behavior. selling 
unstandardis<d commodity, 
selling few items in plenty of 
transactions. ntis means that 
Indonesian intellectuals and 
their works have tended co :,e 
'-
unproductive. 
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disorganised, isolated, and 
overlapping due to the lack of 
cc.mmunication and 
interdisciplinary approach. 
~6 10/8/1995 I Mu•:,ana W. Kusuma ' Media Indonesia Persatuan Cendekiawan The establishment of various No references 
(l.e.,IUrer and NGO Pembangumn Pancasila inteJiectual associations 
Ac:i>ist) (The Intellectual currently seem to be motivated 
Association of by 3 couple considerations. 
Pancasila First is to comolidate political 
Development) mobilisation as well as to 
articulate ideology and interest 
of particular groups. Second is 
:;·:e to the inertia of the existing 
:~odal organisations. The 
meaning of'cendekiawan· has 
changed from its original 
characteristics as an 
independent agent of change • 
. The .. cendekiavr.m is now an 
I attribute derived from people attachment to a certain political 
community. This does not 
necessarily mean a negati\'c 
. connotation. The variety of 
intellectual associations might 
release political satur:J.tion due 
to the uniformity of political 
articulations. 
L. :-'<'---
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I 
77 141811995 AgusSutoyo Merdeka lntelektual, Toe intellectual 3!0 an important William Liddle 
(Social and Political I Demokmtisasi dan element of the middle class has Lewis H. Lapham Observer) Fungsi Transfonnatif a significant role in the process John Naisbitt (The Intellectual, of denJOCtatis.ltion of the Patricia Aburdcne 
, Derr.ocratisatio_, and' nation. Refer to the e>.~; .. ~,ce S. Huntington I 
Transfol'trultional of some societies, e·:: ,!,..':' ·.a) AlvinToffier I 
Function) (intellectual)' ptran;·:,~:- •:. :nuch Dannanto Jatman 
i more powerful in~ 1riving the 
process of democratisation I 
rather than economic other ' 
,, 
sociological factors. In this i 
regzrd, the agenda of 
democratiz:Jtion is supposed to I 
drive intellectual consciousness 
about his/her strategit: role and i 
function in the process of I transfonnation. 
' 
78 19181199:' Ali Masykur Musa Kompas Arus Balik The emergence of various No references ' 
(PoJitiC31 Activist and Cendekiawan Kita intellectual associations is I 
Lecturer) (The Flash Back of Our promising on the one hand' to 
I Intellectual>) challenge the uniformity or 
Indonesian political discourses, 
but it is also alarming on the 
Qther hand, if the orientation of 
I I such associations is just to empower differences that might 
I 
lead to sectari:mism. The 
Intellectual in whatever 
: i)OSition 1-.as to maintain his/her 
; 
I independence. Especially in the 
49 
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transith.m.al era, the intellectual 
is supposed to keep the distance 
i 1 with the ruling power and ' 
political discourses. This does 
not mean that he/she has to be 
allergy with the powe.;,. The 
intellectual should keep 
supplying moral and ethical 
considerations to the power. 
79 22/8/1995, Mutrofin Media, Indonesia Setengah .\bad A half century after Indonesian Da•·id N. Plank 
(Lcctur«:r at Jember Intelektualisme di independence. the Indonesian William L. Boyd 
University) Indonesia intellectual (academician) has 
(A HalfCentury of not yet been independent Crisis 
Intellectualism in in the politics of education and 
Indonesia) the disability of Indonesian 
intellectualism appe:us in 
\'aria us defeat of Indonesian 
intellectuals to exist in their 
homeland. To give an example. 
it has been weJJ-kno\\11 that the 
real intellectual has been hardly 
able to gain a st:mtegic position 
,, in the uni\'ersity; ard once he 
got the position he has to 
compro~.u~ his/her stand point 
with the l<!reaucratic rules. 
80 118/811995 PJ.Suwamo Kompas Fenomen! Solid: ritas The intellectual and the No references 
' I (Lecturer al Sanz!.l Cendekiawan bureaucrat ha\'e different 
Dhanna Ur.:versity) (The Phenomena of sn11rces of authority. 
Intellectual Soli.Llrity) 
-
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The intel1ectual deri\'es his/her 
authority from his'her expertise 
I aod knowledge. The bure:>uc: at 
derives his/her authority fmm 
' 
appointment given by a higher I 
rank officer. The intellectual 
I who becomes the bureaucrat 
has actually discarded his/her I 
intellectual predicate, because 
i the bureaucrat is demanded to 
conduct whatever job and I instruction given to him. 
' 
' 
therefore has no more Date to 
I ' develop his/her knowledge. In 
the developing countries, 
I however, the overlapping 
between the intellectual and 
bw-:aucratic vocation is a 
I common ft.-anue. 
Notwithstondin~ the fact that 
' 
the intellectual cannot be I 
independent from bure::mC&.l.tic 
temptotion. intelleetual 
I associations have to prevei.it 
themselves from prioritising 
political interests by neglecting 
the humanitarian mission. 
81 3/9/1995 H.G. Sudannan Merde!(a Persatuan Cendekiaw;:m The ftrSt impression of No references 
(PCPP Activi<t) Pctnbanguaan Pancasila Indonesian people when listen 
(°CPP): the word "intellectual" by now 
-
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' i I Bennula dari is fractured. on~: 30 Kegamangan intellectual association had (The Intellectual emerged than was followed by 
Association of others. This phenomena left the 
Pancasila Development: question, how is the future of 
Sb.r·tcd from the Indonesian unity. This 
Ambiguity} question has led to the 
establishment of 
PCPP. 
82 61911995 Saiful Mujani Media Indonesia· Cendekiawan dan The emergence of various C. Geertz 
and (Lecturer at lAIN Revivalisme Politik in- ·Uectual associations based 
7/9/1995 Jakarta) Aliran? on coiiUllUAal symbol was not 
(The Intellecnmland an irdication of the revival of 
the Re\•ivalism of 'ali;.;.n politics'. The aliran 
• A limn • Politics?) poli•ks had melted by ti1e the 
accerta.tion ofP::mcasila as the 
sole oasis of politics, and the 
ap!"-o:r.:mce of a new reality that 
borCer betv.-cen 'santri', 
'pri!"'ayr and 'abangan' has 
been fluid. One who comes 
onrinally from abangan family 
may belong to the santri 
community right now. And so 
does the reverse. Therefore, if 
gmupofpeopleclaim 
themseh·es as Muslim 
intellectuals or other claim 
I themseh·es as Pancasilaist (nationalist) intellectuals 
- -
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does not necessarily mean 
reflecting the revival of 
conununal identities. The 
identity here is simply used as a 
strategy to mobilise the 
political legitimacy and suppon 
in the struggle for power. Thus, 
to say that one belongs to the 
PCPP member does not 
necessarily mean that he/she is 
authentically Pancasilaist. And 
those who belong to lCMI 
member do not necessarily 
mean really Islamist I l 
83 7/9/1995 Mochtar Buchori The Jakarta· Post Should Our Intellectual is a devotee of J. McGregor 
(Social and Political Intellectuals Shun ideas, a person concerned Dums 
Observer) Politics critically with values, and a 
theorist and a moralist at the 
same Date. Should such a 
person be dissuaded from 
a'"tive engagemt'nt in politics? 
It depends on what we mean by 
politics. If politics is perce~ved 
to mean ''mere politickingu, i.e. 
the ~iu:er seizure for the power 
to govern, then no respectable 
intellectuol should panicipate in 
such activities. On the other 
hand. if, by this war~ we mean 
the collective search for 
I 
- - -
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a guarantee t.hat society is 
governed in the best possible 
way, then all intelleclu3ls who 
feel responsible for the well-
being of society should 
panicipate. It is said unrealistic 
to require intellectuals to 
confine ther:tselves to 
professional activism, and to 
refrain form political activism. 
Intellectual who wishes 'o be 
active politically9 should be 
aUo-..ved to do so. Whether they 
express their political acthism 
through organisation or 
personal channels is 
I irn.'llaterial. 
84 71911995 Sy;uif Bas taman Merdeka 
I 
' Diletr., Politik lkatan The emergence of various Herbert Feith 
(Lecrurer at Trisakti CendeJd.:nvan intellectual associations based 
University} (The Political Dilenuna on primordial senDatents 
oflntellcctual brought ab:lut a new diJentm:l. .... 
Associations) On the one hand, if they are left 
mur. '131 exclusively, they might 
lee.:~' !J the wival of 
s~..,;t:rl:mism or ·anran· politics. 
Or. :be other hand, the effort to 
tL:ie ::~11 such associations into 
single institution is also 
auatherna in tenns of the 
democratic spirit. 
--
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The question that can be mised, 
is it necessary for :.~icliectuals 
to be organised The intellectual 
has his/her own respcnsibility. 
One of his/her responsibility is 
to cany out a critical ev:"luation 
to Lie soci~political condition 
of soeiety. To be critical the 
intellectual has to maintain 
his/her freedom Therefore, 
he/she has to be free from the 
trap of group fanaticism or 
primordial senDah:nts. 
' 
85 81911995 Heru Nugroho Kompas Menerobos Lingkaran In response to the polenUc No references 
(lecturer at Gadjah Intelektualisme Bazar between Ignas Kleden and 
Mada University)' (To Break the Circle of Mubyarto on the issue of 
"Bazar• Intellectualism) "hazar' intellectualism, the 
author argued that it might be 
more fruitful if the polemic 
discusses not only the relevant 
or irreleVilnt of the hazar 
economic concept~ 1Je 
I t!.iscowse on the lndr ' Jian intellectual, but also does discuss several detennin:lnt 
factors that might contribute to 
the present of such an issue. 
Indi~iltions to the present of 
the biJ.Zar intellectualism in 
Indonesian uni\'ersities ha\'e 
--
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been chamcterised by the I 
tendency towards I 
compartmentalism, I isolationism, redundancy, and 
factionalism. To break such 
barriers, it is mgent to promote 
scientific and interdisciplinary 
forum, scientific journals, 
appreciation to scientific works, 
and material wellbeing of 
intellectuals (academicians). 
86 161911995 Suryadi A. Rod jab Mc:d'ia· IndonesiJ. Intellectual The InteUecrual in Indonesian No references 
(NGO Activist) (The Intellectual) pu~liC: discour:;es has been 
rarely seen his/her attachment 
with the interest. The 
intellectual has often been 
depicted as a moralist who 
lives in a shadow reality. \Vbile 
in fact. there is no one lives in a 
shadow. This indicates that 
discourses on intellectual have I 
undergone ideological 
i distortiono;. It is true that 
intellectual i~ Jt:bft•d ro ideas. ' I 
Such ideas, however, cannot 
i 
stand frcc~y without any 
relations to objective realities. 
\Vhen intellectuals are 
presente~ in realities, they are 
not similar. There is the 
-- -
L__ 
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Student-intellectual, i 
entrepreneur-intellectual, 
bureaucrat-intellectual, NGO-
intel!ectual, religious-
intellectual, labor-intellectual 
and son on. This indicates that 
wherever and whoever the 
inteiJectual is, he/she always 
relates him/her self to the 
interest ground. The intellectual 
who expresses his/her m:tin 
interest and erects ideological 
function for the Sflke of either 
status quo or ~mti-status quo 
can Pe called ••organic 
-
intellectual." 
87 211911995 !pong S. Azhar Media Indonesia DiJema Organisasi Although the idea to establish Dwight King I 
(Lecturer at USU) Cendekiawan intellectual association rem:tiru. Mochtar Mas'oed 
(The Dilemma of a m:~.tter of controversy, the (sources are not 
i Intellectual number of such associations are mentioned) 
Asoociations) growing in number. This 
brought a new dilellUlU. On the 
one hand, the intellecrual as a 
citizen has the right to est3blish 
and join any organisations. On 
the other hand, their strategic 
role as the moral force of 
society might be eroded by 
I L'teir engagement in commu11.:1l 
groups. To come to soh·e I 
! 
- - -
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!~3 dile~ they need such 
conununication forum as media 
for sharing conunon grounds 
and perceptions. 
88 2319/1995 Novel Ali Media lndone~ia Cendekiawan atau The scholar is not automatically No references 
(lecturer at Diponegoro S:ujana an intellectual. To be an 
University) (Intellectual or Scholar) intellectual a scholar must 
enbage in anticipating, 
projecting, predicting, and 
detecting human affairs in the 
surrounding environment 
He/she has to devore him/her 
self to the moral issue and 
human problems of society. 
Most of the people no longer 
care \\ith the academic degree. 
What they appreciate is the 
intellectual quality and 
commitment to human affairs 
and problems of society. 
89 2319/1995 Ferdinand Sinaga Merdeka Menemukan Kembali The emergence of religiously No references 
dan (Sccial and Political Jdentitas Cendekiaw::m based intellectual associations 
18nt1996 Observer) (111e Redisco\'ery of indicates there is something 
Intellectual Identity) \\TOng with the religious 
pmctice in Indonesia which has 
L stimulated the spirit or parochialism. Intellectuals are very intluenti:ll in the political arena. 
58 
Appendix A 
No. Date Author Media Title MatnPoints Main References 
Jn this regard, the inteHectual 
regroupings b:lS':d on religious 
affiliation might pave the road 
for the represent:J.tive of the 
largest religion ro be dominant 
politically. This in tum might 
lead to the break down of the 
state system. Therefore, the 
est!blishment of such 
associations have to be 
reconsidered. The best solution 
to come to term with such 
negative implication is to fuse 
such association under the 
umbrella of the association of 
the Pancasila (National) 
intellectual." 
90 251911995 A. Masykur Effendi Suara Pemb:uuan Di Mana Cendekiawan The emergence of various Julien Benda 
(Lecturer at Brawijaya· Ber.ufu. dan Berpernn? intellectual associations (source is not 
University) (Where is the indicates that the number of mentioned) 
Intellectual's Location intdleclUll in Indonesia is Le\\is Coser 
and Role) increasing. This also mises an 
expectation that in the future 
there will be more and more 
privilege people who have 
commitment to the flight of 
hum:m being. truth and justice. 
. A question that can be raised • 
how far l13ve the Indonesian 
intellectual 
----
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internalised such a commitment I 
in their behavior and action? 
The answer is not so far. But 
this docs not necessarily mean I 
th:J.t intellectuals have IO eSca('e I 
from political practice. There 
I have been many intellectuals 
who engaged in bureaucracy I 
remained able to maintain their I 
moml commitment and other 
intellectual chamcteristics. I 
91 29/9/1995 Amich Alhumami Media: IndOnesia Moralitas Cendekiawan The establishment of various No references 
I (NGO Activist) (The .Mornlity of the , intellectual associations have 
I Intellectual) been driven by politically-laden 
interests rather thz n intellectual 
conunitment. There is no 
I significant contextual reason to 
institutionalise the inteJiectual. I 
The euphoria to establish such 
i 
associations is simply a 
celebrntion to the power I 
-
temptation. There is no 
I prohibition to institutionalisc the intellectualism. Once 
intellectuals had been 
' 
organised, however, they were 
wually unable 10 escape from ' 
political impulses and interests. 
' 
Thus, the intellectual who is 
supposed to debch him/her self 
L_....l'. from 
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-
lhe political pull in order to 
give critical observations to tile 
social problem is becoming part 
of lhe problem. 
92 511011995 Aswab Mahasin The Jakarta Post Will PCPP Balance lhc Public discussion on the No references 
(NGO Activ;st) Political Scale? signit:cance of the 
estab :islunent of the 
AsstX-iation ofinteUectuals for 
Pancasila (PCPP) in July was 
still going on. The author 
argued that the founding of the 
new association showed that 
tile old political cleavage 
f renuins intact. Politically speaking this new association 
i would create a new balance: th~ 
Muslim on the one hand and 
the secular nation:llists on the 
other. 
93 1411011995 Tadjuddin Noer Kompas involwi lntelektualisme 11J.e emergence of the so-ca1Jcd Clifford Gecrtz 
Effeudi (The ln\·olution of 'hazar' intellectualism (source is not 
' (Lecturer at Gadjah Intellectualism) phenomena can be explained by mention:d) 
Mad3· University) using Geertz's theory of Otto Sumarwoto 
(agricultural) involution. There 
are some similarities between 
lhe phenomena of agricultur:>l 
in\'oJution and intelJectual 
involution in Indonesia. To gh·e 
some examples: 
--
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I l11ts of Indonesian students I have gained postgraduate I degree both frf'm•~he overseas and the homeland. But their 
present has not yet cor..tributed 
' 
to the improvement of scientific 
environment, and to the quality 
of ;ntellcctuollife. Sccoud, the 
pattern of social relations 
among intellectuals has been 
. more complicated, especially 
by the emergence of various 
i'71teUectual associations. Thin.i, 
I the rise ofphenomel13 of the I I intellect".J.3l impoverishment signified by the·unproducti\'C and unqualified in~ellectual 
works. These all may derive 
from lhe present of du:J.Jism in 
the framework ofintellcctu>l 
thinking: the pull of ocodemic-
woriC sbllcturc on the one 
bond, ond the bureoucratic 
structute on the oL~er bond. The 
pull of the bureaucratic 
structure is somehow more 
dontinant than the ;:cademic 
one, which has led t~ the 
impoverislm:~nt ::t ir.tellectual 
works and eth~;,:. 
-
J 
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94 2111011999 BenMboi ! Media Indonesia Anbra i'ejabat dan If the state or the nation is No references 
(For.mer Go\'Crr.'.)f of Moralitas Cendekiawan treated as a ship, what is needed 
NT I) (Between tho: Qfficial to find the orient is a signal 
and the Morality of the tower. The intellectua11' .. .d I Intellectual) intellectualism can b\! said as a 
signal tower of the nation. the 
walking conscience ofthe 
nation. lr. order to better 
govern the state, the offici;al of 
the state has to combine the 
political capability. moral 
bravery, and inte!lectual 
capacity. 
I 
95 711211995 BtJdi ~US.1DIO Kompas BeJantar.1 Cendekia The emergence of various 
(An·· Iopologist) (lndouesia) intellc~tual associ:llions led by 
(The Jungle of the senior bureaucrats may look 
I Indonesia Intellectual) unusual as the intellectual used 
to be an independent agent. 
This phenomenon, howe\'er, 
has its parallelism ;n 
Indonesian history. ln the 
1778, for instance, there J-, 
been esbblished the Bab• 
Society of Arts and Seier. 
The most important legacy of 
this institution is .. Museum 
•. :1ah'' and its collection in 
.',karto. The establishment of 
tlus institutiron \\'aS not just 
--·· 
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oriented to scientific 
promotions, but concomil:lntly 
. 
motivated by the desire to 
challenge and restrict the 
political and economic 
domination of an exclusive 
official group, the member of 
Freemason, which had been a 
' 
sou;..;c of intrigues and 
conspiracy in ntln3ging social 
life, economy and polity in 
Batavia a.nd otht":- Hast Indies. 
1hus, the source ..Jiintellectual 
conflicts in Indonesia is power 
relations. This is especially due 
to the nature oflmionesia as a 
plural societr In such a society 
people from various 
background meet each other 
.without able to unite. In this 
situation, the power centre has 
somehow been a crucial arena 
for inteUectual ~onflicts. 
96 7/1211995 Ahmad Najib Burhani Rcpublika Cendekiawan dan The term intellectual is a public A.D. Smith 
(NGO Activist) Transformasi Politik recognition to the capacity of 
(The Intellectual and ideas and the quality of moral 
Political conunitment of someone. The 
Tmnsfonnation) project ofinstitutionalising 
intellectuals, therefore, is not fit 
with the nature of 
---~ 
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intellectualism. This does not 
mean that the political sphere is 
a taboo for the inteiic:n:tal 
engagement. The 
intellectualism is not 
determined by space and Date. 
Thus. it is possible for the 
intellectualtc take part inside 
' 
or ou•..side the political structure 
orb -;.ucracy. 
97 5/1/1996 Ai.K:.d j•1unir Mulkhan Kompas Visi Kcr.tky;ltan Kaum Intellectu:lls have the most No references 
(Lecturer at JAIN lntelektual potenti:ll as agents to promote 
Sunak Kalijaga) (The People-Oriented ideas of development v.hich :re 
Vision of the more conunittcd to the fate of 
I Intellectual) the suffers. In nddition to their historical \'ocation., intellectuals 
occupy key positions in various 
social. economic and political 
institution. In this regard, 
critiques toward ICMI as 
having neglected the plight of 
hWl'.an being has to be 
answered. As the association of 
intellectuals and using hlamic 
l 
symbol, ICMI has to prove her 
self as :1 devotee of ideas and 
devotee ofmornl values. 
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98 1212/1996 Sudorwon Suar.1 Pembaruan Memperpendek Do !lor The transfomntion of Edward Sallis 
(PhD. Student) Pengonggurnn educational institutions should 
lntelektu3l deal with the improvement of 
(Shortening the Ust of the perfnrm:mce of educational 
lntellectu31 institutions and their outputs in 
Unemployment) order to shorten the list of the 
intellectual unemplo}nlent in 
Indonesia. 
99 2212/1996 Abdul Munir Mulkhon Republiko Morallntelektuol don Industrialisation and the John Naisbin 
(l.c<:turer at lAIN Kekerasan Industrial emergence of free tn:lrket (source is not 
Sunon Kolijogo) (Intellectual Morality economy have brought about mentioned) 
and Industrial Violence) social disparities and social 
violence resulted from the 
disability of some people to 
adapt to the new environment. 
In this \'Cry moment ofhunun 
history, religious intellectuals 
who are expected to play a 
prophetic roles hove foiled. 
Instead of struggling to liberate 
human being from the 
modernity and technological 
oppressions, they sbnd behind 
the hegemony of the political 
elite. 
:oo 31911996 A. Ch:!edor Alwosilob Medh Indonesia Kritik Cendekiowon \Vithout critiqut, '_e SomueJJoboson 
(Lecturer otiKIP ( lntellectuol Criticism) go\'emment will always feel (source is not 
Bondung) that everything is all right that mentioned) 
may lend to :~uthorita.rinnism. 
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Meanwhile, when critique is 
not quickly responded, this may 
lead to the accumulation of 
sociol discontents. The 
intellectuol w.uolly plays this 
role. The nuin objective of the 
intellectual critiq;.:e is lo 
influence the policy m:J.king in 
order to better response to the 
dynamic of society. It is hoped 
that intellectual associations 
will maintain their criticism. 
101 7/911996 Subn Ali Asli Merdeka Cendekiow:m dm Sikap Intetlectuals lhould maintain No references 
(Social ObsCJVer) Kritis their criticism, and dediC<ltc 
(Intellectuols ond the their life to the universal truth 
Criticol Attitude) only. In strengthening their 
criticism, intellectuol should be 
free ond open minded. They 
may engilge in political power, 
but never allowed themscl\·es 
to be a prison~r of the power. 
102 211111996 Usodi Wiryaln:lys Kompas Merumuskan Kembali The Intellectual can be Benjamin Disraeli 
(Social and Politico! Pcr.man Ccndekiawan distinguished from the R. W. Emerson 
Observer) Kib intelligentsia. The fJISt one (Sources arc not 
(The Rcfonnulation of refers to a creative, critic:1l and mentioned) 
The Intellectual Role) constructive person who is 
consciously carry out at least 7 
conunitments oriented towilrds 
the realisation of justice, hurr.an 
----· 
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rights, democrncy, morality, 
freedom of press, peace, and 
social welfare. The second one 
r~fcrs to a group of educated 
elite engaging in social 
problem, art or politics. 
Member of th~ intelligentsia 
can be intellectual in the same 
Date should he/she is also 
creath·e, critical, and 
constructive. In considering 
such characteristics of the 
intellectual, the degeneration of 
the intellectual seems to he 
contradiction in tenus. This is 
due to the syst_ern:uic effort of 
the ruling power to destroy the 
image of the intellectual on the 
one hand, and the attitude of the 
intellectuals themselves which 
is obsessed with an instant 
success. The intellectual has to 
return to his/her char.acteristics 
as creath•e, critical and 
construclive person whether in 
religious, politics or economic 
sphere. 
--- --
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103 6/1211996 Jiwa Atmaja Kompas Ruang Okupasi When the people' aspiration Anton Chekov 
(Journalist and Lecturer Cendekia\\'3Il cannot be articulated Michael Confmo 
at Udayana University) (The Occupation Place proponionally, the intellectual StuanMill 
of the Intellectual) suppon as either individual or 
institutional is expected. But 
when personal ideas of the 
intellectual brings about a new 
role for himlher self, the 
intellectual may transform 
him/herself into the 
intelligentsia, that is a group of 
people which can be identified 
to a self proclaimed mission. 
Thus, the new role than can be 
distorted into merely a new 
occupation for the 
intelligentsia, that may tr.lp 
them as simply mental workers 
who struggle for their O\\U 
material interests. In this 
junction. the initial mission to 
support the people can be 
neglected. 
104 23/111997 Tjipta Lcsrnana Merd•k:l Posisi Sulit bagi Following Habibie, the author No references 
(Journalist) Menteri lntelektual defines intellectual as a person 
(The Difficult Position who has commitment to hullk\n 
of The Intellectual- problems. In this regard, the 
Minister) intellectual who becomes the 
minister (the intellectual· 
minister) v.ill be facing 
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A dilemma. As an intellectual, 
he/she cannot blind him/her self 
from every malpractice and 
injustice decision of the power 
(bureaucracy). As a political 
official, however, hefshc is 
restricted by official procedures 
and code of conduct. 
! !05 8/J/!997 Sutrisno Iwantoro Bisnis Indonesia Pcnganggur.m lntelek The inrellcctual (the university No references 
(NGO Activist) d:m Kewirausahaan graduates) uneonplc,yment rate 
( Intellectual in Indonesia is growing larger 
Unemployment and and larger. This is due to the 
Entrepreneurship) mismatch between the output of 
the higher education and the 
demand the job market The 
key word to solve this problem 
is "entrepreneurship... The 
university graduates should be 
motivated to create their own 
jobs. 
106 2516/1997 MJ.Ritonga 1\!erdeka Dicari Cendekiawan The Genuine intel1ectual Shumpeter 
(I..ecturer atllSIP Tulen always desires to maintain Mohammad Hall:l 
Jakarta) (Wanted the Genuine supreme values. Helsbe has no (sources are not 
Intellectual) any interest of status, wealth or mentioned) 
political position. He/she is also 
free to think and act This 
means that it is not easy to find 
the a genuine intellectual. It is 
not enough just to have 
--
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an identity card from a certain 
intellecrual association. 
EspeciaHy, ,,;hen looking the 
reality tb<~t tl1e existing 
intellecrJ.a I a~ociations 
contribute nothing both to 
intellectual ideas and action. 
107 S/8(1997 Mikh:!el Dua Suaro Katy.l Humanisme dan The humanism project in No references 
(Lecturer 31 Alm:l J3y:1 Per.man Kaum contemporary life is 3 cultur>l 
University) lntclektual restorntion in industrial sector, 
(Humanism and the institution and value system in 
Role of Intellectuals) order to be really hum:tne. The 
l:lsk of the intellectual in this 
movement is to give ethical 
perspectives to society which 
enable them to discover 
themselves nnd to tlke p3rt 
consciously >nd critic31ly in the 
whole >Spec! of human life. In 
short. the intellectual vocation 
is educatioml, to give society 
rntional perspectives in dealing 
with 31l>spects ofhum:m life. 
108 22/10/1997 Asep P. Bakhti>r Suaro Katy.l Bahasa Cendeldawan •cendckiaw:m can be translated \Vebst~r's 
(NGO Activist) Kurong Membumi as .. intellectu31'• (an indi,ridual Dictiomry 
(The l..:mguagc ofThe smart person) or "'intelligentsia Kamus Besar 
Intellectual is not Do\\11 (group of such a person). The Bahasa Indonesia 
To E:lrth) e~··cnce, however, remain the Ali Sh:uiati 
same, that both intellectual3nd 
---
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Intelligentsia has responsibility 
to develop and empower 
society. In fact. intellectuals 
seem now to be alienated from 
society. The way they produce 
the language and social 
location, have been beyond the 
understanding of ordin.ny 
people and isolated from the 
soeiallife. They don't look to 
be down to earth. 
109 22/1011997 Sohnl.ake Suara K:Jya Tentang Otonomi Sang Maintaining the intellectual Sodjatmoko 
(Political Observer) Cendekiawan integrity- a~ a freedom and 
(On Intellectual autonomous person from power 
Autonomy) interests, having neutral 
J>QSition which transcends 
primordial borders and 
cosmopolitan outlook -seems 
to be only dream 
Contemporary Intellectual 
communities are suffered from 
some defects. Firs~ our 
I 
intellectual associations were 
not established on the basis of 
inteUcctual vision. but on 
power interests. Secon~ the 
relation between intellectual 
groups both inside and outside 
the il.!!llectual association is 
- ---
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cetnflicting and mutu:ll 
excluding. Third, the 
responsibility of the intellectual 
associations to the social 
problem is low. 
110 3/111998 A. Choedar Alwasilah The J.::akam Post Intellectuals L:lck Indonesian intellectuals are Aryabno 
(Lecturer at IKJP Writing Skills frequently criticised for their Tjokronegoro 
Ban dung) lack of writing ability. In 1980- K.rashen 
1985 around 50 percent of the 
faculty members of the Jakarta 
Private Universities never 
published textbooks or articles 
in Indonesian, let alone in 
English. The present situai:rn 
has been probably even worse 
in considering that the number 
of the faculty members has 
increased considerably, while 
the writing culture of most 
college faculties has not dmnge 
significantly. 
111 1/4/1998 Denny C. Rina Suara Karya Pcran Ccndckiawan Social intellectuals (scientists) I. Wallersttin 
(Social Observer) Sosial di Masa Krisis arc expected to give objective. 
(The Role of Social expl~ll3tive, and comprehensive 
Intellectuals in the Era analysis to re\·eal causes of 
of Crisis) Indonesian crisis and to find 
solutions to overcome existing 
chaos. This implies that soci:d 
l ~dentists need to be self· reflexive. 
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A reflexivity is important to 
prevent intellectu.ll• trapped in 
an "ivory tower" which is 
alienated from social reality. 
112 313/1999 M. Alfan Alfian M Republika Mencertn:Iti Fenomena The intellectu.ll exodus from Julien Benda 
{Political Observer) 'Cendekia-Politik' the ""ivory tower" to the Antoniao Gramsci 
(Observing the political practice (parties) Arief Budiman 
Phenomena of Political· deserves to pay attention. There F. Magnis-Suseno 
lntellectu:ds) are nt least a couple of reasons 
why free "'thinker·intellectuals" 
engage in political pra..-:~i.;e: 
first, they do not only want to 
be mere theoreticians but also 
do want to npply their theories 
into social realities. Secon~ 
they want to change realities 
from inside the political system. 
This choice is not without 
disadvantages. First, their 
thought is no longer authentic. 
It is oriented more to gaining 
the power than to express their 
conscience. Second. their 
creative nnd constructive 
energies are eroded by 
trivialities of political activism. 
Third, their !if" world is 
·. 'Coming restn. :~d. To come l'u term with their shortcoming, 
, the political·intellectu.ll should 
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always be criticised. And this is 
the task of the free thinker~ 
intellectual. Thus, either 
political intellectu:lls or free 
thinker-intellectu:lls have their 
0\\11 significant role. 
113 6rl/1999 Mnkham:~d Najib Republika Reposisi Kaum lntellectu:llHs a highly B. Anderson 
(Student Activist) lntelektual di Era educated people have a Ali Syariati 
Refonnasi strategic role in social changes A. A. lzetbegovic 
(I:.epositioning the and the improvement of human 
lntellectu:ll in the Era of life., During the New Order, 
Refomm) however, rhe intellectual 
performance had been 
' 
paradoxical. On the one hand 
I the quantity nnd the quality of 
I educated people had grov.n 
I considerably. On the other ! hand, the intellectu:ll 
i pioneering in social changes I 
I nnd their responsibility to the people had been paralysed. In 
most cases, in the New Order, 
the intellectu:ll roles had been 
simply giving legitimacy to the 
regime. In the era of 
refoill1.1tion the intellectual 
have to redefine their position 
in society. They have to leave 
I the ivory tower and take side with the people. 
-
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They have to be the light of the 
people. Things that have to be 
worried in the reform:~tion era 
is the tendency of some 
inteHectuals to sell their 
inteh.;~!ltal integrity by 
worshiping .:!'!"' ••incapable 
chilrismatic leadta ·• for the sake 
of political power. :n so doing, 
they are not only o-epeating a 
false tradition of supporting 
i 
incapable political leader, but 
also keeping the people 
.. ignoranL 
114 617/1999 Jousairi Hasbullah Republikn Dominasi 'lntelektual There is no doubt that the will No references 
(Political Observer) I 'Musim:m': Sorotan to refonn can be carried out due tcrha«bp Fenomena to the invol\'ement of 
Wirmr \Viteolar intellectuals. In funher 
(The Domination of de\·elopments, however, the 
The 'Seasonal performance of intellectuals can 
lntcllectu:ll': Focusing be di.o::tinguished into two 
on the \Vimar \Vitoebr categories: moderate 
I Phenomenon) intellectuals and' seasonal 
intellectuals. Moderate 
intellectuals are able to 
nuinttin thdr : ... tellectual 
integrity and :\r ,ented their 
commitment to problem 
solving. \Vhile seasonal 
intellectuals arc people who 
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claim themselves as refonnists, 
I but in fact they have left their 
intellectualism, dedicated 
themselves to the character I 
· assassination, and tended to I 
compel their own argument. I 
-
without being followed by fact 
' and proportional nnal)- ·,-ne 
number of such intell . ~-· ii~ 
small, but they have' .. gt" 
access to :o.ni dl'lm; _4te mass 
m(dia. D;f"'e:- ~- · JOm the old 
co ·n• ;of ~.t.:•eliC"Ctu<tl o.s a 
• .o lives in the air, this 
••• :tua: 1r.coH· _J live in 
!1- ·negat:ve thinking. 
One e.~r.-:pu: of this kind 
intellectual is said probably 
\Vimar \Vi:oelar. 
115 12/10/99 Juliansyah Noor Republika Kelruatan lntelektual The successful of Amien Kais No references 
(NGO Activist) Emosional an.J Akbar Tanjung become 
(The Power of JV.-spectivc:ly the chainn:ln of 
Emotional Intelligence) MPR and DPR is a lesson for 
other politician how important 
the emotional intelligent is. 
Although his parry. PAN, only 
got a relatively fe;..- ~i't in 
parliament. due to his 
emotional maturity, Rais was 
able to nu.ke other parties give 
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their sympathetic to him. The 
same case can be applied to 
Akbar Tanjung. Even though it 
was not easy to be the chairman 
of Golkar in the era of 
transition<. he was able to be 
selfrestra1u and low profile, 
that save Golkar from the 
' 
target of criticism. 
116 1511011999 Ahmad Mabruri Republika Pengkhianatan Kaum Many Indonesian Intellectuals Julien Benda 
(NGO ,'.ctivist) lntelt~tual in the era of reformation have (source is not 
(The Treason of The tended to be pilrtisan of ceruin mentioned) 
lntellectml) political groupslpartie.c;. Se\·eml 
political scientists ofLIPI 
belong to this tendency. They 
do not restrict their political 
artLulations as simply 
a eadem:. .tatements, but also 
have engaged in political 
demagogues. This makes the 
boundary between intellectml 
institutions and political 
institution is no longer clear. 
Many intellectuals are obsessed 
with political practice. This 
tendency can be said as the 
treasCin of intellectuals. 
- ·-
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I 212/1990 Hajriyanto Y. Thohari Kompas Melacak Jejak Langkah 
(Lecturer at Diponegoro Intelektualisme Islam 
University) Indonesia 
(Retracing the 
Footsteps of Indonesian 
Muslim Inteile:tualism) 
Appendix B 
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In hir.torical perspective, the Paul \Volfo\\itz 
contribution of Indonesian (source is not 
Muslim intellectuals to the mentioned) 
Islamic thoughts has been Fazlur Rahman 
declining. Before the twentieth Sukamo 
century, Nusantaran Muslim 
intellectuals had great scholars 
such as Syeikh Nawawi al-
Bant.ni, Kiai lkhsan Kt:diri and 
Syeikh Maffudz at-Tarmisi, 
whose works had been well 
recognized in the Islamic 
world, as their works \\Titten in 
Arabic. Afterward, there had 
come a generation of Hamka, 
Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqi, A. Hasan, 
Mahmud Yunus and others, 
who had been able to produced 
their 0\\11 original books. But 
they seem to be only well 
known in the Malay world, as 
their works written in Malay 
(Im!onesian). 
In recent period, however, 
almost no one Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals have 
written one complete book. 
Most of their books are an 
ontology of articles, which has 
.. -
---
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been presented in local 
seminars or published in 
Indonesian Newspapers. This 
may explain why even though 
the Islamic enthusiasm among 
the Indonesian is growing up, 
the Muslim intellectuat•s 
contribution to the Islamic 
thought remains limited. It is no 
wonder, if Indonesian Muslim 
intelleetual's thoughts are still 
depicted as peripheral to the 
mainstream of word Muslim 
~ intellectualism 
2 l3nll990 AS Ma'arif & Sukoto pelita lntclektualisme Islam: The Development of Islamic No references 
(Lecturer and Student at Masih Status Quo teaching in Indonesi:!. is 
IKIP Yogyakarta) (lsl•mic promising quantitatively but 
Intellectualism: remai.~s poor qualitatively. The 
Remains Statu5 Quo?) fonne1: can be seen in the: 
development of Islamic 
movements (dakwu!J) and 
enthusiasm. publications and 
teachings in every field and 
stage of education. The latter 
can be seen in a rudimental 
understanding of Islam and the 
weakness of foundation of the 
l~!donesian Muslim 
intellectualism. 
-
81 
AppcndixB 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
3 6/12/1990 DennyJ.A. Media Indonesia lkatan Cendekiawan The planning of the F. Budi Hardiman 
(Study Club Activist) Muslim lndonesi:J.: Quo establishment oflCMI bas been Habermas 
Vadi!;? perceived by some (sow-ces nrc not 
(Asso·~iation of the conunentators as simply a mentioned) 
Indonesian Muslim Trojan horse. opportunistic, 
Intellectuals: Quo, and anti-democracy. The first 
Vadis?) means that ICMI' establishment 
is just oriented to support 
Suharto•s road· to power in the 
1992 election. The second 
means that ICMI's 
establishment might 
strengthened the potiticisation 
of Islam in the public sphere. 
The third means that by the 
accommodation \\ith the 
govemmen~ ICMI might be 
pro--status quo and anti· 
democracy. According to the 
author, these all might not 
necessouily to be the case. 
Everything bas a double-bind 
possibilities. By using the term 
'Muslim', might lead to 
exclusivism but also might 
become a driving integrating 
motive to counter the spiritual 
emptiness brought by the pop 
culture. In this case, the muslim 
spirit can enrich pluralism by 
- --
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the prophetic and existential 
dimension of human being. 
Their encounter with the 
politics and bureaucracy does 
not automatically mean 
opponunistic, as there might be I 
possibilities for them to I 
conduct reform from within, 
thus this 1113Y empower their 
role as agents of change. 
Furlhermore, Intellectuals 
cannot be neutral. As people of 
knowledge, intellectuals are 
embedded wilh :he nature of 
knowledge it self. Because lhe 
knowledge is not value· free, 
interest free and power free, 
and so arc inteUectuals. The 
point is not whether or not they 
engage in the power relation. 
but are they using tbe relation 
for the sake of reform or 
1113intaining the status quo? 
4 7/12/1990 Azyumardi Azra Berita Buana ICMI: Dari Syracuse ke The initiati\'e to establish an Edward Shils 
(Lecturer at lAIN 'Brain Trust' association of Muslim (source is not 
Jakarta) (ICMI: From Syracuse intellectuals is not completely mentioned) 
to lhe Brains Trust) new. The similar association 
has been established in lhc late 
1960s (Pers:uni), and in last ten 
years the same effort had 
'--
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been tried although such I 
agendas were doomed tr, fail 
due to the government's 
stumbling block. If the fonner 
initiatives were only suppcrted 
by free-lance intellectuals of 
' 
Muslim NGOs and 
Univenities, ICMI is also 
supported by high rank 
bureaucrats. This has raised 
many speculations that ICMI 
will not able to nuintain its 
intellectual integrity. This 
skepticism emerged from 
preconception that to be 
I intellectual means to be anti-
est:lblishment. This conception 
is rooted in the European 
history of intellectuals, which 
bad been originated from 
perennial conflicts between 
intellectuals vis a vis 
ecclesiz.:.tical structure and 
i leaden which h..'!d been hand in 
• hand with the political 
structure. The result has been 
the separation between the 
sphere of intellectuals, religion, 
and political structure. 
lb.is is, however, not the case 
~--
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I 
of England and Germany when 
intellectuals have a strong 
affmity with the political 
power. In Islam, the 
intellectuals affinity with tho 
I power (ldmlifah) had been 
productive especially in the 
period of Abbasiyah in 
Baghdad, and Umayah in 
Spain. On the contr.try, the 
degener.ttion of the Chinese 
dynasties generally resulted 
from the rejection of 
intellectuals by the incumbent 
I 
dynasty. Moreover~ the 
example of Plato as a political 
advisor of Syracuse until the 
I 
initiath.·e of Roosevelt to 
establish an official intellectual 
institution as the American 
'bmin trust' reflect the 
possibility of intellectuals to 
take part in the political 
structure. In addition, the 
Indonesian h3s currently moved 
into a knowledge based society, 
which put the intellectual in a 
dominant political role. ICMI 
bas to read in this context and 
I 
in the historical development of 
intellectuals. 
-
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s 811211990 S. \Virosardjono Suara Kary:l Muslim yang Modernisation and No references 
(ICMI Activist) Cendekiawan globalisot'·:n might have both 
(The r ... !:.oslim who is an positive and negntive impacts 
Intellectual) on rociety. The tr.lnsfortll3tion 
of society has to optimise its 
positive aspects and mininiise 
its negatives ones. In this 
contex~ the role of Muslim 
intellectuals is to make sure that 
such a tr.lnSformation remains 
friendly witlt Islamic ethical 
values. This is one 
consijcration that led to the 
establishment of!CMI in 
Malan g. 
6 8112/1990 Rid wan Saidi Kompas Cendekiawan Muslim lr. historical perspective, the No references 
(Former chairtll3n of dan Struktur Politik emergence of Muslim 
HMI) (Muslim Intellectuals intellectual groupings have 
and the Political always been a response to the 
Structure) growing present of Muslims 
scholars on the one hand and 
the crisis of political 
representation on the other 
hand. In the 1964, Pe!'Sami 
(Pe!'Satuan Sarjana Muslim 
Indonesia, Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Schola!'S) 
was established as response to 
the problem of political 
dislocation. Most of the 
---
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! Muslim schol:us felt that the 
er.isting parties (NU, PSII and 
Perti) did not compatible as 
channels for their vertical 
mobilisation. This also \\"aS the 
lh.1nom tine of the ICMI's 
estlblishment in 1990. The 
growing number of Muslim 
scholars c:m !be one hand, and 
the incompabo:lity of the 
<xisting political parties (PPP, 
Gollcar, POI) r;s channels for 
their vertical (p.>litical) 
mobilisation on the other hand, 
has motivated some Muslim 
scholars to estz.blisbed their 
own organisation. 
Doth cases indicates that the 
existing Indonesian political 
structure was not responsive to 
the dynamic of social demands. 
7 8/12/1990 A. Muis Berita Buana Ccndekiawnn Mnslim Standing at the dawn of a new AlvinToffier 
(Lecturer in MasaDepan era ofglobalisation, Muslim (source is not 
Hasanudin University) (The Muslim int.:llectuals are now very mentioned) 
lntellcctu.al ofTne seriously affected by the 
Future) cultural pollution presented by 
global mass media. Muslims 
and Muslim intellectuals are 
highly exposed to any form of 
secular nod drstructive 
I 
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information that might be able 
to pam lyse religious values and 
secularise the public life. In this 
regard, Muslim intellectuals are 
expected to be critical and able 
to respond this challenge by 
offering a counter<Uiture 
which is more productive and 
constructive for the future of 
the Indonesian and especially / 
tbe Muslim community. 
~ 8/12/1990 Rid wan Saidi Media Indonesia 'Ccndekiawan' Muslim In the beginning of the new No references 
(Former Chairman of Bcrholopis Kuntul order there was a. polemic on 
HMI) Baris? the role of intellectuals. In this 
(The Muslir,, junction, the term 
'Intellectuals Form a .. cendekiawan" had not :,.-et 
Match) conunonly used. Many 
commentator argued that 
intellectuals nre those who are 
able to maintain their autonomy 
in expressing their ideas. 
Intellectuals are not committed 
to :my interests but the truth. 
They don't need institntion as 
they do not belong to th~ 
masses. This is actually an 
anti-thesis to the role of 
inteilectuals in the Old Order 
who bad been suggested by 
Soekamo to support the 
--
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I tl::· g~·vemment project of' 'the 
forever revolutionary struggle ... i 
In the very mon::nt of the New 
Order, the question of the role 
of inte!:.:ctual has been 
reerr.,.ged. This is esrecially 
1 
due to the growing expectation 
·>f the growing number of 
Muslim 'inteliectuals' to fmd a 
strategic channel for their 
vertical mobilisation. The 
problem is, once they had betn 
org3nLccd, they catmot escape 
the J•.:gic of offidal ir.stitution 
such as routinisation and 
burrJ\uc:atisation which might 
erode the freedom ond quality 
of the intellecnml. 
9 9/12il990 Ja!aluddin Rakhmot Beriu Buana ICMI: Dari Muna do:·, According to the author, the Nurcholish 
(Lecturer at Padjadjaran keMana? "boom" hypothesis which Ma1jid 
University) (10!1: Where is It nrgueJ that the emergence of (sour~e is not 
Fmm ond Where is It ICMI is a natural \!cnsequ:nce mentioned) 
Going?) o!"the growing n~r of 
highly educated Muslims who 
need an institution to unite their 
potential for the sake of the 
development ;s over too 
optimistic. This cannot answer 
the question why is it emerge in 
a c.:rtain moment of history. 
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" 
I On the othe< hand, the .. holopis 
! kuntul baris" (march fomdng) 
I 
h)pothe!:is. which nrgued th3t 
ICMI"s estnblisluneut is a 
political channel for the verticnl 
mobilisation of Muslim 
intellecnuis. is too simplistic. 
I ; According to him. the roie of ICMI is not determined by those hypothesis, as wei! as 
other concepts which h>d been 
formulated in the IO.U 
Symposiutn.9 or even by the I term intellcctua.l attached to the association. The role ofiCMI is 
determined by its integrity, 
; cnpability :md achievement. 
110 1211211990 A. Muis I Kompas Ccndelcia\\'a'l Muslim In the era of globalisation. John~ ·._- -t 
I {Lecturer at Hasanudin Menyongsong Abad Muslim intellectuals are Alvin ·1.·· let University) Ke-21 expected to be capable in (sources ~e n'>t 
(The ~uslim understandir.g the logic of mc:ntioned) 
Intellectual Welcomes globalisation on the one h>nd, 
the 21st Century) and the scientific clues in the 
Holy Koran on the other h>nd. 
This is necessnry in order to 
better response to The 
ch>llenge of social ch>nges. 
The !\.luslim intellectual should 
' be able to combine the positive l aspects of the global 
-
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information with the strength of 
Islamic traditions. 
11 14/1211990 Ade Komaruddin M. Suara Karya Cendekia\1.-an Muslim The establishment oflCMl is R. William Liddle 
(The Chairman of dan Politik Islam Orde the greatest historical moment (Source is not 
HMl) Baru for Indonesian Muslim mentioned) 
(TheMttilim community after the 
Intellectual and The establishment of so; This 
Political Islam of The reflects the dyramic of 
New Order) lslamisation in Indonesia. 
Different with the political 
Islam of The Old Order, which 
used a normath·e-ideological 
' 
approach in its action, the 
I political !slam of the new Order 
I bas used an intellectual and 
pragmatic approach: by 
adopting an accommodative 
altitudes and giving attention 
on substantial and material 
gains. Its new credo is: Islam. 
yes; Islamic political parties, 
no! As the protlgonist of 
Islamic political panics 
gradually lost its ~"rip, the 
Islamic leadership bas been 
gradually taken over by Muslim 
Intellectuals. By adopting a 
cultural approach, these 
intellectuals have been 
wel~ome by the government 
-- --
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I to take pan in both bweaucracy 
and development process. In 
the long run, both quantity and 
capacity of Muslim 
intellectuals to engage in the 
de\·elopment process have been 
more and more powerful. This 
has !'timulated them to take a 
real action in ortf:r to 
implement their ability in the 
political process. The 
culmir.:!tion of this is the 
establishment of!CMJ. The 
ICMI project is a dilemma. One 
the one band, ICMI needs to 
accommodate the logic o'"the 
political power in order to gain 
supports for its agendas. On the 
other hand, the power 
interplay might erode the 
intellecr.Jal integrity and 
creativity. 
12 16/1211990 Moeslim Berita Buana Kang Tbo\\illlrutiCMI The ICMI establishment is a No references 
Abdurrahman (Kang Tbo\\iiJoins historical moment signifies the 
(Researcher at the JCMI) etrectivt"ness of the so-c:11led 
Minister of Religious cultural approach. Under the 
Affairs) banner of political Islam or 
'aliran' politics', (during the 
Old Order until the beginning 
of the New Order), the Muslim 
----
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I 
corrmunity cOntinuously 
I 
trapped in internal rivalries, 
and to be Muslim activists 
means to be marginal. By I 
adopting cultur:ll approach, 
Islamic movements seem to be 
more effective and productive 
in terms of both Islnmising the 
member of Muslim community 
and breaking the 'aliran' 
boundaries. The culmiru!tion of 
this transfollll3tion is the 
establishment of!CMI where 
Muslim intellectuals from 
..-aria us factions and posit· • 
can unite. 
13 1 28/12/1990 Deddy D:uy:m DB Angkatan Kebcradaan dan The emergence of!CMI bas No references 
(Social Observer) Berscnjata Kemitraan ICMI been responded enthusiastically 
(The Existence and by the Indonesian as reflected 
Partnership ofiCM1) in abandon news and views in 
nuss media.1CMI is expected 
to be the bridge between the 
problem of society and the 
policy making. The role that 
bod been performed by K.H. 
Ahmad Dahlan a:td others in 
the posL The ICMI's present 
has to benefit the entire society 
and is expected to avoid the 
spirit of sectarianism. 
'--·'-
93 
AFpcndixB 
No. Date Autltor Media Title Main Points Main References 
14 7/111991 Idris Thaha Berita Bu3113 Sardar dan Posisi 1CM1 Based on Ziauddin Sardar (a· Ziauddin Sardar 
(Study Club Activits) 1991 Pakistanis intellectual), the (source is not 
(Sardar and 1CMI's author argued that the history of mentioned) 
Position in 1991) civilisation in the second half 
of the twentieth century has 
been colored by varieties of ' 
socia-.polilical violence and 
moral degenemtion. Traditional 
Muslim intellectuals and their 
modem-seculill' counterparts 
have been failed to answer the 
challenge. While the former 
have declared their refusal to 
the Western ideas, the second 
accepted unselectively to 
whatever come from the \Vest. 
A new generation of Muslim 
intellectuals have emerged to 
transcend this mutual exclusive 
position. by combining p~sitive 
aspects both from the West and 
Islamic traditions. ICMI is 
supposed to bke this way in 
order to find alternative 
(synthesis) ideas to bener 
anticipate the challenge of the 
global sociely. 
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15 14/111991 M. Dawam Rahardjo Berita Buana Seand:tinya Saya Five weeks after the TheQur•ran 
(NGO Activis~ an (Ketua ICMI) establishment ofiCMI, the 
ICMI Initiator) (lfl were a Chairman author (as one of the Sponsors 
ofiCMI) ofiCMI) felt worried about 
Habibie's indication to be one 
man show, authoritarian and 
creating an inner circle in 
ICMI. 
16 17/111991 A yip Bakor Pelita Risalah Muhibah untuk The birth ofiCMJ was a Gold1vin Smith 
(Colunmist) ICMI reflection of a p:trticular Fazlur Rahman 
(Messages for ICM1) generation of Muslim BJ.Habibie 
intelligentsia looking for a (Sourct!s are not 
foundation for cultural dialogue mentioned) 
in the scale ofnation\\ide. 
Some people disagree with the 
' Project as it is elitist and 
primordialistic. Such ! 
perceptions might be not true. 
The project was initiated by 
students (pure academicians) of 
Brawidjaya University, Malang ! 
and the meeting WOlS not held in 
lsl::amic universities or 
' 
'pes;mtren'. but in a secular 
university. Because the basis of 
I 
ICMI is nationwide. it is 
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appropriate to say that ICMI 
belongs to bolh Islamic 
conununity anti the Nation. 
ICMI is not a political power. It 
is a power of intellectual 
conuuunity who has a depth of 
mind. breadlh of view, sound of 
judgmen~ logic reasoning :md 
social conunitmcnt. Things that 
have yet to be proved is that 
ICMI has to engage in solving 
social problems and in directing 
social changes for the benefit of 
the entire society. 
17 211111991 Rid wan Saidi Berit:t Buana Mcnyimak Renungan This is the critique to the No references 
(Former Clmirman of Colon Sekjen ICMI prc\ious Rahar::lj09S accusation 
HMI) (Considering the towards Habibie9S style of 
Reflections of the managemenL To the author9 He 
Secretary General seems to be inunature by 
C.ndidate of!CMI) gh·ing a presumption of 
somebody's attitude \vithout 
having any proofs. He is 
supposed to be sincere if he is 
' finally not appointed as a 
secretary general ofiCMI. 
18 22/1/1991 Hadimulyo Bcrit:t Bu:ma .• .ICMI... ICMI is supposed to focus on No references 
(NGO Activist) strategic issues which can 
benefit the entire- Mlis1ir.i 
conununity and the Nation. 
-
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19 2VJ/1991 Saiful Muzani Pel ita Krisis Ilmu Sosi:J.l, It is said that the social science, Thomas Kuhn 
(Lecturer at JAIN Agenda Cendekiawan especially in Indonesia, has Naquib al-Attas 
Jakarta) Muslim been in crisis. In Indonesian 
(The Crisis of the environment the feeling of 
Social Sciences and the unsatisfactory with the 
Agenda of Muslim paradigm of modernism has \ Intellectuals) long been expressed. As every 
paradigm is derived from the 
belief of certain intellectual 
conununities, Muslim 
ir.!ellectuals might be possible 
to set up a scientific pmdigm 
based on their own belief 
system. The challenge is how 
to elaborate this Islamic 
paradigm into logical 
postulations as a foundation for 
theoretical reconstruction and 
further operational techniques 
:md methodologies. This is a 
challenging agenda for Muslim 
intellectuals. 
20 71211991 M. Thoha Anwar Berita Buana ICMI dan Para Fuqaha The author welcomes happily No references 
(Alumnus of Al-Azhar (ICMI and Islamic the birth of!CMI. But critique 
University, Egypt) Jurists) was given for the lack of 
'fuqaha' (Islamic jurists) 
recruited by ICMI. There has 
I 
been an impression in 
contemporary discourses of 
Muslim intellectuals that the 
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legal35pett oflsl::m (fiqh) is 
peripheral in dealing with the 
challenge of modernity. In fact, 
this aspects cannot be 
~eglected, not to say is very 
import30L 
21 1412/1991 A. Makmur Makk:l Kompas Catalan Pengantar Becoming the chairman of No references 
(Staff of BPPT, one of Tugas Pcngurus ICMI ICMI is a new experience of I 
the 49 first Sponsors of (Introductory Rcm:rrks lbbibie in tn:luaging Islamic 
ICMI) for the ICMI Officials) org3Ilisation. As a new comer 
he rem:~ins unfamili:rr with the 
Muslim intellectual COI1UJ'l1mity. 
On his flfSt meeting with some 
sponsors of!CMI (25 
September 1990), for instance, 
he looked unfamiliar with some 
big rumes of Muslim 
intellectuals who joined the 
meeting. It is said that the 
reason of his appointment due 
to his scientific achievement, 
sincerity. and capacity as an 
integrative factor (in a 
divergence of Muslim 
intellectual streams). This new 
role brought about a new 
problem for him. Habibie is 
actually a natio113listp:::r 
excellence. He has not been 
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used to think for a certain 
primordial group. By accepting 
this position, he has been 
accused by his non-Muslim 
~olleagues as creating a new 
inner circle in the bureaucracy. 
In the same Date when some 
ICMI members disagreed with 
his mode of management, he 
has also been accused as having 
an inner circle in ICMI. In fact, 
Habibie always refers his 
decisions to his O\\'Il principle: 
be rationa1. consistent and 
justice! 
22 16/2/1991 A. Makmur Makka Berita B1•ar.a ICMI Bukan Rekayosa As a living witness the author No references 
(Staff ofBPPT, one of dari Atas argued that ICMI project is not 
the 49 first Sponsors of (ICMI is not Designed designed from the Top. The 
ICMI) from tl\e Top) early initiative came: from 
religious activists of 
Brawidjaya Unh·ersity who 
would like to held a National 
symposium of Indonesian ' 
Muslim intellectuals. In the 
de\·elopment they met 
Imaduddin Abdulrachim and 
Dawa.m R.ab:lrdjo (prominent 
Senior Muslim Activists) who 
proposed ideas to enlarge the 
scope and objective of the 
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symposium, and the possibility 
to ask Habibie to support dte 
project. In their flst meeting 
with the •"target man .. , Habibie 
had not recognised yet even one 
of them (including such a big 
name as Imaduddin). The story 
goes, Habibie as a minister 
asked pennission to the 
presiden~ and Suharto 
pemritted him to join or even to 
lead the projecL 
23 2012/1991 Fathoni Moehtadi Berita Bu:ma Sistem Matriks dan The ICMI chairman, Habibie, No references 
(Management Advisor) ICMI has decided to adopt matrix 
(Ma:rix System and system of m:magement which 
1CM1) has risen controversies among 
the members. The matrix 
system has some advantages 
and disadvantages. Its 
advantage is that experts in 
different functional units can 
I anyDate be utilised more 
effectively and efficiently for 
the benefit of the organisation. 
The disadvantage of this 
system is that the management 
becomes more complicated. 
-
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24 4/3/1991 Komarodin Angkatan Tantangan bagi ICMI: The establishment ofiCMI is No references 
(Researcher at BPPT Bersenjatl Karya Nyota, Pemikiran motivated by the desire of 
and ICMI Activist) Sr.ttegis dan Kegiatan Muslim intellectuals to shan: 
Praktis their ideas and engage in the 
(The Challenge of development process in 
ICMI: the Real Work, anticipating the arrival of the 
Strategic Thought, ::nd new milleni1an. As a social, 
Practical Activity) intellectual and religillus 
organization, ICMI is expected 
to be the meeting pl"'int between 
social a~ir:ltion, ideas and 
concret~ ;~ction ofMtJSlim 
intellectual on the oee hand and 
the government's program and 
policy on the other hand. In so 
doing, ICMI program has to 
integrate scientific approach 
(lptek) and religious ethos and 
values (/mtat), in order to bring 
healthy welfare for the entire 
society. 
25 18/311991 M. Syofi'l Anwar Pelita Kclas Mcncngah Santri 11:; emergence ofiCMI has io Clifford Geertz 
(1ourtl31ist) dan Konvergcnsi be read as a long n1ar.:h of the M. Vatikiotis 
Sospol: Menguak struggle and transf~rmation of As\vab Mahasin 
Dimensi Sosio·historis the 'santri' midd:'e class. In 
ICMI socio-historical perspective, the 
(The 'Santri' Middle origin ofsantri middle class 
Class and • land was a petty bi>wgroisie 
Political C' Jence: includi.,g m!!rdunts, artisans, 
slll3ll entrepreneurs, and land 
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Revealing Socio. owners . Prior to Lite 
historical Dimensions Indonesian Independence tho::y 
of!CMI) developed themselves gr.uiuolly 
in order to be able to compete 
with other groups (Europe:m 
and Chinese) that got privileges 
form the colonial govemmenL 
The representation of this 
economic struggle was the 
establishment of SOl in the 
1911. 
In another ·.vay, there had been 
a new model of Islamic 
institution which had been 
focused on social and 
educational development such 
as Muhanunadiyah (1912) and 
Al-lrs}ad (1926) which tried to 
empower cultural capital of the 
middle elm santri through 
education. After the 
Independence, by the rise of 
political organisations lots of 
' santri middle elm leaders and 
activists became the elite 
member of the government and 
gained bure:mcratic po::iticns. 
After the policy of so-called 
"guided democracy" (1959), 
I 
however, the s:ntri's power in I the rolity. bureaucracy and 
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j 
economy eclipsed gradually. In 
another way a.roun~ bo\\-ever, 
there had been more and more 
santri entered into modem 
educational sectors. In the long 
run, they h:ld successfully 
graduated from both domestic 
and overseas universities and 
then achieved strategic 
positions in the bureaucracy. 
This rrocess h:ld led to the 
, follll3tion of the so-called 
.. priy.tyisasi santri... This nco-
I santri is more pragmatic and less puritan th.:ln the elder one. I As s.Jcb they h.:ld been more 
accorrunodarh.-e to the demand 
of the state and bureaucracy. 
Their panicip3tion in 
bureaucracy had been 
supported psychologically by 
the emergence of the new 
intellec!U3ls of the so-called 
I . reneY..-al of the Islamic thought. This Muslim activists appealed 
toward an inclusive theology, 
and diet not hesitate to accept 
Pancasil3 as the principle of the 
Nation. As a result, the 
I I 
government ielt more 
comfortable to acconunodate 
i 
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I Musiim participation in politics an.J OJureaucracy. Moreover. 
due to the harmonious relati:ms 
bet\\een lsla:...'"l and the state. 
there had been such a 
psychological gratification 
among the former ••secularn 
priyayis to he more friendly 
towards Islam. The 
culmination of this reciprocity 
(mutual understa;,ding) was 
the establishment of!CMI in 
the 1990. Looking at this 
perspective. the rise ofiCMI 
I 
has nr"': to be percei\·ed as a 
political threat to other groups. 
JCMJ is just an ucna for self 
i actu31isation needs, instead of 
26 23/j'\991 Satyagraha Hoerip Su:&ra pembaruan Syul:urlah, ICMI Sudah 
politically-oriented project. I 
1hanks that ICMI' has taken the 1 No references 
(Columnist) Memu1ai initiative to make a dialogue 
(Fol1tlrul:ely, ICMI has \\ith the governor of Centre 
started) Java in coupling v.it..'t· the 
dispute of Keaungor.lbo Dam • 
This means that IC:MI has been 
at the forefront ofconcrelc 
action not ; ·~t grumbling about 
it at th:.- bndc o\ the governor. 
I 
This has to be fiJI~ ,'wed by 
other social instit~o· .. ons. 
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27 27/3/1991 H. Lukman Harun Pe1it:l ICM1 dan Hampan The present of!CMI has No references 
(Former Vice Chainn:m Umat brought about fresh wind to the 
of Muhanunadiyah) (1CM1 and The life of the nation and especially 
Expect..tions oiUmat) the ununat (Muslim 
community). 1CMI is really 
expected to improve the quality 
of the Nation and ununJ.L Its 
contribution is expected to be 
more strategic and stronger 
0 than other Muslim 
-
organisations as it is the 
association of the intellectual. 
The conunon weakness of 
Muslim Of£::1' ·::~tions is lack of 
working com. :.,~ts J.nd thinkers. 
ICMI is expected to be • think 
bnk and centre of excellence 
I oithe ununaL ICMI is 
supposed not to duplicate 
progr.uns of other Muslim 
organisation~-- irL'itead it has to 
take a strater,!-: ~:~og:.' · which 
has stratebi:: impact for the 
future of the ummaL In order to 
tnJ.inuin its flexibility and 
autonomy, ICMI is supposed 
not to be dominated by 
hw-eaucrats. 
I 
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28 3/4/1991 Achsin Utami Media Indonesia Tantangan dan Har.:1pan The Muslim community bas No references 
(Public servant) kepada ICMI been too long dwelling in '"the 
(Challenges and house of the past". as prisoner 
Expectations ofiCMI) ofa backward looking 
nostalgia. In so doing, they 
h:lve lost their power of 
creativity and vision for the c 
future. ICMI, by organising idle 
Muslim intelJectual resources, 
is expected to carry out ::...tch a 
breakthrough in order to bring 
the Indonesian Muslim 
community to a new era of 
enlightenment 
29 llf4/1991 A. Muis Suara Pembaruan ICMI dan Silaturaluni In addition to the oral 'dakv:ab' No references 
(Lecturer at Hasanuddin (ICMI and Friendship) (Islamic propagation), ICMI 
University) has to pioneer the action 
oriented 'dakwah'. In latter 
'dakwah', it is necessary for 
ICMI to promote such a legal 
aid institution to empower the 
people at the grass root le\'cl. 
This \\ill strengthen the 
friendship between elite 
intellectuols (IO.ll) and the 
people. Critiques that ICMI is 
just a Trojan horse to gain a 
political position has to answer 
by offering people oriented 
programs. 
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30 20/4/1991 M. Rusli Karim Berita Buana ICMI dan Pluralitas ICMI is the most interesting AlvinToffier 
(Lecturer at Gadjah Gerakan Islam di Masa phenomenon of the last decade. 
Mada University) D<pan First, tlte idea ofits 
(ICMI and The establishment did not purely 
Plurality oflslamic come from Brawidjaya 
Movements in the students. Second. its prime 
Future) initiators are intellectuals who 
have long been the opposition 
of the govemmenL Third, the 
Habibie factor as the chairman 
which might reflect the 
deepening process of 
lslamisation or inst~d the 
deepening subordination of 
Islam to the incumbent regime. 
Fourth, tl>e ICMI's impression 
is extravagant Fifth, the 
1 present ofiCMl indu:ates a new 
trend of Islamic movements, 
that is the tendency towards 
pluralism. 
DennyJ.A Pelita Forum Demokrasi, Human society, where\·er ;:md No references 
31 20/4/1991 (Study Club Activist) ICMI, dan Partai Politik whene\·er, has always a demand 
(The Forum for to politically a.rticulatinf?. The 
Democracy, ICMI and power dimension is embedded 
Political Panies) either in social or indi\idU3l 
relations. In parliamentary 
democrocy. such a need is 
facilitated by political parties. 
Generally. there are three 
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functions of political parties, 
that is: a political vehicle for 
people to gain the power; 
perfonning control to the 
official power; and conducting 
A political education through 
fanning of cadres and public 
opinion. If one of the three 
function is not carried out 
optimally, people will be 
looking for other channels. The 
rise oflCMI and 'Forum 
Democracy• can be seen 
through this lens. The different 
is, while ICMI tries to find 
another channel through 
mobilising intellectual and 
Islamic capital, the latter does 
the same thing through 
mobilising a common ideas and 
principle. Both are welcome as 
this might indicate the 
beginning of vociferous 
politics. 
32 24/4/1991 S. Takdir Alisjahbana Felita Menyambut The em:rgence oflCM.I is an Mob. Iqbal 
(Rector of National Kebangkitan Kaum important historical momenL In Pic:o del01 
University) Cendekiawan Islam last hundred years, Muslim in Miraodola 
(Welcoming the lr.dooesia and the world did not 
Resurgence of Muslim give a significant contribution 
Intellectuals) to the de\·elopment of science 
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and technology. Even in the 
revival oflslam in the twentieth 
century, promoted by AI-
Afghani and Abduh, Indonesian 
Muslims have hardly share lo 
enrich the ideas. In !his regard, 
lhe emergence of! C."•!! might 
bring a fresh blood, reignite the 
waning fire, and reinvent 
fruitful ideas for the better 
future of lsliliil and Indonesia. 
Therefore, it is expected not to 
be just a fashion or stuck in 
trivialities of shan tCrm 
development agendas. ICMI 
has to explore strategic agendas 
in order to improve the quality 
of thought and life of 
Indonesian. 
33 30/411991 GJ. Aditiondro Peli13 Dendungan Raksasa In response to ICMI's initiative Several Muslim 
i & (Ph.D. Candidare at dalam Media Islam di to be im,.olved in the Kedung media 
115/1991 Cornell University) Indonesia: Suatu Ornbo dam scandal, the author 
Cal313n Kaki untuk shows the way Muslim media 
ICMI exposed giant c:fum projects. 
(Giant Dams in According to him, most of 
Indonesia's Muslim Muslim media have been less 
Media: Footnotes for anticipating the negative 
ICMI) impact of such projects in the 
long run. 
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34 18/5/1990 Sri-Edi Swasono Pelita Tantangan Kaum The '1945' Indonesian Emil Salim 
(Lecrurer at University lntelektual Muslim bagi Constitution is loaded with (source is not 
oflndonesia) Pembangunan Masa Islamic values and even placing mentioned) 
Depan Islam in a strategic position. 
'llle Muslim Thus the responsibility of 
I intellectual Challenge Muslim intellectual in the 
for the Development of Republic of Indonesia is 
the Future) double faces: for the sake of 
Muslim community and for the 
sake of the nation. Muslim 
intellectuals have ~o realise that I 
science and technology is not i 
value-free. The challenge is 
how to integrate both Islamic I 
values and the National outlook 
to the educational curriculum 
and s:ienccltcchnology 
development for the \vclfare 
and h:umony of the people. 
Thus, Muslim intellectuals are 
' 
supposed to be agents of ' 
progress for the Muslim 
conununity and the Nation. In 
so doing, Muslim intellectuals 
arc not supposed to lh·e in the 
"ivory tower" or trap in the 
intellectual folJower syndrome. 
I What they have to do frrstly is 
to solve their own weakness. 
I 
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35 z4nll991 Syarifuddin Abdullah Pelita Gerakan Cendekiawan In last years, almost all Muslim Louis Dollot 
& (Middle Eastern Muslim Mesir: Evaluasi countries have been grappled AdelAwa 
25n/1991 Political Observer) SUcap dan Recitrarisasi by a new agenda, that is the 
Pesan Islam role of Muslim intellectuals. 
(Muslim Intellectual There has been a growing 
Movements of Egypt: tendency to take Islam as 
An Evaluation of alternative foundation to deal 
Attitudes and a New with social. politics and 
Image of the lslomic economic problems. In Egypt, 
Message) discourses on intellectuals have 
reemerged after the war or the 
gulf crisis, as an evaluation to 
their attitude during the crisis 
and the role that might be taken 
in the future. The Egyptian 
popular nome of intellectual is 
"mufakkir Jslamy". During the 
crisis there had been a 
• 
contro\'eiSy among Egyptian 
Intellectuals whether or not 
they have to stand behind USA 
by sacrificing Islamic sentiment 
or stand behind Iraq by 
sacrificing the bUth and justice. 
The term intellectualism is 
• contested along this dilemm3, 
between modcrnte intellectuals 
who dominated mass media, 
and radical intellectuals, 
•Jamaan lslamiyah• who closed 
to the masses. 
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36 3/9/1991 Dhia Prekasha Yoedha Kompas lCMI dan Politik The emergence of!CMI might Nurcholish 
(Journalist) Spasialisasi Agama be a response to the New Madjid 
(ICMI and the Politics Order's policy of religion (source is not 
of Religious spatialisatioiL Through this mentioned) 
Spacialis:ltion) policy, religion is removed 
from the politico-.public sphere 
and left in a private sphere. 
I This policy has been applied to 
all religions in Indonesia. but 
its impact on Islam could be 
more serious, as it has a long 
history of engagement in public 
' affairs. The result of this policy 
is a .. symbolic pietism .. rather 
. 
than .. actual pietism ... Islam has 
lost its vitality in coupling with 
j social and political matters. The tide of educated 'santris• h:lve 
led to a new expectation of 
repositioning religion omd 
religious man in the public life. 
The problem is, while every 
religion wants not to be placed 
in isolation. religious plur:llism 
in Indonesia is obviously 
un\\illing to accept any single 
religious group facilitated by 
politics for the sake of politics. 
Thus, ICMI has to prove its self 
not to be trapped in exclusi\'ism 
and political games. 
I 
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37 111111199 I M. Dawam Rahardjo Pelita Kecendekian adalah The tenn · 'cendekiawan" TheQur'an 
up to (Vice Chairman of Amanah (intellectual) and ulama has Zuber Usl113n 
13/1111991 ICMI'< Board of (Intellectualism is cflen been dichotomised. In Nazwar Samsu 
Experts) God's Mandate) Qur'anic perspective, the (sources are not 
synonym of the term mentioned) 
"cendekiawan" is ulama, ulul 
a/bab. ulun nuha and others, 
which basically refers to a type 
of person characterised by an 
inclination towards thoughtful 
activities, meditation, 
observation of universe, history 
and society in order to achieve 
the real truth and its functions 
which will be oriented to 
empower his/her eommibnent 
to solve social problems. Thus, 
the use of•intellectual' term in 
ICMI's case does not refer to 
social status, but rather to 
attitude and process of 
actualising intellectualism as a 
God's mandate for the 
realisation of human mission 
as a vicegerent of God in the 
earth. In this process,ICMI 
members perceived that to unite 
in the form of organisation is 
important to make such process 
and actions more effective, 
system:Itic and integrative. 
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38 111111991 Soctjipto \Virosardjono Pel ita Tentang Agama dlln In last centuries the No references 
(Fonner Chairn13.n- of lptek: Menyambut development of religion has 
BPS, ICMI Activist) Silakruls ICMI been challenged by the ubiquity 
I 
(On Religion and of science and technology. 
Science: Welcoming There has been an optimisnt 
the AnnWII Meeting of that science and technology can 
ICMI) ' handle every problem of human 
being. In fac~ such a belief is 
not always true. In spite of their 
possibility to solve human 
I problems they also have 
I brought about negatives 
impacts on society and 
environment: social disparities, 
environmental pollution, and 
moml hazard. The premise that 
I science and technology are 
value~ free seems to be 
responsible to the rise of such 
negative impacts. To :orne to 
term with this problem science 
and technology are supposed to 
be guided by religious ethic. 
ICMI is challenged to take the 
iniliath·e. 
39 5/1211991 Sayidiman Kompas JCMJ dan Sektor One of The ICMI's objectives 
Surhadiprojo Informal is to improve the quality of 
(Fonner Governor of (ICMJ and The human life. The poverty 
Lemhannas) Informal Sector) eradication beJongs to tltis 
agenda. 
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How to create job opportunities 
is its solution. The informal 
sector is proved to have widely 
absorbed the job seekers. The 
problem is, the government has 
been unlikely to pay serious 
attention to this sector. ICMI is 
challenged to find concepts to 
improve the quality of this 
neglected sector. 
40 5/IV1991 M. Dawam Rabardjo Peli.a Sosiologi Cendekiawan The term Muslim Sycd Hussein 
up to (Vice Ch:lirman of Muslim 'cendekiawan' bas been widely Alatas 
7/1Vl991 ICMl's Board of (The Sociology of used since the beginning of 
E.'Perts) Muslim Intellectuals) 1980s reflecting the growing ' 
engagcmcut of Muslim scholars 
I 
in the discourse of development 
and social changes. This is by 
no means that there has not 
been 'cendekiawan" Muslim I 
before that period. In 1964 I 
there was lkat3n Sarjilll3 ! 
Muslim Indonesia (1964); 
followed by Persatuan Sarjana 
Muslim Indonesia (Persami) in 
I 
the 1969. The emergence of 
Muslim 'cendekiaw;m' since 
1980s, however, have been 
more significant in tenns of 
both number and influence, 
which have stimulated 
-
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the establislunent ofiCMI in 
the 1990. In contempor.uy 
discowses on Muslim 
intellectuals there are several 
kinds of the Muslim 
'cendekiawan'. Firstly is 
"ulama-cendekiawan", that is 
cendekiawan wqo has initially 
been educated in traditional 
Islamic schools, but has a 
relatively wide undcrst.-utding 
' 
of secular knowledge through 
! both autodidactic or overseas 
studies in secular unh·ersities. 
Secondly is .. cendekiawan-
ulama", that is cendekiawan 
who has initially educated in a 
general education system, but 
has a sufficient mastery of 
Islamic teachings through early 
socialization in the family life. 
autodidactic or imrolvement in 
Islamic organisations. Thirdly 
is the majority of "mediocre 
Muslim-cendekiawan", that is 
Muslim cendekiawan who has a 
secular educational background 
with no sufficient knowledge of 
Islam, but has an Islamic 
commitmenL This is in fact a 
mainstream. 
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41 6/12/1991 Manvah Daud Ibr:1him Beritl Buana ICMI dalam Realitas: ICMI is present to actualise the No references 
& (ICMI Activist) Suara dari Dalam scattered potential of Muslim 
7/12/1991 (ICMI in Realities: A intellectuals for the sake of 
Voice from Within) social welfare. ICMI is a 
unique forum. People from I diverse backgrour:zds can sit 
I together. People from engineering background can 
share ideas with poople from 
"pesantr.:n', bureaucrats Ciln 
meet NGO activists, NU 
activists meet Muhanliilildiyab I activists, economists meet 
' 
technologis~ blld S:J fonh. In 
ICMI people open to the 
difference, nppreciate pluralism 
I atid utilise it fer coupling with common objectives. As J. 
strategic rroup ICMI "ill not 
just s~y in: ihe .. h•ory tower" 
which only produce st!tement I 
and recommendation, but will 
intentionally engage in concrete 1 actions. In so doilJg, ICMl wm . 
focus on strategic action plans, 
' not to duplicate programs of 
other Muslim organisations. 
ICMI is orien!cd to long term 
goals instead of short·term 
I expedieneies. 
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42 7/1211991 H. Habib Chirzin Media lndouer.ia Pena.nyaan Buat The establishment ofiCMl is a No references 
(IC.I\11 Activist) Silaknas ICMI convergl!nce of various streams 
(Questions for the of the Indonesian Muslim: the 
Annual Meeting of convergence between 
ICMI) modernism and tr.tditiona.lis~ 
between an 'Islamicate~ and 
'lndonesianicale~~ between the 
'ummat development and the 
National development, and 
between the impro\·ement of 
I the quality of 'ummat' and natiOn and the universal 
problem of human being. Thus, 
} the ICMI's pres.:nt has op<ned 
a new outlook and vision in the 
de,·elopment of Islam in 
Indonesia, which will raise 
vario~ questions, s:Cepticism 
and er..pectation. 
43 13/12/1991 Yuriadi Pclita Tugas dan Tanggung In following Habibie, the 
(Student Activist) Ja'Vab Cendekiawan author defines intellectual as a 
(The Vocation and person who is able and capable 
Responsibility of to read his environment ~swell 
Intellectuals) as concerned to his. The 
development process cannot be 
totally handled by the 
government. It needs to be 
supponed by initiative and 
ideas of inteUectuals. The 
!;UCCeSS of failure Of 
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the development process is in B.J. Habibie 
fact depending on the extent of Akio Morit:l 
intellectual participation in the F. Yukichi 
project In this regard, the 
intellectual is not necessary to 
be the opposition of the 
goverrment, but can also be a 
good partner of the 
government ICMI is possible 
to take this latter position. 
44 13112/1991 Syamsul Hadi Media Indonesia ICMI dan Posisi Sosial The ICMI's present is S.H. Ala tiS 
(Study Club Acti\·ist) IU!um Cendekiawan phenomenal. This C'ln be seen S. Kartodirdjo 
' (ICM!and The Social from continuous controversies Oxford Dictionary -, 
Position of surrounding it From the point 
Intellectuals) of view of the pro it said that 
ICMI is needed as a 
communication forum for 
Muslim intellectual to share 
constructive ideas which can be 
contributed both to the 
government and society. On the 
other hand, the skeptical pobt 
of view argued that ICMI's 
csbblislunent has been a 
government tactic to get 
political suppon and legitimacy 
from Muslim intcUectuals. 
Every stand point has its O\\n 
rationales. 'Vhich one is more 
reliable depends on how far 
. 
--
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JCMI is able to maintain its 
intellectual capacity and 
integrity vis a vis the political 
structure. IF ICMI is able to 
' 
maintain its independence or at 
least interdependence ,,;th the 
government, its present can be 
justified. If it is dependent on 
the gO\'cmment. however. 
ICMI has lost its raison ditre 
as association of intellectuals 
Nhich has to be based on three 
principles: the freedom. truth 
and autonomy. 
45 13112/1991 Dep_ny J.A. Media Indonesia Antara ICMI dan One year after its No refercnc.es 
(Study Club Activist) Kcltur Modem establishmen~ 10.11 has been 
(ICMI and Modem big in name but stilllinle in 
Culture) reality. The challenge of an 
org:misation which uses the 
Islamic symbol is to IWTow 
down the gap between the ideal 
text (of the Holy Koran) and 
real context of the Muslim life. 
Islam as a textual doctrine (in 
Koran) is quite compauole \\ith 
the modem life signified by the 
appreciation of rational 
principles. productivity. 
democr.tcy and h\UtWI rights. 
I Islam as contextual experience 
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of Muslim communities, 
however, is a far cry from the 
ideal type. As association of 
Muslim intellectuals, ICMI is 
challenged to bring Indonesian 
Muslim communities to be able 
coupling with !he demand of 
modem life. 
46 13/12/1991 Mochur Nairn Pelil:l Du:disme Pendidik:m di The dualism of education No references 
(Lec!Urer a! Andalas Indonesia: Sebuah system in Indonesia between 
University) Sumbangan Pemikiran religious education and general 
unmk ICMI education system has put 
(The Dualism of religious education in an 
Education in Indonesia: inferior position. Bright 
the Contribution of students tend to choose secular 
Though! to ICMI) education system and the rest 
will fmally choose religious 
education. As a result, students 
who study religion have been 
mostly a mediocre student. and 
students in secular education 
system got no sufficient 
religious teachings. To come to 
term with such a weakness, 
ICMI Ius to take an initiati\'e to 
unite education system under a 
single umbrella. 
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47 17112/1991 DennyJ.A. Pelita Menunggu l.:lngkah ICMI has enough capital to be a No references 
(Study Club Activist) Besar ICMI big organisation. It is supported 
(Waiting for lCMI's by the state (bureaucracy), a 
Big Step) business community, scientific 
community, politician and 
NGO activists and e\o·en the 
masses (lite ummal). Thus, 
lCMI combine within i~ the 
power of the state, rhe political 
community and civil society as 
well. The ICMJ's dilemma 
seems to be manifested in the 
Habibie~s position. On the one 
hand, Habibie as a strong man 
is needed to unite various 
streams and personalities in 
ICMI. On the other hand, 
Habibie's position as a 
powerful bureaucrat makes him 
almost impossible to be 
criticised, which means that it 
is also difficult for ICMI to 
criticise the bureaucracy. 
Although almost impossible to 
wait for ICMI's political 
breaklhrough, lCMI nuy play 
significant role in scientific and 
human resource development. 
If!CMI has a big step in this 
projec~ the ICMI's significance 
is more than enough. 
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48 6/111992 Musni Umar Bisnis Indonesia Mampukah ICMI In the second year since its No references 
(Entrepreneur) Dorong Ekonomi establishment, ICMI decided to 
KeraJcyatan? give a more serious attention on 
(Is ICMI Able to the people's economics. This 
Promote People's conunitment has been aroused 
Economy) by Muslim intellectua:.S' con 
cern to the economic 
pcrfonnance of Indonesia 
which bas been dominated by a 
small group of conglomerate. 
According to the author, ICMI 
can at least play at three levels: 
fust, the ICMI"s members both 
in bureaucracy and business 
sector can offer job 
opportunities for small·scale 
businesses and beginners. 
' 
I Second. ICMI can set up 
concepts for developing of 
entrepreneursoip and people's 
ecooomics. Third. ICMI 
through its lobby in the 
bureaucmcy is expected to 
influence the policy making on i 
the job market and capital 
access. 
49 101111992 M. Qasim Mathar Pelita ICMI-Ummat: The relation bel\\-een IOU and Sydo<y Jones 
(Lecturer at lAIN Jembatan Emas atau •ummat' is not simple, not to (source is not 
Ujung Pandang) Perang Baru say conflicting. The ummat is mentioned) 
never unified. It is fractured. 
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lCMl-Ummar. the Some segments of ummat may 
Golden Bridge or the accept the present ofiCMI as 
NewWnr) their representation and others 
else might not Thus, the 
present ofiCMI C<J.D either 
become the golden bridge or 
lhe ""'w war among the ummat. 
To ovoid the Iotter, ICMI 
should prove its self not to be 
exclusive and serve the whole 
ummat regardless of their 
streams and positiom. 
50 1115/1992 Andi Suwirtl Petito Islam. .. Snouckisme .. ~ term Snouckism refers to a Snouck Hurgronje 
(Lecrurer nt !KIP don Cendekinwnn well· known Dutch orientalist, (source is 
Bnnduog) Muslim Snouclc. Hurgronje, who has a mentioned) 
(Islam. 'Snouckism •, wide understanding of Islam for Ali Syari'ati 
I and Muslim the sake of colonial interesL Arnold Toynbee 
Intellectu.:lls) Snouckism is then attJ.ched to a (sources arc not 
' person who has a strong secular mentioned) I 
scientific mastery but is cynical 
towards religious ideas and 
symbol. This kind of people bas 
no moral (Ommitment to the 
fate of ummat. What they 
concern is just maintaining 
their own status quo. The 
Muslim intellectu.:ll is supposed 
to be free from the element of 
the Snouckisrn. 
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51 19/5/1992 Toto \Vidyarsono Pelita Kebangkitan lntelektual In historical perspective, there No references 
(NGO Aeth;st) hlam has been a mutual influence 
(The Resurgence of between the Islamic intellectual 
Muslim Intellectuals) reform and educational reform. 
The Islamic reform at the eve 
of the twentieth century bad led 
to the reform in Islamic ! 
educational systems. On the 
other hand, the reform in the 
latter had a great significant 
' impact on the reform in Islamic 
I 
intellectual movements. If the 
former Islamic refonners 
engaged in cducatk 1 ~ctor 
due to the lack of< . ,'\ ~1131 
access and resbicti• · · .. 
Muslims by the colonial 
government, today Muslim 
reformers are supposed to 
promote equal opportunities for 
the whole people to get a good 
and proper quality of education. 
52 3/811992 H.H. Ahmad Jaiz Pelita Prof.Dr. FM. Rasjidi: Prof. Rasjidi is an all H. Soebagio IN 
(Journalist) Intelektu>.. yang encompassing Indonesian 
Bersuara .. Ber.mi": Muslim intellectual. He is not 
(Prof. Dr. HM. Rasjidi: just a master in religious studies 
An Intellectual who but also in secular sciences. He 
Speaks out) is a real representative of the 
I '"ulama..cendekiav.,.a.n". -~ 
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53 12/1011992 Binhadi Pelita Peranan ICMI dalam In facing the ern of deregulation No references 
& (Director ofFirunce, Era Deregulasi dan and globalisation in a 
I 
13110/1992 the Bank of indonesia) Globalisasi fon:seeable future, there are 
(The Role oflCMl in sevc:rnl aspects tklt have to be 
the Era of Deregulation developed and relevant to the 
and Globalisation) role of!CMI. These aspects 
comprise the empowerment of 
peopJe•s p.:~.rticipation in 
economic development. the 
macro policy tlut can cre.:~.te 
conducive business activities, 
the professionalism and 
transparency, and the law and 
ethical enforcemenL As an 
associ:1tion of inte!lectuals, 
lCMI can play significant roles 
in preparing society lo deal 
with the above challenges, as a 
motivator, mediator and 
chancellor. 
54 5112/1992 Soetjipto SuaraKarya Silaturahmi lCMl The ICMI annual meeting is No references 
Wirosardjono (The Friendship called 'silaturahmi ', means 
(ICMI Activist) Courtesy of!CMI) stttngthening of friendship, 
which indicates peaceful and 
mutual respect. Through the 
ICMI's annual meeting this 
year, ICMI will hopefully be 
able to produce its platform and 
code of conduct which reflects 
the spirit of 'silaturahmi '. 
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55 7/1211992 Denny J.A. Media Indonesia Dialog ICMI dengan After two years since its No references 
(Study Club Activist) Pusat Kekuasaan: esl:!blishment ICMI hos been 
Rc:nungan Dua Tahun the most powerful civilian 
ICMI, 7 Desember faction in the: Indonesian polity. 
1992 This fact hos raised happiness 
(ICMI's Dialogue wiUt for its proponents and fear for 
the Centre of Power: its opponents. The opponent of 
Reflections on the ICMI argued Utot (I) ICMI hos 
Second Anniversary of prioritisc:d its harmonious 
ICMI, 7 December relationship wiUt Ute 
1992) government raUter thon playing 
a critical ngent of the power; 
(2) ICMI hos been more 
interested in the struggle fon 
economic and political 
resources rather than trying to 
develop political foundation for 
democracy; (3) ICMI hos used 
Islamic label just for political 
commodity to facilitate the \\ill 
to powerofits members; (4) In 
cose ICMI runs along Ute 
Islamic principle, it tends to 
use sectarian interpretations of 
Islam. On Ute oUter bond, tl1e 
proponent of!CMI argued Utot 
(I) Ute ICMI's rapprochement 
with the power centre should be 
viewed in a wider context. The 
Muslim community has long 
been in confrontation \\ith the 
-----
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State with a painful 
marginalisation in the economic 
and political life; (2) If!CMI is 
assumed as paying to much I 
attention on economic and 
political resources, this has 10 
be understood in a particuJar 
reality that the Muslim has long 
been the Ill3jority in number but 
minority in economic and 
political power; (3) IfiCMI is 
I accused ns m:mipulating 
Islamic symbols, what kind of 
parameter is used. This i.~ 
especially in considering that 
Islam is multi·interpretable; (4) 
IfiCMI is imprinted as having 
no attention on democmtic 
promotions,lCMI is able to 
point out its various agendas on 
human rights, democracy, 
cmironment and clean 
go\·emance. Both positions 
have to be seen as 
complementary. The critique 
can be used by ICMI as a mean 
for self·reflcction. 
56 6/111994 Franz Magni~Suseno Kompas ICMI, PlKI, dan Lain- Should different religion Suh>rto 
(Churchman) lain I necessarily mean different 
(lCMl, PlKI, and so on) specific political options? 
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If the answer is yes, where is 
then the place of the National 
unity, and what is the mea..11.ing 
ofPancasila as the sole basis of 
politics. lsn 't it true that the 
contribution of intellectuals 
should be based on their I 
capacity as people of ideas not 
on their group affiliation? Isn't 
it true that if the stlte is based 
on Pancasila means that every 
person has equal rights in 
politics regardless of whatever 
his/her religion? Based on his 
' 
capacity, religious intellectuals 
are supposed to help their own 
religious community how to 
interpret their religiosity in a 
plurnl society and in changing 
environment. Instead of calling 
for exclushis~ religious 
intellectuals are expected to be 
mediators ofint~r·religious and 
inter ..cultural dialogues. I 
57 271111994 AdiSasono Republika IC:.t! dan Politik Aliran ICMI is a representation of the No references 
(Chairman, Board of (ICMI and "Ai·:~n'" new lndon~sian 'ccndekiawan'. 
Director ofCIDES) Politics) that is the ccndekiaw:m who 
b:.s a stroiib r:ligiuus 
! I 
committnenl This a new 
I movement has been accuso..-d 
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by its critique a:~ reviving 
":llirnn' politics or sectarianism 
which in its alliance with the 
government will finally lead to 
authorita.-ian politics. In fact, 
the Indonesian polity in early 
1990, has been signified by the 
growing· openness of political 
discourses, naticnaJ 
cor:ur.ibnent to hum::m rights 
promotion., freedom of the 
press, sustainable developmeat, 
th'! improvement oflabor 
welfare, the protection of small . 
scale bwinesses, and so forth. 
Thus, the thesis that ICMI's 
p.'Uticipation in politics \\ill 
empoY.-er authoritarianism is 
not valid. Such an accusation, 
instead of helping a productive 
dialogue for a mutual 
understanding, it has forced 
ICMI into a comer of isolation. 
58 1411211994 Yudi Latif Republika Fondasi Kultural One cfthe issues of the fourth Van Peursen 
& (Researcher at LIP!) Pengemb:mgan Jptek: annual meeting ofJCMI is Ems Cassircr 
15/1211994 Catalan Menjelang discussing the cultural strategy W. \V. Lowrnnce 
Silakaas ICMI of science and technology Y. Suriasum:mtri 
(Cultural Foundations development According to the 
of Science and author, this topic has a double• 
Technology bind implication. First, science 
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Development: Notes for And technology are supposed I 
' the ICMI Annual :o be grouoded in the cullur.ll I Meeting) context of Indonesia. Second, 
Indonesia is supposed to 
intemalise specific cultures 
which are compabble with the 
development of science and 
technology. 
59 14112/1994 Kuntowijoyo Republika Kesado!ran Nasioll31, Sl, Comparing the characteristic of No references 
(Lectwer at Gadjah dan!CMI Sl and ICM!the author argued 
Mada University) (The National that there bas been parallelisrr. 
Comciousness, SI, nnd and differences. During the SI 
ICMI) period, people bas to choose 
eithe:- as SI members or 
bureaucrats. In the period of 
lCMI, people o:on choose both 
as ICMI members and 
bureaucrats. SI emerged in the 
period of nationalism and 
industrialisation, while ICMI 
' exists in the period of post-
nationalism and liberalisation. 
There has always been such a 
gap between the elite's 
perception and the mass. In the 
period ofnatiomlism. SI's elite 
perceived SI :'l a political and 
econ;)mic movement in a 
fmmev:.,rk of the ideology of 
nationalism, while the Sl's 
-
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1113SSCS perceived Sl as a social 
and cultural movement in a 
framework of the mY.)hology of 
millenarianism. In the period of 
post-nationalism. lCMI's elite 
may perceive econonic 
liberalism as an idea, while the 
masses will be thinking 
ideologically as a threat to 
equaf redistribution. So, 
nothing to be hesitated for 
somebody to claim himJ}1er self 
as an intellectual. AO...'llitting as 
a mass man, while in fact 
bc:Jongs to the elite is as . 
dangerous as elitism. 
60 5/111995 Nasir Tamara Republika ICMI, Sejarah dan Borrov.ing a Habibi's phrase, Fernand Braude! 
(JCMJ Activist) Pcradaban thr. q,uthor stated that ICMI is a (sowce is not 
(ICMI, History and long march project of mentioned) 
Civilisation) Indonesian Muslims to achieve 
a high degree of civilisation. 
Tnus ICMI is not fused itself to 
short term targets, but a iong-
term strategic transformation. 
Thus, to p~at in Bt:~.udelian tenn, 
ICMI has to read in •longue 
duree of historical analysis. 
-~ 
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3111/!995 Afru41.\1alay Rept'lika Faktor lCMl Menjelang Although the emergence of No references \· 61 (NGO Activist) Pergeseran Politik various interest groups has been 
(The ICMI Factor in cl:limed as non-political 
Approaching Political movements, they cannot a\'Oid 
Change) themselves from political 
temptation. The ICMI 
establishment, for instance, has 
not simply been designed to 
unite Muslim intellectuals, but 
must be seen in the context of 
the political accomrn~dation of 
the New Order govemrnenL 
This slr.ltegy has been applied 
in tenns of political correctness 
I to s:op marginalizing the 
' Muslim political interest on the 
hand. as well as to use Muslim 
Intellectual supports for the 
I political legitimacy on the other 
hand. Thus, the political 
accommodation might not the 
ultimate goal of!CMI, but the 
ICMI project to bring Islam 
from periphery to centre of the 
power has UDa\'Oidable political 
consequences which can be 
abn:~d by the government to 
mai11tlin the stltus quo. 
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62 1712/1995 Abdul Munir Mulkhan Kompas Visi Intelektual dan Muslims belie\'e that the Koran No references 
(Lecturer in lAIN Kemanusiaan AI- contains the absolute and 
Sunan Kalijaga) Qur'an universal truth, which can he 
(The Intellectual Vision used in interpreting social and 
and Humanism of the natural phenomenon. In fact, 
Koran) only few Muslims have tried to 
extract and elaborate the 
Koranic social and L.iJtoric.al 
signs/predictions for bener 
anticipating "'>Cio-historical 
problems of the contemporary 
life. Thus, lots of Muslims have 
neglected teleological 
intellectual visions and 
1-...:~manism of the Koran. 
63 1311011995 Amich Alhumami Media Indonesia Refleksi Lima Tahun ICMI lw been continuously in Harry J. Benda 
(NGO Activist) ICMI controversies since its 1 (source is not 
(Reflections on the establislunent. For its mentioned) 
Fifth Yoar ofl':Ml) proponents, ICMI has ~n 
perceivod as a symbol of the 
Islamic resurgence~ white for its 
opponents JCMJ has been 
depicted as a showcase of the 
spirit of sectarianism and 
primordialism. The ICMI's 
present has often been put as a 
turning point for MmJims to 
enter into a- new political stage. 
This is probably an over 
expectation since the 
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I 
integration of Muslim into the 
I 
political structure seems to be a 
temporary political tactic rather 
th:ln a reriiUnent 
accommodation. Thus, 
Mwlims (intellectuals) are 
supposed to develop a 
functional-integrative pattern of 
relationship. In this a new 
pattern, Islam will inherently 
play a determinant role in the 
work of the state. In this 
regard, ICMI should 
consolidate its social basis in 
order to empower its ba.rgaining 
position before the state. 
64 14/10/1995 Laode Ida Medii! Indonesia. Menguji Eksistensi dan Officially ICMI is not a Roben W. Hefner 
(Social Observer) Agenda Politik ICMI political mo\·ement, but in 
(Examining the reality ICMI has a real political 
Existen:-: and Politica.l ba.rgaining position. The 
Agenda ofiCMI) ICMI's gro"ing political 
influence is due to: (I) the 
positi\'e response from the 
state; (2) the Habibie factor as 
powerful burea.ucrat and 
scientist; (3) the growing 
tendency of intellectualising the 
Indonesian polity. These all 
ad\'3Iltages, however, are 
supposed not to lead ICMI into 
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I 
a conservative political force, 
which is only supplying a 
political legitimacy for Lle 
political establishment. 
65 22/1111995 M. Rusli Ka ;m Media Indonesia Menelusuri Perjalanan Officially, ICMI has just rcen No references 
(l.e<:turer a· 'KIP Panjang ICMI e<Ublished 5 years ago. But a 
Yogyakaru) (Tracing Back the Long precursor to its establishment 
Adventure of!CMI) can be traced back to ten ) .:ars 
ago or even since the beglnning 
of the New Order. There are 
seveml "push factors" leading 
to the esublishment of!CMI. 
First. international factors, as 
an integral p:in of the emerging 
issue of the Islamic reswgence. 
in the beginning of 1980>. 
including (a) the improvement 
of Muslims' social and cultural 
infrastructures such as 
education, (b) the economic 
improvement following the oil 
boom, (c) the Iranian 
revolution. Second. the 
domestic push factors, 
including: (a) the Muslim 
political deprivation 
(dislocation) during the New 
Order which in tum lead to the 
demand of new alternative 
channels for their political 
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articulation; (b) the growing 
number of middle-class 
educated Muslims who need 
channels for their \'ertical 
mobilisation, (c) the dominant 
of other groups in resources 
allocation; (d) th~ improvement 
of Muslim infr.t·structure as a 
result of the development; (e) 
I The internal Muslim 
polarisatio~ which lead to the 
dream of unifying Muslim 
potentials; (f) the rise of an 
inclusivistic·pluralistic 
theology among urban educated 
Muslims; (g) population 
explosion and urbanisation 
which moves the centre of 
gravity from countryside to 
metropolitan cities; (b) the 
government suppor".s. 
66 23/1111995 Deni Almanda Merdekll ICMI, Bagaimana As a culrural movement, ICMI No references 
(ICMI Activist) dengan Wong Cilik? is supposed to bring benefit for 
(ICMI, Hew ore the the whole people. Therefore, 
Poor?) ICMI should be developed 
through peaceful and tolerant 
languages. In addition, ICMI 
should be low profile, 
performing intensive 
communication \\ith other 
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elements of society by 
conducting programs which 
invulvc especially the poor, 
NGOs, tradition:1list Muslims, 
military people and so forth. 
JCMI has also to restrain its 
der·endence to the government 
to escape from political 
conservatism. ICMI can 
maintain its good relationship 
with the bureaucracy, while 
remains able to maintain its 
criticism. -
67 2411111995 Mohammad Shoelhi Bisnis Indonesia Kerisauan terhadap The development oflCMI No references 
(CJDES Activist) ICMI di Tengah nukes happy for some people 
Persaingan Elit Politik and nn:dety for the other. The 
(Anxiety Towards jealousy towards JCMJ 
JCMI in the Midst of resulted from people's tendency 
Competition Among to exaggernte ICMI's present. 
the Political Elite) while in fact JCMI itself has 
been just an ordinary 
organisation. The an:dety 
towards ICMI has also been 
pushed by the imagination of 
the conflict of interest. In fact. 
ICMI, as 'lilY other 
organisations, has of course a 
p:uticular commitment. So why 
has then ICMI to be worried 
just because it pu: ••M .. Ietter 
. 
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(Muslim) in the label. Why 
should people allergy with the 
Islamic symbol? 
68 29/1111995 M. Dawam Rahardjo Republika ICMI, Masyarakat There have been three R. W.Hefner 
& (ICMI Activist) Madan~ dan Masa perspectives on the 
30/1111995 Dcpan Politik Indonesia estoblishment of!CMI. First, 
(ICMI, Civil Society, ICMI is depicted as symbol ~f 
and the Future of the deepening Islamisation of 
Indonesian Politics) bureaurracy. Second., in 
contrary, ICMI is perceived as 
symbol of the bureaucratisation 
oflslam. Third. ICMI is 
portrayed as representation of 
the revival of the Muslim 
middle-class as a part of civil 
society. In favor to the third 
perspective, the author argued 
that the ftrSt two perspectives 
have ignored ICMI as a real 
actor that has its own 
perspective. According to him, 
the emergence of!CMI cannot 
be isolated from a Muslim 
historical trajectory and the 
present of other previous 
institutions such as LSAF, 
Paramadina, FKPI, Campus 
Mosques, and ""santri .. 
technocrats in bureaucracy in 
which have such desires to fuse 
·-
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Islamic factions, to renew the 
understanding of!slam, to 
participate in the development 
process, and to improve human 
resources. ICMI is the meeting 
point of these all ambitions. 
ICMI is oriented to empower 
civil society in the· decision 
-
making process. 
69 211211995 !pong S. Azhar Media Indonesia Dinamik:l ICMI The ICMI"s present cannot be Adam Schwarz 
(Lecturer at USU) (The ICMI Dynamic) detached from the glubal 
phenomenon of Islamic 
revivalism since the end of 
1970s. It is also a blessing in 
disguise from the state decision 
to install Pancasita as the sole I 
principle of the political and I social organisation. which bas 
transformed Muslims 
orientation from ideological 
battles to culturill actions. In 
addition, ICMI has also been a 
consequent of the inertia of 
Islamic political parties during 
the New Order, which has lead 
Muslim activist to fmd other 
alternative channels for their 
political articulations. ICMI is 
one of them. Because from the 
beginning ICMI has chosen its 
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position as a tutehuy 
organisation rnther than mass 
organisation, it is no wonder if 
JCMI has often been portrayed 
as exclusive. Having decided 
its socialloeation, JCMl is 
supposed to be more 
independen~ in order to 
empo\'w"Cr its constituent vis a 
vis the govemmenL 
70 4/12/1995 Fachry Ali Republika 1CM1, Politik, dan Since the colonial period, the No references 
(Political Observer) Negara Indonesian state has been an 
(1CM1, Politics and the external oriented state which 
State) sought its political legitimacy 
from external sources. In the 
end of 1980s, fol!O\\ing the 
devastttion of the Conununist 
bloc, the intem:ltional source of 
politicallegitim:lcy has been 
transformed from ideological 
considerations to contemporary 
issues of democt:J.cy, human 
rights and environments. In this 
junction. the New Order regime 
has suddenly lost its foothold in 
intemational community. To 
make a compensation it tried to . 
empower its political 
legitimacy from domestic 
sources. The tide of the 
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unprecedented Middle-class 
educated Muslims seems to 
inspire tl1e regime to counter· 
balance its intefl13tional sources 
oflegitimocy by domestic 
powerful sources of legitimacy 
by accommodating educated 
Muslims into the political 
structure. Thus ICMI's 
incorporation into the political 
structure can be interpreted as 
signifying the compatlbi!ity of 
the mode:n state of Indonesia 
with a massive modem 
dome:;tic constituent of the 
Muslim conununity. 
71 511211995 Manuel Kaisiepo Kompas ICMI, ontaro Politik ICMI is the only Islamic No references 
(Journalist) Akomodosi don Godoan organisation which from the 
Berpolitik beginning of its birth hos been 
(ICMI, Between the raisin~ J>Oliticol polemics. ICMI 
Politics of has bctn criticised as 
Accommodation and reemerging the old pattern of 
Political Temptation) primordial political affiliation 
I 
('aliran' politics). There is a 
tendency to ignore another 
fundamental point that the 
present of!CMI signifies the 
I 
end of protracted tension · 
between the state and Islam. I The tension that has made I 
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i 
Muslims margin:~Jised from the l 
political structure. The 
rapprochement bel\vec:n Islam 
and the state has been initiated 
since the end of 1970 by 
several young Muslim 
intellectuals as pioneers of the 
renewal of Islamic 
understanding and seems to 
ac:ticve its peak momentum in 
the establishment of!CMI. The 
question is: how should ICMI 
lead this momentum to? IF 
ICMI is able to maintain its 
objective as a cultur.ll 
movement :r.truggling for Ute 
impro\'eJTU~:nt of human quality: 
the ICMI's pi<Sent will be 
meaningful. In contr.lry, if 
ICMI is trapped in the political 
maneuvering. it will betray its 
commitrr..:nt as association of 
intellecttm.Js. 
72 SIIV1995 Kuntowijoyo Republika ICMI, Mobilitas Sosial, There have been at least three No references 
& (Lecturer at Gadjah · ;.\an Dcmocratisa.si opinions on ICMI: (I) ICMI as 
6/IV1995 Mada University) (ICiv.!, Social Mobility expectation; (2) ICMI as 
and Der • .uc:acy) doubtful; (3) ICMI as threat. 
The second and third opinion 
~\c emerged from people who 
pcrcci\·ed ICMI as a political 
~-
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I 
Movement which is full with 
pclitical interests. According to 
the author, such perceptions are 
accepted. But more than 
everything. ICMI is a social 
I and cultural movement which 
orientc:d to long term 
achievements. ICMI is not only 
concerned with democracy in 
polity, but also in economy, 
social, culture, and religion. ' 
Perceiving ICMI is simply a 
political movement is over 
i 
simplification. The partnership 
of!CMI with tho bureaucracy 
and Military is honest 
partnmhip, not simply 
political. Whether or not it is 
co--optation. Muslim 
intellectuals are not supposed to 
leave this opponunity, if they 
don't want to repeat the mistake 
of the past. Mwlims have lost 
their first opportunity of 
ascending social class through 
military eanier after the 
Japanese occupation. due to the 
great tremor of political 
trivialities. They arc not 
supposed to lene it now. 
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73 7112/1995 Mansyur AI Farisi Media Indonesia ICMI dan Perubahan The elite configuration in ICMI Clifford Gcertz 
(Lecturer at Satyagama Oricnwi Politik Islam is nor homogenous. There are Robert 'V. Hefner 
University) (ICMI and the at least three factions. First, Adam Schwarz 
Changing Orientation group of technocrats and 
of PoHt1cal I::!am) bureaucrats who place rcligbn 
as su!u~rrlination to the state. 
Second, is group of nco-
modernists who desire to 
promote ICMI as medium for 
Islamic studies as well as a 
channel for social and 
economic reform rather than 
political interests. Thir~ group 
of modernists who have a 
certain agenda to make IOvU as 
basis for Muslim political 
aspir.ltion. According to him, 
the fact that the first and second 
faction arc more dominant than 
the third made ICMI looks 
more as a cultur.ll movement 
than a political on:. 
74 711211995 Santi WE Soekanto The Jakarta Post ICMI l!egins Second Faith. science and technology 
(Journalist) Congress might not be the only things on 
which the ICMI second 
congress \Vould bave to focus 
I· 
its attention. There were a host 
of power holders and alleged 
I lack of independence, to rifts bemrccn members, so-called 
·' 
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elitist programs, and 
~ccusations that ICMI was a 
m:rc political tool for certain 
I 
interests groups. These all 
should be answered in the 
congress. 
75 7/IVI995 Abd. Rohim Gha-.:ali Suara Karya ICMI d.1!i Kegelisahan Some critiques bne a:sumed No references 
(Secretar;• General KaumMuda ICMI as incompatible with the 
IMM, NGO Activist) (ICMl and the process of de:nocrntisation for 
Restlc!. :iness of the its accommodation to the 
Young) govenunent. Such vaews have 
ignored that IC"I'il i:Selfis not 
I 
-
homogenous. There have been 
internal mutual checks and 
balances. Bureaucrats of!CMI 
have often hcen criticised by 
other mcmb:rs of it. If the 
youth has criticised ICMI fo~ 
its conservatism, this has 
actually been directed to one 
segment of!CMI. But this is a 
warning for ICMI to change its 
behavior in favor to the spirit of 
the youth as an intellectual to-
be; a.n6 also in parallel with the 
main char:lcteristic of the 
intellectual as tolerant and 
open-minded. 
-
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76 7112/1995 Agh<Wahid Kompa.s ICM!dan Th. '-MI'j politieal dimension No references 
I 
(Researcher at LSAF) Pemberday:tan has exhausted our attention on 
Ekonomi Umat other its achievements. ICMI is 
(ICMI , . i the in fact bas a well-plan and 
empowennent of the concrete action in social and ! 
Umat's Economy) economic sectors. One of its 
pilot-project is providing I 
' 
alternative financial systems for 
I the poor, such as the syari 'ah I 
I (non-interest) bank system (B~IT). the people's credit 
bank (BPR), and the people's 
house ofnon..collatcmllending 
I system BMT J. These financial schemes, especially the latter, ! 
have attracted the poor to join 
the project. To give example, 
0 B1t1T has now nlfne than SOO 
outlets. This indicates the 
! 
seriousness effort ofiCMI to 
empower the people's 
economy. 
77 7/12/1995 M. Rusli Karim Republika Memantapbn ICMI bas been criticised by its No references 
(Ph.D student at UKM) Eksistensi ICMI opponents a.s symbol of 
(Consolidating the disintegration. And then 
Existence of!CMI) discourses on intellectu:lls ha\'c 
tended to put Muslim 
: intellectuals into a comer. ICMI 
has been accused as sectarian 
i I for its struggle to improve 
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the quality of life of the 
majority of Indonesian. ICMI in 
fact has h«!l emerged as a 
m:mifestation of the resurgence 
of the Muslim middle-class 
having ambitions lo empower 
the potential of the ummal. 
Therefore, the ICMJ•s present 
is by no means the threat as its 
main objective is not a political 
exclusion but rather a cultural 
et;1powerment 
78 711211995 Fachry t,F Rcpublika JCMI: Sang Ba}i dan ICMI is a modem organisation No references 
(Politi.c • ubserver) Masyarakat Indonesia supported by Muslim educated 
(ICMI: The Ba~ and people who do not share a 
the Indonesia: 'Ciety) common !.ymbol with the gr.lSS 
root people. Its prime 
con:;tituents derive from those 
who are present :md able to 
participate in industrial society. 
Having Jack of suppon from the 
grass root level. the baby of 
ICMl still needs alternative 
protections to suppon its 
I survival. 
79 8112/1995 Rofiqul Umam Media Indonesia ICMI,. NU, dan By lllking "the lstiqlal Festival" No references 
(NU Youth Activist) Persa=.ngan as a metaphor-where most of 
Representasi Muslim the cultur.tl anifacts derive 
I lndonesiil from the work of traditionalist 
--
148 
Appendi:cB 
No. I Date Author Media Title Main Points Main Reference: 
(ICMI, NU, and the Muslims but the festival itself 
Competition of the was organizo:d by modernist 
Indonesian Muslim Muslims-~'·e author perceived 
Representation) that while tl :majority of 
Muslims be'ongs to the NV 
(traditionali' t) member, the 
modernist Mus lim has achieved 
much more significant role in 
politics. This is more obvious 
after the present oflCMI. In 
order to enlarge i!!. po!itical 
roles, NU h.ld actually tried to 
get closed to the go\'emment by 
declaring the credo .. to return to 
the khittah (nature) ofNU 
1926. But by the establishment 
ofiCMI supponed by huge 
Muslim sch•Jlars, the NU 
scenario ha!· been paralysed. To 
counter balance ICMlas 
Muslim representation, Gus 
Dur tried to get dosed to other 
groups by establishing "Forum 
Democracy" and an ''inter· 
religious dialogue .. and made 
alliance with the natioiUiisL 
Having realised that ICMI h.ls 
tended to be neglecting the 
pluralism, ICMI's incorpot::!tion 
into the government has given 
I an alarm of threat to 1\'U and 
- -- ·-
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other groups. Thus, as ICMI 
and the moJt'rnist Muslim is 
getting closc:r and closer to the 
government, NU tried to 
consolidate the opposition. To 
calm down the competition of 
the Muslim political 
representation between ICMI 
I (the r.:odemist) \\ith NU (the 
traditionalist) needs mutual 
understanding and self-
reflection. 
80 8/1211995 Laode Ida Media Indonesia Perlukah ICMl ke According to the author, ICMI No references 
(Social Observor) Tingkat Bawah is not necessary to extend its 
(Is it Necessary for recruitment until the grass rot 
ICMI to Operate in the level. First, ICMI has to I 
Grass Root Level?) maintain its operation in the 
I elite level to produce strategic 
thinking. Second, by operating 
in the grass root level, ICMl 
creates a new institution which 
might lead to intefll31 tensions 
among Muslim communities. 
Third, :here have been stable 
Muslim organiS3tions in the 
grass root level. The present of 
lCMJ will overlap the existing 
institutions. What lCMI has to 
do is helping the others to be 
I I more functional. 
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81 8/12'1995 AslamNur Republika ,-_~ndekia\r.m ~!uslim Certain values are usually No references 
(Lecrurer at lAIN Ar- (1hc Muslim rep~:.ented by a cenain figure. 
Raniry) lntellecrual) lfiCMI has to be exemplified 
by a person. the most 
appropriate one is the Prophet 
Joseph. First, Joseph is a great 
master of knowledge 
symbolised t.y his power of 
prophecy. Second, his 
invoh•ement in the intenul 
power structure. Third, his 
perfonnance is impreSj:i\•e. 
ICMI has to follow his way, 
entering the power structure 
without losing its ability to 
promote political reform and 
respect from other gr1.1ups. 
82 9/1211995 FachryAii Republika Sisi Sosial Budaya There has been a new socio- No references 
(Political Observer) Muktamar dan Nernca cultural cultunl phenomenon 
Kekuatan Individual emerged from the second 
untuk Sekretuis Umum congress ofiCMI. If social I ICMI st,tus in the tr.J.ditionalist 
(The Socio-Culrurnl Muslim community is 
Dimension ofiCMI determined by the degree of 
Congress and the religious knowledge and 
Individual Bal:lnce of sanctity, in the ICMI 
Power of the Secretary community this has been 
Genernl Candidates of determined by the power 
ICMI) position. Among the urban 
middle class Muslims, 
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the respect seems to have 
moved from religiously erudite 
1 indiviJu.Jls to secular power 
i:olders 
83 11/12/!995 Fachiy Ali Media, Indonesia Menengok Prospck The reappoin:ment ofHabibie No references 
(Political Observer} Perl:embongon ICMI as the o'toirmon ofiCMI, and 
TornfKedua the :o-"'lllnJnent of Adi Sasono 
(Looking at the as tn~ :;ecrctary general seems 
Development Prospect to be an id~ai couple. Habibie 
of ICMI in the Second a.c; a prestigic'aS bureaucrat can 
Te:,n) maintain ICMI's pr~ent in the 
elitist ~:!la, whilt: Adi Sasono 
a:; an NGO activist can attach 
ICMI into populist (gross root) 
polit:~l issues. The chaHenge 
for Sasono is how to prepare 
the third and tt-~ fourth Ioyer of 
ICMI. 
84 12/12/1995 Haryoso The lokom Post Many Question The appointment of Adi Sasono No references 
(loumolist) Bureaucrats • Grip on as the secretary general of 
ICMI ICMI has been perceived by 
some obse:vers as migh[ 
loosening Hobibi's grip on it. 
As Nt>T<holi!<b Modjid said, "It 
ts now more of a collecti\·e 
leadership." IfiCMI continues 
to rely on tt~ bu:eaucrats, it 
will lose its character as an 
organisation o!"intell~tuals. 
--
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85 13/1211995 Baharuddin Lopa Republika ICMI Perlu Berakar ICMI needs supports from the No references 
(Secretary General of (ICMI Needs to be masses. An organisation which 
KomnasHAM) Down to Grass Root) has a strong gross root support 
will be everlasting. In this 
regard, ICMI needs to be down 
to earth by carrying -Jut 
programs which will help the 
poor· improving their quality of 
life. 
86 1311211995 M. Dawam Rahardjo Republika Tiga Dilema ICMI From the beginning of its William Liddle 
(ICMI Activist) (Three Dilemmas of est:blishrnent up to the 1995, (source is not 
ICMI) ICMI has never free from mentioned) 
critiques. Despite most of those 
critiques ha\'e no empirical 
judgments, they also have been 
contradictions each other, 
which fonn at least three 
dilemmas of!CMI. First, is 
JCMI supposed to actively 
engage in politics or avoiding 
politics? Second, is ICMI 
supposed to be an elitist or 
mass organisation? Third, is I ICMI supposed to be closed or 
far from the bureau..:racy? I 
Aller oil, ICMI, from the 
beginning, is not designed to be 
political organisation. It also 
has no certain political 
.. 
programs. 
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I 
Notwithstanding the fact, ICMI 
cannot escape from political 
image and implication. First, 
lots ofiCMI members belong 
to member of certain political 
organisations, as a personal 
matter. Secon~ ICMI itself is 
' 
rngaging in political 
discourses, not as a low politics 
(practical politics), but as a 
high politics to come to term 
with the issue of human rights, 
peoptc•s economics, rule of 
Jaw, environment. civil society 
and so forth. Third, IC."''I might 
be accused as politically 
practicing. for its engagement 
in resources aUocation. In this 
case ICMI clearly put itself as 
partner of the government. This 
is merely due to its 
rcspomibility as an 
organisation of intellectuals. 
One of the most salient 
cha.racteristics of the third word 
intellectual is his/her 
involvement in the political 
process. 
I 
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87 1511211995 DennyJ.A Kompas Berharap kepada ICMI is expected to put the S. Huntington 
(Study Club Activist) ICMI project of .. lndonesia•s (source is not 
(The Expectation to transition to democr.:~cy .. as its mentioned) 
ICMI) main agenda. A transition to 
democr.~cy needs not only some 
preconditions but also 
leadership. Based on 
Huntington•s study there have 
been three ways toward 
democratic society. First is the 
transformation way, where 
movements toward democracy 
is Jed by reformers from inside 
the government. Second i3 the 
replacement way, where the 
' process is led by the opposition. 
Third j.q, the transplacement 
w the process is led 
by "U\ .-::~n..lon be: tween the 
government and opposition. 
From 35 cases of transition to 
democracy, 16 cases have been 
running along the 
transformation way and II 
cases by transplacement way. 
' 
As ICMI has its cadre both in ! 
the bureaucracy and NGOs, 
ICMI can play significant role 
in leading Indonesia•s tr.msition 
to democracy via both trans for· 
mation and transplacement. 
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I 
88 15/12/1995 Fahri Hamzoh Republika ICMI dan Mah:lsiswa ICMI is not well-accepted by No references 
(Muslim Student (ICMI and the Student) lots of Muslim student activists 
Activist) in L:ampus due to the Islamic 
reluctance of ifo; members. 
Different from mainstrenm 
• HMiactivists (dominant until 
tl:e end of 1970s), Muslim 
sn1dent activists of campus in 
1990s tend to be more 
lslamised. If HMI has 
emphasised political activities, 
the latter emphasised religious 
piety. For these latter nctivists, 
101.1•s performance is not 
weli-Islamised. Some of 
ICMI's leading acthists tended 
to be reluctant to perform 
Islamic charocters.lfiCMI 
wants to be well-accepted by 
them, it has to be more 
corrunitted to Islam. 11ris is by 
no means a threat to other 
groups. To be a good Muslim is 
by no means to be anti non-
Muslims. On the contrary,. 
Islam is a supposed to be 
blessing for the entire human 
being. 
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89 19/1211995 Elza Peldi Taber Media Indonesia Bagaimana ICMI The main problem ofiCMI is William Liddle 
(Paramadina Acth;st) dibaca Pasca Muktamar how to maintain its critical Fachry Ali 
(HowislCMI articulation without losing its (Sources are not 
Supposed to Read After ability to accommodate the mentioned) 
the Congress) government interest. ICMI 
needs to answer this problem 
not only by apologetic 
statements but also by concrete 
actions. In this regard. ICMI is 
supposed not to be allergy v.ith 
the critique. Moreover, ICMI 
has to be more tolerant to 
different critical perceptions. If 
no~ ICMI v.;n be lefl by the 
spirit of a new era of the 
openness. 
90 30/1/1996 Anw.lr Harjono Republika Meneropong ICMI By the emergence ofiCMI No references 
(Chairman ofDDI) 1995-2000 some negative inug~ of Islam 
(Foreseeing ICMI such as extremity. terrorism. 
1995-2000) and nurginality have been 
disappear. ICMI is a meeting of 
interests between the 
government and the Muslim 
community. The challenge of 
ICMI in a foreseeable future is 
how to be more serious giving 
attention to the welfare of 
society. Adi Sasono is 
expected to be able to lead 
ICMI dealing mth this agenda. 
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91 19nil996 Moeflich Hasbullah Media Indonesia ICMI dan Pemilu ICMI has been in a dilenuna. John Naisbitt & 
(Lecturer at lAIN (ICMI and the Election} On the one hand, It has to P. Aburdene 
Sunan Gunung Djati) m:lintain its accommodation DanielS. Lev 
· with the government-in order Kuntowijoyo 
to end the Muslim painful 
remembrance of being 
·· marginalised from the political 
, power. On the other hand, by 
doing so it might against the 
tide of the democr.Itic 
3Spiration of the public. To 
co~ to term with this 
dilemm:1, ICMI ha.s to convince 
the public tha.t wha.t they do in 
t.ieir ·:ongagement in the 
bweaucracy is par.IIIel with the 
demand of reformation. 
92 4/1211996 Arsalam Media· Indonesia ICMidan ICMI can be categorised, in Antonio Gramsci 
(HMI Activist) Pemberdayaan Gramscian term, as .. organic S. Huntington 
Ekonomi Kerakyatan: intellecnlill'', that is the S. Martin Lipset 
Sebuah Catatan untuk intellectual who is actively (sources are not 
Silaknas ICMI engage in politics to achieve mentioned) 
(ICMI nnd the and enlarge the power. To 
Empowerment of the enh:mce its power influence, 
I PerJple's Eccmomy: ICMI is not supposed to be just 
N.Jtes for the ICMI's a partner of the government bllt I 
/i.nnual Meeting) also a partner of the people. 
Therefore, the argument tlut 
ICMI has to maintain its elitist 
pcrforn1:1nce is not right. 
' 
~ -- -------- ---- J 
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ICMI has to get closed with tJJe 
gi:l5S root people by paying i 
. 
serious attention to peopJe·s 
economy. In this ase, ICMI is 
supposed to be a mediator and 
' 
catalyst between the policy 
advocating and the 
I 
cmpowennent of people's 
economic perfonnance. 
93 5/12/1996 lmron Rosyidi and Media Indonesia lCMl di Tengah Model ICMI"s characteristic is No references 
I Marzuki Wahid Gerakan !siam di obviously different from oLlJ.er 
(Alumnus lind Student Indonesia prc\'ious Muslim organisations, 
of lAIN) (lCMI Among the such as NU, Muhammadiyah, 
Model of Islamic Persis and so on. If the pre\·ious 
Movements in organisations were esublished 
Indonesia) based on the need for religious 
' consen·ation, revitalisation and , 
purification, ICMI was 
esmblished bz.sed on pragmatic 
interest of Muslim community, 
that is how is Muslim supposed 
to deal with the challenge of 
.:cienc~ and technology, and 
technocracy. Different 
otjective means different 
J, implications. If the structure 
of previous organisations ~ 
L_ been dominated by ulama (religiou~ erudite people), ICMI hr1 combined both ulama and 
··---
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modem scholars where the 
fanner is subordinated to the 
latter. Funhennore, if the 
' mainstream discourses of 
previous organisations have 
been closely linked to the 
empowerment of religious 
teaching and understanding. 
ICMI has been overwhelmed 
by cli:cout:'iCS on human 
resource and technology 
development. The pragmatic 
-
tendency of ICMI has make it 
got closed with the government 
agt:ndas. It is no \\'ond:r:ing if I ICMI is. often perceived as 
engaging in practical politics. 
94 ~11~11996 Vktor I. Tanja Republika ICMI dan Politik At<an ICMI ha! br.en depicted by its Unders Ullin 
(Ckrgyman) (ICMI and The 'AI iran' opponents as leading to ':1liran 
Politics) politics' or sectarianism which 
has raised counter-groups such 
as 'Forum Demokrasi', YKPK, 
PNI Barn and on son. 
Accordins to the author, the 
people integration into a certain 
'alirar: is not always negative. 
It is in fact unavoitmble as a 
' reflrction of religious pluralism 
in Indonesia. Since C\'ery 
religion has its unique truth, as 
--
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! 
such might lead to a unique 
religious groupings. In case of 
ICMI, it puts the word 
• 
'Muslim" not 'Islam' in its 
labeL This means that the 
emphasis is not on Islamic 
fanaticism but rather on its 
commitment 10 improve the 
quality of Indonesian 
Muslims-which will ha'w'e a 
positive consequences for the i 
Nation as a whole. If there is 
such a tendency of politicising 
religion, this has to be 
• 
interpreted as an abuse by 
persoru>IICMI members not as 
an original objective of!Cl\11. 
Speaking about abuses might 
r.ot be jcst occurred in ICMI, 
but Jlso be done by personal 
members of other groups 
unexceptionally ''Forum 
Demokrasi'". '\'){_PK and so on. 
95 51211997 Abd. Rohim Ghazali Kompas Ketika Intelel-tua1isme Islamic Studenl .A.ssociation No references 
HM!Meredup (HMI) has ever bad a 
(When the HMI's significant contrib~tion to the 
InteUectua1ism is Fade in!el1ectual ~isce;arses in 
Away) Indonesia. People such as 
De liar Noer, Nurcholish Madjid 
and Dawam Rahardjo are the 
-----' 
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The Jiving examples of that 
contribution. In the last 20 
years, however, the intellectual 
tr.ldition of HI\! I has been fade 
away due to a couple reasons: 
internal and external factor. 
Firs~ the system of cadre 
upgrading in Hl\11 has not been 
anticipative to the challenge of 
contemporary era. Instead of 
forward looking. Hl.U h.:ls 
tended to be a prisoner of the 
great history of the pasL Nr'(t, 
the HMI orientatior. i:; m:...<t 
more pragmatic politics rather 
than intellectualism. Second, 
this bas been a consequence of 
the grand strategy of the New 
Order corpor~tive state to co--
opt •be whole youth 
Ort: ·-~-;ations under the state 
C(lntrol. 
96 1/3/1997 Prayudi Bisnis Indonesia IC!\11 & Arus The resignation of Amien Rais Alan K. Schreiber 
(Social and Politicai Perpolitikan Sistem from the head ofiCMI's board 
Observer) Korporatis ofExpens may support the 
(ICMI and the argument that the establishment 
Corporative System of ofiCMI is a part of the logic of 
Political Stream) the corporath·e state, when the 
state desires to accorrurodate 
e\·ery potential groups of 
--
162 
Ill 
_, Ill llllil 
-
, . 
. ···. 
-
.. B!l ,._ '· s • 
AppcndixB 
No. Date Author Media Title Main Points Main References 
the society. In this context. 
ICMI is perceived as the 
effective medium of the state 
acconunodation to the power of 
the umat. This accommodation 
is carried out to empO\\'Cr the 
political legitimacy of the state 
and the smoothness of the 
development programs. If 
ICMI wants not to be 
undergoing such a political 
decay, it must empower its 
independence and bargaining 
power before the state and 
govenrrncnt. 
97 4/3/1997 I pong S. Azhar Media Indonesia Fenomena Pak A mien The resignation of Amien Rais No references 
(Lecturer at USU) dan Keberadaan ICMI from the head of the ICMI's 
(The Pak Amien board of ••pert (24/2/1997) 
Phenomenon and the might bring a negative image to 
Existence of!CMI) ICMI. This signifies that ICMI 
is more responsive to the 
govenunent"s interests rather 
th.:ln to the public interests. As 
association of intellectuals 
ICMI is supposed to be 
reorienting its position to 
anticipate the dynamic of the 
future Indoncsi:m politics. 
- ~ --~ 
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98 4/311997 Alunad Bahar Media Indone'iia Potrct Cendekiawan The resignation of Amien Rais No references 
(Editor of Book Muslim from the ICMI's board of 
Publisher) (The portrait of Muslim expen indicates his self as the 
lnlelleciUals) real intellectual. The real 
intellectual is supposed to be 
independent, responsible and 
authentic (the unuy of talk and 
action). This also indicates the 
departure ofiCMI from its 
original mission as a cultural 
and intellectual movement 
99 6/311997 Sutrisno Suara Karya ICMI Telah Berpolitik? The resignation of Amien Rais David After 
(Postgraduate Sll!denl ICMI has Engaged in from the ICMI's board of (source is not 
i a lUI) Politics? expert, has been said by some mentioned) 
observers as an indication that 
ICMI has engaged in politics. I 
The term politics here is 
connoted to the allocation of 
the power position. This is an 
over simplification of the 
original meaning of politics. It 
derives from the wordpolistaia 
I (polis), which means the entity 
of society that is able to 
I manage itself. Thus. politics is 
basically the effort to manao;e a 
I collective life. In this sense, I 
ICMI is of course has engaged 
in politics. 
' 
I 
-
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100 121311997 Sudirrnan Teba Media Indonesia DilematCMI ICMI as a strategic group has No references 
(Religious Observer) (The ICMI Dilemma) dilemma. On the one hand, as 
an association of intellectuals it 
is expected not to keep silent in 
facing maiprnctice of the 
political power. On the other 
hand, members ofiCMI inside 
the bureaucrncy are demanded 
to maintain the govenunent's 
interests. To come to term with 
this dilemma,ICMI has to 
return to its origin.:tl pl:!.tform. 
that is struggling to empower 
the Muslim communi:y Lhrough 
human resources de\'eiopment, 
instead of dealing with the 
political affair. The Amien Rais 
ca5e is a good Jesson for ICMI 
to reconsider its original 
mission. 
tot 4/6/1997 Soetjipto \Virosardjono Republika \Vejangan Pelindung Suhano's ga\·e an ad\•ice to the No references 
(ICMI Activist) ICMI heod ofboord ofodvisors of 
(Advice of the Patron of ICMI, thot ICMJ ond other 
ICMI) Indonesian intellectuals are 
supposed to be self-
introspective try to examine 
their own behavior and 
integrity. According to the 
outhor, os no body perfec~ the 
call on self reflection is not 
' 
--
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only directed to ICMI 
members. but also to its 
opponents. And this is not that 
easy. 
102 14/8/1997 Salim Said Media Indonesia Hartono. ICMI. Habibic The failure of ICMlto put its No refcren.:es 
(P~Iitica1 Observer) best cadres in MPR in 
conjunction with the 
appointment of General 
Hartono as a Minister of 
Information and his decision to 
join JCMJ indicates that 
Habibie has no longer 
significant role in political 
recruitment By promoting 
Hartono. Soeharto seems to 
rn.ake a political structural 
readjustment by reducing the 
ICMI factor in politics. The 
General Hanono's planning to 
join ICMI has made pro and 
contra opinion. Those who can 
accept him argued that the 
intellectualism is not 
determined by formal 
qualification, but rather by a 
person conunitment to the fate 
of human being. And Hartono 
. 
can meets the requiremc:nt. On 
!he contrary those who refuse 
him argued that by accept him. 
-
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ICMI might become a Trojan 
horse of a certain group, and 
then lost its ideal position as a 
meeting point of various 
religious streams and groups. 
!03 16/17/1997 Novel Ali Republika Habibie, Hartono, dan Having accepted Hartono as a No references 
(1...-cturer at Undip) ICM1 new member JCMI is chaUcnge 
(Habibie, Hartono, and to be more independent in order 
1CMI) to ref me its image in society 
that 1CM1 has been just the tool 
of the government. Ideally, 
ICMI is not supposed to be the 
tool of the govemmen~ but also 
not 10 be the opposition of the 
government. 
IIJ.I 13/3/1999 Sukidi Kompas Panggilan Jihad The tennjihad in contempomry Ziauddin Sardar 
(Member~f lnteleki\L1l mainstream intellectual 
Muhanunadiyab (The Call for the discourses has been commonly 
Student Association) Intellectuai"Jihad") perceived in tcnns of physical 
mobilisation (war). Such a 
superficial understanding of the 
tenn might ha\·e negative 
impacts on both inter~religious 
understanding, and the future of 
human being. Based on this 
consideration, jihad should be 
reinterpreted more genuinely 
which reflects more benign and 
tolerant spirit. Sardar Ius 
------
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fonnulated a new interpretation 
! 
of jihad as an "intellectual 
jihad'". oriented to rn:1intain 
values of the truth. justice, and 
goodness. 
lOS 19nl1999 M. Dawam Rahardjo Republika · Cain Inn dari Rakomas \Vhen the committee of No references (ICMI Activist) lCMI di Bandung Rakomas met Habibie, he 
(Noles from ICMI's asked ICMI not criticised the 
Coordination Meeting weakness of other groups, and 
in Bandung) not to discuss the presidential 
candidature or releasing a 
statement of sup paning him. In 
reality. ilO\\-ever, m1ny 
panicipanb. of the meeting ask 
the coauninee to discuss a 
concrete problem of the Nation 
that is the presidential 
candidature. According to 
them, in the age of reformation 
!nlking about practical politics 
in no longer a taboo. There is 
no legislation forbids an 
organisation such as ICMI to 
engage in politics. On the 
contrary, the participation in 
politics is now needed in terms 
ofrn:1intaining the democr.atic 
environment There are three 
roles lb.11 any NGO such as 
ICMI can participate in !his 
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process. First, as a 
countervailing power, 
especially to the government. 
Second, as a partner of the 
government. Thir~ as an 
intennediary institu!ion. The 
j, :..'tird role seems to be 
dominated ICMI's position. In 
once moment of the history, 
this position is necessarily 
taken in ordC"!" to motivate 
umat :S participation in 
development and modernisation 
,_ 
and as '"·ell as to reduce their 
rebellious mentality. This 
mentality may revive again in 
the future if groups of Anti-
Islam (lslamo-phobia) win the 
election. In this regard the 
meeting urges Islamic parties to 
unite under the Islamic faction 
(in DI'RIMPR) and supports 
Habibie to be the next 
president. 
106 Jln/1999 Masykuri Abdillah Kompas lntelektual Muslim dan Indonesian Muslim No references 
' (Lecturer at lAIN Ide Demokrasi intellectuals, as their 
Jakarta) (Muslim Intellectuals rounterparts in any other 
and the Democratic Muslim countries, argued Llmt 
Ideas. Islam is not only a system of 
theology but also a global way 
_L__ 
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of life including ethics and 
moral guidance for human 
society and nations. Different 
from Muslim intellectu:J.ls of 
other parts of the Muslim 
world, however, where lots of 
intellectuills are still arguing the 
relevance of democracy to their 
society, all Indonesian Muslim 
intellectuals accept this system 
and even support democracy as 
• good system that has to be 
practiced in Mwlim society. 
According to them. demo:racy 
is compatible with Islamic 
values. Second. democratic 
system is an appropriate v.'ily to 
articulate Muslim aspirntions. 
The Muslim belongs to the 
majority of Indonesian people, 
while democracy works under 
the principle of the majority 
rule. 
107 511VI999 Afon Gofar Republik:! ICMI Adoloh Jembobn Many observers assumed that No references 
(Lecturer at Godjoh E1113S the foil ofHobibie (from ll:; 
Modo University) (ICMI is o Golden president) meons the foil of 
Bridge) ICMI. 11tis assumption is 
misleading due to the 
misinfontl3tion which has been 
systel113tically designed by 
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groups and media of anti· 
political Islam in general and 
ICMI in particular. It is 
misleading because JCMI has 
never had a certain ""'i;tical 
mission. ICI historical project is 
to improve the qualily of 
human resources. This does not 
necessarily mean that ICMI is 
apolitical. The politics ofiCMI 
as an organisation is a high 
politics in terms of policy 
reform and mediarion, such a 
) 
' 
golden bridge wluch link 
various elements of the Muslim 
communicy. The strategic 
posicion ofiCM:I as a mediator 
was obvious in its contribution 
to the fonnation of the so.-called 
.. Poros Tengah", and' 
supponing some Muslim 
leading figures su:h as Amien 
Rais and even AbdlUT:lhman 
\Vahid to achie\'e top political 
positions. \Ve don't also forget 
to thr fact that some prominent 
ICMI cadres such as Bambang 
Sudibyo, Hasballah M Saad, 
Yahya Muhaimin, M. Tolchah 
Hasan, and Basri Hasanuddin, 
are now appointed as ministers 
--
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in Gus Dur cabinet. Thus, the 
challenge of!CMI is how to 
sustain its achievement by 
preparing bright cadres for the 
future leadership. 
108 6/12/1999 H. Nasir Tamara Republika ICMI Tanpa Patron Although ICMI has lost its No references 
(ICMI Activist) (ICMI v.ithout Patron) powerful political patron 
(Habibie as president), ICMI 
annual meeting in Jakarta. ( 4-
5/12/1999) has been 
enthusiasti~lly follow~d by its 
members. This indicates its 
maturity and independence. 
ICMI v.ill remain survive, 
active and dynamic. To 
empower its position ICMI is 
supposed to be seriously 
conunitted to its origirutl 
mission as a cultural movement 
oriented to empower the 
Muslim quality of life. The 
focus of attention has to be 
I given to education sector and mass communication. Two sectors that are strategic in term 
,, 
of Muslim's empowerment in 
I the future. ICMI is not supposed to be converted into 
i political party. It is a personal 
' 
matter of!CMI member. 
! 
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Appccdix C 
Socio-Graphic Backgrounds and Rcligio-Political Perceptions 
of the Surveyed ICMI Members 
(Date of Survey: 02 Scptcmbcr-31 December 19~a) 
N=21U 
lA \ge 
. 
··"'"--··· Age Number 
·-·-
< 20 years 0 
-··-· 20-30 years 24 
31-40 :,ears 75 
-~-----41-50 years 58 
~ 
>50 years 53 
2 Place of Birth 
Place of Birth Number 
Village 70 
Outskirts of city 34 
Small Citv 51 
Big City 42 
-
-
Others 13 
3.Sex 
I ~~mber 
__ ] 
4 Eth . B k d me acKgroi'D 
Ethnic Grollj)_ Number 
Javanese 65 
Sun danese 38 
Sumatra ethnic group 33 
Sulawesi ethnic group 16 
Kalimantan ethnic group 10 
Others 48 
5o r ecupa JOn . 
Occupation Number 
Lecturer/Researcher 52 
Public Servant/MilitarY 87 
Private Sector/Entrepreneur 68 
Others 3 l 
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6 Income 
Scale of Income (per month) Number 
<Rp 500,000 56 
Rp 500,000- Rp 1,000,000 79 
Rp 1,000,000- Rp 1,500,000 30 
Rp 1,500,000- Rp 2,000,000 II 
Rp 2,000,000- Rp 2,500,000 9 
Rp > Rp 2,500,000 25 
7 "'d . c ucatlona IB k ac(groun d 
Educational Attainment Number 
Secondary School 9 
Diploma (non-degree) program 26 
. -
Undergraduate (degree) program 102 
Masters 57 
PhD 13 
--Others 3 
8 F ld fs d IC 0 tuJy 
Field of Study Number 
Social Science and Humauitics 128 
.. 
Economic/Management 43 
. 
-Natural Science and Engineering 36 
Others 3 
··--·-
9 s . 0 
. octo- rgantzatJOna EXj!Cncncc 
Name of Organization Number 
HMI 52 
·-PJI 7 
JMM/Muhammadiyah 20 
PMIYJPNUINU 13 
-
Mosque Youth(Dakwah) 20 
Others . 17 
Have no islamic org. background 81 
10 R r . Affir . fP eltglOUS 1 tatton o arcnts 
Religious Affiliation Number 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 70 
Muhammadiyah 54 
Persis 7 
-· Others II 
Have r.o affiliation 68 
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II R 0 0 AffiJ' 0 o ehgwus 1 muon o fR d espon ents 
Religious Affiliation Number 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 34 
Muhammadiyah <i6 
Persis 5 
Others 16 
Have no affiliation 89 
l2oPosition in ICMI I Position 
Board 
Member 
13 R fl J 0 0 ICMI easons or ommg 
Reasons Number 
ICMI as vehicle for Islamic struggle 47 
ICMI as vehicle for unifying the w11mat 61 
ICMI as vehicle for developing 55 
professionalism 
Because of emotional and environmental 17 I factors 
Others 20 I 
14TI B fi f1 ° 0 ICMI 1e ene 1ts o ommg_ 
Benefit Number 
Broadening insishts and <."~Eerience 66 
Strengthening the commitment towards 19 
the ummat 
Findin~ a space for self actualisation 50 
Becomin~ proud ofbein~ a Muslim 14 
The bendlt is not much 38 
Others 23 
IS ICMI benefits for the Ummat 
Benefit Number 
A unifying factor and articulutor of 77 
~ap1ic aspiration _ 
Stren~thening Muslims' political position 53 
Eliminating negative images of Islam 32 
wit:1in the milieu of bureaucracy 
Giving real contributions to improving 37 
social welfare and human resource 
development 
Others 11 
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